Introduction

The priority issues addressed in Part One of this paper relate to human security or as we would prefer to call it, ‘human stability’, at the regional, national and sub-regional level in the Horn of Africa.

In Part Two (to be published in the next volume of this journal) specific attention is paid to steps taken at the level of the African continent towards promoting increased human stability and the prevention of conflict in the region, the development of a conflict prevention agenda at the sub-regional level, and the practical steps needed to realise these objectives.

Social scientists often feel the need to define one or two terms at occasions like these, because they find it difficult in recent times even to communicate successfully among themselves, let alone with people representing other disciplines. Thus we would like to substantiate why we prefer the use of the term ‘stability’ rather than ‘security’. One could define security as ‘the guarantee of safety’ as has often been done. One might further define the guarantee of safety as ‘the political arrangements that make war less likely, which provide for negotiations rather than belligerence and which aim to preserve peace as the normal condition among states’.

The term ‘security’ has sometimes assumed sinister overtones in the sense of ‘national security’. National security can refer to safety, the likelihood of the absence of war, the likelihood of negotiations rather than belligerence and the preservation of peace as the normal condition for some people within the same society but not for others. National security also has come to denote all purposes of defence, including the preparations for belligerence, pre-emptive strikes and even any presumed ‘vital’ interest. As a result, policies of national security may precipitate insecurity rather than security by being the exclusive tools of those in power. Moreover, when measured against the reality of instability and insurrection in especially the less economically developed countries today, speaking of ‘guarantees’ or ‘near guarantees’ of peace and stability appears to be somewhat idealistic. Because they may be ideologically loaded in favour of the ruling classes, for those who have attained power a more neutral term such as ‘human stability’ may take some of the heat out of the debate and add more light to it. This may indeed be one reason why the terms ‘stability’ and ‘destabilisation’ appear to be more appropriate.

The political climate in the Horn of Africa today is influenced by local political and social conflicts not only in terms of specific histories and effects, but also their interaction with forces operating at a global level. The history of the countries of the Horn since the end of colonialism in the region has largely been one of violent repression and insurgency. No matter how governments in the region came to power, in practically every case, force has been the means of dislodging them. Succession by peaceful election has been the exception. Independent organisations formed in civil society have proven to be ineffective counters to the power of the chiefs of state and the circles surrounding them. They have been either banned outright and forced to go underground or carefully monitored to ensure they are apolitical.

In spite of this, civil society can have a profound influence on governments and military regimes in the Horn. Groups may organise by affinity (for example age, kinship, gender, work and religion). The groups could include church groups, elder associations, youth groups and labour unions. On the other hand, they may gather only temporarily in public demonstrations or private meetings to pursue common ends. The level of independence or autonomy of civil society is often regarded as a significant indicator of the degree of democracy in a country.

Nation states attempting to eliminate or control civil society often use authoritarian practices and policies to do so. They often try to create the illusion of a thriving civil society by creating their own official organisations with a view to mobilising the population in public support of goals formulated by the regime themselves. The so-called GONGO (government organised non-governmental organisation) is a related phenomenon. Its specific task is to express public solidarity with its regime at international meeting places even while claiming to represent civil society. In these circumstances the intent of the state may be that it aims not to depoliticise civil society, but to subjugate or eliminate it. In this paper we look at the internal conflicts in the Horn of Africa in terms of the balance of power between civil society and the state in the countries comprising the Horn.

The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is in a part of the African continent in which struggles over economic and political power often take the form of ethnic conflict. This portion of the continent is underdeveloped and the socio-economic systems of the countries in it are often rooted in exploitative relations. Ethnic identities in this region, although they are ‘beneficial’ for those ethnic groups that are in power, tend to be used to consolidate and serve the interests of the dominant ethnic groups. The contemporary destruction of the legitimacy and accountability of many of the states in the region results in part from their territorial awkwardness, which was brought about by colonial partition and then ‘transferred’ to the local elite.

In these circumstances, overlapping ethnic identity between states, especially in the pursuit of power, often becomes a source of conflict rather than unity. In the past two decades hundreds of thousands of people have indeed become the victims of violent conflict and dictatorships in the region. In their alienation from the state, many people have fled and become part of Africa’s gloomy refugee problem.

The states of the Horn of Africa are undermined by acute environmental degradation. A fragile ecological inheritance of cyclical drought has been exacerbated by armed conflicts. Pastoralists and other hinterland populations have been among the primary victims. Desertification, droughts, environmental degradation and a scarcity of resources have displaced large numbers of people, driving them across national borders as migrants or as environmental refugees. Aside from putting pressure on state boundaries, their arrival sometimes results in feelings of insecurity and intolerance among the local population, who now have to compete for the same limited resources. This of course can engender xenophobia and conflict of various kinds in the populations of the receiving countries.

