|
Constitution & political system
- Constitution - adopted 11 November 1975; revised 7 January 1978, 11 August 1980, 6 March 1991, and 26 August 1992.
- Legislative branch - Unicameral National Assembly with 220 seats
- Legal system - based on Portuguese civil law system and customary law; recently modified to accommodate political pluralism and increased use of free markets.
- Elections - last held 29-30 September 1992.
Overview
A single party system operated from independence in 1975, and restrictions on parties other than the ruling MPLA were lifted only in 1991. Legislative elections and the first round of presidential elections followed in 1992. Before the second round of presidential elections could take place Jonas Savimbi withdrew his Unita movement from the process and war resumed. An uneasy peace was established by the Lusaka Accords of 1994, but a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was created only in April 1997. At the end of August 1997 the MPLA decided to exclude Unita from the GURN over its failure to comply fully with the terms of the Lusaka Accords. Unita’s 70 parliamentarians were then excluded from the National Assembly. Subsequently a small part of the Unita leadership in Luanda declared that it was deposing Savimbi from the party presidency. The MPLA government then declared that it would negotiate with this “Renovated Unita”, a step that gained some backing from the OAU, despite misgivings at the UN.
The fall of Mobutu in Zaire and Pascal Lissouba in Congo-Brazzaville signalled the removal of two of Savimbi’s staunchest regional backers and emboldened Luanda to lift the formal ban on Unita, which it now recognized as the official opposition. Attempts were also made to revive the GURN, and a number of Unita members were appointed to governorships and cabinet positions. Unita’s failure to respect its undertakings in terms of the Lusaka peace accords led to a gradual resumption of hostilities by the end of 1998.
Despite this a number of non-aligned Unita members have returned to their seats in the Assembly, essentially as independents. Renovated Unita has also begun to assert a measure of independence from its MPLA sponsors, who have grown disillusioned with the scant results of this gambit.
In an effort to strengthen its legitimacy, abroad if not among the Angolan population, the MPLA government has announced that fresh elections will be held in 2001. It is generally agreed, however, that such an exercise will be impossible until 2003 at the earliest, given the collapse of physical and administrative infrastructure, and the lack of any control over the larger part of the national territory.
Political groupings and alliances
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) was established in 1956, led from 1962 by Agostinho Neto, and received support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. In the 1992 parliamentary elections it secured 54% of the vote and took 129 seats.
The principal opposition, União Nacional de Independencia Total de Angola (Unita), took 34% of the votes and until its expulsion from the National Assembly held 70 seats. Unita-Renovado has now taken over the constitutional position previously occupied by Unita.
The remaining 21 seats in the Assembly are shared between 10 other parties.
Governance
In formal terms, government authority remains highly centralized, in part a legacy of the Portuguese colonial system, but accentuated by the centralizing tendencies of the MPLA during its Marxist period. The President remains the most powerful figure in government, and it is he who generally chairs the council of state, not the prime minister, whom he may appoint or dismiss as he pleases. In the latest cabinet reshuffles no prime minister was appointed, President dos Santos preferring to retain those powers for himself.
Provincial and local structures were embryonic even before independence, and have been largely dislocated by decades of war. Most of the country is under no effective administrative control, and since the beginning of the latest round of fighting there has been little permanent or effective administration beyond the outskirts of the major urban centres.
The record of the MPLA government has been a poor one. President dos Santos has been unable to form a ministerial team capable of addressing or perhaps even understanding the depths of Angola's structural economic problems. Some of this has to do with the president’s own political style, which is to guide and direct by way of suggestion raher than command. This approach allows him to fix the blame for failed policies upon his subordinates, thus deflecting additional criticism away from the presidency. In consequence policy drifts and oscillates in what can at best be labelled crisis management. In any event, any attempt to explain Angolan economic policy has to take account of a reality in which the principal concern of the ruling elite is the furtherance of their own material and political interests, at whatever cost to the population at large. There are indications, however, that a number of the wealthy elite realize the difficulty of enjoying the fruits of their gains, however ill-gotten, unless there is some relaxation of state control over their movements. Some are therefore now inclined to support a moderate change in the rigidly authoritarian structures that currently exist, so long as this does not threaten their ability to retain, rather than augment, their already considerable fortunes.
