Introduction

This paper explores the nature of police labour relations in the Southern African region. It does this by exploring seven key themes: the legislative framework governing police labour relations; the grievances of police officers; collective bargaining arrangements; unions and associations; and the impact of South African police labour relations on police labour relations in the region. The paper is derived from a report commissioned by the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) in August 2000 as part of its long-term project to facilitate the liberalisation of police labour relations in the Southern African region.

Five countries were visited in the process of the research. These included Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho and Swaziland. Attempts were made to visit Botswana and Mozambique, but it was extremely difficult to gain access to the police services/forces in these two countries. Police officers and trade union officials were interviewed in each of these countries. Police standing orders, national constitutions, police annual reports and other relevant legislation and documentation were also collated and analysed for the purposes of this research.

Police labour relations in South Africa are at present comparable to those in Western democracies where, in broad terms, police are accorded the right to organise and to collectively bargain. Police labour relations in South Africa were formally liberalised with the promulgation of the first South African Police Labour Regulations in November 1993. The 1993 regulations mark an important break with past mechanisms for dealing with labour-related issues in the police:1

The Regulations recognise the right of police employees to join organised representative formations.



The Regulations contain a new grievance procedure aimed at resolving grievances more speedily, and which devolves responsibility to the lowest possible level.



Most importantly, the Regulations provide for the establishment of a national negotiating forum (NNF)2 in the police service. Over the years, the NNF has become an arena for collectively dealing with conditions of service as well as with broader transformation questions such as health and safety, affirmative action, equal opportunities, police plans and the National Crime Prevention Strategy.

At present, there are three main police representative organisations in South Africa—the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), the South African Police Union (SAPU) and the Public Service Association (PSA).3 The police are covered by the newest Labour Relations Act (1995) and thus share the same rights, responsibilities and protections with other workers in both the private and public sector.4 These representative organisations, while not permitted to engage in strike actions, are permitted to engage in collective bargaining and political pressure activities.

The police unions were formally recognised in 1993, and have since played an important role not only in determining officers’ salaries and fringe benefits, but also in setting policies pertaining to promotions, assignments, discipline, and other conditions of work. The involvement of police unions in determining conditions of work has a number of positive spin-offs. First, it fosters co-operative relations between police workers, police managers and police employers. Second, it provides police with the opportunity to participate in determining the conditions of their daily working lives and thus builds morale and commitment to the service. Collective bargaining between police managers/ employers and police workers also serves to weaken the traditionally militaristic and autocratic nature of police administration. The police unions in South Africa, particularly POPCRU, have also been concerned about the external democratisation of the police force. They have initiated campaigns concerned with building police professionalism and have promoted community policing as a new philosophy and practice in the South African Police Service (SAPS).5

While most other Southern African states claim to be democracies, basic employment rights have not been extended to the state police. This is despite evidence from South Africa and abroad that institutionalised collective bargaining arrangements within police organisations contribute positively to the overall effectiveness and professionalism of the police.6

The state of labour relations in the region

The nature of the police agencies differs in each country in Southern Africa, however, a few general observations can be made as to the current state of police labour relations in the region (where South Africa is an exception):

Police labour relations and unionisation are not considered by police authorities and police management to be an important issue for discussion or consideration. The only two countries that have collective bargaining arrangements and structures for police are South Africa and Lesotho. In Lesotho and South Africa, police are viewed as both workers and professionals by the government and the union movement.



The prospect for creating police unions in the region is poor. In most countries in the region, police are not viewed as ‘workers’. The relationship between the police and unionised workers is generally an antagonistic one, evidenced in the repressive role that the police play with regard to public union activities in the region.



Despite past and recent moves toward democratisation within most Southern African states, the police remain extremely acquiescent with regard to the government of the day, and are seemingly unwilling to ‘rock the boat’. This could be because there are more important issues of public order and social control that need to be dealt with, particularly in those countries where there is currently political instability and uncertainty, such as in Zimbabwe. A similar sentiment is likely to exist in Mozambique and Angola. The state police have considerable strategic importance in these countries, and have also been involved in the repression of union activity and other collective action in their respective countries. This has particularly been true in Zimbabwe and Swaziland recently.



State departments and ministries in Southern Africa have stated that there will be no tolerance of the collective organisation of police members. The state police are in fact excluded from existing labour law legislation and as a result they do not have the same rights and freedoms as other workers in the public service.