Internal social tensions and external pressure are combining to push people in the region towards larger groupings which are better able to respond to the global economy. Technological innovations, although they have helped nation-states, are now helping to undermine national borders as capital and information flows show scant respect for boundaries. One of the main effects is that, no matter what the origin of social conflicts, it is becoming increasingly difficult to contain them with present state frameworks. The state failures in Somalia, for instance, indicate that a monopoly of power held by one group backed by foreign sponsors may lead to government failure and civil war. Furthermore, in some African countries the differences between crime and war are becoming less obvious.

Many poverty-stricken followers of African warlords find membership of those warlords’ rag-tag armies preferable to conditions in general in their countries. Facing such armed bandits, Africa’s professional armies are often found wanting. Their budgets are often smaller, their equipment more out of date, their salaries late or unpaid. Morale is sinking. War’s advantage over mere delinquency is that it legitimises in the name of ‘justice’ or ‘the revolution’ the use of arms and violence to gain control over the resources of the state. Thus the regular armies of increasing numbers of African states have been defeated and replaced with striking ease by insurgent guerrilla forces drawn from their own citizens. A major problem thereafter for the new regimes even as they start building up new armies, is how to disarm and demobilise various other bands of ethnically-based guerrillas. The situation is further complicated by the need to recruit, train and organise new armies from among people who often remain ethnically polarised. Moreover, the colonial practice of recruiting from and promoting in the army smaller, less politically powerful ethnic groups has created one of the major sources of the instability that plagues army-state relations in post-colonial Africa. In effect, those relations have become unhinged to the extent that the geo-ethnic make-up of the group that wields military power need not reflect or articulate the outlook or position of the group whose members claim the mandate to rule. In this process, old prejudices are susceptible to manipulation by elites on all sides of the conflict.

These processes indicate post-colonial instability in the region and open the possibility that state boundaries as recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), may be altered in future. There is an inexorable growth in the list of provinces that have already detached themselves from central authority, with federalism and secession remaining as viable options. Although secession as such has thus far been the exception, Eritrea is probably the most relevant example of a successful breakaway. More generally, communities who have suffered at the hands of dominant groups holding military and/or political power, claim that their rights as groups should be recognised and actions be taken to satisfy their demands.

Having established some of the basic parameters of the often intransigent problems that face governments both in Africa and the region of Africa within which the Horn of Africa falls, we now turn to the Horn of Africa itself. People who live in the Horn of Africa have faced a pervasive crisis for a very long time. The dynamics of the crisis originate at the local and at the global level. The people suffer from the impact of colonialism and authoritarianism, and the rule of those who try to manipulate and control the state for their own narrow interests. The crisis is manifested in many different forms: civil wars, violation of human rights, the suppression of civil liberties, abject poverty, famine, epidemics, debt problems, population displacement, ecological disasters and disenfranchisement. Marginalised social groups – women, children, the elderly, the economically destitute and ethnic minorities – bear the brunt of the crisis.

The crisis in the Horn appears to be without end. Attempts by groups inside and outside the countries to manipulate and control their states, and the inequitable distribution of resources generate intense armed conflicts among different social groups. These conflicts result in further depletion of resources, violence, disruption of economic production and increased demographic displacement. Eventually, the crisis destroys the social fabric by promoting militarisation, tyranny and mutual animosity and together these over time produce a ‘culture of warfare’. The region’s bondage to world markets also contributes to the crisis: regional economies are disrupted by unequal exchange and exploitative relations with the West and the formation of an alliance between global capital and the region’s economically privileged and ruling political elites.

Another relevant feature of the crisis in the region is the formation and disintegration of centralised states. On the one hand, the centralising states are affected by the crisis, which can lead to their fragmentation and demise. On the other hand, the states themselves contribute to the escalation of the crisis. Varied attempts to form and centralise the states in the Horn of Africa have usually been at the centre of the crisis. Many of the political and armed conflicts in the region have been aimed at control of state power, because states have been central conduits to power and resources in colonial and post-colonial Africa.

The ruling political groups often are not interested in power sharing, while formally presenting themselves as facades of representative democracy. These rulers have become clientelist and sectarian, leaving no political space for disenfranchised and marginalised social groups, who often have no choice but to resort to resistance to obtain freedom and emancipation. Consequently, the states themselves in the Horn of Africa have become central elements of the crisis, largely through their incessant quest to centralise and concentrate power. These states then produce and reproduce hegemonic facades, seemingly so inextricably caught up in their own political practices that they cannot extricate themselves from it. The only solution then is periodic disintegration of the states.

The Horn of Africa, comprising Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, is a region of considerable strategic importance, even to nations far beyond its borders. There are three main reasons why the Horn of Africa has attracted international attention for many centuries. First, its strategic location: four countries in the Horn of Africa, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, border two crucial sea routes, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. These waterways are currently regaining importance in international naval trade now that a number of Middle Eastern countries, Asian countries and Russia are trying to open new markets in Africa in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, Africa is emerging as a potentially lucrative market for Asian electronic technology, oil has been discovered, and globalisation has affected international trade. These factors have combined to make the Horn of Africa an important region in the international economic arena of the 21st century. Sudan has potential as an oil producer, while the country has significant water reserves and agricultural potential, which could make it a meaningful contributor to regional development once it attains internal stability. Ethiopia, with its huge water reserves and human resources, can also be considered a contributor to regional prosperity, should its internal problems be resolved.

