BURUNDI: PEACE AT LAST?

The Burundian transitional government sworn in on 1 November 2001, marks a turning point in the country’s troubled history and seems the best opportunity to end the conflict between the country’s Hutu majority and Tutsi minority. Much of the credit for these developments must go to the previous mediator, South Africa’s former President Nelson Mandela. The transitional government was set up in terms of the Arusha Accord signed in August 2000. The Burundi government agreed with Mandela to set up a protection force to protect returning exiles wishing to take part in the new transitional government in preparation for planned elections. On 26 October 2001, the South African and Burundian governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Pretoria, which paved the way for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) troops to be deployed to Burundi.

The transitional government makes provision for cabinet posts to be split between Hutus and Tutsis; for the establishment of an ethnically balanced defence force; and for a general election to be held after an interim period of three years. The transitional administration, to be led by President Buyoya for the first 18 months, will have a cabinet compromising 26 portfolios, 14 of which will be allocated to Hutu political parties and the remaining 12 to Tutsis. Council level elections are expected to be held by the end of the first half of the transition, with senatorial elections envisaged to take place during the second half. Immediately thereafter, the national assembly and senate are expected to convene to elect the first president for the post-transitional phase of government. For the transitional government to achieve success, a series of reforms within the administration, judiciary and military spheres of government must take place. Even with the establishment of a power-sharing transitional government, several obstacles still, however, stand in the way of achieving peace. It must be remembered that no peace agreement has yet been signed. The armed activities of Hutu rebels refusing to support the deal continues, as does the opposition of some radical Tutsi groups to the power-sharing arrangement and the resistance of some parts of the Tutsi-dominated army to the proposed integration process.

The two main Hutu rebel groups, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the National Liberation Forces (FNL), refuse to be bound by the Arusha Accord or the transitional agreements. Given the militarisation of the ethnic extremism that characterises the Burundian experience, it is hoped that the inauguration of the transitional government might serve as a confidence-building measure to induce those rebels still outside of the process to participate in political negotiations.

Some 700 SANDF troops were deployed to Burundi from 28 October 2001. These troops were drawn from 44 Parachute Brigade, the South African Military Health Services, VIP protection units from the South African Air Force and Headquarters personnel from 43 SA Brigade. They have been deployed to Burundi in line with a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution that was formulated to protect Hutu politicians who were returning from exile to participate in the transitional government. They are currently protecting nine political leaders who have returned from exile. A further 29 are expected to return to Burundi soon. The situation on the ground is still precarious and clashes between Hutu rebel movements and the Burundian security forces continue. Extremist groups on both sides of the conflict have publicly rejected the deployment of South African troops. This accounts for the strict force protection measures taken by the SANDF contingent.

The SANDF presence in Burundi should not be perceived as, or mistaken for, an international peacekeeping force operating under the auspices of the UN in accordance with the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. Unlike typical UN Peacekeeping practice, the SANDF contingent does not appear to be part of a ‘blue helmet’ operation. The SANDF contingent is clad in camouflage uniforms with a South African flag shoulder patch and is the only force deployed in Bujumbura, supported by its own armoured vehicles and unarmed Oryx helicopters.

South Africa’s decision to enter Burundi on a unilateral basis could be regarded as somewhat risky and even precarious. The installation of a broad-based legitimate government in Burundi was, however, seen as imperative in order for peace to prevail in the Great Lakes region. The SANDF’s involvement may well prove to be an important catalyst in finding the way to a negotiated settlement. The South African government undoubtedly made a bold decision, even though it was under some degree of pressure, to respond positively to Nelson Mandela’s request to deploy a protection force to war-torn Burundi. The SANDF should be commended, too, for its swift response and professionalism in a deployment so rapid as to have drawn admiring comment from international sources. The ideal scenario now would be for the SANDF involvement to lead to the deployment of a strong and competent multinational peacekeeping force after a ceasefire is negotiated. If this operation could help police the transition to a new dispensation, it would certainly be to the benefit of the Burundian people and a sign of Africa’s ability to help itself in complex emergencies. – HB

CÔTE D’IVOIRE: WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

Contrary to popular expectation, the arrival of the three main opposition leaders – Alassane Dramane Ouattara (RDR – Rassamblement Democratique Africaine), Henri Konan Bédié (PDCI – Parti Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire) and Robert Gueï (UDP – Union pour la democratique et pour la paise de la Côte d’Ivoire) – in Abidjan for the Forum for National Reconciliation organised by President Laurent Gbagbo, has failed to assuage fears of political instability in Côte d’Ivoire. The forum, which began on 9 October 2001, was aimed at healing the wounds of a decade of political and social instability that had afflicted the country following the death of the independence leader, Félix Houphouét-Boigny in December 1993.

