Introduction

The precarious nature of security in Africa1 today gives cause to wonder whether or not security and defence policies in African states, namely in sub-Saharan Africa, remain appropriate. Various, albeit fragmented, studies on this theme from African researchers, European and US academic centres have come to the conclusion, sterner still, that such policies quite simply do not or no longer exist.

The rationale is as simple as it is paradoxical: generally speaking in Africa, the very concept of security is cause for fear. Fears of a military coup have prompted leaders in numerous countries to strip the defence apparatus of its resources. By the same token, citizens fear ruling forces—be they militia, police or armed forces—which do not refrain from resorting to violence against people. And we find just as vivid a fear within the military itself to talk about security, out of concern their failure may be revealed, out of anxiety within the hierarchy that they might lose the few favours handed out by the ruling regime, out of fear too of the unknown and of change. For all these reasons, there has been little security debate since the era of African independence and the Cold War. In this vast silence, many African militaries and security forces have often lost everything but their bad reputation. Efforts along two lines are therefore indispensable to ensure the success of defence policies in Africa.

First, there is a need to promote the return of an enabling political environment by restoring a government monopoly over public force and by making it accountable for its use. The goal is that security finally becomes a public good, and that action taken by security forces offers value-added to the citizenry instead of just serving the government. What is at stake here is the legitimacy and survival of several African governments. South Africa’s successful experience suggests that each nation should agree on a political vision of its security and defence, and that governments should initiate and facilitate this debate while involving in it as many citizens as possible. Furthermore, recent African history confirms that without such an overture towards the legislative branch and civil society, attempts at reforming defence policy never get off the ground.

Second, there is a need to develop a strategy in order to implement the political vision. Priority must be given to stemming any further destabilisation of the political environment so that there is no occurrence of new Somalia, Liberia or Sierra Leone-like crises. It is just as important that governments strive to create conditions that would allow for the modernisation of their armed forces, namely, to overcome the lingering causes of their military weaknesses, and that they empower state institutions by supporting the restructuring of their armed forces.

Restoring an enabling political environment

Since there have been few studies on this issue to date, it is impossible to know with any degree of accuracy which African countries have developed a sound defence policy. Apart from South Africa eight years ago, no other African state has published a White Paper based on the results of wide public debate. In Mali, a few officers are currently working on such a paper; Congo-Brazzaville has just completed its White Paper and Botswana has published its security strategy, although it has not been as open a design process. Malawi is also working on a similar project and other countries are carrying out studies. Generally, debate has been confidential. Such an approach is understandable: a public debate would blatantly reveal the abysmal state of military doctrines, human resources, equipment, inadequate means to perform missions and lack of capacity to meet threats. States that are strong militarily and under democratic rule can perhaps expose the level of strength of their armies: this is part of deterrence. But for too many African states, to put in plain view security forces without arms would be tantamount to opening the door to chaos.

However, two factors might prompt African leaders to change their attitudes in the coming years, and to re-establish, as a priority, a return to sound political and military environments. For a start, security has become everybody’s business. Containing threats that expose their citizenry to strikes from across the border has become a priority. Second, increased risks and conflicts of unprecedented magnitude continue to undermine the legitimacy and the viability of government assets. Faced with these scourges, African militaries and armed forces are not likely to remain inert. Targeted as an entity, they will unite and seek, as they have done so often in the past, to substitute violence for a vanishing leadership—in safeguarding their own interests they will disregard those of the citizens and the state.

Turning security into a public good again

The concept of security has undergone dramatic changes over the past ten years. While the traditional notion of national security is defined by Luciani2 as “the ability to withstand aggression from abroad”, the reality in Africa has shown that this approach leads to a dead end: more weapons do not mean better security. This approach also creates a dilemma, as evidenced by the Great Lakes crisis: attempts by states to single-handedly ensure their own security tend to unsettle neighbouring nations. One out of three internal crises in Africa is the direct result of a conflict in a neighbouring country. As already underscored in the Palme Report of 1982: “states can no longer obtain security at each other’s expense, but only through co-operative efforts”. Part of any solution is to become interdependent, which implies exchanging information on each other’s armed forces and establishing a common implementation of procedures. A multilateral debate about common security, shared national security interests and a unified defence vision is a prerequisite for the development of successful sub-regional military capacities.