Second, the region has the most diverse religious and ethnic groupings. In view of a tendency for ethnic and tribal wars to erupt throughout the region, this situation requires careful management. Most of the residents of the Horn of Africa espouse Sunni Islam as their religion and most of them can trace their historic origins to the Middle East. With its radical religious politics, it is likely that the Horn of Africa will witness, as has already been the case in Sudan and some parts of Somalia, the rise of Islamic radicals trying to impose their version of Islam on others. The emerging latent rivalry between Sunni and Shiite Islam on the east coast of Africa might well pose a threat in some countries in the Horn of Africa.

Finally, the Horn of Africa has significant agricultural potential. The source of over 80% of the waters of the Nile River and its tributaries is in the area. With such agricultural potential, the Horn of Africa could achieve economic prosperity should its leaders assign top priority to peace in the region. The Horn of Africa has the capacity to identify trade interests in East Africa and neighbouring Middle Eastern and Asian countries. However, representative political participation and economic stability are two major prerequisites that the region has to achieve if it is to become part of an integrated African economy, and more so now that African decision makers are putting in place the economically strategic New Africa Initiative.

Even from the short description above, it can be deduced that discussing war, peace and development in the Horn of Africa is a daunting task and requires a critical analysis of the situation in each country separately. Identification of the mechanisms available to individuals handling peace and war in that volatile region are often the crucial issues at stake in such analyses.

Sudan

Sudan straddles both the African continent’s Arab north and its sub-Saharan south and has a diverse landscape, consisting, away from the Nile River, mostly of semi-arid plains. Sudan, Africa’s largest country, is bordered by Egypt, the Red Sea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya. From 7000 BCE, farmers and herders lived along the Nile in Nubia, known to the Egyptians as Cush. Nubian civilisation reached its peak between 1750 BCE and 1500 BCE. It is thought to be the oldest civilisation in sub-Saharan Africa. By the mid-7th century, Arab Muslims had conquered Egypt and raided Nubia. In the early 1500s, black African Muslims called Funji conquered Sudan. Meanwhile black Africans settled in central and southern Sudan. From the 17th to the 19th centuries the rulers of these increasingly Islamic parts of Sudan adopted an Arab identity.

Sudan’s history since independence in 1956 indicates that successive Sudanese regimes have been unable to accommodate the diversity of their people in an inclusive nationhood. The predominantly Muslim north has controlled each government. Discrimination against non-Arabs and non-Muslims and aggressive attempts to eliminate them, have been perpetrated by military and civilian governments alike.

The conflict can be divided into three phases: 1955–1972, 1975–1982 and 1983 to date. The root causes of the conflict throughout this period can be summarised as:

Cultural, religious, historical, ethnic and political diversity between the north and the south – the south sees itself as African and mainly Christian, a historically separate entity unlike the Arabised north, where the majority of the population identify with Arab culture and the Muslim religion.



The colonial history of the two regions: the successive British and Egyptian colonial authorities treated the two regions differently, as separate entities, having found very little that could help to forge any kind of meaningful integration between the two regions. Politically, the south was administered as an entity separate from the north. Christian missionaries were confined to this region and given responsibility for all education. The north was treated as part of the Middle Eastern world, whereas the south was administered to become part of the British East Africa territories. The 1906 Closed Districts Ordinance required Northern Sudanese and non-Sudanese to have visas in order to enter Southern Sudan.



Until the 1980s the south was economically less developed than the north, where the colonial administration had concentrated the main economic projects of the country. However, with the oil, water and agricultural land of the south becoming increasingly important aspects, natural resources will continue to evolve into one of the key issues in north-south relations.

The modern civil wars can be traced back to August 1955, when the first military rebellion, referred to as the Torit Mutiny, broke out, leading to the civil war that came to an end in 1972, when the Addis Ababa agreement was signed between the central government and the southern rebels. In 1975, however, a group of soldiers rebelled in protest against the government’s policy of transferring some former AnyaNya units that composed the bulk of the pre-Addis Ababa agreement and who had been integrated into the Sudanese army in 1972, to the north. In 1983 there was a further mutiny, involving the central government’s alleged violation of the Addis Ababa agreement. The mutineers joined the rebels of 1975, who were already waging a war against the Jaffar Mohamed Numeiri government from their bases near the border between Sudan and Ethiopia.