The crisis that followed Houphouet-Boigny’s death pitted the then prime minister, Alassane Ouaôttara against the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié, who had proclaimed himself head of state a few hours after the death announcement. Immediate recognition of Bédié’s presidency on the part of France’s President Francois Mitterrand forced Ouattara to resign the premiership, leaving room for Bédié to consolidate his position as head of state. He soon removed all Ouattara supporters from key positions in government and passed laws that excluded him from running for the next presidential elections in 1995 on the basis of his not being a ‘pure’ Ivorian. The long-standing opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI (Front Populaire Ivoiriers), also withdrew from the race, claiming that the electoral process had been manipulated. Bédié subsequently won 95% of the vote in the elections, although these were marred by violence.

By 1998, support for the Bédié government started waning in the context of an economic downturn. The president’s continuing attempts to bar Ouattara from the 2000 presidential elections only brought the former into greater disfavour with the international community. In 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) decided to withdraw its structural adjustment funding for the country. Student and trade union protests increased and Ouattara returned to the country after resigning from a senior appointment at the IMF in Washington, to be selected as the presidential candidate for the RDR; things were turning sour too fast for Bédié. In the heat of the political imbroglio, the military struck in a coup on 24 December 1999 that saw General Robert Guéï assuming the position of head of state.

Ivorians were generally relieved when the military announced that the next elections were to be held by the end of 2000. An all-party transitional government was formed, but an alliance soon developed between the FPI and the PDCI, resulting in a conspiracy that saw all but one of the RDR ministers dropped from government in a May 2000 cabinet reshuffle. Simultaneous army mutinies in Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo heaped further suspicion on the RDR, resulting in more harassment of the party. A new constitution that prescribed further restrictions on the eligibility of the presidential candidates was approved with an 87% vote, in a 58% turnout. General Guéï soon announced his candidacy for the presidency, in direct contradiction to his initial claims of political neutrality on ascending to power. The issue of the restrictive clauses in the constitution for presidential eligibility was then brought before the Supreme Court, presided over by Tia Kone, General Guéï’s legal adviser. As expected, the court’s findings disqualified most of Guéï’s stronger political rivals, causing the RDR and the PDCI to boycott the election. The battle lines had been drawn between General Guéï as an independent candidate and Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI.

Following a blatant attempt to rig the elections in his favour, General Guéï faced a general uprising that placed him on a collision course with people supported by his own army. He backed down. After the declaration of Laurent Gbagbo as winner, RDR supporters continued protesting against what they termed the fundamentally flawed nature of the elections. The army, with the support of the FPI, reacted violently against the mainly northern supporters of the RDR, killing more than 150 people, of whom 57 were buried in a mass grave; most of these were later found to be Muslims and were believed to have been killed while in police custody.

Legislative elections slated for December 2000 were also marred by violence after Ouattara’s candidacy was again disallowed, prompting another boycott by the RDR. The 22 independent candidates elected to the legislature only confirmed the degree of dissatisfaction with the participating parties. The level of violence in the country prevented elections from being carried out in 29 constituencies in the mainly RDR supporting north. By-elections in January 2001 succeeded only under very tight security. By the end of the polls, the FPI had won 96 constituencies, PDCI had won 94, 22 constituencies elected independents, and 5 constituencies returned the RDR, although the party had generally boycotted the elections.

For a country that once prided itself on harmony in diversity, it is perhaps surprising that today Côte d’Ivoire is riven with such dangerous tensions and suspicions. The political drama that unleashed such reckless belligerence drew its inspiration from the gimmicks of individuals attempting to reduce their personal political risks by excluding their most potent adversaries by calling into question their nationality. The consequences of this process are still threatening to split the country along both religious and regional lines. Political realignments reflected in party support have imposed themselves upon the geopolitical map of the country, with the north mainly supporting Alassane Ouattara’s RDR and the west divided between the FPI and PDCI.

The Forum for National Reconciliation may have created room for discussion of the political and social issues that have bedevilled relations within the country, but there are still grave doubts as to whether this has created a level playing field for all the various political players. Forum recommendations, however, have no legal force in the country. Technically, Ouattara is still disqualified from running for the presidency, because Gbagbo has refused to amend the provisions of the constitution regulating eligibility. The courts still hold that Outtara is not Ivorian, while he continues to argue that the matter is actually political and not judicial. The support he wields in the north is still too formidable for Gbagbo to take too many chances. Proof of this is reflected in the RDR’s electoral victories secured during the 21 March 2001 local elections, where the party even won in Gbagbo’s native town of Gagnoa, polling the highest number of votes and taking the most constituencies. As long as northerners feel disenfranchised there will be problems.