There is also growing pressure from the international community for the government to take seriously its responsibilities to assist in the alleviation of the plight of the overwhelming majority of the population, whose condition deteriorates continuously. This, the availability of revenues from higher oil prices and the reduction of expenditure on heavy military equipment, inappropriate for counter-insurgency operations, will also have an effect on the organization and orientation of government activities, however modest.
Foreign policy
The principal foreign policy interest of the Luanda government after the 1992 elections was centred on maintaining international condemnation of Savimbi and Unita, severing his external lifeline and securing support for a position refusing negotiation. Relations with countries seen to be continuing or conniving at support for Unita are strained, and Angola and its allies refused to attend last year’s OAU summit in Lomé because of Togo’s position in this regard. Mozambique’s failure to support Luanda’s boycott call has led to a cooling of relations between the two countries, exacerbated by Maputo’s acceptance of the South African view that regional conflicts such as those in Angola and the DRCongo must be settled ultimately by negotiations.
Despite well-founded doubts about the intentions of the Unita leadership, and misgivings about the administrative probity of the government, following the Lusaka agreements of 1994 foreign investors had returned to Angola in increasing numbers, particularly to the lucrative oil and diamond sectors. The diamond sector is very important in the field of foreign relations, and a few well-placed Israeli-Russian interests have managed to inveigle their way into the new monopolistic sales arrangements centred on the president’s daughter, Isabel. Israeli companies have also made their appearance in the oil sector, and the related provision of security services and military training. Angola is to open an embassy in Israel in the next few months.
Construction may eventually offer rich rewards, especially if the government helps break the stranglehold currently exercised by Portuguese and Brazilian concerns. Portugal and Brazil enjoy a natural advantage in Angola, in that they are Lusophone, and few Angolans (in contrast with Mozambique, which is surrounded by nominally Anglophone neighbours), speak English. Portugal, in particular is well placed to provide the service skills in such short supply in the Angolan economy. This is especially true in the field of legal services, partly because of the language issue, but also because of the underlying similarity of much of the legal code.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Angolan government's formal renunciation of Marxism-Leninism have not really affected the close, though sometimes equivocal relations between Russia and Angola. (Cuba’s links with Angola have always been warmer, more fraternal and culturally more in tune and co-operation continues in what is for both countries a historical alliance with its own dynamic, quite removed from the old Soviet connection.) There were some difficulties over the matter of debt owed to Moscow, but arms sales continue now that credit lines have been opened based on the granting of oil, diamond, hardwood and fishery concessions. There is considerable annoyance in ruling circles about the role played by Russia and other East European states in the rearming of Unita, but it has been made clear to Luanda that the interests involved in this illegal trade are beyond government control. Russia is now better positioned than ever to exploit the natural wealth of Angola, and will also be able to cash in on internationally funded reconstruction projects.
Relations with the USA, historically strained in consequence of Washington's long support for Unita, were repaired by formal recognition of the Luanda government in 1993. This was a great relief to US oil interests, which have long held a major stake in the Angolan industry. To some extent this brings them into competition with French companies, and this has occasionally blown up into open rivalry between Washington and Paris for influence in Luanda. In particular, following Elf's major oil strike in Block 17, Luanda was able to pressure Paris to constrain the activities of Gaullist groups supporting Jonas Savimbi. Occasionally French oil and US interests combine in consortia to explore the difficult, but rich, deepwater oilfields off Angola. Revelations about Angolan corruption emerged in French court hearings into Elf-Acquitaine’s activities, and the US has been quick to exploit the resulting rift. It also seems that the US and France vied with each other to supply the satellite intelligence that contributed so significantly to Luanda’s recent military success.
