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Political and Security Information
(updated: February 2005)
Conflict History
A carefully planned genocide against Tutsi was launched by the akazu and other select members of the Rwandan government on 7 April, 1994, immediately after the death of Habyarimana (see Political background). The Rwandan armed forces (FAR) and government-backed ) tia, of whom the most important was the MRND's "youth wing", known as the Interahamwe (those who attack together), orchestrated the massacres, with the willing or coerced assistance of ordinary Hutu. Yet while the FAR proved adept at the slaughter of civilians, it was unable to resist the RPF, which resumed its ) tary advance when the genocide began. UNAMIR, which had most of its personnel withdrawn on UN Security Council orders soon after the genocide started, played no significant role at any stage.
For several critical weeks, Security Council members termed the killings "tribal slaughter", despite being in possession of intelligence showing that the genocide was politically directed by people known to them. In addition, the US government in particular frustrated efforts by African governments to assemble an African intervention force with Western logistical backing. The French government announced in June 1994 that it would send troops to Rwanda on a humanitarian mission, and the highly controversial Operation Turquoise began shortly afterwards. Once French forces had been deployed in western Rwanda, with rear bases in Zaire, it became apparent that in addition to its humanitarian objectives, Operation Turquoise was also intended to prevent the RPF conquering Rwanda. The RPF and French troops came close to fighting several times, but desisted, and, after the French government had concluded that RPF victory was inevitable, signed a non-aggression agreement on 6 July. French troops withdrew from Rwanda soon afterwards, and the RPF captured Kigali on 04 July 1994. It emerged later that the akazu, and other Rwandans from the self-proclamed interim government who orchestrated the genocide, escaped in July from Rwanda into eastern Zaire, with the direct assistance of French ) tary officers serving in Operation Turquoise.
The retreating Rwandan government, along with the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, precipitated the flight of the over two million predominantly Hutu civilians into eastern Zaire by June and July 1994. This was achieved through a mix of scare tactics and intimidation, and the revenge massacres being perpetrated in Rwanda by the advancing RPF. Enormous refugee camps were soon established near the DRC-Rwanda border where thousands of refugees died from infectious diseases, in the full blaze of international media publicity, before humanitarian agencies could stabilise the situation.
The ex-FAR and Interahamwe, with the assistance of the Zairean armed forces (FAZ) established control of the refugee camps, and regrouped and rearmed. Sporadic attacks into Rwanda began in 1995, and in 1996, the newly established, RPF-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) (renamed the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) in 2002), invaded eastern Zaire to close the camps.
The RPA conducted the operation, which was largely shielded from the media, with the newly-formed Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). The AFDL's spokesman, later to become its leader, was a little-known but veteran Tanzania-based anti-Mobutu guerrilla called Laurent Kabila, who had been chosen by the Rwandan, Ugandan and Tanzanian governments, and was later backed by the Angolan government. As a result of the RPA/AFDL operation, 1.2m Hutu refugees returned home while the remainder were either killed, or fled deeper into the Zairean interior.
Members of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR joined the exodus into Rwanda, and there was a serious insurgency in the northwest during 1997. Although sporadic raids have persisted since, the government and the RPA effectively defeated the internal insurgency in 1998, through a combination of aggressive ) tary counter-offensives, a controversial villagisation programme, and the drawing of Hutu community leaders into local government structures.
Kabila seized power in Zaire in May 1997, changing the country's name to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The RPA played a major role in bringing Kabila to power, and for a time dominated the government and armed forces. Aware that his reliance on the unpopular RPA was a political liability amongst the Congolese, Kabila ordered the Rwandans to leave in July 1998.
As a tactic to contain Rwanda's ) tary might, and also to supplement his own feeble armed forces, Kabila began providing assistance to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe during 1997. To neutralise this threat, and ensure continued political, ) tary and commercial influence in the DRC, in August 1998 the Rwandan government covertly deployed the RPA in the DRC to assist a new anti-Kabila Congolese political movement called the Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie (RCD). The intervention was assisted by the Ugandan and Burundian armed forces. The RCD and its allies swiftly captured most of eastern DRC, and the RPA nearly captured Kinshasa, but was thwarted by Zimbabwean and Angolan forces, who had been deployed to save Kabila's regime. The RPA was forced to retreat from western DRC, but remained entrenched in the east.
The Rwandan and Ugandan governments had until then been close allies, but soon fell out with one another over the DRC, partly because of politics, but also over competition for the DRC's natural resources, especially the diamonds found in the vicinity of the north eastern city of Kisangani. The Rwandan and Ugandan defence forces clashed three times around Kisangani from late-1999 to mid-2000, with the RPA emerging the decisive victor.