Incidentally, interdependence is also an essential tool for responding to newly emerging transnational threats. In the years ahead, increased incidences of drought, crime, pollution, various illegal trafficking activities, and infectious diseases—above all the scourge of HIV/AIDS—will have a direct impact on African states’ security, sometimes threatening their very existence. Some hardly dare mention such a series of catastrophic events and their devastating impacts lest they be branded as doomsayers. As defined by Ullman:3

A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that threatens to (1) drastically and over a brief time span degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state and (2) significantly narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state.

In fact, these non-traditional/non-military threats have already affected most of Africa, endangering the most basic order in several states. The question is no longer whether or not these threats will reach a state, but rather when and with what magnitude they will be manifested. These are powerful threats for they have the ability to impair a state’s military and security capacities unlike any other traditional enemy or war. Infectious diseases alone are responsible for a quarter of all deaths, and HIV/AIDS has killed more people in Africa than all the armed conflicts of the 20th century.4

A government’s primary function is to ensure the collective security of its citizenry. In this instance, Montesquieu’s comment rings loud and clear like a prophecy: “True political liberty can only occur when the security of the people is ensured.” Today, the security of the state hinges more and more on the security of the people and not the other way around, as was the case during the Cold War era. Furthermore, the combined effect of all these new threats on the population as a whole and on the productive labour force, in particular, is drastically changing the entire spectrum of human activity. This calls for a redefinition of our understanding of security as a meaningful condition that is validated by society as a whole and not just by a small elite or social community. Security, beyond freedom from physical violence, is an approach that adds what Steve Metz5 describes as:

a condition … confirmed by the society as a whole: protection and preservation of all that the society considers important and valuable. It includes the safety of individuals and groups from physical harm, conditions of life that are healthful and satisfying to all, economic and environmental heritage passed on to future generations, protection from arbitrary and coercive forms of political rule.

Restoring legitimacy

In the absence of major change, conditions in Africa could lead to the collapse of more states. These will not necessary be the poorest but, on the contrary, states where public services were functioning more or less satisfactorily until increasing deterioration and collapse heightened social tensions, exceeding the abilities and powers of elected officials to maintain order. In such circumstances states may fall back on secondary community cohesive structures, which are often linked to ethnic groups, resulting in deep ethnic divisions and social disorder—as in the case of Somalia or even the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Once ignited, it is difficult to extinguish the blaze of destructive events. Furthermore, one cannot predict or isolate the moment in time when chaos erupts.

Defusing an explosive situation, while there is still time

The cumulative impact of traditional factors aggravating conflict is important. These factors include historical misrepresentations; real or perceived inequities in natural assets and human resources; poverty; unemployment; illiteracy; a growing number of orphans; a demographic revolution undermining cultural values and traditional authorities; and the feasibility of pillage as a means to acquire resources. Today, however, there is a new element adding a deadly spark: challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling regime. This may happen in three ways:

First, Africa’s opening up to democracy has prompted civil society to demand more of ruling regimes, and to be less forgiving of unfair policies, the ransacking of national wealth, corruption, bad governance and poor management of social tensions. Because such mistakes or shortcomings affect entire segments of society, as in the case of Zimbabwe and Kenya, more time than is available would be required to rebuild the social capital and restore the trust in governments and authorities which has been eroded. HIV/AIDS today amplifies and triggers conflict arising from social disparities. The rich have access to well-equipped infrastructure, can afford to travel abroad and will live longer. The middle class and the poor, those who live in remote and border areas or in war zones, will not be treated for HIV/AIDS because of a lack of money, information and public health facilities.

Second, the spread of civil wars and social conflicts creates regional instability and insecurity while providing governments with less time to react to new forms of violence which they are seldom able to control: acts of violence primarily targeting civilians; acts of violence from groups with a chain of command which is neither able nor willing to curb the excesses of their followers; acts of violence planned to benefit financially from humanitarian aid and natural resources; the rise of organised crime which comes as a result of the security, justice and enforcement vacuum left behind.

The third way in which legitimacy is challenged is the most alarming. An environment may be created in which the government seems neither legitimate nor necessary. In some countries, the government has lost its control over the entire national territory and simply wields its power to take from and repress its citizens, not to provide for or protect them. Quite often, national leaders are deprived of the ability to exercise their sovereignty and their sole legitimacy relates to diplomatic ties with the international community.

