SUDAN

Political and Security Information
(updated: 12 January 2005)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

 

AU African Union

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

JEM Justice and Equality Movement

NANS National Alliance for National Salvation

NC National Congress Party

NIF National Islamic Front

PNC Popular National Congress

SLA Sudan Liberation Army

SPA Sudan Peace Act

SPI Sudan Peace Initiative

SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army

TUA Trade Union Alliance

Turkiyya Turko-Egyptian empire

Turuq Muslim brotherhoods of the Sufi order

UPF Unions and Professional Front

UP Umma Party

 

DATE	REGIME	REMARKS
1956-1958	1 January 1956: Independence. Government alliance between influential turuq (brotherhoods)	Internal strife: parties quarrel over role of religion in state affairs Sectarian politics prevents any real policy formulation
Transition	Sectarian leaders ignore southern calls for federal status. General Ibrahim Abboud is disillusioned with factional, religio-sectarian rivalries and lack of functional government. He stages a coup ushering in a military junta.
1958-1964	Military regime led by General Ibrahim Abboud	Abboud launches Islamization; assimilation policies seen as facilitation of unification of national identity.
Transition	Popular Uprisings and mass action campaigns by the UPF oust Abboud in “October Revolution”. UPF transitional government, under civilian Al-Khalifa, convenes Round Table Conference (1965) to address war in the South. Sectarians question authority of transitional government to draft constitution and call for early elections.
1965-1969	Democratic government led by the Umma Party; Sadiq al Mahdi	UP elected because of traditional influence. Increased Islamization. Al Mahdi agitates ethnic differences to garner more support.
Transition	Shari'a is introduced as basis for Sudanese law and forced assimilation in the South escalates conflict. General Nimeiri is disillusioned with Islamist policies and failure to end the war in the South; stages a military coup.
1969-1985	Military regime led by General Jafaar al-Nimeiri	Initially identifies with Nasserite ideals. Attempts grandiose developments schemes. Signs Addis Ababa Agreement (1972), creating degree of autonomy in the South with separate Regional Government.
Transition	Due to economic constraints and internal pressures, Nimeiri cooperates with sectarians, forms alliance with fundamental NIF; mass Islamization. Nimeiri interferes in regional politics, attempts to redraw borders following discovery of oil and institutes “September Laws” which lead to the abrogation of Agreement. SPLA is founded. Popular uprising ousts him while he is abroad. The TUA calls for general strikes to oppose harsh imposition of Shari'a and hududs; their campaigns bring down the Nimeiri regime.
1985-1989	UP led coalition government Initial coalition with DUP, later form NIF coalition	Similar to 1965, sectarians question mandate of TUA and call for early elections. Fighting in the South prevents voting in the region. NIF wins only 6% of votes in 1986 elections.
Transition	DUP coalition members sign SPI peace agreement in 1988 with SPLA, calling for a constitutional conference. Al Mahdi is forced by military and NANS to recognize SPI. NIF bows out of coalition in opposition to SPI. Al Bashir seizes power on the day that the Shari'a law and SPI were to be vo ted on by parliament.
1989-present	NIF fundamentalist regime under leadership of General al Bashir & Hassan al Turabi	NIF steps up military campaigns in southern and other opposition areas. Shuts out all political parties, increases Islamization programmes and militia activities. Drastic increase in military spending. Parts of the constitution suspended, the national assembly dissolved and a state of emergency still in place.
Current	Political rift between Turabi and Bashir deepens internal political crisis. Rapprochement of Bashir government with the SPLA and the signing of Machakos Protocol and Naivasha security agreement in 2002. Current peace talks still underway in Kenya . Renewal and intensification of conflict in Darfur ; emergence of Janjaweed militia as well as JEM and SLA rebel groups. Darfur talks underway in Abuja , Nigeria . Currently, a small AU military presence in Darfur to monitor the ceasefire. US Congress signed the SPA in 2002. EU reopens development aid to the Sudan in 2002.

Constitution and political system

 

•  Constitution - adopted 12 April 1973, suspended following coup of 6 April 1985; interim constitution of 10 October 1985 suspended following coup of 30 June 1989; new constitution implemented 30 June 1998, partially suspended December 1999.

•  Legal system - based on English common law and Shari'a (Islamic law). Since January 1991 Islamic law applies to all residents of the northern states regardless of their religion.

•  Legislative branch - unicameral National Assembly (360 seats; 270 popularly elected , 90 elected by supra assembly of interest groups known as National Congress). Parliament dissolved and a state of emergency declared in December 1999.

•  Elections – Last elections held December 2000.

History

Pre-colonial and colonial period

 

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, consists of four major regions. First there is the Nile valley, whose Arab-identified peoples have come to dominate the political and economic life of the country. To the West are the desert nomads such as the Fur people, whom are of Sudanic or Sahelian African origin. To the South, separated from northern Sudan by an enormous swamp, called the Sudd, and the Bahr-al-Arab or Kirr River are the peoples of African origin or Nilotic Christian descent. The Beja, neither African nor Arab, are remnants from the ancient Cushitic kingdoms found in eastern Sudan.