Since 1994, South Africa has also become a major trading partner, with a number of entrepreneurs and major companies also seeking to make inroads into the Angolan economy, against the expectation that its recovery could be dramatic and its rehabilitation provide rich pickings. All this will depend on a satisfactory end to hostilities, however. In the meantime, relations between the authorities in Luanda and Pretoria remain cool, with a great deal of mutual distrust. President Mbeki is under no illusions about the probity of the Angolan presidency and its allies, and is also convinced that a negotiated peace is the only way forward, even if this excludes Savimbi’s participation.
Of immediate concern is the serious deterioration in relations between Angola and Zambia, following the realization that members of the Zambian political and business elite were involved in the supply of equipment and other goods to Unita. Savimbi’s forces in the Mexico province appear to have retired intact into Zambian territory following the successful government offensive against Cazombo. This may presage a return to the days of launching attacks on Angola from border regions under the tenuous control of the Zambian capital. It may also be that Unita seeks to draw Angolan forces into hot-pursuit operations that may bring a measure of international criticism. A further consequence could be that Lusaka would be convinced that only by strengthening Unita could it ward off Angolan raids. Though a formal war with Zambia seems unlikely, there is little doubt that we will see further clashes along the Angola-Zambia border, with all the accompanying refugee activity.
External political risk factors
Non-belligerent intervention
Commercial competition between outside powers tends to enjoy the backing of their respective state structures, given the size of the profits anticipated from any eventual economic rehabilitation. Political ties are of the essence, and need to take account of the inability of the major internal players to understand the concept “conflict of interest”. This is a predatory economy, in which for the players the ends justify the means.
Discriminating acts
The most pervasive forms of discrimination will centre on language and culture. Angola’s business world is almost exclusively Lusophone, and foreigners will also find themselves gravely disadvantaged in any legal battle, to the extent that most goes to virtually any lengths to avoid such a confrontation. On the cultural side the Luanda elite prides itself on its sophistication, despite the parlous condition of the capital.
War or warlike conflicts
Over the past two years Angola has been drawn into conflicts in neighbouring territories: to help Kabila to power in the DRC, to assist Denis Sassou-Nguesso to seize power in Congo-Brazzaville and, currently, to help defend Kabila’s regime against a rebellion partly inspired by Rwanda and Uganda. How long Luanda can sustain these efforts is a moot point, given the security situation within its own borders.
Social structures
Any attempt to secure political, economic and social reconstruction will have to take account of the profound distrust between the followers of MPLA and Unita. This distrust will not vanish overnight because it is rooted not only in the experience of civil war but also in different ethnic and racial origins, and cultural preferences, the result of centuries of differentiated exposure to Portuguese influence. While Unita’s power base is among the Ovimbundu people, that of MPLA is among the Mbundu, while its leadership has a strong element of urban-based mestiços. It is worth noting that Savimbi's rhetoric when addressing rural audiences in the vernacular is quite different from the persuasive and moderate tone he uses on the Western media: his appeal to his followers is unashamedly racist, in particular reviling the “non-Angolan” origins of many government leaders, including the President, whom he refers to as a São Toméan. He is also at pains to remind the government in Luanda that just because he is a black man from the south, this does not mean that he is stupid.
History of the conflict
Optimists hoped that the emergence of democratic movements in Eastern Europe, the threatening collapse of the Soviet bloc, and South Africa's willingness to let go its hold over Namibia might bring peace to Angola. South African and Cuban troops withdrew between 1989 and 1991, and in May 1991 Unita and the Angolan government signed the Bicesse peace accords.
Provision was made for the holding of multiparty elections, which took place in September 1992. Initially matters appeared to be going well, but when the MPLA emerged with a clear parliamentary majority and Dos Santos, having failed by the slimmest of margins to secure an outright win in the first round of voting, seemed set to retain the presidency, Unita claimed that this could be the result only of widespread fraud, and remobilized its forces. Fighting now resumed on an intensified scale and although Unita was driven from the capital, by the middle of 1993 it had succeeded in seizing control of almost three-quarters of the country. The government now reorganized its army and gradually succeeded in regaining the upper hand, with the assistance of substantial mercenary reinforcements and advisors. The UN brokered a series of talks in Lusaka between the two sides, and after a year of negotiation, new accords were signed in November 1994 providing for the demobilization of the rival armies and the resumption of peaceful political activity. In February 1995 the UN Security council approved the deployment of Unavem III, a monitoring force some 7 000 strong to supervise the disarmament and encampment of the rival armies prior to their incorporation in a unified army.