President Numeiri, who came to power in 1969 by means of a military coup, made three errors that led to his overthrow and the third civil war in the country. First, Numeiri tried to redraw the north-south boundaries of 1956 with the aim of annexing the oil-rich southern province of Bentiu and a province rich in agricultural resources, Renk. Second, Numeiri re-divided the south in 1983 into three mini-regions with capitals in Juba, Malakal and Wau. Third, Numeiri declared Islamic law applicable throughout the country, including the south. Numeiri was overthrown by a popular uprising in April 1985. A joint military-civil government under General Swar al-Dahab took power. In 1986, an elected civilian government took over the administration of the country under the premiership of Sadiq al-Mahdi. However, an Islamist coup led by General Omar Ahmed al-Bashir and Dr Hassan Abdalla al-Turabi, toppled al-Mahdi three years later. Thereafter, a confused situation led to the current stalemate:

the Islamist government declared a holy war (Jihad) on southern rebels;



the southern groups organised into the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/SPLM) and held both secret and open talks with the governments of Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia in the United States (US);



other peace initiatives were led by the OAU and non-Sudanese;



a quarrel between al-Turabi and his students over power and the distribution of revenues from the oil-rich south led to al-Turabi’s imprisonment;



splits occurred in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the umbrella organisation of northern Sudanese opposition groups.

Consequently, non-Muslims in Sudan continue to occupy a tenuous position under a regime that has stated its aim to be to build an Islamic state according to a version of Islam that discriminates against non-Muslims. Non-Muslims are theoretically excluded from high-level government positions, including those in the judiciary, the military and any position in which they would exercise authority over Muslims.

Sudan’s history in the region is unique in the sense that it has experienced several periods of democracy brought about largely by popular uprisings that overthrew military regimes. In 1989, however, Lt Gen Omar Hassan al Bashir overthrew the elected government of Sadiq el Mahdi and imposed martial law. Efforts to control Sudanese institutions and society began immediately. All political parties, labour unions, professional associations and independent institutions of civil society were banned. The assets of these institutions were seized and various GONGOs were created. Elections in the new national assembly, unions and universities became characterised by government-approved candidates and rigged voting procedures. Control of the judiciary has been transferred to the Department of Justice and the chief justice, formerly elected by sitting justices, is now appointed by the regime. Freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association have been suspended and all private newspapers banned.

The current regime is dedicated to fundamental religious and ideological changes aimed at building an Islamic nation and society. A policy of forced assimilation to Islamic and Arab national identity prevails. Resistance to these programmes is widespread. Although most of the Sudanese who took part in the struggle for human rights during the previous more democratic period have gone into exile, a new generation of people, many of them women and youths, have taken their place. Despite the risks, an extensive and informative network of activists and clandestine organisations has arisen. Although they operate ‘illegally’, this network has grown into a dynamic, continually expanding human rights community. Passive resistance and the documentation of torture, detentions and ethnic cleansing have become part of the tactics to needle the regime.

A unique aspect of Sudan compared to other countries in the Horn is that the Sudanese (at least those in the north) turn to parts of civil society to change their government and solve their problems. They look to students, trade unionists and the opposition, especially when buttressed by sympathetic elements in the army, to bring about a popular uprising.

Djibouti

Djibouti is strategically located on the strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea between Eritrea, Somaliland and Ethiopia. One of the smallest countries in Africa in both area and population, Djibouti, is the product of the 19th century French aim to gain a foothold on the north-eastern coast of Africa. It consisted of little more than a port and a capital city, also called Djibouti. In spite of this, Djibouti is today a principal base for the French Navy and Air Force in the Indian Ocean, a reluctant host to refugees from the surrounding countries and a member of the Arab League.

Since independence in 1977, President Hassan Gouled Aptidon appeared to consider it important that all groups be represented in the three branches of government. However, political loyalty appeared to be the most important qualification for office. Neither the legislature nor the judiciary was intended to provide a significant challenge to the power of the executive. The army and security forces acted to ensure the president’s dictate was law. Until a constitution was finally adopted in 1992, sudden decrees from the president constantly expanded the powers of the state. Recently, however, local human rights groups have emerged, for example, the Association for the Defence of Human Rights and Liberties and the Committee of Support for the Liberation of Political Detainees. A small core of persistent activists has been detained repeatedly, sometimes on the grounds of having allegedly defamed the army or slandered the president.

Civil war erupted in Djibouti in 1991. It was triggered by two main, related conditions. Gouled decided to run in 1993 for what turned out to be his last term of office. First, supported by his Issa clan, Gouled sought to isolate his opponents, imprisoning some and forcing others into exile. It should be recalled here that the population of Djibouti is about 60% Somali (of which the Issa constitute about 40%), while the Afar of Ethiopian origin make up about 35%. Both groups are Muslim. Second, Gouled’s government faced economic hardship, forcing many Djiboutians who were not part of the ruling tribe to ask for reforms. These two factors ultimately resulted in Afar tribesmen taking up arms, starting a civil war. A government offensive in 1993 forced thousands of families to flee to Somalia and Ethiopia.