 

Prior to any colonial authorities asserting their power in the Sudan, numerous independent Muslim sultanates, such as the Funj and Fur, as well as Christian kingdoms, such as the Nubians effectively governed themselves in Western and Southern Sudan. From the 13th Century onwards, what is currently known as the Sudan began absorbing an influx of Arabs from Egypt. By 1821, such population movements began to cause friction between the immigrants and local populations. Arab migrants settled in the Nile valley, where the White and Blue Niles converged and where the city of Khartoum was established. As a hegemonic power in the region the Turkiyya, Turko-Egyptian empire, asserted its power from 1821-1885. It was under the Turkiyya that patterns of salve raids and the plundering economic goods from the South were established. The South was a lucrative area for exploitation, particularly for slaves as the Ottoman empire sought to replenish its ailing armies. With raids into the South for goods such as ivory and agricultural produce, Khartoum developed into an important trading post for the Turkiyya. Practices of slave raids and the exploitation of resources from the largely African South sustained Arab settlements in the North. By the end of the 19th Century, immigrants from North Africa and Arabia had also established influential turuq (Sufi Muslim brotherhoods) that began to challenge Turko-Egyptian authority. One of these local turuq, whose followers were known as Mahdists, under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad Al Mahdi, repelled colonial authorities and establish the Mahdist state for the brief period 1885-1889. In the decade leading up to Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule, which was asserted in 1898, tensions between the British and Mahdists mounted following the opening of the Suez canal.

Under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, patterns of slave raids and exploitation inherited from the Turkiyya continued unabatedly. The British seized power, absorbing the relatively advanced North, and the remote and undeveloped South, perpetuating the preconception that the South was “backward”, pagan and less developed; serving as an exploitation platform for projects in the North. The British economic interests essentially lay to the North, in particular in protecting Egyptian interests. Thus, in 1899 the modern border between Egypt and Sudan was declared to be the 22nd parallel. This completely colonial border inception is still a point of contention between Egypt and Sudan, in particular the contested town of Hala'ib. The British ruled Sudan as if it were composed essentially of two separate territories: the functioning, economic entity in the North, and the neglected South. This division also coincided with differences in climate, topography and religious and ethnic affiliation. Governing structures were developed in the North with limited participation or input from southern, western and eastern parts of the country. For most of the colonial period the British anticipated a divided future for North and South, with the latter being incorporated into British East Africa. In 1946, however, under pressure from northern Sudanese nationalists who objec ted to these arrangements, London modified its policy and began to work towards the formation of a unified state. Many Southerners were alarmed that they would fall under the domination of the better-educated and more experienced Northern administrators and politicians, particularly since the South had yet to form coherent political organizations or to develop a sense of national identity. These fears were fully realised when self-government was granted in 1953.

Independence

 

Nothing came of pre-independence undertakings by the Sudanese parliament to consider Southern demands for federal status. In 1954, as the colonial authorities undertook the “Sudanization” of the administrative and civil service in Sudan; only 6 out of 800 senior administrative posts were granted to southerners. The Independence government of 1956 was an alliance between the influential turuq, most notably the Ansar and Khatimiyya brotherhoods that had steadily gained support and influence in Sudan based on economic incentives gained via relations with the ruling colonial powers. The Ansar, or Mahdists later transformed into the Umma Party (UP) and the Khatimiyya into the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as political entities. Ominously, independence in 1956 was preceded by a mutiny in August 1955 by the men of the army's Southern Corps against their Northern officers. The mutineers, led by local junior officers and NCOs, took control of almost the whole of Equatoria Province before Northern reinforcements re-established control. A large number of mutineers fled into the bush to continue their resistance.

 

A quick military coup led by General Abboud occurred in 1958 based on the military's disillusionment with the turuq factional in-fighting and the lack of a functional government in Khartoum. The military regime was strongly opposed to entertaining southern demands for federal status, and thus staged the coup the day before the Sudanese parliament was to vote on the proposed Islamic constitution and the federal status of the South. Abboud's regime saw assimilation of the northern Arab-Islamic culture as a means for unification of the country and launched aggressive Islamization and Arabization programmes. Perhaps the greatest miscalculation of successive regimes in Khartoum has been the assumption that assimilation could be used as a mechanism for universalism. As a consequence, for all but 11 of the 41 years since independence the country has been racked by devastating civil wars as the Southerners have resisted attempts from Khartoum to enforce a policy of Arabization and Islamization.

 

The first civil war proper began in 1963-64, with numerous northern groups disenchanted with Abboud's military junta. An armed rebellion also emerged in the South. The rebellion was led by Anyanya, a guerrilla movement that consisted largely of semi-autonomous groups in the South, fighting against the government, for greater autonomy of the southern states and transformation of the governing structures in Khartoum. The civil war was fought exclusively in the three states of southern Sudan – Upper Nile, Equatoria, and Bahr al Ghazal. The cause of the Anyanya was hampered by its looseness as a political and military movement. By the late 1960s, there were at least five different Anyanya “movements” in the south, and much of their energy was spent fighting each other. This changed in 1969-70 when one of the myriad Anyanya leaders, Joseph Lagu, was able to assert his position as acknowledged leader of the movement, through his access to and control over foreign weapons and patrons (including Ethiopia and Israel). Anyanya reconstituted itself as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and superseded the various factions operating both in the South and in exile. Anyanya was politically weak and unable to exert any real political pressure in Khartoum , but was responsible for the launching of an armed struggle in the South.