Unavem III's deployment was slow, and its mandate a limited one. This and other UN shortcomings enabled Unita to protest that its failure to stick to the timetable for the disarmament and quartering of its combatants was no fault of its own. Similarly, when Unita troops began to desert the UN-monitored encampments in ever-increasing numbers, the blame was placed at Unavem's door. Meanwhile it was made abundantly clear by the Unita leadership that it had signed the Lusaka agreement only because of its recent military setbacks, which it saw as the result of mercenary intervention. Already there was talk of the need to renegotiate parts of the protocol. At the close of its congress in Bailundo in February 1995, Unita gave an early indication of its tactics: it gave only an alarmingly qualified approval to the Lusaka accord, saying that it preferred under current circumstances to take its place in parliament as an opposition party. This effectively rejected the idea of participation in government, despite the allocation of posts in the Lusaka agreement and the undertaking on the part of Unita to respect scrupulously the government's programme -- this after months of detailed negotiations around these exact issues.
There was continued concern about the use of belligerent language by the military chiefs on both sides, and reports of widespread cease-fire violations, which Unavem was too weak to investigate with any thoroughness.
By January 1996 agreement appeared to have been reached about the integration of forces into a new Angolan army. Doubts remained however, about Unita's commitment to the process. Many of the fighters it encamped were either under-aged or very old, and little effective weaponry was handed in. There were increasing fears that Savimbi had decided to insure himself and his supporters against a repeat of the 1992 disaster by removing his best trained and equipped troops out of the view of Unavem, some to protect the alluvial diamond fields upon which Unita depended for its capacity to continue operations, others beyond the country's borders as a force in being.
In his conclusion to the Unita conference at the beginning of 1996, Savimbi emphasized the need to begin political discussions with the government before the completion of the disarmament process. He expressed the view that the mandate of the present parliament, elected in 1992, expired on November 1996, and that it should then be replaced by a transitional government of national unity, which would be responsible for running new elections in one or two years time. Once again, this amounted to a call for a substantial revision of the Lusaka Accord of November 1994, under which Unita was to receive a minority of posts in an MPLA-directed government.
This established a pattern of relative consistency in the behaviour of the mercurial Savimbi, who continued to make the minimum concessions necessary to avert a UN withdrawal or sanctions, while procrastinating as far as he dared the integration of his military and political arm in the Luanda-dominated system. A Government of National Unity and Reconciliation was to have been formed by July 1996, then in November 1996, and finally in late January 1997. Until the first months of 1997 Savimbi managed to delay the process, either by demanding the reallocation of posts, or by insisting upon a say in policymaking, or by requiring a clarification of the special status to be enjoyed by himself as leader of Unita.
At the end of August 1997 the MPLA decided to exclude Unita from the GURN over its failure to comply fully with the terms of the Lusaka Accords. Unita’s 70 parliamentarians were then excluded from the National Assembly. Subsequently a small part of the Unita leadership in Luanda declared that it was deposing Savimbi from the party presidency. The MPLA government then declared that it would negotiate with this “Renovated Unita”, a step that gained some backing from the OAU, despite misgivings at the UN.
The fall of Mobutu in Zaire and Pascal Lissouba in Congo-Brazzaville signalled the removal of two of Savimbi’s staunchest regional backers and emboldened Luanda to lift the formal ban on Unita, which it now recognized as the official opposition. Attempts were also made to revive the GURN, and a number of Unita members were appointed to governorships and cabinet positions. Unita’s failure to respect its undertakings in terms of the Lusaka peace accords led to a gradual resumption of hostilities by the end of 1998.