Agreements concluded between the leaders of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) resulted in the incorporation of rebel leaders into the government. The 1994 agreement specifically required the FRUD to abandon armed resistance. Gouled was elected in 1993 in the country’s first multiparty elections, which were widely boycotted by the opposition. These elections followed after a constitution allowing for a limited multiparty state won the approval of voters in Djibouti. The election in 1999 was won, however, by Ismael Omar Guelleh. The idea that Djibouti was for all Djiboutians was enshrined in the constitution at the time. This helped opposition groups to feel they were part of the political process in the country.

Taking an inclusive approach to tackling political differences appears to have helped end the civil war in Djibouti. This inclusiveness could also benefit Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is located in the centre of north-eastern Africa – bordered by Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan – and is composed of numerous nationalities encompassing more than 80 language groups. Oromos constitute the largest language group and span more than half the country’s territory. Amharas, traditionally the cultural and political elite, are the second largest and Tigrayans third. Ethnic Somalis, also found in Djibouti and Somalia, and Afars, who also live in Djibouti and Eritrea, command strategic, if not numerical, importance because they live in border areas that have been a source of international conflict. Amharic (a Semitic language), Oromo, Tigrinya and Somali are spoke by two-thirds of the population. Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity and Islam are each adhered to by approximately 40% of the people, while the remainder are Protestant, Roman Catholic or followers of traditional religions. A small group, the Beta Israel, are Jewish.

Ethiopia is rich in resources. Some of the country’s agricultural failures have been precipitated by drought and insect infestations, but the scarcities and related deaths have been primarily human-made armed conflicts.

Historically, the Semitic Amhara and Tigray peoples of the northern highlands of Ethiopia have dominated political life in the region. Between 1941 and 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie tried to erase the identities of non-Amhara nations and nationalities in the name of Ethiopian unity. Amharic and Amhara culture became the essential attributes of being Ethiopian. As a result, peoples of the south, in particular, suffered comprehensive domination – economically, politically and culturally.

Between 1974 and 1991 the military dictatorship (Dergue) attempted to maintain the imperial state while modernising and secularising the country, primarily by breaking down the social and economic power of the church and landed aristocracy. However, this breakdown of power encouraged the proliferation of regional nationalism directed against the central government in Addis Ababa. The Dergue tried to purge all citizens suspected of harbouring ethnic loyalties, especially Eritreans. It recognised the right of all nationalities to a form of self-determination, defined not as the right to secession, but regional autonomy. The Somali invasion put an end to this tendency. After the Ogaden war in 1978, the Dergue leader, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, exploited clan differences between the two largest dissident pastoral communities, the Afars and Somalis. A third, smaller group, the Boran in Sidamo, were driven into the arms of the Dergue by opposition to Somali expansion. The largest ethnic group, the Oromo, also failed to create an effective national movement despite a history of ethnically based rebellion and the existence of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Other local peoples in the south such as the Gurage and the Sidamo, also wanted to create separate states, but complicated residence patterns would make drawing boundaries impossible. Under Mengistu’s 17-year reign, tens of thousands of suspected political opponents were murdered while several times that number were killed in a civil war that served as a convenient pretext for suspending freedoms and forbidding independent institutions.

In May 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of movements dominated by the initially Marxist-Leninist Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), marched into Addis Ababa. A number of foreign and Ethiopian observers have noted that the EPRDF’s record on civil rights is far better than its record on political rights. It is clear that the EPRDF chose stability over complete freedom of expression.

The EPRDF inherited a country infrastructurally, economically and psychologically devastated by war and totalitarian rule. A number of months after assuming power, the EPRDF convened a conference to which it invited 26 groups that had opposed Mengistu’s rule. The conference established the two-year Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and adopted a charter embracing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ensuring many freedoms, including the right to self-determination. The new government officially renounced Mengistu’s Marxism and committed itself to building a democratic society respectful of human rights.

So far, the processes of change have not been very smooth in Ethiopia. The TGE faced challenges including the rehabilitation of a devastated economy, the orderly demobilisation of hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the previous regime, the prosecution of more than 2000 people accused of human rights violations and the general absence of a democratic tradition. Moreover, the independence of Eritrea has represented a major bone of contention. There have been charges that Eritreans still living within the boundaries of Ethiopia are reaping the benefits of Ethiopian citizenship without having any of the obligations. There is also resentment in view of the allegation that Eritreans are ‘stealing’ Ethiopian jobs. Amharas have charged that they are accused of being settlers in regions where they have lived for centuries, that they are excluded from elections, prevented from engaging in entrepreneurial activities and have been discriminated against in the assignment of public assistance.

Moreover, civil organisations are struggling to generate citizen participation. Civil society in Ethiopia is very weak as that country proceeded directly from feudalism to communist dictatorship. Although some institutions had a measure of independence under the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopians had no experience in public institutions able to make the government accountable and little tradition of questioning authority. Local activists report that the vast majority of Ethiopians were traumatised by the Mengistu era, when almost every institution became just another instrument of the state.