The RPA's intervention in the DRC has effectively contained the security threat posed to Rwanda by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, but has never dislodged them from the DRC provinces of North and South Kivu, which neighbour Rwanda. The RCD has split several times over the years, and the pro-Rwanda faction, known as RCD-Goma, has retained control over much of eastern DRC, with considerable assistance from the RPA. Congolese of Rwandan origin, known in South Kivu as Banyamulenge, were initially close to the RCD-Goma and RPA, but later turned against them, and a full-scale rebellion against the RCD-Goma, led by Patrick Masunzu, developed among the Banyamulenge during 2002. Despite massive RPA deployment, the rebellion was never defeated.
Security Situation
The security situation throughout the country is stable, with no substantive or sustained armed domestic opposition to the RDF, despite occasional incursions into the Nyungwe forest in the south-west by anti-government ) tias based in the Kivus or using Burundi as a corridor. The retreat of the RDF from eastern DRC in June 2002 made Rwanda's western borders more vulnerable to attack from remnants of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, and RDF deployment has escalated in these areas.
Since a transition government was inaugurated in the DRC in June 2003, there have been a series of clashes in the east pitting the soldiers from the RCD against government troops. The most serious incident took place in late-May and early June 2004, when general Laurent Nkunda, a dissident RCD officer rallied several thousand ex-RCD troops and captured the South Kivu capital Bukavu, claiming that a genocide against the Banyamulenge was underway there. A UN panel monitoring the arms embargo on the DRC later alleged that Rwandan officers had assisted Nkunda in his recruitment of young men from the Kiziba and Gihembe refugee camps in Rwanda. There are also other allegations that Rwanda actively supported Nkunda’s campaign with logistical and financial assistance, and that it is illegally harbouring one of Nkunda's allies, Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, who fled to Rwanda after assisting Nkunda in his attack on Bukavu. Mutebutsi fled to Rwanda with 300 troops in tow and is currently in a refugee camp in Gikongoro province. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has refused to grant refugee status to Mutebutsi and his troops until they clarify that they are no longer combatants. Rwanda has denied all allegations made by the UN panel.
In late-November 2004 Kagame told the UN Security Council delegation on a mission to the Great Lakes region that the efforts of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to voluntarily disarm the Interahamwe in eastern DRC were insufficient. Several days later he declared that Rwanda was preparing to invade the eastern DRC in order to track down the Interahamwe. Throughout early December 2004 there were sightings of Rwandan soldiers in the DRC, and MONUC confirmed that it had seen at least 100 Rwandan soldiers on Congolese soil in the area of Goma in North Kivu. As of December 2004 intense diplomatic efforts were underway to avert a Rwandan invasion of the eastern DRC - however Kagame and other senior Rwandan officials have repeated their threats. The threat comes shortly after MONUC and Congolese troops had begun joint patrols in South Kivu with the aim of increasing security in the area and of encouraging the Interahamwe to disarm in the area of Walungu. The Congolese army had also declared its intentions to pursue the Interahamwe and disarm them forcibly. There has been some speculation that the increased ) tary presence in the area would get in the way of Rwanda’s ongoing economic activities and that this may be one reason why the threat to invade comes now. There has certainly not been an increased threat to Rwanda ’s security over the last few months which would justify such an invasion.
Since President Kagame made his declarations, allegations that Rwandan soldiers have already crossed into the DRC have been strictly denied by the Rwandan government, which has nonetheless maintained that its troops will cross into the DRC if Rwanda 's security is threatened by Hutu combatants there.
In late-September 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that Rwanda and the DRC had agreed to the formation of a joint verification mechanism (JVM) to monitor security along their border. The idea was first discussed at an emergency summit of the Rwandan and Congolese heads of state in Abuja, Nigeria, following the fall of Bukavu in June 2004. The JVM is essentially a revival of a similar agreement between the Rwandan, Congolese and South African governments which was initiated in late-2002. The Congolese government subsequently pulled out of the agreement, citing concerns that South Africa and Rwanda were colluding to cover up Rwanda's continued interference in the DRC following the withdrawal of its troops from eastern DRC. The JVM is not yet operational and renewed hostility between Rwanda and DRC renders is future somewhat uncertain.
Security Related Budget
Defence expenditure in 2001 was officially recorded as 3.3% of GDP, down from 4.4% in 1998, and is officially forecast to fall to 2.3% by 2004, despite significant costs associated with demobilisation. However, there has been substantial off-budget defence expenditure throughout the DRC war, partly financed, it appears, by unrecorded mineral re-exports from the DRC.