In such a context, the use of excessive public force to restore or protect central authority can cause local communities, militia and private interests (which were previously benefiting from an absentee state) to unite against the state. To regain their lost control and to be seen as necessary, national elected leaders need to ensure that force is only employed for the good of the public.

Political leaders who use the state as a personal resource must be aware that the military, and especially those in the lower ranks, may become impatient if they do not share in those resources. Soldiers may, having witnessed the efficiency of a few rebels in Bangui, Abidjan, Harare or Bissau, note with envy the benefits that come from the successful democratic transitions in Senegal and Ghana. Young officers, along with the rank and file, will be less willing to forgive their leaders and may resort to violence.6

To grant these men a monthly stipend will no longer suffice. They must be given hope that the military has a valuable, positive role to play. As a minimum, they should be endowed with defence resources (equipment and a budget) which, while certainly modest, would enable them to take their role seriously.

The will to develop and implement a strategy

For a variety of reasons, the vast majority of sub-Saharan African states do not seem to have developed a long-term military strategy. The conditions in these states are so diverse that no single reason may be offered for this absence. However, the common consequence is that the capabilities and capacities of their armed and security forces have consistently been diminished.

Nigeria and South Africa—two countries which on the surface seemed most powerful—have limited abilities judged by Western standards, as was evident in the Bakassi conflict in Nigeria and the Lesotho operation for South Africa. In the meanwhile, long-time rivals, Ethiopia and Eritrea, have been engaged in a deadly First World War–type conflict using conventional armies and incurring heavy casualties. Some Rwandan forces fight according to the teachings of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh and by learning Chinese tactics; Zimbabwe’s military leaders have unlearnt what made them so successful as guerrillas. The situation has deteriorated so much that all these states have found themselves in a bizarre situation: defence budgets are insufficient to maintain basic public order and yet are too large for the states’ budget. Three main areas of work need to be carried out simultaneously, though over time the emphasis will have to shift from one to another. Governments must:

remedy the most serious factors of instability in the short-term;



overcome the underlying causes of armed and security force weaknesses in the mid-term; and



develop a long-term strategy for the use of military and for military planning.

Containing instability

Half of the countries in Africa that have achieved peace, or ended hostilities between factions, have then seen those factions taken up arms again within five years. Like Europe in the Middle Ages, Africa is almost constantly unstable. Violence is the usual process by which disputes are settled. Two imminent dangers face African armed and security forces:

fragmentation into opposing factions; and


the lure of a coup.

In some states, the prime objective of the national defence policy is simply to keep armed forces in uniform and in their barracks.

In the context of supreme insecurity, militia and private armies hold a privileged position, becoming the principals of violent acts and relegating regular forces to a marginal role. These groups are often composed of former military commanders or retired regular soldiers who, faced with a lack of economic opportunities, have tended to return to the only world they know: the world of weaponry and violence.

The solution is therefore only partly military in nature. It has to be part of a wider strategy of post-conflict development which allows people economic opportunity without having to use violence or force. Another goal is to restore trust between civilians and the military, particularly in regimes where the army has recently handed back power to democratically elected leaders.

From 1979 to 1981 Ghana failed in this regard but seems to be doing better now. Nigeria is recently experiencing similar tensions. One of the major criticisms made by military leaders of their civilian counterparts is their incompetence in military affairs and their history of political mismanagement. However, in any given year, some 5,000 African military personnel are trained in defence academies and institutes throughout the developed world, and among them a significant number specialise in strategic policy analysis and national security issues. By comparison, the number of civilian elites trained in these areas is small. This discrepancy in skills creates contempt for the uneducated on the one hand, and defensive mental blocks on the other.

Even when unable to provide national security, military and security forces should certainly not be the primary and immediate sources of national insecurity. The armed forces’ other basic focus and responsibility should be to strive to correct the consequences of inefficient military administration, mismanagement of resources, and the misappropriation of funds. The effects of these problems are clear to see: a growing number of obsolete and badly maintained equipment; inadequate operational systems and procedures; and the lack of a sound national military budget.