In December 1998 full-scale hostilities recommenced across much of the country, and as the fighting intensified, Unita appeared to hold the initiative. Two government offensives against the Central Plateau redoubts of Unita were beaten off with heavy loss, but a third succeeded in taking the strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo, following an extensive programme of rearmament. This operation apparently destroyed much of Unita’s conventional military capacity, and was followed by an attempt to destroy Unita’s remaining infrastructure in the south of the country. Though Angolan forces succeeded in capturing the old Unita headquarters in Jamba, by approaching from the Caprivi Strip, there the offensive stalled. Another operation into the Moxico province resulted in the capture of the important supply base at Cazombo, but even as government forces were pushing into areas of historic Unita support, Savimbi’s resumption of a decentralized guerrilla campaign in regions vital to the government indicated that grand military offensives were unlikely to secure the desired victory. It does not appear that Savimbi is aiming to win a total military victory, but that he intends to demonstrate that Unita cannot be defeated or destroyed militarily. This, combined with adverse developments in the regional balance of power will place the onus upon the government in Luanda to decide when to reopen negotiations.
Internal risk factors of economic origin
Angola has a rich natural endowment, including substantial reserves of petroleum, diamonds and other minerals: abundant arable land and a diverse climate that favours a wide variety of agricultural crops; some of the best livestock and fishing resources; important forest areas; and the considerable hydroelectric and irrigation potential of its many rivers. Before independence in 1975 the infrastructure was well developed by sub-Saharan Africa standards. GDP increased at an average annual rate of 7.8% between 1960 and 1974.
Given peace, stability and realistic economic policies, Angola could in due course become one of Africa’s most prosperous countries. The continued oil-strikes being made in the deep water off the continental shelf seems destined to confirm Angola’s rising position among petroleum producers. However, three decades of warfare, the flight of most of the 340 000 Portuguese settlers — practically the only skilled or unskilled inhabitants, disastrous economic policies, and inept public administration have reduced the country to a shambles. Millions of people have been displaced by war, countless persons have been killed, an estimated 70 000 have been maimed by the millions of mines laid by all parties to the war. Most of the people suffer from shortages of food and basic necessities. Many have starved to death. The production of oil and, to a lesser extent, alluvial diamonds, has long been the only feature of a market economy, though oil mainly served to finance the government’s war efforts and diamonds those of Unita.
Of great interest currently is the status of the negotiations between the Angolan government and the International Monetary Fund. This is far more complex than has been reflected in press reports. In April 2000 a staff-monitored IMF programme began, scheduled to last until the end of the year. This programme was the first stage in an effort to win the confidence of world finance, seen as vital to Angola’s economic future because of a desperate need to reschedule the country’s external debt, calculated at some US$9.6 billion. The programme established a timetable for economic reform, elements of which encountered formidable economic and political obstacles. Some of these appear to have been the result of internal contradictions within the programme itself: how is inflation to be reduced to an annual 120% (from nearly 450%) at the same time as subsidies are removed from fuel and food? The matter of independent audits of the diamond and oil sectors and of the national bank also present very grave problems to a political elite that has systematically used these instruments for protracted self-enrichment, the uncovering of which could prove politically and financially suicidal. In the event the mid-term review of the programme was not completed in September 2000 as scheduled. Progress has also been delayed and frustrated by the replacement of the highly-regarded Joaquim David as minister of finance in a reshuffle on 11 October. That this manoeuvre was deliberately intended to confuse matters hardly seems in doubt, especially as David has been replaced by a man of little experience but of great personal loyalty to the president.
Labour relations
From outside the formal structures of government, however, there is growing disquiet about the government's inability to address the deepening socio-economic crisis short of imposing austerity measures which bring the urban poor to the verge of revolt. The danger of civil unrest in Luanda and other centres under government administration, however unlikely, cannot be ruled out, especially as a resumption of war imposes new demands and restrictions on a long-suffering population. Indeed, such a development forms part of Savimbi’s strategy of bringing Luanda to the bargaining table. The flow of refugees and internally displaced persons has placed terminal strain on the resources of urban groups and humanitarian agencies, harvests rot in the abandoned countryside, and there is little that can now be done to avert a human catastrophe of proportions immense even by Angolan standards. The mobilization of civil society in the towns after decades of hibernation is important in providing an outlet for frustrations about the social inequities of Angola’s economic dispensation.
|