Eritrea

Eritrea, a narrow country populated by 3.2 million people and extending from Djibouti in the west to Sudan on the Red Sea, achieved independence on the battlefield in 1991 after a 30-year war with Ethiopia. During the war, pro-independence Eritreans claimed that Eritrea was a region related to, but distinctive from, Ethiopia. Much of Eritrea has been culturally and politically linked to the Christian Abyssinian highlands since the first centuries AD. Eritrea was detached from Ethiopia in 1890 when Italy colonised those portions of Africa left after Western Europe’s lust for colonisation was satisfied. Although Italy aimed eventually to capture Ethiopia, the troops of Emperor Menelik II repelled them. Italy was therefore forced to make the best of its retention of Eritrea. At the same time, 50 years of Italian colonisation combined with later mistreatment by Ethiopian generals and administrators, ensured an Eritrean national consciousness.

Eritrea lost its formal autonomous status in 1962 when Emperor Haile Selassie pressurised the Eritrean legislative assembly into approving assimilation with Ethiopia and becoming a province of Ethiopia. At approximately the same time, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began an armed secession drive. The ELF drew its support mainly from Muslims in Eritrea’s western lowlands, who opposed incorporation into Christian-dominated Ethiopia. However, the ELF was gradually supplanted by another group, the more politically doctrinaire Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF, led initially by Christians from the western highlands, accused the ELF of representing the interests of a conservative Muslim elite. By contrast, the EPLF followed a Marxist, class-based analysis of Ethiopia’s history and rejected any appeal to Eritreans based on religion, region or ethnicity.

In 1974 Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by the Dergue. Despite initial independent Eritrea-minded hopes, it transpired that the nationalistic Dergue was as opposed to a sovereign Eritrea as the Emperor had been. The new junta, soon to be headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, was committed to maintaining the ‘Ethiopian province’. In the end an Ethiopian insurgent group allied to the EPLF moved in on Addis Ababa as the EPLF entered Asmara victorious after defeating the remnants of the Ethiopian army within Eritrea. During the 30 years of insurgency 40 000 Eritrean civilians died and over three-quarters of a million fled the country.

The pragmatic alliance between the EPLF (renamed the People’s Front for Justice and Democracy in February 1993) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a semi-broad-based coalition of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), enabled them to mutually strengthen their one-party states. The temporary alliance between the groups was instrumental in suppressing internal opposition forces that challenged their sectarian rule. For example, they drew up an extradition treaty primarily designed to expel and imprison political opponents. The Eritrean and Ethiopian groups are dominated by the elites of the Hamassien and Tigray regions, respectively, excluding other political collectives from a representative power-sharing arrangement.

In May 1991, Eritrea became de facto independent, following the defeat of the Dergue by the military alliance of the EPLF and the TPLF. The TPLF emerged as the leading group in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and has been a ruling group in Ethiopia since May 1991. In 1993, Eritrean independence was formally attained after a nominal referendum, with the United Nations (UN) admitting Eritrea as a member state.

Their tactical alliance enabled the two groups, during the crucial early stage of the ascendancy to power, to receive mutual support and recognition in establishing one-party states. They also assumed leading political roles in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes area, creating conflict in the course of this as neither nation was prepared to assume a subordinate position as they sought to expand their political and military dominance in the region. At the same time, the short-lived military pact between the two nations enabled the two ruling groups to deter any possible aggression from neighbouring states and to undertake military intervention in the civil war in Sudan in 1995–1996. With military and technical assistance from the US, the military pact was instrumental in the US policy which failed to oust Gen. Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Tourabi’s Sudanese National Islamic Front.

Economic co-operation between Ethiopia and Eritrea was aimed at being beneficial for both countries. The movements came to own many public properties such as land and business enterprises, making their respective states powerful landlords and business corporations. They also established private companies, owned and managed by their organisations. In both cases the politics is carried out in the context of restructured national economies in which the organising principle is that of free enterprise. Examples indicating the authoritarian and interventionist nature of the ruling groups abound. Both Fronts monopolise the media and engage in hollow constitutional and electoral politics without a free press or opposition parties.

However, the two states appear to suffer from a kind of hegemonic rule in which an expanded or integral state is produced and in which the ruling class dominates primarily through consensus rather than coercion. It therefore appears that the two states are confronted by a crisis of hegemony. Ultimately, although the two Fronts successfully captured state power, they remain merely political and ideological factions of the petty bourgeois class in their respective countries. They have failed to lead even their kindred groups. The petty bourgeois class in both Ethiopia and Eritrea remains fractured from within. However, nationalism is inherently competitive, as its organising principle is the idea of ‘them against us’. It is against this background that, as was the case with Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam, peaceful and democratic change under the reign of the EPLF and the TPLF seems unlikely, once again rendering violence a necessary catalyst of social change.