Overcoming causes of military weakness

In order to develop a viable strategy, it is necessary to take stock of the current situation. What exists cannot be torn down to ‘re-establish’ a new military organisation without organising a transition between the dead-end of today and the improvement of tomorrow’s vision. There is also a need not to ignore, and thus repeat, the errors made elsewhere on the continent. Shortcomings common to many African armies are as follows:

A lack of vision

The lack of advanced planning, strategising and programming still stems relatively often from the government’s inability to assess financial resources for the years ahead. In some cases, the defence budget is unknown even in the middle of the current fiscal year. Those countries with large military forces may spend more than 80% of their annual budget on salaries alone, as is the case in Côte d’Ivoire where compensation is paid on a regular basis—a rare privilege in Africa. The lack of will to reduce personnel numbers as earmarked by the budget makes the financial burden heavier. In some cases, some money is kept aside as a reserve to be disbursed to curb rebellions caused by many months’ arrears in wages.

However, these shortcomings cause much tension and lead to a precarious balance between equipment acquisition and operating budgets. The imbalance may lead to programme delays and the cancellation of the upgrading and adaptation of military equipment. In most cases, the operating budget is sacrificed, which effectively paralyses the security forces, causing a drop in motivation. This lack of interest in the soldier causes high levels of absenteeism, and may lead troops to rebellion or to working for a militia. The result is that many African armies spend whatever little resources they have in order to avoid disintegration. Advanced planning remains a pipe dream.

Risky restructuring

Restructuring the military is a very sensitive issue as it necessarily involves downsizing personnel, which has its share of risks. Unfortunately, given the recent negative history of armies which have carried out demobilisation programmes, officials are reluctant to undertake a serious review of personnel. To demobilise soldiers without easing their return to civilian life is to unravel a contained crisis into a full-fledged one. Indeed, officials are even reluctant to assess too precisely existing personnel numbers. These unreliable numbers are therefore often ignored in budgetary decisions. The difference between the personnel numbers on paper and the real ones adds to the budget deficit. External pressures may be placed on officials in charge of troop rosters to falsify a birth date, to remove a soldier from checks carried out by name, or to nominally bring back a dead person or one no longer in the military. In some countries, notably Chad and Djibouti, personnel downsizing has caused acute tensions and has added to the instability. The demobilised personnel left with their weapons and joined a rebel front.

Finally, in some cases, restructuring has only made the situation worse by creating a pyramid of ranks shaped like a mushroom and a vicious circle of promotion and recruitment. Promotions are reduced, causing a widening of the mushroom cap relative to the stem. Recruiting may then be stopped (the stem becomes shorter), which affects the future of the forces. When the large, high-level cap finally vanishes, massive enrolments then occur and a pyramid shape is formed once again. This time, the problems are those of poor quality of troops and even officers, mainly civilians who have suddenly been promoted to higher ranks without any real qualifications.

In addition, operational units deployed far from the capital city seldom receive either sufficient funds or troops. High-ranking leaders rarely join them far from the capital, and if they do, it may be an assignment from above to keep them away from power. The actual leaders live in the major management or economic centres of the state. Programme planning must be enforced to ensure that stipends are paid (to counter absenteeism); to provide decent infrastructure to units located far from the capital city; and to undertake activities that will forestall idleness and counter a lack of motivation.

A lack of transparency regarding financial resources

In some cases, unwillingness to plan is deliberate, as it allows leaders to shift resources in ways that do not always serve the government or its military interests. At times, budget items are blurred and cross-referenced to another agency’s accounts. In other cases, only part of the allocated budget is disbursed and the balance vanishes into thin air. These gimmicks often dishearten planners who know full well that the required funds will in any case be available when urgently needed.

More often than not, lack of transparency in the budget process is prejudicial to units and organisations located far from the capital city or decision-making centres. The disappearance of resources in rural areas prompts personnel to seek assignments in already bloated central areas.

This phenomenon worsens the military’s operational shortcomings and concentrates all the bitterness and idleness within the capital city—a situation that, while predictable, nevertheless recently occurred in Bangui, Brazzaville and Abidjan. The problem is by no means restricted to francophone African countries. As long as political leaders fail to mobilise and co-ordinate efforts from government institutions and civil society alike to mitigate these causes of conflict, developing and fully implementing a long-term strategy will remain out of reach. Once a common vision has been agreed upon and the military personnel numbers have been reviewed, financial planning can provide an opportunity to re-open dialogue between political parties, civilians and the military.