While police documentation in most Southern African countries refers to the civilianisation and demilitarisation of police forces, there is no mention of the need for internal democratisation of these police forces or the need to liberalise police labour relations. For example, the 1994 and 1997 Zambian Inspector General Annual Reports refer to reform processes in the police force, yet there is no mention of the rights of police as workers or the need for individual and collective bargaining arrangements or grievance procedures.

South Africa remains an exception with regard to police labour relations in the Southern African region. Police labour relations in the rest of the region remain autocratic and there appears to be little prospect of liberalisation despite broad attempts at the democratisation of police organisations.

The democratisation of policing

Throughout Africa governments profess to be moving toward greater democratisation. This move includes a concern with the participation of citizens in matters that affect their daily lives, consultation with citizens, establishing processes and structures of accountability, and working towards greater service delivery. The police, as the most public face of the state, have to be seen to reflect this ‘new’ democratic ethos.

The police forces in Southern Africa profess to a concern for the practice of democratic policing. The formal documentation of most state police agencies in the region stress a commitment to community-oriented policing. There is also an emphasis on the move away from being a ‘force’ to being a ‘service’. This represents a major change from police forces that were historically brutal and discreditable. But, while Southern African police services recognise the need for reform or change, this relates to external democratisation (improving service delivery) rather than internal democratisation (improving the internal service conditions of the police). There is in fact no acknowledgement of the contingent relationship between internal and external democratisation.

While there may be attempts on the part of governments to democratise, the reality is that governments in Southern Africa remain autocratic and intolerant of popular mobilisation and protest. The police in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland have all been employed in recent years to repress opposition collective action. And, despite attempts to transform (or more appropriately reform) police agencies in these countries, police management has not changed significantly and neither has police legislation.

Police agencies may try to practice the philosophy of community-oriented policing, but this will be limited if police organisations themselves are not internally democratic. Police management and government in most Southern African countries have failed to see the link between internal and external democratisation in police agencies.

Legislation governing labour relations and grievance procedures

Unlike in South Africa, police in the rest of the Southern African region are excluded from existing labour relations acts. Police labour relations are generally governed by police acts and police standing orders, which are often not in concordance with the more liberalised labour legislation governing the private sector. Thus, in every country surveyed aside from Lesotho, police have no access to collective bargaining forums and grievances are dealt with by means of an autocratic ranking system.

The police are viewed fundamentally as security personnel who are part of the essential services rather than as workers with industrial based needs and interests. Where they are allowed to organise collectively, it is within associations that essentially represent the professional interests and needs of the police.

Zambia

In Zambia, the Industrial and Labour Relations Act No. 27 of 1993 does not apply to any of the ‘security organisations’, which includes the police, the military and intelligence.7 As a result, labour disputes within the police service cannot be taken to the Industrial Relations Court since this court is only available to those who fall under the Industrial and Labour Relations Act. The Court is an important institution in that it has the power to inquire and make awards and decisions in collective disputes, inquire into and adjudicate upon matters affecting collective rights and the obligations of employers and employees. The Court thus plays an essential role in regulating and ensuring the rights and obligations of all parties in a given industry, which the police do not have access to.

Zambian Police labour regulations are to be found in the police Standing Orders and the Police and Prisons Service Commission Regulations of 1976. The Police and Prisons Service Commission Regulations outline the procedure for the discipline and suspension of police officers as well as all matters relating to appointments such as probation and retirement practices. In accordance with this Regulation, the Police and Prisons Service Commission deal with all grievances in the Zambian Police Service.8

Lesotho

The Lesotho Mounted Police Service has been engaged in a process of organisational transformation since 1997. This was spearheaded by a 1997 government White Paper entitled ‘A new partnership with the Police’, which resulted in the promulgation of a new Police Act, No. 7 of 1998. This replaced the Police Order of 1971. The transformation process in the police was initiated after labour unrest and widespread dissatisfaction in the police force. The country faced ongoing strike action from the police from the end of 1993 until 1996 when the disruptions were ended by military force. The occupation of the royal house and the attempted overthrow of the Lesotho government by the opposition parties and elements of the junior police and military ranks during the 1988 constitutional crisis, eventuated in a Southern African Development Community (SADC) military intervention. This was the final motivator for the transformation of government agencies.

In the ‘old’ police agency, there was no mechanism for police officers to raise complaints and problems. A new system was needed to give officers the opportunity to air their grievances and to resolve their problems.9 A new Police Act was drawn up. It is based on the British model of police labour relations. This new act allows for collective bargaining arrangements in the police service, and for police members to be part of a police association. This police association (formed in 1999), as with the British model, is institutionalised within the police service. Police are not allowed to join independent trade unions or affiliate to a union federation.

As is the case in the rest of the Southern African region (except for South Africa), in Lesotho the police are excluded from the general labour relations legislation (called the Labour Code). The Police Services Act outlaws membership to independent trade unions or political parties. In fact, the police are banned from joining any body that ‘aims to influence the conditions of service of police officers’. However, police officers are allowed to join a police association approved by the minister.

While grievances can be handled via the ranking system, the association has the right to take up individual grievances of its members at any stage. These grievances can be presented to senior officers or to the commissioner in biannual meetings. Disciplinary or grievance procedures begin as a consultation with the Complaints and Discipline Office at police headquarters.

The association is allowed to provide legal representation for their members. Alternatively, the defendant is allowed to seek his or her own legal representation in hearings. Defendants who face disciplinary charges can take the outcome of the proceedings to the Police Appeals Tribunal for review. According to police officials interviewed, this often happens. The minister or commissioner is not expected to arbitrate on disputes.

Namibia

The state police in Namibia are also excluded from the general legislation governing labour relations. The Labour Relations Act No. 6 of 1992 covers only civilians working within the Namibian Police. This provides the space for police management to operate according to its own set of administrative laws. In fact, the Head of Legal Services in the Namibian Police Service stated in an interview that if the police were to fall under the general legislation governing labour relations, they would be entitled both to join unions and to strike—which he viewed as problematic.

Labour-related issues and grievances are dealt with via internal police legislation. Within the police directives there is a stated grievance procedure. All grievances, both individual and collective, must be brought to the attention of an immediate commanding officer by means of a written letter. Should the immediate commanding officer not be able to resolve the stated grievance, the matter will be handed to a higher-ranking commanding officer. In short, grievances are dealt with via the ranking system. All grievances are processed through the Complaints and Discipline Department. If grievances are deemed to be serious, the Complaints and Discipline Department will institute an investigation into the matter and will suggest a solution based on the available evidence. Members of the Namibian Police Service are allowed to have legal representation for any grievance, complaint or appeal. According to the head of Legal Services, the chief director and the head of Research and Development, police members appear to be satisfied with the existing grievance procedure. There has to date been no protest against existing procedures and structures for dealing with disputes and grievances in the Namibian Police.

Police management in Namibia maintains that it is appropriate to deal with labour-related matters through the existing structures of the police. It is believed that the small size of the police force (about 2,848 members) does not warrant more extensive processes for dealing with labour relations issues.

As the head of Legal Services stated: “The current system works well particularly because the force is so small. We do not need external regulation.”

Swaziland

The Royal Swaziland Police are excluded from the Industrial Relations Act (2000). The Police Act No. 29 of 1957, covers their labour relations separately.10 According to the act there are two main mechanisms for dealing with grievances or labour disputes:

Ordinary grievances are raised by individuals via the ranking system.



Longer-term issues, or issues of more collective interest, are raised via the recognised police association.

Individual officers may lay a grievance with their officer-in-charge. The grievance is then taken through the chain of command, up to commissioner level if need be. Individuals, however, have no right to legal representation or assistance during this process. They also have to accept any decision made by the commissioner, but are free to take the Royal Swaziland Police (RSP) to court if they wish.

Collective issues such as salaries, conditions of service and laws are discussed in the associations. They are allowed to submit grievances or issues for consideration to the commissioner who then considers which ones to forward to government and which ones to deal with himself. The associations have no grounds to appeal against or dispute the commissioner’s decision. The police association is not allowed to represent officers facing disciplinary action. Should the charged officer be unsatisfied with the outcome of the hearing, he/she can appeal to the prime minister, who then makes a final judgment. If the charged officer is still not satisfied, he/she can take the RSP to a civilian court.

Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe the labour standards of the police are dictated by the Police Act (1996) and by police standing orders. Police standing orders dictate every facet of the organisation including the conduct of the police and conditions of service. The Zimbabwe Republic Police are exempt from key constitutional passages. As part of the ‘disciplined forces’ they are not protected from forced labour practices, employment discrimination, or treatment amounting to violations of human rights. To change this, a two-thirds vote of parliament would be required. However, Zimbabwean labour law, particularly as it pertains to the public service, is currently under review. In early 2001, the new Labour Relations Act Amendment Bill was scheduled to go before parliament. This bill is an attempt to combine and rationalise the existing Labour Relations Act and the Public Service Act that presently set two different standards for employee rights. Among other things, the newly proposed bill would allow the many public service unions now in place to become fully-fledged unions.