There is a recent history of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and between the EPRDF and the EPLF. Since it came to power in May 1991, the EPRDF and the groups it established close ties with in the war to overthrow Mariam, tried to resolve internal conflicts of interest within the country. Similarly, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) tried to draw the opposition groups within and outside the country into some kind of coalition. Attempts to develop these two separate countries, unified only within themselves, was one of the factors that led to conflict between the two countries.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been fought over many different issues and has had broad implications for politics in the Horn of Africa. In May 1998, war broke out between the two countries. One of the obvious aspects of the war is a border conflict between the two states, with each claiming the border area of Badame as part of their territory. The war was also generated by many other factors, among them economic, cultural and political disputes, and can be seen as a manifestation of the inability of the two states to manage their internal crises as well as their differences. The conflict has had broader geopolitical effects, leading to further destabilisation of the Horn region.

At first, the leaderships of Eritrea and Ethiopia were convinced that a peaceful solution to any problem between the two countries was the best option. After 1998, possibly as a result of internal political pressures in each of the countries, the same leaderships became convinced that a decisive war between them would help reunite their populations. Ethnic and religious conflicts also resurfaced soon after each rebel group took over the reins of government in Addis Ababa and Asmara. In Eritrea, the Christian and Tigrayan-dominated EPLF was accused by the Muslim-dominated Eritrean Liberation Front of dominating the government and army structures in the country and politically and intentionally marginalising the Muslim population in the country. Similarly, the president, Meles Zinawi, was accused of favouring minority tribes and isolating the majority of Amharas and Oromos.

While the war united both Eritreans and Ethiopians internally, the problem of displaced people from both sides to the conflict will remain one of the issues that may trigger another war in the future. As long as the leaders of the two countries refuse to open direct channels of communication between them as in the past, the possibility of forging a lasting peace between them will remain remote.

Somalia

The Somali Republic is the easternmost extension of the African continent and is bordered by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Sixty per cent of the population, which is concentrated primarily in the north, is nomadic. The southern region between the Juba and the Shebelle rivers is the main area where settled agriculture is practised. Because only 13% of the land is arable, there is intense pressure on available pasture and water. Somalis are divided into three major clan families, the Saab, Irir and the Darood, each of which comprises numerous sub-families and lineages.

The Irir and the Darood are predominantly pastoralist, while the Saab, who live in the south, have long mixed herding with peasant farming. Pastoralists have faced grave problems in environmental degradation of the lands, mainly in the north.

European colonisation resulted in the division of Somali territory into five different colonies. The question of reunification occupied successive elites at the cost of addressing more concrete issues. National issues were not debated while the cultivation of clan and subclan interests accentuated the demise of kinship and the rise of clannism. Somalia became independent of Italian and British rule in 1960. Traditional rivalries between the various Somali clans, including the Isaaq of the north, Ogadeni of the south and Hawiye of central Somalia, were exacerbated by the rule of Mohammed Siad Barre, whose regime (1969–1991) had one of the world’s worst human rights records. As many as 500 000 Somalis starved to death as warring clans strove for power during this time.

The other side of the coin was the suppression of civil society. Free association and expression deemed to exacerbate kinship group divisions was banned. Strikes, viewed by the state as a form of economic sabotage, were legally punishable by death. The judiciary was an arm of executive policy and handed down long prison sentences even to non-violent anti-government demonstrators. The media was state-run, and criticism of the regime not tolerated. Agents of the National Security Service tortured political detainees, who were often held indefinitely without charge or trial. As civil society was squelched, Siad Barre began openly showing favouritism to a narrow range of kinship groups to which he was linked by blood or marriage. This created unprecedented conflict, which was exacerbated by Siad Barre’s war with Ethiopia in the 1970s, in which the former Soviet Union became aligned with Ethiopia and the US with Somalia.

The weakness of the military state became obvious as Soviet aid and technical assistance disappeared. The failing economy and political system reawakened discontent, long suppressed, over the regional neglect of the north. Moreover, the people of the north were not treated as equals. By 1988, Somalia had become embroiled in one of the most brutal civil wars in Africa, involving the government and five armed opposition groups.

In January 1991, after a concentrated two-month assault on Mogadishu by United Somali Congress (USC) insurgents, President Siad Barre and the remnants of his regime were forced to seek refuge in their Marehan traditional kinship group area in the south-western part of the country. With the end of the 20-year dictatorship, it was widely hoped that there would be peace in the country.

The situation became more complicated when, in May 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM), composed largely of the Isaaq kinship group-family that had taken over the administration of north-western Somalia after the defeat of Siad Barre, unilaterally declared the independence of a breakaway Somaliland with Hargeisa as its capital. Puntland, once called north-eastern Somalia, installed its own administration in August 1998. Unlike Somaliland, it refused to accept the break-up of Somalia.

Most of the peace initiatives since 1991 have failed to address the main issues in Somalia, which are that the war in Somalia has much to do with the lack of strong institutions in the country, a lack of a clear formula for power sharing in the country, and the fact that the solution needs to be found by Somalis themselves as the war was not instigated from outside the country and the Somalis fought the war themselves. However, since the civil war broke out, the warlords Hussein Mohamed Aideed, Musa Sudi Yalahow, Mohamed Kanyare Afrah and others seem to have lost control of the people they claim to be representing.

The UN had scant success in the early 1990s in breaking the cycle of war, human rights abuses and famine, even though international standards were grossly violated. The UN troops left in 1995, whereupon traditional clan leaders, not faction leaders, tried to discuss free movement, grazing and water rights and interclan family disputes. With clans protecting rights and security, justice too often depended on the kinship group and its relative power in the local community. Under this traditional system, members of minorities possessed few realisable rights either as groups or individuals.

The Somali peace process started on 2 May 2000 and, brokered by Djibouti with support from African and Arab states and the European Union, has shown some promise. President Abdulgasim Salad Hassan, who was elected in Djibouti on 25 August 2000, has already won both regional and international recognition, as has the Somali transitional parliament. The question of Somaliland and other small regions that are not part of the current peace process can be worked out once the issues of militia disarmament, integration of national ports into the central government system and economic institutions, constitution, new inclusive administrative structures and power-sharing issues are settled.

There is a growing awareness of the limitations of the clan-based explanation of the social and political problems in Somalia. Thus, important social aspects such as class, race, gender and age all have a role to play. The picture of Somalia as a homogeneous population of cattle and camel-herders is historically inaccurate, excluding as it does significant numbers of farmers who have lived for centuries in southern Somalia along the banks of the two major rivers, the Juba and the Shebelle. Somalia also contains caste-like groups identified by their ancestry and/or occupation.

Not all of these groups are associated with particular clans. Moreover, clan membership is not immutable. In history there has been considerable movement between clans, especially in the more populous south. Affiliations can be changed through intermarriage, for the purposes of protection, for grazing and land rights, for labour-related or political reasons.

Ancestry is an important determinant of status in Somalia. Pan-Islamic definitions of enslaveable populations as ‘black’, together with definitions of race and ‘purity’ support the construction of so-called Bantu Somalis as racially distinct and inferior. With the rise of Zanzibar as a trade centre in the mid-19th century, Somali entrepreneurs even began to purchase East African slaves through the Indian Ocean slave trade in order to undertake plantation agriculture in the Shebelle River region. In 1992, a scorched earth policy operated against the communities in the region between the Juba and the Shebelle rivers, removing their very means of survival. Powerful race and class tensions have thus been very much a part of Somali society and its destruction. Attacks on southerners did not indicate a descent into chaos and anarchy, but followed a pattern of state appropriation of resources established in both the colonial and the Barre years. Women have been especially vulnerable in this situation.

The two main outstanding issues that may cause future problems within Somalia and perhaps with its neighbours are:

The Ogaden problem, that led to war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977–1978, remains unsolved.



The unification of the country, particularly regarding the question of Somaliland, is still uncertain.

Although it is true that Somaliland has as yet not been party to efforts made to end the civil war up to now, it is important for Somali leaders in the south to learn from their counterparts in the north with regard to the administrative reforms the northerners have introduced. Any future peace talks including Somaliland and Puntland will have to take cognisance of the developmental programme the Somaliland leadership has embarked upon. The use of traditional methods in dealing with conflicts in Somalia and the encouragement of the diaspora to be a part of Somalia’s development plan will be useful to Somalis when the time comes for them to reunite their country.

From this it is clear that attempts to centralise the state in Somalia have been problematic in that they have caused old rivalries for power in the country to rear up again. In view of this, it is perhaps significant that a group of academics knowledgeable about Somalia, when they considered four possible frameworks for resolving the state crisis in Somalia just after the UN’s withdrawal, did not discuss a single model involving creating a centralised state in Somalia. The frameworks for resolving the state crisis were rather federation, confederation, a decentralised unitary state with regional autonomy or a consociation based on kinship interests. The most desirable short-term political arrangement for Somalia would be one without any reference to a unitary political centre.

Moreover, some Somalis subscribe to the idea of regional federalism in which Somali regions become loci of decentralised power with a titular federal state. The proposed regional structure in this case reserves the right for each region to draft its own constitution, to have its own legislature and to elect leaders accountable to the respective kinship groups. The semblance of a Somali statehood can also be foreseen in some developments in the social and political life of Somalia since the collapse of the central state in that country. Consolidation of clan ties and kinship networks became the primary mode of political and social life. These new power networks provided an alternative to the state for the collective security of groups and group alliances. Urban elites, traditional elders of the countryside and religious leaders participate in these group formations.

Conclusion

Where does all this leave the Horn of Africa with its pronounced propensity for conflict and displacement of people? It is clear that Africa has few resources to help the region with this problem. It is also clear that authoritarian statism has been the rule rather than the exception during the past four decades in the Horn of Africa and is further fostered by international capitalist interests.

In Part Two of this paper we consider the steps taken at the level of the African continent towards promoting increased human stability and the prevention of conflict in the region, the development of a conflict prevention agenda at the sub-regional level, and the practical steps needed to realise these objectives.