Developing a consensus on the use of armed forces

On the issue of developing a national consensus, South Africa has shown the way in the mid-1990s. The result has certainly been more than the production of a White Paper and a military programme planning document, but more effectively a tool that led to national reflection on the key instruments of the previous regime. The process even served to strengthen democracy in South Africa.

Many states have conducted defence reviews, and while the means and outcomes may vary, a few common benchmarks exist. Proven methods include consideration of all data related to funds, human resources and projected equipment trends. The goal here is not to present these processes in detail, as they are well known and widely taught, but to take into account the findings of those who have organised such reforms in the past, and to highlight the discussions and viewpoints of African and Western leaders, and to offer the key points.

Citizens, politicians and the military need to reach a consensus on general and military policies that is consistent with national objectives. The danger lies in skipping this step and conducting the debate in secret, among the ruling elite, and simply proclaiming military programming plans and restructuring schemes without any consultation or open dialogue. The military in the Central African Republic has been revamped several times in the past ten years, but to no avail. Gabon has postponed, until at least 2002, the implementation of its new military programming plans originally slated for 2001, since consensus on the goals, role and missions for its military has not been reached. By contrast, South Africa, soon after apartheid, successfully completed this phase.

It is vital to develop a security strategy because it defines goals for the nation and sets principles to abide by in the pursuit of these objectives, which affects many national activities. The strategy defines ways to protect and promote national interests as well as to define threats and ways to deal with them. In turn, the security and defence policy is only a component of this security strategy. Indeed, it is nonsensical to think about security without first developing a fully-fledged vision of security reform. Nearly all government agencies have a stake in security and defence issues. And in one way or another, these players should support, to a lesser or greater degree, reforms in the security area.

Identifying interests is at the core of this process. Prioritising them will determine which efforts are needed to attain, promote or protect these goals. As a minimum, the government must ensure some economic well-being within an adequate security environment. A clear definition of national interests is therefore an essential prerequisite. An example of a vital interest may be defined as a specific material or immaterial asset without which a nation could not function as normal. It is worth noting that during various seminars, African decision-makers have often defined economic development as a vital interest that is far more important than the protection of borders. A strategic interest is also defined as a material or immaterial asset that, if lost, would force the government to make considerable sacrifice and concentrated effort to avoid deterioration and social collapse in the country.

In this day and age, we must include public health along with the preservation of skills and specialisation, unique to a country, as well as various other natural and economic resources. Botswana, for example, has identified the drivers of its enormous ore trucks as people to be protected as a matter of national priority. Indeed, without this expertise which requires several years of training, the leading national economic activity of Botswana would be brought to a halt. In Zambia, it could be the protection of the educational system, as more teachers die of infectious diseases than the country is able to train. A third category of national interest, perhaps more moral rather than material, are those interests that contribute to the development of a country, its place within the international community, and the values it wishes to defend and share. Fewer nations on the continent now consider foreign armed aggression as their main risk yet doctrines and force systems have not changed to reflect this. The nature of a threat is computed by multiplying two parameters: the gravity of its impact on institutions, the economy, the society and the armed forces; and its probability of occurrence. The results show that ‘civilian’ threats in Africa have now superseded military-based risks. Nevertheless, with the exception of South Africa, many African militaries still prepare only for external threats.

Defining roles and missions

Identifying the role and mission of the armed forces is the last step in a sequence leading to the development of both security and military strategies. In this regard, there is a great ideological divide between English-speaking African states and those in other regions, where the concept of a ‘gendarmerie’ is well established and highly regarded. In the British and American tradition, the military is not to be caught up in maintaining public order but should instead be restricted to responding to external threats. Though a more detailed study would warrant further analysis, one recent theory states that the absence of military contributions to domestic order increases considerably the risks for civil and interstate wars in Africa.7

In today’s environment, a few general trends are emerging with regard to the role of African armed forces. These include the role of the military in defending the national territory against more than just external threats. The word ‘aggression’ is seldom used in today’s context because it implies direct military threat. Instead, the term ‘transnational threat’ is used to identify the new challenges: internal rebellion forces, internally displaced persons, and an influx of refugees. Therefore, to maintain internal security and provide support for government assets and organisations in charge of civil protection, African militaries have to adopt new roles and responsibilities to contribute to regional security and peacekeeping missions on the continent.

