Future prospects for the Horn of Africa

In Part Two of this paper we consider the steps taken at the level of the African continent towards promoting increased human stability and the prevention of conflict in the region, the development of a conflict prevention agenda at the sub-regional level, and the practical steps needed to realise these objectives. At present, the economic sovereignty of many of the states in the Horn of Africa is being undermined by emerging patterns of globalisation. At the same time, banditry and informal cross-border trading networks are growing. A further threat to state autonomy stems from the growing militarisation of conflicts. As states become more unstable, low-level warfare, famine, deprivation and political crisis overlap. Those nominally in control of the state are unable to provide security for their citizens, cannot provide the basis for economic improvement, do not fully control their territory and are unable either to co-opt or defeat their opponents. Economic pauperisation and an ideological vacuum arising in part from the erosion of human rights – the uglier side of nationalism – are giving rise to the proliferation of religious cults and extremism. This is forcing a redefinition of social cohesion and civil space.

Many of Africa’s social problems revolve around a misconception among Western analysts regarding the construction of centrally organised states. It has been claimed that the centralising state is universally applicable regardless of different social structures and cultures in the world. Moreover, the idea of the state as an embodiment of order has been contrasted with its absence, namely an undesirable state of disorder. The Hobbesian conception of the ‘state of nature’ as a state of anarchy has informed this contemporary political theory of the state. However, many statist scholars and state elites have failed to come to terms with the construction of the centrist state in Africa. State projects in Africa legitimated and subsequently glorified the economic, cultural, social and political development of late modernity under the banner of world democracy and free market economy.

Centralised states, together with global forces, continue to stress sameness and similarity rather than heterogeneity as part of the human condition. Under this banner, it is claimed that rationality will pull in those people who were traditionally excluded, leading eventually to a melting pot where maintenance of identity diminishes in importance as identity transformation becomes less recognised or is seen as archaic.

The creation of a rational order implies the construction of homogeneous nation-states, national identities, centralised bureaucracies, unified legal systems with a set of formal laws and the institutionalisation of market capitalism as the only rational economic system. These are claimed to represent ‘civilised society’. The state’s task is to enforce centrally all these features under a ‘rule of law’. One of the primary functions of the state is therefore to maintain law and order. The ‘rule of law’ comes to represent value-free, neutral and transcending institutionalised power relationships. Interpreted in this manner, the rule of law is elevated and becomes a universal benchmark identifying deviance in all societies, regardless of specific traditional polities.

The concept of the rule of law does not explain changes in the law or differential application of the law. Consequently, the relationship between changed state structures and legal rules remains blurred as the sacredness of the rule of law is invoked in appropriate and inappropriate instances. The rule of law therefore fails to explain how concepts of legal equality have changed, for example, legal status based on gender, ethnicity, race and age. It does not even address discretion in law enforcement or punishment. The statist approach is universalist and imperialist, but has major self-negations embedded in it. In spite of these, it has been imposing its monolithic conceptual scheme in every part of the world. This includes employing naked force or technologically enforced violence, up to and including committing genocide. The statist approach may, however, hegemonically impose itself also through diffusion of ideas and training, as well as by indirect rule through co-opting indigenous modern elites.

In other words, despite being embroiled in eternal ruptures and fragmentations, the ultimate design aims at establishing ‘universal order’ through the central state, an assumed potential order the state itself inherently lacks. This lack is borne out by the catastrophic conflicts taking place among the various alternative state systems. The indices referred to, based on Western constructions of the concept of ‘disorder’ rather than ‘diversity’, are now employed by the New World Order as justifications for extermination under the façade of progress.

Conflict prevention

It is clear that the countries of the Horn of Africa remain, even today, full of conflict and the potential for conflict. What can be done to help? The rest of this analysis is devoted to answering that question. One of the main consequences of conflict is coerced population movement and the need to protect displaced persons at the local, national, regional and international levels. A comprehensive conflict maintenance system has three functional objectives. The political aim of conflict prevention is to avert conflict altogether, or at least to defuse it in its initial stages through trust building, coalition building and negotiated settlements. No conflict prevention mechanism can be maintained without a viable early warning and risk assessment system. Protection for displaced persons should be ensured at this level.

Most African states and regional actors do not have either systems in place warning them of conflict or risk assessment capabilities. African regional actors such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) are, however, attempting to develop systematic conflict prevention capacities. A problem is that, although the OAU intends to develop early warning and risk assessment capabilities, its inability to predict adequately and respond to conflict has, in contravention of the spirit of the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969, inhibited its ability to provide protection to displaced persons and to prevent population displacement. Sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) exhibit the same inability as the OAU to prevent conflict because they too lack early warning and risk assessment capabilities.

Unless host states and humanitarian actors are supplied with sound information about the location, direction, number and immediate needs of refugees and internally displaced persons, the principal function of the OAU Refugee Convention – namely to establish a firm legal standard for refugees and to ensure their safety and security, thereby decreasing the likelihood of mass population displacement – cannot be met.

Conflict management

The conflict management objective is, by virtue of being the most integral to the physical and legal protection of displaced people, the most important one. In this context it works towards the prevention of the escalation of refugee flows and the protection of internally displaced people. The political objective of conflict management is to promote trust and confidence and to ensure peace, security and stability with respect to displaced persons. The aim should also be to minimise the escalation of conflict and to provide humanitarian assistance and case-specific solutions.

A great shortcoming of the OAU has been its incapacity to deal with the effects of conflict, that is, to manage conflict. Greater emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures and concerted peacemaking and peacebuilding can, however, lessen the need to resort to complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations. Of late, the OAU and IGAD have become more concerned with developing and enhancing their conflict prevention capabilities, with both being in the process of establishing early warning and risk assessment capabilities.

Conflict resolution

The last conflict maintenance process and the linchpin to sustainable peace is conflict resolution. The political objective of conflict resolution is to maintain and sustain peace by building and rebuilding civil society and state institutions to allow for transparency and accountability. At this level, the displacement aim should be to negotiate agreements on the return of displaced persons to their home states and/or places of habitual residence.

The international community and the United Nations (UN) in particular, has an unacceptable record of safeguarding the rights of forcibly displaced people in Africa. African states themselves have a far better record in this respect. Africans appear to be the most committed and best suited to safeguard the rights of Africans. Africans, however, lack the resources and logistical resources to provide adequate protection.

The OAU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD have all engaged in conflict resolution with varying degrees of success. The OAU and ECOWAS appear to be the most active in this respect. However, because of the technological and military assets at its disposal, SADC appears to have the greatest capability to engage in long-term conflict resolution. But all four organisations remain hamstrung by limited resources. This difficulty has starkly diminished their capacity to engage fruitfully in this area.

It should be mentioned that there is as yet no African mechanism that permits individual refugees to bring claims against host state governments or combatants for violating their human rights. Until such structures are instituted, the international community would be well-advised to question the authenticity of African governments’ and regional actors’ attempts to tackle problems associated with the plight of displaced persons.

Conclusion

Where does all this leave the Horn of Africa with its pronounced propensity for conflict and displacement of people? It is clear that Africa has few resources to help the region with this problem. It is also clear that authoritarian statism has been the rule rather than the exception during the past four decades in the Horn of Africa and is further fostered by international capitalist interests.

There is much speculation about what the future holds for the Horn of Africa. The Horn is still a place of early mortality, poverty and illiteracy. The short-term solutions most often proffered are greater ‘state’ influence in the region, more ‘law and order’ practices based on the Western model and an increased military presence meant to quash insurgency and rebellion. These solutions, however, come at the expense of the development of civil society, the search for consensus and respect for diversity, and tend to exacerbate strife and conflict in the region despite their cosmetic overtures to the rule of law, order and security.

The Western response to internal conflict (sometimes termed ‘lawlessness’) has been to promote and encourage the development of ‘law and order’ institutions. These often consist of institutions such as a strong central military apparatus, larger and more secure prisons, technology to enable surveillance and monitoring and practices such as ‘swift and certain’ sentencing, more aggressive policing, curfews and austerity measures. Such ‘law and order’ antidotes to African ‘lawlessness’ have the effect of strengthening the officially recognised ‘state’ regime in each country at the expense of dissenting political views, minority groups and spheres of civil society. Indeed, in essence the externally imposed Western model has promoted authoritarian statism in the Horn of Africa despite its putative commitment to democracy, equality and individual rights.

Accordingly, the West cannot delude itself into thinking that it is capable of taking the lead in building or rebuilding a civic society in any of the countries of the Horn of Africa. The situation in Somalia bears witness to the disastrous effects of such a strategy. While the international media now point to the $30 billion spent on the ‘humanitarian’ mission of the early 1990s and the atrocities committed against Somali civilians by United States, Canadian, Belgian and Italian military contingents during the mission, these disasters are only a small part of the devastating losses.

This analysis has revealed a number of non-exhaustive and tentative principles that need to be adhered to in trying to formulate any lasting solution to the conflict, both internally and between the different nations, in the Horn of Africa:

Greater democratisation needs to be established in the area, especially in the sense of avoiding all forms of authoritarian/hegemonic rule both within and between states.



A regional co-operation plan, based primarily on present functional contributions to the region rather than merely on historic conflicts, should be established for the whole of the Horn of Africa.



The history of conflict in the region as a whole and in smaller parts of it should, however, be considered in detail and should be a guiding principle in formulating any plan for regional co-operation.



In any such plan, there should be firm and clear sanctions against any form of power dominance, whether by individuals or groups; rather, the principles of the minimum of government and equal representation of all in central institutions should apply.



A looser form of federal co-operation between states and within governments with no single state being dominant and no government having the opportunity to assume hegemony within its own state, may be one of the options worth considering for regional co-operation in the Horn of Africa.



There should be no assumption of cohesion between the regions within the states or the states of the Horn of Africa in formulating a plan for co-operation between and within states in the region.



Closely allied to the previous principle, inclusion of all identifiable interest groups (at least cultural, religious, economic, social and political groups) needs to become a firm underlying philosophy of any plan to establish regional co-operation in the Horn of Africa.



Because Western nations have achieved minimal success in allaying conflict in the Horn of Africa and have in fact through colonial rule exacerbated the situation, African nations need to take the initiative in formulating and applying any co-operation plan for the Horn of Africa.



All Western attempts to interpret internal conflict in the Horn of Africa as ‘lawlessness’ should be vigorously resisted in formulating a co-operation plan for the region, because perceptions of the conflict as ‘lawlessness’ rather than ‘diversity’ undermines the legitimacy of the struggles fought over centuries in the region.

In view of what has been discussed regarding the future of the Horn of Africa, ‘internal’ solutions should be sought. Civil society organisations, kinship structures, social safety nets such as hospices and mutual aid, independent resolution of disputes and sharing of common resources may steer the countries of the Horn of Africa in a new direction. This direction would be greatly informed by the time-tested wisdom of the region’s pre-colonial past. Perhaps then the Horn of Africa may become a model for drawing positive results out of the complex historical dialectic of external ‘order’ and internal conflict.

On the other hand, it should be recognised that in the short- to medium-term, no modern state can afford to ignore the demands of global capitalism. These demands can take many forms, but require relatively uniform economic requirements to be met in order for any country or region to become part of it and share in its spoils. In the Horn of Africa, regional affiliations of whatever nature – but definitely including close economic co-operation – appear to be an option worth investigating. It is true that many of the nations in the Horn are characterised by internal social formations and cultural groupings that foster conflict and violent struggles. At the same time it should be recognised that centralised state power, although it has become an essential survival mechanism in the Horn of Africa, has also become its greatest weakness, fostering old rivalries for attaining centralised power between social, cultural and religious groupings that may otherwise have lain dormant for centuries.

Whether stronger or weaker affiliations are needed should be investigated for each country individually and also for different regions within each country before any firm steps are taken. What is clear is that in the end a possible solution is that of a regional union with the rights of each participant clearly spelled out and enforced by a regional organisation of greater size, possibly the African Union. In this envisaged union, one of the crucial principles that should apply is that of scrupulous inclusivity, which should be enforced and adhered to by each prospective participant. In this manner, the Horn of Africa may be able, by exploiting its strategic position, diverse culture and resources, to make a meaningful contribution to the global economic system.