The present FPI-PDCI coalition may not last long because of a possible split between those who want Bédié to continue as leader of PDCI and those opposed to this: a rift that may come up during the party congress sometime early in 2002. The PDCI or some of its members may withdraw from the government, leaving the FPI running the country with a minority of seats in parliament. General Guéï’s support for Ouattara will not go down well with some of his supporters, which could also cause a split in his own RDR. In any event, for now there will be an uneasy peace in the country, waiting for any turn of events to tip the scales.

The situation with the military does not make things any better. It will be difficult for Gbagbo to take any action against the security forces for their human rights violations during the crisis in the north. He needs their support even if this is tinged with unspoken suspicion. He has placed more trust in the police force, to the point of promising to increase their salaries and even transferring some of the normal functions of the army to them and arming them more heavily. The interior minister has been quoted as saying to the police elite that they now form the rapid intervention force against insurgents. The army still seems to have some residual support for General Guéï, another potential political rival for Gbagbo. He may have to turn to Presidents Eyadema of Togo or Omar Bongo of Gabon to mediate in the internal political turmoil.

Calls for land reform and an overhaul of the judiciary may receive some backing from the government because Gbagbo is still strongly counting on the support of the international community to re-launch the economy. Paris was the first capital to declare its satisfaction with the success of the National Reconciliation Forum, which it supported in principle and materially. French support is expected to lead to a rapprochement with the European Union whence some financial support will be coming in to boost the economy by early 2002. The IMF and World Bank will also resume sponsorship of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility following the rounding up of the Staff-Monitored Programme (SMP) that began in July. The government has worked hard to fulfil most of the quantitative and structural criteria under the SMP.

Relations within the region will remain cool as the Malians and the Burkinabes press Gbagbo to combat the high level of xenophobia in the country in return for them reducing tensions at their common borders.

The economy will recover slowly following the cautious return of international investors. Foreign exchange from the sale of cocoa will rise following an increase in production from 1,2 million to about 1,3 million tons, and scarcities in world supply has prompted an increase in market prices. On the other hand, the price of coffee will fall because of a glut in the market. Production from the Espoir oil and gas fields will increase the quantity supplied from the Ivorian market from 12,000 barrels per day to 19,000 barrels per day.

President Gbagbo may not be too wide off the mark when he says that the politics and economics of Côte d’ Ivoire are not in so poor a state as is made out. He will, however, have to move with extreme caution if he is to avoid stimulating centrifugal political forces. Even then, he will be hard pressed to maintain a smooth pace towards peace building in order to promote economic recovery. – JT

ZAMBIA: EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES

The Zambian presidential and parliamentary elections of 27 December 2001 and the subsequent protracted process of declaring the results, mark the culmination of a particularly lively phase in the country’s political life. The political arena of the previous two years had been dominated by the debate about the presidential succession at the end of Frederick Chiluba’s second and final term of office.

For most of that time it was an unspoken assumption that the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) would prove far too strong for its divided opponents and that the outcome of the presidential elections, to be held by the end of 2001, was a foregone conclusion, in party terms at least.

That events unfolded in an entirely different fashion was certainly not anticipated until very late in the day. This development had to do with the effect of President Chiluba’s ill-disguised efforts to have himself thrust into a third term, and in particular its divisive impact upon the MMD, which came perilously close to self-destruction as a consequence, and ultimately had to take recourse to some fairly transparent electoral chicanery to retain even a tenuous hold on power.

The most serious challenge to Mwanawasa’s candidature appeared at first to come from what was, in essence, an offshoot of the MMD, the foundation for Democracy and Development (FDD), the core of which comprised the dissidents whose opposition had thwarted Chiluba’s efforts to win himself a third presidential term. After a bruising struggle for the FDD candidature, Christon Tembo emerged victorious. FDD support seemed particularly strong in Lusaka and parts of the south. Another MMD offshoot, the Heritage Party under Godfrey Miyanda, was expected to win enough support to split the opposition vote quite significantly.

Until very late in the contest, Anderson Mazoka’s United Party for National Development (UNDP) seemed unlikely to assert its presence outside of the Lozi and Tonga areas of the south, despite its serious claims to advocate new policies. Mazoka himself – as a businessman of stature and with a firm grasp of economic realities – certainly had the right credentials to challenge the ‘old guard’, under whatever banner they chose to fight, but observers noted his lack of charisma and the dryness of his presentations and thought these likely to prove a fatal handicap.

Of the other parties – there were 11 presidential candidates in all – the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was riven by internal rivalries, which were expected to complicate the electoral chances of Tilyenji Kaunda, who replaced his brother, Wezi, as the chosen political heir after the latter’s murder.

On 22 November Chiluba ended persistent speculation and announced polling day as 27 December. This choice of a date in the middle of the Christmas/New Year holidays suggested a cynical attempt to reduce the probable turn-out, which was expected to favour MMD.

The poor turnout for voter registration (only 2,6 million of some 4,7 million eligible voters bothered to put their names on the roll) also indicated that many Zambians had lost faith in most of the existing political class, seeing the current jostling and manoeuvring for place and position as essentially self-seeking. Certainly the cynics had a point. Why did so many of the ‘insiders’ wait until their own political ambitions were threatened to reveal what they knew about the character of the Chiluba administration? Those who had served at the heart of government must surely have been aware of the malfeasance they now found so distasteful. Some, indeed, profited from it during their time near the top.

As election day neared, there were indications that Mazoka was emerging as the leading opposition candidate, ahead of Tembo. Some opinion polls placed him ahead even of Mwanawasa, despite the latter’s access to superior funding and logistical resources, usually at the disposal only of an incumbent. A remarkable development was ex-president Kenneth Kaunda’s apparent endorsement of Mazoka’s candidacy, and his call for three of the opposition parties without MMD connections to form a united front to defeat Mwanawasa at all costs.

Contrary to expectations, and despite torrential rain, voters turned up at the polls in droves, and the voting exercise carried on into the night of 27 December and beyond to accommodate the large number of electors who patiently waited for hours to cast their ballots, undeterred either by the elements or the chaotic administration and late delivery of voting materials at many stations. In some places, voting seems to have been delayed by as much as six days beyond the official date. Voting went off peacefully, but there were early allegations of irregularities and the buying-up of voter cards by MMD agents. Ballot-stuffing was also reported from certain areas, and international observers voiced disquiet about some of things they had seen.

The announcement of the results was expected within two days of the polls, but delay followed delay and the declaration of results took place piecemeal and with a slowness that lent credibility to the allegations that some malpractice was afoot. International observers also noted discrepancies between local counts and the final tallies announced. For a few days, Mazoka appeared to be moving towards victory, which he claimed prematurely. The final swathe of votes from the Copperbelt, however, swung the balance in Mwanawasa’s favour. The opposition protested in vain and took their case to court, seeking to have the inauguration postponed. The presiding judge decided against the plaintiffs on a technicality, though he noted that their concerns appeared to have some substance. Most opposition parties have since filed applications for the verification and recounting of all ballot papers, though few observers see much chance of the announced presidential result being overturned, especially as detailed returns have yet to be made public.

Observers from the Carter Centre and the European Union voiced disquiet about the conduct of the elections and the hasty release of incomplete results. In particular, they questioned the huge discrepancies in several constituencies between the number of parliamentary and presidential ballots, and the relative absence of spoiled papers. They were also surprised at the rigidity of the timing of the presidential inauguration.

On 2 January, and with the votes of 13 constituencies still outstanding, Levy Mwanawasa was sworn in as President, having taken some 29% of the vote. Mazoka ran a close second with more than 27%, Tembo was in third place with 13%, ahead of Tilyenji Kaunda with 10%. International observers remarked upon local discrepancies between the parliamentary and presidential tallies, and were roundly rebuked by the new head of state for meddling. He also warned the opposition to abandon its threats of civil disobedience or face the full weight of the law. His tone has subsequently softened, though offers of rapprochement have yet to be reciprocated by his opponents.

The parliamentary results have left the MMD without a parliamentary majority. It won 69 seats and Mwanawasa has appointed another six nominated members of parliament (MPs). He may still nominate two more, to bring the total in the Assembly to 158. Mazoka’s UNDP secured 49 seats, UNIP 13, FDD 12, the Heritage Party 4 and the Patriotic Front and Zambia Republic Party one each. There is also one independent. The new parliament began its proceedings inauspiciously with a violent quarrel inside the House over the ballot to elect a new Speaker. Eventually the previous incumbent was retained by a narrow majority, three opposition MPs having voted for the MMD candidate.

Zambia’s new president faces some daunting challenges in the immediate future. Among these are the consequences of the unexpected withdrawal of Anglo American from the Copperbelt. The need somehow to diversify a battered and beleaguered economy, the AIDS pandemic, the debt crisis, endemic corruption, chronic poverty and food shortages – any one of these would have been difficult enough to address effectively. Now President Mwanawasa has to do this in the context of continued doubts about who actually leads the ruling party, since ex-president Chiluba has gone back on his undertaking to yield the party leadership to his successor. There are other indications that Mwanawasa may prove more independent a figure than was expected, and members of his cabinet have raised awkward questions about the previous administration’s activities in the banking sector.

Ironically, it may be the very severity of Zambia’s multifaceted crisis that comes to his aid politically, convincing the more responsible of his opponents that this is not the time to mount a full-scale assault on the presidency. That, and some judicious dispensation of patronage, may give him the space to attend to the affairs of this troubled state. – RC