To be proactive, they must be able to give prior warning using their intelligence capabilities and good mobility. To be reactive, they must be able to respond and support those missions that are designed to maintain and restore order, fight organised crime and be able to sustain long-term operations. Nevertheless, the basic mission of the military must never become an overtly quasi-police role nor should it replace private actors in the development arena. The military should therefore not supersede police forces but instead help co-ordinate its actions to achieve synergy between the forces rather than creating competition. The armed forces should be summoned to protect government institutions in the most exceptional of cases.

In spite of weak private sector resources, the armed forces must not endanger economic growth by monopolising large contracts (the military corps of engineers must not replace civil engineering companies for road maintenance, waste water treatment and disposal, building infrastructure and so on). Likewise, the transport, aviation or train units of the armed forces must not rob ground transportation companies of potential markets. They must limit their action to supporting private companies in cases of emergency or if the latter cannot respond to a pressing need.

The emerging trend toward co-operation in support of regional security and peace is probably the most gratifying strategic option for the military. Indeed, such a mission contributes to internal security by eliminating transnational risks and avoiding conflict between the armed forces and civil protection actions. Furthermore, the skills used in this type of operation match those traditionally taught in military units. Those units engaged in these operations often get help from donor countries to train and procure the necessary equipment. Moreover, these assignments tend to be more of a status-enhancing exercise for the armed forces in terms of procuring financial benefits and national gratitude.

Developing a long-term model for the armed forces

A key criteria for long-term planning is to look into the future and project possible outcomes, which is extremely difficult in Africa. Most African militaries limit their programming to short-term projections, mostly two to three years. However, projections shorter than 15 years8 will hardly allow for the establishment of a system that is consistent and capable of keeping up with the probable recurrent changes in a given strategic environment. At best, it would allow for a response to short-term constraints, but such a system would rapidly become obsolete. On the whole, repeated and frequent restructuring will cost the government more money and be less effective than a single system of reform where the changes are modified in small steps so that the outcomes are not traumatic for the troops.

A prospective analysis of the security environment over the next 15 years (its political, economic, religious, social and international aspects) must describe operational situations used as reference points to define required levels of armed forces. This approach aims at identifying the minimum level of forces required to meet the most probable scenarios. The goal here is to limit the size and reshape the foundation (i.e. all structures which are not directly involved in operations but are indispensable in ensuring the general functions of the armed forces such as command, administration, training and education, support mechanisms, and so on). Following such reform, a financial assessment should be prepared to include a proper inventory of required personnel, equipment and infrastructure.

In the end, trade-offs and successive optimisations will allow planners to reconcile financial constraints with operational needs. A realistic and measured approach is vital in the African context when economic premises make ambitions akin to Western standards unaffordable in terms of equipment and capacity. For example, fighter planes would impart much prestige to an air force but that could spell disaster both for the budget and other armed services.

Ensuring a transition period

The transition to a new system is a step of utmost importance. Its purpose is threefold: to organise the transition process; to assess and remedy security deadlocks; and to demonstrate political will. First, there needs to be a correlation between the present and the future (15-year time span), to reach some form of consistency and stability. At the five-year point, the first benchmark should be reached and the capacity goals achieved. The five- to 15-year timeframe pertains mainly to weapons procurement and human resources. For example, naval forces used to monitor the coastline are to have a function greater than merely buying patrol boats and transferring personnel from other units. The five-year timeline is thus a programming benchmark that will produce concrete expressions and ideas in military programming plans that should be translated into law and political will.

Second, in the strategic area, financial constraints and political choices will lead the force system to a series of trade-offs since it will not be able to contribute as much as planned in the security strategy. Political leaders will either have to take this risk or seek funds outside the security budget, including co-operating with others, or achieving their objectives by leveraging other assets of national power (such as diplomatic, economic, media-related influence).

Third, there must be a strong political will to establish mechanisms to monitor and control implementation, obviously within the armed forces and the government themselves, but above all, through an oversight process from parliament, without which the best resolutions will soon be buried. Implementing plans must reconcile two often contradictory concerns: to maintain financial goals in the long-term; and to keep within the budget in the short-term.