 

These developments in the southern armed movement coincided with political developments in Khartoum. There was great popular discontentment with the Abboud regime and its inability to address the “southern problem”. An increasingly vibrant civil society began placing pressure on the regime. The religio-sectarian DUP and UP are most often cited as the main political protagonists in Sudanese politics, however, a lively civil society contributed greatly to Sudanese political development. In 1964, the “October Revolution”; a conglomeration of public uprisings and mass action campaigns launched by the UPF (Unions and Professional Front) paralyzed the country and brought down the Abooud regime. The UPF appointed a civilian government under the leadership of Mr Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa, an individual dedica ted to addressing southern concerns and ushering in unification. Hastily, the Round Table Conference of 1965 was called to negotiate peace with the South, however, al-Kalifa's political leadership came to an end as the sectarian parties questioned the authority of the transitional, civilian government to draft a constitution. Thus, elections were called in 1965 ushering the Umma Party, under Sadiq al Mahdi, into power. No southern representation was present in the constituted parliament as fighting in the South prevented participation in the 1965 elections.

 

The UP had gathered much support based on its religious appeal and social organization. The UP and DUP had established loyalty networks based on decades of the collection of Islamic tithes and payment to rural workers in grain and clothing for work done on turuq cotton schemes. There was a renewed hope that the UP would be able to successfully govern the Sudan. Under the unconvincing veneer of democratic values and a desire for a southern solution, al Mahdi merely stepped up the Islamization programmes. As a religious sectarian he wanted to maintain his power and desired a military solution to the war in the South. In 1966, he proclaimed that Islam and Arab culture would be the overpowering expression of Sudan and in 1968 he passed a constitutional bill that would make Shari'a the basis for all Sudanese law. Islamization was again used as a vehicle to ensure the government's self-perpetuation and as a mechanism for universalism. The armed resistance in the South continued and gained more momentum. The UP government was not able to redress the structural governing weaknesses inherited at independence and failed to address the grievances of the South and other regions.

 

By 1969, there was much opposition to its leadership. In May 1969, a group of young military officers staged a military coup. The new military government, under General Jafar Muhammed Nimeiri, moved to find a political and economic solution for the problems that beset the Sudan. Nimeiri was disillusioned with religio-sectarian power politics and came to power espousing Nasserite socialist ideas. He launched large scale development plans including the mechanization of agricultural projects. These projects were ambitious, but structurally flawed and Nimeiri faced increasing internal pressure as economic decline continued. Following a failed coup attempt by the Communist Party in 1971, Nimeiri realized that his regime was facing possible collapse. It is within this political context that a rapprochement with the South occurred in 1972. The war ended in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement between the government and Anyanya. While the agreement that ended the war won Nimeiri support in the South, it failed to address the root causes of the conflict. While it gave the southern states some measure of self-rule, including the establishment of a Southern Regional Government under a new constitution, it also left the autocratic state in the North intact, and led to growing discontent in the North itself. This, combined with growing economic decline, led Nimeiri, in the latter 1970s, to attempt to reassert control over the South and its mineral and oil wealth thereby abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement.

 

In 1980, Nimeiri attempted to redraw the boundaries of the South, thereby removing the oil rich areas from southern jurisdiction.  When the southern states resisted this move, Nimeiri began sponsoring, organizing and arming tribal militias in the South, a legacy which lives on today. The regional political dynamics also forced Nimeiri to change ideological affiliation. Following a coup in Ethiopia bringing a pro-Soviet Marxist Mengistu Haile Mariam to power in 1977, Nimeiri was drawn into Cold War dynamics and US military support pumped arms into Sudan. Nimeiri oscillated between loyalty to the USA and the USSR during his rule. Facing growing internal political pressure during the early 1980s, Nimeiri fostered relations with the sectarian UP and DUP and aligned himself with the Islamization ideology which initially led him to stage his coup.

 

Final demise of the Addis Ababa Agreement came in 1983, when Nimeiri imposed Islamic law on the southern states (the “September Laws”). This led to renewed civil war, began by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983. The main military force of the SPLA came from Battalions 104 and 105 of the Sudanese army, which defected in May 1983 with all their equipment, escaping to Ethiopia. A number of changes had occurred, which distinguished the new civil war from the earlier one. By the early 1980s, not only the southern states were alienated from the central government. The growth of mechanized farming in the “transitional states” incorporating the central Sudan region during the 1970s, led to the dispossession of growing numbers of Arab and other Muslim communities as well, and they were increasingly aliena ted from the Nimeiri regime. The SPLA which launched a new civil war in 1983 was only one dissident group in Sudan, albeit the strongest militarily.

 

Ethiopia began to back the SPLA militarily soon after its formation, in response to the Nimeiri government's military support for anti-Dergue guerrillas in Ethiopia and Eritrea. It was through Ethiopian support that a single military command was formed, with Colonel John Garang de Mabior (former head of the Staff College at Omdurman) at its head. By 1984, the SPLA had established its presence throughout the South, by incorporating existing independent guerrilla groups operating there. The SPLA's training and rear bases were in Ethiopia, and by the late 1980s it was proving to be a formidable military enemy for the Sudanese government forces, and managed to capture a number of military garrison towns in the south, as well as substantial amounts of government weaponry.

 

In 1985, an active northern civil society brought down Colonel Nimieri's military. Popular uprisings under the TUA (Trade Union Alliance) were called to oppose the September laws. A rather unstable DUP and UP coalition of conservative political forces was reinstated, and in 1986 a general election returned Sadiq al Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar sect and the UP, to power. Mahdi was eventually constrained to enter into negotiations with the SPLA, following mounting internal pressure to resolve the conflict. The Kokadam conference of 1986 was called, however, talks with the SPLA quickly broke down. Following this, al Mahdi broke away from the DUP and formed a new coalition with Hassan al Turabi's extreme National Islamic Front (NIF) that won a mere 6% of parliamentary seats in the 1986 elections. Turabi had actively been involved in Sudanese politics since the early 1960s when his political Islamist ideology won popular support at the University of Khartoum . His supporters were often intellectuals and bureaucrats who propped themselves up financially through the establishment of Islamic banking systems in the Sudan. Furthermore, he served as Attorney-General under Nimeiri's regime and proposed the bill to redraw southern boundaries and encouraged the September laws and an Islamic state. Moreover, al Mahdi and Turabi are brothers-in-law and developed a political alliance that encouraged the ideals of an Islamic state. The DUP continued negotiations with the SPLA and in 1988 signed the November Plan, which later became known as the SPI (Sudan Peace Initiative). The Plan, which made provision for a freezing of Islamic laws and the calling of a constitutional conference, was presen ted to the coalition parliament in 1988, and failed to pass. The DUP officially bowed out of the coalition.

 

TUA popular uprisings and dissatisfaction with Al Mahdi's poor economic policies led the armed forces to pressurize him into forming a new national government including TUA members in March 1989. Furthermore, growing international pressure following the popularization that food was being used as a weapon in the war, placed immense pressure on Mahdi. His government accepted the SPI and the NIF furiously bowed out of the coalition as it strongly opposed any reconsideration of Nimeiri's harsh September laws. Mahdi was facing political demise and thus he acted as a political opportunist taking steps to retain his grip on power. Steps were taken to implement the SPI, formulate new laws and initiate the proposed economic reforms. New laws were drafted by eminent Sudanese jurists and approved by the Attorney-General. The day the Assembly was to vote on the new laws and other clauses of the SPI, an NIF orchestrated military coup brought down the government. Thus, in 1989, the democratically elected government of Sadiq al Mahdi was overthrown by a military junta led by Lieutenant-General Omar Hassan al-Bashir. It soon became clear that the coup had the backing of Islamic extremists in NIF, led by Islamist ideologue Hassan al Turabi.

The new NIF regime, had successfully penetrated key sections of the armed forces and the civil service prior to the coup. Political parties were banned, the organized opposition was undermined, and strict Islamic legal codes enforced. The new government did not end the war, and in fact escalated it. By 1989, the war was no longer a guerrilla affair, but involved conventional warfare, and the SPLA rivalled the Sudanese government armed forces in number of recruits. A secure base in Ethiopia, as well as a steady supply of arms from the Ethiopian government, was largely responsible for this state of affairs.

 

The SPLA suffered a series of debilitating setbacks in the early 1990s. Firstly, the SPLA lost its rear bases and its supply of arms when the Ethiopian military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, its chief patron, was overthrown in May 1991. Within months of this, the SPLA itself split into two, when a group of officers based at Nasir along the Ethiopian border, broke away from the mainstream SPLM/A of John Garang, in part because of his undemocratic style of rule, and in part because they favoured outright independence as opposed to mere autonomy for the South. The Nasir faction, led by Riek Machar, was also encouraged militarily by the Sudanese government in the aftermath of the split. It is possible that the government manufactured the split because the Nasir area, from where Machar came, was known to be rich in oil deposits.

 

Between 1991 and 1995, the Khartoum government appeared to have the upper hand in the conflict, and managed to retake a number of garrison towns from the SPLA. The most serious challenge faced by the SPLA in the field during this period came from the breakaway SPLA factions who were now supported by the government militarily. By the mid-1990s, however, the SPLA managed to recover many of its losses in the field. In 1995, the SPLA also joined northern opposition groups, under the umbrella National Democratic Alliance (NDA), giving further credence to its claim that it was not a southern regional movement, but was national in character.

 

By the mid-1990s, the Khartoum government was under enormous pressure, at home from the military campaigns fought by the SPLA, and abroad, as a result of its perceived support for international terrorism. Khartoum alienated almost all of its neighbours, many of whom began to supply the SPLA and other opposition movements. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda all called openly for the overthrow of the Khartoum regime. The SPLA/NDA had managed to extend the military campaign from the south, to include parts of the east (the Red Sea Hills and Kassala) and central Sudan (the Nuba mountains of South Kordofan).  Internationally, the US was also at the forefront of attempts to unseat the government, because of Khartoum 's policy of exporting the Islamic revolution and the tacit refuge offered to Osama Bin Laden. Meanwhile, attempts to resolve the conflict by political means were spearheaded by the East African regional grouping, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The first IGAD meeting was called in March 1994, and Bashir refused to meet Garang. IGAD drafted its Declaration of Principles (DOP), which included a clause on southern rights to self-determination. The NIF government rejected the DOP because of this and further talks were suspended until 1997. In the interim, regional pressure exerted on Khartoum continued to mount. Relations further soured with Egypt following an assassination attempt on Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995 and the USA severed all diplomatic ties and imposed a complete trade ban on the Sudan. The NDA also consolidated its organization and civil society began to challenge the government again; numerous uprisings met vicious responses in Khartoum. By 1997/98, the Khartoum government seemed willing to consider political concession within the IGAD forum, as a result of the pressure it was under. In 1997, Bashir was compelled to sign the IGAD DOP in light of a Political Charter signed with Machar's Nasir faction of the SPLA in 1996 which included a provision for self-determination. However, he stated that the DOP was not legally binding and that his government would not accept secularism or confederation.

 

This situation changed drastically in 1998, however. In May 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war against each other, and in August of that same year, Uganda became embroiled in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This deprived the SPLA of vital military and material support. Further political and economic pressure also came to bear on Bashir's government and the events of 1999-2001 brought both parties to the negotiating table again.

Post-2000 developments

 

The tumultuous year of 1999 provided the backdrop that led both parties to re-enter negotiations under the IGAD process in 2001. Late in 1998, drilling for oil began in the Sudan. Since oil exports began in 1999, the government's military machine has been fuelled by oil revenues; approximately $500million per year. In the same year Turabi openly admitted to the French press that oil money was being used to finance the construction of several weapons factories. The Khartoum government was also accused of illegally purchasing weapons from abroad with profits gained from oil exports. It quickly became apparent that despite US trade and investment bans, European Union (EU) and other arms embargoes, Sudan was able to find other states willing to fund investment in its oil industry and provide it with arms; in recent years close relations have been forged with China, India, Malaysia and former USSR states. Government military expenditure has doubled since 1998 and the bloodiest fighting of the civil war occurred between January and June 2002.

 

The sustainable livelihoods of thousands of Sudanese have been disrupted as government militias clear oil-rich areas for development and concurrently damage precious agricultural lands. Such forced dislocation has occurred in the Upper Nile Region and the Nuba mountains. International groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have voiced their outrage at the out-right involvement of oil corporations in the conflict: corporation airbases, such as the one at Heglig, are freely used by government aircraft to refuel and carry out attacks on civilian populations in the region. Human rights activists asserted that the clearing of local populations in a series of military operations amounted to "ethnic cleansing". Although the government was at pains to deny these allegations, there was sufficient evidence to embarrass Western oil companies that were implicated by association in these activities, and a number of them subsequently sold off their interests in Sudan.

 

In 1999, Bashir also faced an internal political crisis. The power struggle between himself and Islamist ideologue al Turabi, by then speaker of the Sudanese National Assembly, broke out into the open. In 1999, Mahdi defected from the NDA and the UP entered into a coalition with the NIF. In May 1999, Mahdi and Turabi met in Geneva to draft plans to circumscribe President Bashir. Their proposal would allow for Mahdi to become President and Turabi, Prime Minister of the Sudan. In December 1999, the constitutional reform bill outlining their proposal and limiting Bashir's powers was presented. Bashir promptly suspended parts of the constitution, dissolved the parliament and declared a state of emergency, which still remains in place.

 

During 2000, the political rift between Turabi and Bashir intensified as did international pressure on Bashir's government. In June 2000, Turabi formed his own political party the Popular National Congress (PNC) to counter Bashir's dismissal of him as head of the NIF and the renaming of the government as the National Congress Party (NCP) government. Elections were held in December 2000; political opposition was excluded and Bashir reaffirmed his NC government. International pressure mounted as the American Congress openly began debating the Sudan Peace Act (SPA); an attempt to address the moral dilemma of oil politics in Sudan. The original language of the bill created a precedent by calling for capital market sanctions on any oil companies actively involved in Sudan. The Act was passed by an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives in 2000. The Bush administration, however, remained wary of setting a precedent for involvement in the capital market for political reasons. The Act was finally passed in 2002 without the capital markets sanction clause, granting President Bush the freedom to act accordingly if he felt that Khartoum was not acting in good faith at the IGAD peace talks.

 

Numerous factors contributed to the decision by both the SPLA and the Khartoum government to re-enter IGAD negotiations. Bashir's internal political crisis forced him to the negotiating table as he feared Turabi's influence. By 2001, the southern political groups were achieving a measure of rapprochement between themselves. Rebel successes in the Bahr-el-Ghazal region also came as an unpleasant shock to Khartoum. The military stalemate was however taking its toll on SPLA forces and the export of oil increased the desire of all parties to be stakeholders in the wealth that it would generate. The SPLA was also concerned about increased government military spending. Moreover in 2002, the EU ended an 11 year hiatus of developmental aid to the Khartoum government. European companies were granted contracts to undertake construction efforts in Khartoum. In the post September 11th global environment, Bashir has made a concerted effort to normalize Sudan 's relations with the West and to mend its reputation as a sponsor of international terrorism. An internationally supported peace agreement would also provide Bashir with the opportunity to reassert his power and re-establish his standing in the international arena.

 

Thus, following direct engagement between Bashir and Garang, the Machakos Protocol was signed in July 2002 to act as a guideline for future discussions and an eventual peace agreement. The key provisions of the Protocol made allowances for a referendum on secession to be held in southern Sudan following a six year transitional period and for the application of Shari'a law in Northern provinces. Talks continued sporadically under intensifying international pressure until the signing of a framework agreement in June 2004. This framework outlines provisions for power-sharing, wealth-sharing and transitional security arrangements. It also includes special status for the contested areas of the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Southern Blue Nile. Following a special meeting of the UN Security Council in Nairobi in November 2004 (see resolution), the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A committed themselves to concluding the final details of the peace agreement by the end of 2004, but most neutral observers thought it unlikely that this deadline would be met.

 

Issues which proved important in negotiations in 2003 and 2004 included the institutional and political arrangements for the transitional government, the armed forces, wealth sharing and the application of Shari'a. The status of Khartoum proved to be a point of contention. The SPLA advocates a religiously neutral government enclave, while Bashir's government affirms that this violates the terms of Machakos and is unwilling to accept such a proposal.

 

The Government of Khartoum and the SPLA did in fact finalise negotiations by the end of 2004. This resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. The CPA drew together all the previous protocols regarding respective issues that the Government and the SPLA had agreed upon. Numerous provisions address the various contentious issues.

Provisions of the CPA:

 

PROVISION RELATING TO	DETAILS OF PROVISION
1) Armed Forces	The North and South are to maintain separate armed forces. There is to be the withdrawal of 91,000 government troops from the South within 2 and a half years. The SPLA has 8 months to withdraw its forces from the North. The Naivasha Protocol that forms part of the CPA outlines the details of integration: it allows for integrated units of 21,000 soldiers (of which half will be government and half SPLA) to be formed during the 6 year interim period. They are to be deployed to sensitive areas such as the 3 disputed areas. These units will be commonly stationed but maintain separate command and control structures. If, after the interim period the South decides not to secede, both sides will unify into a 39,000 strong force.
2) Autonomy	The South will have autonomy for 6 years to be followed by a referendum in 2011 regarding secession from the Sudan.
3) Oil wealth	To be shared on a 50:50 basis between the Khartoum Government and the SPLA.
4) Economic issues	Two separate currencies are to be used within a dual banking system. The North will retain the Sudanese Pound while the South will opt for the Sudanese Dinar. Essentially, the dual banking system means that banks will be commonly stationed with two different windows for service.
5) Administration	Positions in the central, transitional government are to be split 70:30 in favour of the government, and 55:45 in favour of the government in the contentious areas of Abyei, the Blue Nile State and the Nuba Mountains. Bashir's position as Head of State is entrenched and Garang is to serve as Vice-President. A government of national unity is to be formed.
6) Islamic Law	Shari'a is to remain applicable in the North and parts of the constitution are to be rewritten so that Shari'a does not apply to any non-Muslims throughout the Sudan. The status of Shari'a in Khartoum is to be decided by an elected assembly.
7) Other	Each territory is to use its own flags. The North will maintain use of the current Sudanese flag and the South is to introduce its own flag.

 

 

Within the ambit of the CPA, the transitional government will have to address numerous issues. The issue of a future, inclusive constitutional conference has not been addressed yet. Despite the Naivasha security agreement, discussion regarding the eventual demilitarization and demobilization of forces once mutual security threats have been attenuated, has not yet been discussed. The current wealth-sharing agreement will need much more specificity and economic policy issues for the transitional government also still need to be addressed. Further discussion on the three disputed areas of the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Southern Blue Nile is also needed.

Darfur Conflict

 

The ongoing talks between the SPLA and Bashir government as well as the signing of the CPA have been overshadowed by the unfolding conflict in Darfur, which began in earnest in February 2003. The conflict involves an armed militia group, known as the Janjaweed, which consists mainly of members from the numerous Arab tribes in the region. The other main protagonists are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), which consist of members drawn from the numerous African pastoral and subsistence communities in the region. The JEM and SLA claim neglect by the government and have taken up arms against the Janjaweed's Arab nomads that have driven them from their lands and destroyed entire communities. It is widely believed that the Janjaweed receives support from the Bashir government. The latest flare up of conflict has been an outgrowth of decades-long competition between settled African communities and Arab nomads for scarce resources such as water as well as grazing and arable land. The conflict also has complex political dimensions. The SLA is linked to the wider Sudan opposition movement under the NDA umbrella that seeks to transform the governing structures in Khartoum and create a new Sudan. The JEM has strong links to Turabi whom sought to expand his support base to African Muslim communities during the 1990s. Following the political fall-out between Turabi and Bashir in 1999, Bashir was prompt to purge the government of Turabi loyalists, and this included his African Muslim supporters from the Darfur region, which regrouped to form the JEM. It has also been speculated that Turabi agitated the Darfur conflict in order to discredit Bashir and threaten the peace process with the South since it is widely known that Turabi is strongly opposed to any concession in terms of self-determination for the South. The Darfur conflict has had an enormous humanitarian cost and the UN is investigating the charge that acts of genocide have been committed.

 

The protagonists to the conflict have been holding peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria since August 2004 under the auspices of President Olusegun Obasanjo, current Chairman of the African Union (AU) and President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The talks have collapsed on numerous occasions and ceasefire agreements have also been violated. Both the United Nations and the African Union have taken numerous decisions on the situation in Darfur. The AU issued a communiqué in which it was noted that the situation cannot be defined as genocide, however, also noted the gravity of the situation and the need to urgently act. The AU launched its African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and in June 2004 sent Military Observers to the Darfur region and a high level Team of Experts from South Africa and the AU Commission to carry out a preliminary assessment of post-conflict needs in Sudan. The AU Peace and Security Council decided that AMIS should consist of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers, up to 815 civilian police personnel as well as the appropriate civilian personnel. Initial deployments were carried out in August 2004. As of October 2004, the number of military personnel deployed under AMIS is 597 troops, with troop contributions from Nigeria and Rwanda.

 

Parties to the conflict in Darfur remain highly suspicious of each other and negotiations up until now have not made much progress. The JEM stated that it believed the government was preparing for war on an even greater scale. The rebels have also accused the government of redeploying forces from areas now considered peaceful in the South, to the Darfur region. Cease-fire arrangements have continually been violated and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons continues to rise. The United Nations has urged urgent action on the situation. The international community and the UN have been critical of AMIS due to the slow deployment of troops. While the CPA has been lauded as a crucial milestone for the Sudan, some criticism has been levelled due to the fact that it does not address the conflict in Darfur. The UN Security Council has threatened sanctions if the violence in Darfur is not brought to an end. The Bashir government has stated its commitment to the CPA and has alluded to the fact that it could be used as a blue-print for discussions with the JEM and SLA to try and peacefully negotiate a solution to the situation in Darfur.

A note on ethno-religious conflict in the Sudan

 

As noted earlier, Sudan has a rich history and has been a convergence point for numerous cultures over the centuries. The main groups can be divided as follows: the Nilotic Muslim Arabs that consists of Arab immigrants that began settling in the Nile Valley from the 13th Century onwards. The Sudanic or Sahelian peoples are groups of African origin and stretch right across the continent from Nigeria all the way through to the Sudan. The Fur or Funj are examples of Sahelian groups. The Beja, in the east, are neither Arab nor African, but remnants from ancient Cushitic kingdoms in the Sudan. There is also often confusion regarding the Nubians and the Nuba of the Sudan, which in fact are two completely separate groups. A key distinction needs to be made: the Nubia is an ancient African Christian kingdom that was also known as the Black Pharaohs, which at the height of its power fiercely competed with Egypt. The Nubians are found in upper Sudan and the lower reaches of Egypt. Very few Nubians remain and many of their communities were disrupted and resettled for the construction of the Aswan High Dam during the 1960s. Their Christian kingdom collapsed in 1900, however the Nubian language has perpetuated itself until today. The Nuba, on the other hand, are also descendants of the Cushitic kingdoms of the 8th century as well as an amalgam of various different tribes and languages. They live in the Nuba Mountains, which are wedged between Northern and Southern Sudan. The Nuba mountains are resource rich and the area is in fact a contested region between North and South Sudan. The Nuba also have a very distinct and old heritage and are known for their tolerance. There is no dominant religion for the Nuba – they have amongst themselves Muslims, Christians and animists.

 

Although ethnicity and religion have played a large part in the Sudanese conflict, economic and political marginalization have been motivating factors for conflict. Ethnicity and religion have been manipulated for political purposes. Evidence of government PDF forces indiscriminately targeting Muslim and Christian communities attenuates ideological underpinnings of the pro-Islamization government. Moreover, attacks by the Janjaweed militia on Black Muslim communities and their cattle or land in Darfur highlights the resource aspect of the conflict.

 

Most northern political groups have seen assimilation of the dominant Islamic, Arab culture as a basis for a common Sudanese identity. This policy has failed and does not take into consideration large segments of the population that do not identify with the Arab culture. There exists essentially a clash of two perceived origins; the association with Arab-Islamic culture versus Africanism, not mere ethnic or religious cleavages. It is essential to highlight that many Northern Black Muslims still associate with their African customs and linguistic heritage yet embrace Islam, thus retaining their cultural legacy and not adopting Arab culture. An elitist Arab subset of society has been able to control successive governments and attempt to impose their perceived superior culture. Reference to an Arab culture is a hugely ambiguous term that needs further explanation. Furthermore, according to Rachel Gisselquist, a mere 30% of Sudanese population identifies itself as Arab. An Arab-identified person is someone whose mother tongue is Arabic and is racially “similar to the populations of the old historical Abyssinian heartland of Ethiopia ”. Thus, it is not simply Muslim versus Christian or Arab versus African, but a complex question of identity that has been agita ted for political and economic purposes.

Security related budget:

 

The Government of Sudan is estimated to spend at least US$ 1 million per day on the civil war.

Political Oversight:

 

President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces is Lieutenant-General Hassan Omar al Bashir. Minister of Defence is Maj-Gen Bakri Hasan Salih.

Forces deployed outside the country:

 

Sudan does not acknowledge any troop deployment outside its borders. It has, however, at different times been involved in the conflicts in the DRC (in August 1998, in support of President Laurent-Desire Kabila against the rebel forces backed by Uganda), in northern Uganda (in support of the Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, fighting against the government of Yoweri Museveni), in Eritrea, and in Ethiopia. It has also provided military support to the governments of Chad and Central African Republic.

Sudan Armed Forces:

 

Total strength and composition: Estimated total strength of the Sudanese armed forces in 2000 was approximately 100,000. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that a further 85,000 reserves and 15,000 active irregulars in the paramilitary Popular Defence Force (PDF) militia were also available; on top of this, the army can also call on the services of at least 20,000 pro-government militias operating in the south, who have since the early 1990s broken from the SPLA. The latest CIA statistics (2004 estimate) indicate that there is approximately 5,75 million males currently fit for military service. Although the army is ill-equipped, it has more arms and vehicles than the rebel SPLA.

Senior Personnel:

 

•  Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen (Engineer) Abbas Arabi

•  Deputy Chief of Staff: General Mohamed Bashir Suleiman

•  Chief of Intelligence: Lt.Gen Muhammed Sanoussi Ahmed

•  Chief of Staff Operations: ---

Structure:

 

The army forms by far the largest proportion of the armed forces. The airforce consists of approximately 3,000, and the navy of approximately 1,500.

Defence Budget:

 

It is difficult to give reliable figures due to much secrecy on the part of Bashir's government. According to the CIA, military expenditures for 2001 were estimated at $581 million per annum. In 1999, military expenditures were estimated at 2.5% of GDP.

Army Bases:

 

•  Atbara

•  Dongola

•  Juba

•  Kassala

•  Khartoum

•  Nyala Omdurman

•  Port Sudan

 

Defence Equipment:

Armour:

T54/55	Main Battle Tank	270
Type 59	Main Battle Tank	60
Type 63	Main Battle Tank	45
M60A1/A3	Main Battle Tank	20
Type 62	Light Tank	70
Saladin Mk2	Reconnaissance Vehicle	40
AML-90	Reconnaissance Vehicle	6
Ferret	Reconnaissance Vehicle	50
BRDM	Armoured Fighting Vehicle (wheeled)	60
	Commando Series Armoured Fighting Vehicle	80
Type 531	APC (Wheeled)x	25 (none in service)
BTR-50	APC (Wheeled)	30
BTR-152	APC	50
OT-62	APC	20
OT-64	APC	50
M1 13A1	APC	36
Walid Mk1/2	APC (Wheeled)	96
Fahd	APC (Wheeled)	n/a

Air Force Bases:

 

•  Fashir

•  Juba

•  Kassala

•  Khartoum

•  Malakal

•  Port Sudan

•  Wad Madani

Air Inventory:

Fixed Wing:

F-7B	Air Defence Fighter	15
F-6	Air Defence Fighter	12
BAC Strikemaster Mk 90	Attack	3
MiG-23B Flogger	Attack	6
Shenyang F5	Attack	6
DHC-5D	Transport	4
Falcon 20F	VIP Transport	1
Falcon 50	VIP Transport	1

Rotary Wing:

Mi-24	Attack	2
BO 105CB	Attack	12
Mi-8	Armed Support	6
Mi-4	Light Support	4
AB212	Light Support	11
IAR-330L	Light Support	15

Naval Bases:

 

•  Flamingo Bay (Red Sea)

•  Khartoum

•  Kosti (Nile)

•  Port Sudan

Inventory:

Rasmussen	Coastal Patrol Craft	2
Kurmuk (Type 15)	Inshore Patrol Craft	4
Sewart	Inshore Patrol Craft	4
Ashoora 1	Inshore Patrol Craft	8
AFL	Supply	7

 

Security Forces:

 

The main intelligence organizations are the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the General Security Organization.

Popular Defence Force (PDF):

 

The paramilitary PDF was formed in 1989, and was from the beginning closely linked to the NIF. Initially, the NIF envisioned that the PDF would eventually replace the Sudan Armed Forces as the main defence army of the country and government. The split which erupted between President al-Bashir and Speaker al Turabi in 1998 was in part over the role of the PDF versus the defence force. Bashir, representing the army, appears to have won that battle, temporarily at least. In 1994, PDF training camps were established that service all young people of university age, and political indoctrination is an important aspect. The PDF has also incorporated civil servants into its training and indoctrination. The PDF serves on the front in the war against the rebels, despite being a“political” fighting force.

Rebel Forces:

Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)

 

The main rebel force is the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the military wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). John Garang is both leader of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA. Since its formation in 1983, the SPLA has received crucial military support from its neighbours. In the first years of its existence, it received assistance from Ethiopia, Israel and Libya. Libya later shifted its support to the Sudanese government after the overthrow of Nimeiri. In 1991, the SPLA received an almost fatal blow when the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown in Ethiopia and it lost its most important source of military hardware. In the 1990s the SPLA was able to enlist the support of the new governments in Addis Ababa and Asmara, as well as of the government of Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, partly in response to the Khartoum government's support of armed opposition movements in those countries. By the latter 1990s, there was also increasing evidence that these neighbouring states were acting as conduits for US military hardware to the SPLA - the US branded the Khartoum government a rogue state in 1996.

 

With the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and Ugandan involvement in the DRC conflict in 1998, these countries began making overtures to the Khartoum government, and their support to the SPLA has been drastically reduced, though not, as has been reported, completely stopped.

 

The SPLA operates in brigade-sized units, and is both highly mobile and in possession of good communications between the different war fronts. In 1995, the SPLA, together with a number of northern opposition groups, formed the NDA which united them under a single military command, under the control of Garang. However, the different fighting forces are not yet fully integrated, and the SPLA, with an estimated fighting force of 20,000-30,000, remains the main fighting force. But in the mid-1990s, the fighting spread to other areas of Sudan, outside the south, and a number of northern groups were involved in fighting in the east, along the Eritrean border.

SPLA Doctrine:

 

The SPLA is a highly centralized guerrilla movement, in which planning and movement of troops is controlled by the central leadership. The SPLA has adopted a strategy of military fighting in the hinterland, and against important economic installations, combined with increased political pressure in the main northern cities, directed by its northern allies in the NDA. This would, it is hoped, eventually lead to a popular uprising against the government.

The Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF)

 

The Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) are composed of northern military officers who broke away from the government. Led by Aziz Khalid, their forces are estimated to number 500.

The Beja Congress

 

Operating in the east, along the Eritrean border, their forces number some 500. The Beja are a Muslim non-Arab minority group opposed to the government's arabization programme. They have undertaken a number of highly symbolic sabotage attacks against the oil pipeline. The forces of the New Sudan Brigade total around 2,000.