International Treaties/Protocols/Alliances
Rwanda has signed the following international agreements:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951).
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981).
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction (signed, not ratified)
Human Rights Practises of Security Forces
The RPA was guilty of major human rights violations during the early part of its counter-insurgency campaign in northwest Rwanda in early 1997, but is reported to have improved its behaviour since as part of an effort to win Hutu "hearts and minds". Human rights organisations have nonetheless accused the RPA/RDF of involvement in the torture, murder and arbitrary detention of civilians within Rwanda, particularly in areas that have been threatened by rebel ) tia, though most of the accusations relate to the armed forces' conduct in the DRC. The RPA/RDF has never tried to capture Congolese hearts and minds, and its heavy-handed conduct and brutality has encouraged a deep-seated antipathy towards it among many Congolese.
International Community Involvement
The RDF has received training and assistance from the UK and US ) taries, though to date this has not been to the extent the FAR formerly received from France. Rwanda is a member of the Joint )tary Commission, which is overseeing the implementation of the 1999 Lusaka cease-fire in the DRC.
Forces Deployed Outside Country
During the latter part of the DRC conflict, the RDF was believed to have deployed 17,000 –18,000 troops in the country. The Rwandan government says all of these were withdrawn by September 2002, and this claim has been accepted by MONUC. However, the DRC government insists that many RDF forces have secretly remained behind, and MONUC is currently attempting to verify whether the entire RDF force in the DRC has indeed withdrawn.
600 Rwandan troops are currently deployed in the Darfur region of Sudan as part of an African Union peacekeeping force there.
Defence Force Senior Personnel
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Defence minister, Marcel Gatsinzi, like his predecessor Emmanuel Habyarimana, is a former member of the FAR. Gatsinzi was previously the director general of the National Security Agency.
Rwandan Defence Force
Commander-in-Chief: Major General Paul Kagame
Chief of General Staff: General James Kabarebe
Chief of National Security Council: Maj Dr Emmanuel Ndahiro
Chief of the Directorate )tary Intelligence (DMI): Colonel Jacques Musemakweli
Army Chief of Staff : Major General Charles Kayonga
Air Force Commander : Brigadier Charles Muhire
Marine Unit : Major C. Nzaramba ?
Commando Unit (Paratroopers) : Major M. Murengerantwari
Doctrine
The RDF is an effective, mostly disciplined force, proud of its origins as a guerilla army. The RDF has incorporated several thousand members of the ex-FAR in recent years, but no major internal tensions have ever been reported. A new ) tary training academy has been established, with international assistance, aimed a creating a more professional army.
Interahamwe
The Interahamwe was the youth wing of the MRND. Towards the end of Habyarimana's regime, the Interahamwe was ) tarily trained, partly by serving French officers, and instructed by the MRND hierarchy and akazu to prepare Rwandan Hutus for participation in the genocide. During the genocide, the Interahamwe carried out much of the slaughter, and those who could fled to Zaire after the RPF conquered Rwanda in July 1994. The Interahamwe fought with the FAZ in Mobutu's failed counter-offensive against Kabila in 1996-7, but later switched sides, and joined Kabila's Congolese armed forces (FAC), so as to keep fighting the RPA. The Interahamwe posed a threat to Rwandan security during the late 1990s, but this has been largely neutralised since. According to the 1999 Lusaka peace agreement for the DRC, the Interahamwe is a "negative force" to be demobilised, disarmed and repatriated.
Forces Armees Rwandaises (Ex-FAR)
The ex-FAR was the Rwandan army until 1994, and was a major player in the 1994 genocide. At the time of its defeat by the RPF, its numbers were estimated at some 20,000. Most ex-FAR fled to North and South Kivu in 1994, where they regrouped in Mugunga refugee camp among others, establishing a ) tary training camp further west, from where they launched cross-border attacks into Rwanda. Starting in May 1996, there were ex-FAR movements towards Burundi, allegedly to prepare an offensive in conjunction with Burundian Hutu rebels (PALIPEHUTU & FDD), which was, however, pre-empted by the ) tary coup in Burundi in July 1996.
The AFDL/RPA offensive in October 1996 cut ex-FAR supply lines. Like the Interahamwe, the ex-FAR fought alongside Zairian soldiers in the failed counter-offensive against AFDL forces. Following Kabila's victory, some ex-FAR left for the Central African Republic, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon and Angola. After Kabila broke with Rwanda, remaining ex-FAR, like the Interahamwe, were brought into the FAC, for deployment against the RPA/RDF.
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