Conclusion

A British study on reforming the security sector in Africa concluded:9

The most fundamental change is about recognising the growing importance of consolidating the institutional framework within which the security sector operates.

To inscribe a political will into reality in the long-term is certainly the greatest challenge, since it forces African states to rethink their constitutions and the role of government institutions. Many will have to develop the means to ensure the enforcement of principles that support democratic institutions, such as balance of power, efficient and transparent control mechanisms, management skills, military professionalism, the preservation of strong ties between the military and civilians, to name but a few. Without such fundamental reforms, African military leaders will surely not achieve what they have planned.

The international community and Africa’s special partners must support those states undergoing these reforms. Several states are already co-operating with their African partners. Some international organisations have also implemented programmes to help African armies, notably in the post-conflict area.

In the short-term, there is a need to prevent the destruction of African states and their armies. As a priority, it would seem proper to make African decision-makers more aware of the dangers inherent in the precarious position of their military personnel. Additional efforts should be made to train more civilian leaders in defence-related issues. Concurrently, military personnel should be apprised of all security issues and encouraged to have a broader vision of government action in response to newer threats.

A medium-term goal then is to prepare for the modernisation of Africa’s armed and security forces. There are two priorities in this regard: first, to provide incentives and information to governments so that there are informed debates about issues of security; and second, to provide guidance to the military and to conduct a technical audit of its forces while helping them engage in future planning, restructuring and implementation.

In the long-term, these transformations will have to be promoted and sustained by increasing civil–military co-operation and the careful implementation of the processes outlined above. Continued success of any security sector reforms will require broad social acceptance of the changes and a high level of discipline by both civilian and military leaders.

Notes

Africa holds some records that few would envy. More than half of the internal and regional crises in the world take place on the continent, impacting three out of four of its inhabitants. In 1999, Africa experienced 16 armed conflicts, including seven wars having each claimed more than 1,000 lives, caused 300,000 children to bear arms, displaced 30 million people and killed one million others. More than 30 million landmines are said to be scattered over various African theatres. Damages to infrastructure and the environment are unfathomable. All countries involved in the Great Lakes crisis emerged weakened, fraught with acute social and political tensions. These national armies are nearly lifeless, decimated by HIV/AIDS, and having become the main factor for spreading the disease upon returning home. From 1994 to 1999, a third of new infectious disease outbreaks occurred in Africa.



Luciani, Giacomo, The economic content of security, Journal of Public Policy, 1989.



Ullman, Richard, Redefining security, International Security, 1983.



Some countries will lose 40% of their population by 2010, primarily women. Life expectancy will have then fallen back to its end-19th century level, i.e. 30 years of age. By the mid-2010s, the number of orphans in Africa may equal the population of France.


US Army war college address, September 2000.



Coups and/or uprising staged by young officers or NCO are many—1960: Mutiny of the Force Publique in Belgian Congo; 1964: Veterans in Togo and various rebellions in East Africa; 1966: mutinies in Nigeria and in Congo; 1968: Sierra Leone; 1974: Ethiopia; 1979–1981: Ghana; 1980: Liberia; 1982: coup attempt in Kenya; 1982-83: Burkina Faso. Since the 1990s, the record is well known: Gambia, Burundi, Central Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.



Out of 17 countries that have waged war in a neighbouring state in Africa in the past 10 years, 11 do not possess forces comparable with the gendarmerie or Maréchaussée. These countries have forces that pertain mainly to the protection of the national territory or against external attack. However, in the absence of border disputes with neighbouring countries, these armies would have little, if any, justification. To preserve their corporatist interests, they would instead tend to invent an enemy for themselves and would be more inclined to seek war with a foreign country. Countries with a gendarmerie system do not face the same dilemma. Public service missions and support assignments to civilian authorities are accepted by, and known to, the armed forces. It ensues that the disappearance of a threat on national borders does not put in question units’ or troops’ behaviour.



Developed countries and South African are developing 30-year plans, in view of their quest for new technologies and the growth of their armament industry. But in less than 15 years, it is difficult to shape a harmonious pyramid of ranks or to develop adequate human resource policies, especially for experts and officers.



From a study published by the Centre for Defence Studies in the United Kingdom (2000) and commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID).