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Constitution & political system
Constitution - none; constitution of September 1968 was suspended in April 1973. A new constitution was promulgated on 13 October 1978, but was not formally presented to the people. Swaziland’s constitution, or the lack of one, lies at the heart of political risk in that country. For the past fifty years Swaziland has been struggling to find a way of marrying the demands of the “modern” bureaucratic state with the power and privileges accruing to those owing their position to a “traditional” system centered upon the ruling Dlamini royal lineage.
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Legal system
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- based on South African Roman-Dutch law in statutory courts and Swazi traditional law and custom in traditional courts.
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Legislative branch
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- Bicameral parliament or Libandla, consisting of a Senate (20 seats) and House of Assembly (65 seats).
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Elections
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- House of Assembly elections last held September 1998.
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Swaziland’s constitution, or the lack of one, lies at the heart of political risk in that country. For the past fifty years Swaziland has been struggling to find a way of marrying the demands of the “modern” bureaucratic state with the power and privileges accruing to those owing their position to a “traditional” system centred upon the ruling Dlamini royal lineage.
On 6 September 1968 Swaziland became independent, with a parliamentary multiparty system dominated by the Dlaminis’ own political creation, the Imbokodvo National movement (INM), which had taken all the seats in the pre-independence elections of 1962 and 1967. During the next few years King Sobhuza II outmanoeuvred the relatively small group of modernists who sought to reduce his role to that of a constitutional monarch or figurehead, and although the terms of the largely British-designed constitution forced him to rule through parliament, no laws were passed without his approval. In the elections of 1972, however, it appeared that the INM's parliamentary monopoly had been breached when three opposition members were returned by the electorate. In a long court battle the INM and the King himself sought to overturn this election result. They proved unsuccessful, but in April 1973 King Sobhuza suspended the constitution, which he declared unsuitable, and appointed a royal commission to make recommendations on a constitutional system more amenable to Swaziland's traditional élite.
The commission's findings were never published, but in 1977, as the life of parliament was about to expire, the King announced that Swaziland would now be ruled through “traditional institutions”, and that in future MPs would be elected by an indirect system centring upon regional committees (tinkhundla). In essence this system was designed to prevent the modernists and reformers gaining even the smallest foothold in the political arena. Despite the apparent reintroduction of constitutional institutions, Swaziland was now an absolute monarchy, in which unauthorized public meetings were prohibited and preventive detention was used to deter opponents.
Despite the myths perpetuated, often in good faith, by the “traditionalist” camp, the Swazi kingdom it is neither very old in historical terms, nor have its institutions been cast in stone. Indeed, one of the underlying reasons for King Sobhuza's success as a leader was his ability not only to modify and transform Swazi tradition when occasion demanded, but even to re-invent it. It was due in no small part to Sobhuza's own personal charisma and stature that certain institutions and practices advocated by him came to be accepted by the majority of his subjects as essentially“Swazi” and therefore immutable.
King Sobhuza's own presence and personal skills might have kept this unusual political system working, but as he was now 80 years of age, provision had to be made for the succession, never an easy process in Swazi history. Before matters could be finalized, Sobhuza died suddenly, in August 1982.
As so often in Swazi history, the death of the King ushered in a time of troubles, for the succession goes almost invariably to one of the late King's youngest sons. The Queen Mother, Dzeliwe, now assumed control as Queen Regent, pending the coming of age of the Crown Prince, whose identity was still a closely guarded secret (Sobhuza was survived by some 110 children, of whom 40 were sons). Dzeliwe soon found herself embroiled in a power struggle with some of the senior princes in the royal council, who feared that she might encourage reforms that could threaten their privileged position. In August 1983 the princes struck, deposing the Queen Regent, and replacing her with Queen Ntombi, the mother of the Crown Prince. This dramatic development caused a severe rift within the royal family, and led to unprecedented public protest, which abated only in September with the return of the Crown Prince from school in England.
The power struggle within the ruling élite continued, with detentions and arrests of prominent figures who dared oppose the new royal council. In October 1985 the tide turned, and early in 1986 the“usurpers” within the council found themselves under attack and eventually in prison. On 25 April Prince Makhosetive ascended the throne as Mswati III. As an absolute monarch aged just 18 years, Mswati III faced a formidable challenge in trying to restore the unity of the Dlaminis at the same time as he sought policies to combat the substantial economic and social problems confronting the kingdom.
By 1988 it was clear to most observers that the political and governmental system was in need of radical change. Sobhuza's experiment had failed to meet the demands made of it. Efforts to reform this system and the resistance to change by so-called“traditionalists” have continued to provide the dominant theme in Swaziland's history ever since.
By the end of the 1980s coherent opposition to the status quo was emerging from the ranks of organized labour and the students at the national university, who were willing to defy legislation that branded virtually all criticism as subversive. By the beginning of 1991, events in South Africa, and the keener interest being shown in Swazi affairs among foreign aid donors nudged the King and his followers towards the path of reform. In September 1991 a consultative commission, known as Vusela (Greeting) I was established, to canvass Swazi opinion on constitutional matters. The commission was dominated by conservatives, and proved a disaster, simply heightening political tensions. Its successor, Vusela II, was a little more progressive, and recommended a fairly substantial reform of the system, though it stopped short of calling for the reintroduction of party politics. The political struggle now moved to focus on this issue, with the reformists drawing encouragement from the democratic revolution in South Africa. Strikes, political violence and arson have raised the stakes in the political arena, and the conservatives and traditionalists find themselves under increasing pressure to dismantle the system that assures them of their place in society.
Understanding the complexity of Swaziland's political and social turmoil it is made more difficult by pervasive rumour and intrigue. More than that, the duality of the political system it is reflected in one of world views. There it is a substantial part of Swazi society, including most of the leadership, whose view of causation relies upon a belief in the supernatural. In other words, many of the people involved sometimes act according to assumptions about causal relationships that would make little sense in the modern, industrialized world. The rituals and symbols of kingship, for example, are more than mere tokens: to the key participants they are real, of frightening power and efficacy.
This situation will obviously compound the problems of finding a way for Swaziland's political and social order to undergo an orderly transformation into a modern democratic system, since this would involve an assault on the entire mystery of Swazi kingship and its religious and magical significance in the social fabric of rural Swazi society. By the same token, it is evident that the demands for democratic modernization being heard from young town-dwellers, students and organized labour in Swaziland have received a sympathetic hearing among South Africa's ruling circles, which will prevent any thought of outright suppression. King Mswati's late father Sobhuza dealt with political crises using a combination of charisma, political nous or guile. It is open to doubt whether the young King has inherited or yet developed these talents, and it seems probable that the next few years will see the royal house put to its severest test in a century.
Numerous cabinet reshuffles have been seized upon as signs either of impending change or of a hardening of the political arteries. More often than not, however, it appears that these were mere attempts at procrastination. The deliberations of the most recent constitutional review commission, appointed in 1996, were ponderous and it was forbidden to recruit constitutional experts to assist it in formulating a draft the completion date of which was postponed several times. Most human rights and pro-democracy bodies in the kingdom rejected the report before it was even delivered to the King in February 2001, four months after its completion. Mswati III’s ill-health prevented him making any pronouncements on its findings in the first half of the year, but decrees were issued reiterating the ban on political parties and other provisions of the key 1973 decree. Though this represented a slight softening of a highly authoritarian diktat issued the previous month, it was a strong indication that the conservatives centred around the queen-mothers court were consolidating their ascendancy.
This was borne out on 11 August 2001 when King Mswati revealed the long-awaited review. The chairman of the commission told the crowd at the royal kraal that their investigations had demonstrated that the people were satisfied with the existing system. His deputy added for good measure that the King’s powers would be enlarged and that the country did not want trades unions.
The gauntlet has been cast down. In the past the palace has had to contend with a fairly narrowly based modernising opposition based on the professional classes, trades unions and students. The extension of the royal prerogative in more absolutist terms over rural chiefs, already presaged in two of the eastern chieftaincies, and the broader adoption of dictatorial initiatives in personal matters may yet change the political equation.
Opposition to King Mswati’s III undemocratic rule reached unprecedented
levels in 2002, with increased allegations of the abuse of power being levelled
against the monarchy by pro democracy activists. Of primary concern was that
a flawed constitution would cause division in the nation that could possibly
lead to clashes between Royalists and those in favour of democracy. In a bid
to reduce tension surrounding the proposed new constitution, the Swaziland Council
of Churches organised a conference addressed by the Deputy Prime Minister early
in 2002. The conference subsequently appointed a 14-person committee to have
an audience with King Mswati, and inform the monarch of criticisms about the
constitution and the royal decree that bans political activity. The Committee
members include conservative Senators Simeon Simelane and Thabsile Mavimbela,
professors from the University of Swaziland, and representatives from NGOs, labour
unions, and the Swaziland branch of the Media Institute of Southern Africa. The
out come of the deliberations by the committee produced results, which were unfortunately
consistent with the past autocratic position adopted by the monarchy. Royalist
elements maintained that a referendum on royal rule has already been held, and
its results will form a new national constitution that is due in 2003. Influential
elements within the palace argued that Prince Mangaliso Dlamini had alread led
a Constitutional Review Commission that “interviewed ordinary Swazis” in
secret on the type of governance they preferred. Although the commission released
no data on how many Swazis were interviewed or what was said, Dlamini reported
to Mswati that an overwhelming majority wished to see the king's powers enhanced,
and want his political opponents to remain banned. Accepting his brother's constitutional
report before giving it to another prince to draft into a governing document,
Mswati told the Swazi people that they have spoken once and for all on the issue
of royal rule.
The Swaziland Democratic Alliance, made up of illegal political groups, progressive
labour unions and human rights organisations, not surprisingly rejected the upcoming
constitution.
In an attempt to challenge the power of the monarchy, a group of lawyers filed
an action in The Swaziland Court of Appeal opposing the Kings ability to decree
laws without first consulting parliament. The Court of Appeal ruling in November
2002 stripped Mswati of the power to decree laws without parliament, but Prime
Minister Sibusiso Dlamini said government would ignore the decision.
The monarchies defiance of legislative authority resulted in the
Swazi Senate in August 2002 calling for the arrest of Prime Minister
Sibusiso Dlamini over the cabinet's use of development funds to purchase
a US $45 million luxury jet for King Mswati III, amid a food crisis
that threatens one quarter of the population. A US $20 million down
payment was paid to ExecuJet, a South African firm representing Bombardier
Aerospace, the Canadian manufacturer of the 18-seater Global Express
Bombardier corporate-style long-range jet for Mswati. To purchase
the plane, the prime minister took funds earmarked by parliament to
build factory shells for foreign investors and to upgrade the road
infrastructure. In terms of government expenditures, the jet's purchase
price is more than double the annual health budget of US $20 million,
at a time of an AIDS crisis is reaching proportions.
2003 will see parliamentary elections in October, when candidates
unaligned with any political parties vie for 55 seats in local constituencies,
called Tinkhundla. Because they have no party platforms to follow,
candidates will woo voters with promises of clinics, roads and employment-generating
projects, none of which MPs are in a position to deliver. Cabinet
ministers, all palace appointees, determine development projects.
Parliament does not set national policy or write
legislation, which is the privilege of Mswati and is carried out
by cabinet. MPs
complain they have been reduced to rubber stamps,
and that cabinet ministers ignore them even in an advisory capacity.
The local press
printed a memo from Swaziland's ambassador to the
United States to the prime minister noting the perception of the
international community
that Swaziland has no parliament.
Neighbouring South Africa has remained quiet about
governance in Swaziland, but the United States
and European Union are expecting political reform, specifically a
bill
of rights that
transcends the power of the king.
However the question that continues to concern most political analysts
centres around what the opposition pro-democracy movement must do
to demonstrate that they have real popular support, mandating them
to continue their challenge to royal rule. The consensus of opinion
is that an unequivocal display of numbers through a march or demonstration
must be mounted.
Conversely, what must sub-Saharan Africa's last absolute
monarchy do in 2003 to prove to a world doubtful
of the legitimacy of non-democratic states that the palace should
continue to rule uncontested?
Many observers believe that regular and free elections,
or at least a referendum, should be held to settle this question
for the time
being.
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