Nature of members’ grievances

Given the poor economic status of the states in Southern Africa, it is hardly surprising that police members are poorly paid and that their key concerns centre on service conditions and wages. At the same time, given that the police agencies in Southern Africa remain autocratic in nature, police members voiced disapproval at the way in which important decisions are made (such as with regard to promotions and transfers) and the way in which commanders conduct themselves.

The main grievances raised by members of the Zambian Police Service (and those dealt with by the Zambia Police and Prisons Service Commission) relate to service conditions. In particular, members have raised problems as to how and when promotions are made, decisions around transfers, and the procedure for appealing disciplinary decisions.

Members of the Lesotho Mounted Police Service have a number of grievances and according to officials interviewed, this keeps the association ‘very busy’. The nature of grievances raised are limited to daily issues and do not centre on the broader political issues of policing in Lesotho.
The officers interviewed listed the following as the key grievances:

dissatisfaction around transfers (currently the main grievance);



unfair and autocratic behaviour of commanding officers;



lack of access to representation in disciplinary hearings;



unfair dismissals;



low pay and related financial difficulties experienced at home; and



domestic-related problems viewed as stemming from conditions of service such as alcoholism.

Police management in the Namibian Police Service claim that most grievances submitted pertain to general workplace-related issues such as salaries, promotions and transfers. Members also complain about the autocratic procedures regarding transfers and discharge from service. Unlike in the SAPS, racism and affirmative action are not key issues of concern. Police management believe this is because there is fair representation at all levels of the Namibian Police Service. However, police management acknowledges that there are signs of discontent in the Namibian Police Service. Absence from duty, particularly toward the end of the month, has surfaced as a major problem.
According to the head of Complaints and Discipline in the Royal Swaziland Police, there are three main grievances:

police officers believe there is a shortage of personnel;



related to the lack of personnel, the police believe that they are working too much overtime and are not adequately compensated for this;



salaries are seen to be far too low; and



the police association is angered that they are not recognised as bargaining agents and are excluded from wage negotiations.

In Zimbabwe the key grievance expressed by police workers is poor wages. While significant pay increases have been issued in recent years, these have not managed to keep pace with inflation and the decline of the Zimbabwe dollar. A second issue of discontent is that of housing. While in the past, police were housed in police barracks, there is no longer funding for the development of new police barracks or camps. This is viewed as a problem since police members who lived in barracks were not expected to pay rent. Furthermore, police members seem to feel that living separate from the rest of the civilian population is desirable, and they are resentful about living among civilians in high-density urban areas. Both management and rank-and-file in the police view this as problematic and as a threat to the integrity of the police force. It is believed that friendships formed on the ‘outside’ might interfere with the ability of police members to arrest those they know personally. This reflects a highly militarised view of policing. Police work is seen as a vocation for which civilian identity (and life) must be sacrificed. The isolation of the police from the rest of society allows for greater levels of brutality against dissenting civilians.

Collective bargaining arrangements

Collective bargaining in the public sector is fairly new in Southern Africa (including in South Africa). It is therefore not surprising that collective bargaining structures do not exist for the police, except in Lesotho. This means that police have no forum in which to voice their collective concerns or to negotiate their conditions of service. At the most basic level, police members are denied any power to influence police policy or economic interests.

The Zambian Police Force does not have access to direct collective bargaining. The Zambia Police and Prisons Service Commission deals with issues of a collective nature such as appointments, promotions, transfers, retirement, and compensation in cases of death. Salaries and other conditions of service are determined by central government whenever there is a general salaries and conditions of service review in the civil service. During these review processes, representative unions represent other civil servants. The police, however, have no union to represent their unique interests. A police association does exist but is not eligible to negotiate for collective agreements, as a union would do.

The Lesotho Mounted Police Service has a police negotiating council. This was established in terms of the new Police Act (1998) and was launched in March 2001. It comprises an equal number of representatives of the police staff association, government and police management. The objective of the Police Negotiating Council, as stated in the act, is “to consider questions relating to the terms and conditions of service of members of the police service and to establish procedures for dealing with any grievances of members of the police service”. Before making any regulations, the police authorities are bound by the act to consult the Police Negotiating Forum. However, from interviews conducted in Lesotho with police management, there appears to be a lack of clarity as to exactly how disputes or negotiating deadlocks are resolved. This is not stipulated in the Police Act that allows for the establishment of this forum.

In Swaziland there are no structures or legal provisions for collective bargaining of police members. Issues of salaries, conditions of service and laws are discussed in the police association. Grievances and issues for consideration can be submitted to the commissioner for consideration by the commissioner. This is unlikely to change. In fact, it would seem that the unilateral powers of the commissioner are likely to be increased. Currently, the commissioner can only “appoint, promote, suspend, reduce or discharge” officers below the rank of inspector. Higher ranks are the responsibility of the Civil Service Board. The new act which was being discussed in early August 2001, will extend the commissioner’s powers to appoint, promote, suspend, reduce, or discharge officers up to the rank of senior superintendent.

In Zimbabwe, according to the revised Police Act (1996), the Police Service Commission makes recommendations to the minister regarding salaries and the general conditions of service of members. Collective complaints are expressly prohibited, except in accordance with the constitution of the Zimbabwe Republic Police Association. At no time are such issues to be discussed with the press or the public. ‘Frivolous complaints’ are strictly punished.

While police do not directly engage in collective bargaining in Zimbabwe, police officers may be members of the Civil Servants Employees’ Association that engages in collective bargaining for public service employees. According to the standing orders “no member shall complain on behalf of another member and collective complaints or representations are not permitted except in accordance with the constitution or the Zimbabwe Republic Police Association”.

Unions and associations

Police unions are taboo in the Southern African region. South Africa is the only country in the region that legally provides for the unionisation of the police. In fact, in South Africa an agency shop agreement compels police officers to join either SAPU or POPCRU. The South African experience, however, appears not to have impacted positively on the rest of Southern Africa where police management and government perceive police unions as troublesome and as a threat to police professionalism. There is no appreciation of the positive spin-offs of police representative organisations. The police in Southern Africa are in fact prohibited from joining unions. Unions are distinguished from associations in two ways. First, unions aim to control or influence conditions of service and employment. Second, unions engage in collective action and this may (though not necessarily) include the right to strike. Unions represent the working interests of members whereas associations represent the professional interests of members.

Police in Southern Africa, it would seem, are viewed as ‘professionals’ who are employed in the security sector and thus require military-like discipline. Belonging to a trade union is seen as antithetical to membership in a military-like organisation. In Zambia, for example, police involvement in a go-slow or strike action is considered as mutiny. Police managers and authorities in Southern Africa seem to believe that police membership in a trade union undermines their role as state agents. As one of the Zimbabwean police superintendents interviewed stated: “The police are the state. How can the police strike against itself?” Individual officers uniformly asserted the loyalty of the police to the state and were unwilling to take action against their ‘leaders’. In a country such as Zimbabwe, where politics is polarised between state and anti-state actors, the police see themselves on one side of the divide and unions on the other. Further, the police in Southern Africa are uniformly deemed part of the essential service despite the fact that it is debatable as to whether the entire police service is an essential service or not. It is internationally accepted that essential services should not be permitted to engage in any strike action: This is cited by police managers and police authorities as a justification for the prohibition of police unionisation. Police managers also fear that if police unionise, they will affiliate to a union federation (as is the case with POPCRU) and will then feel compromised in policing union activities of other industries.

Police members are allowed to join associations in all of the countries visited, except for Namibia. Shortly after national independence, long-serving members of the police in Namibia attempted to form a police association. Both police management and the Ministry of Home Affairs blocked this endeavour. While police associations do exist in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, they seem to focus more on issues of recreation and benefits than issues pertaining to working conditions and the professional development of police officers. Police associations are barred from negotiating collective agreements. In Swaziland, the police associations are not even allowed to raise questions related to promotion or issues pertaining to ‘politics’ and ‘discipline’.

The trade union movements in Zambia, Lesotho and Swaziland indicated that they hope to organise police members in the near future. The trade union movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia, however, did not express much interest in unionising the police.

Influence of South African police labour relations

The SAPS was the first police service in the Southern African region to recognise police unions, to afford police members freedom of association and organisation, and to develop comprehensive procedures and structures for collective bargaining. However, these developments in South Africa seem to have had little impact on the rest of the region. In fact, police representatives from Zimbabwe and Namibia indicated that the conduct of police unions in South Africa had reinforced the belief that the police should not be allowed to unionise.

There was a general belief expressed by police managers in the countries visited that the right to unionise automatically gives rise to the right to strike and that police will strike if this is allowed. This, they believe, is counter to what is expected from the police as a ‘disciplined’ grouping of essential service workers.

It is only in Lesotho that South Africa’s police labour relations seem to have had a positive influence. According to police managers interviewed, the fact that there has been a liberalisation of police labour relations in South Africa meant that similar liberalisation processes were appropriate and workable in Lesotho. The Lesotho police were particularly impressed by the positive spin-offs of collective bargaining. However, both unions and police representatives maintained that it was not appropriate for police to unionise, but that police associations were needed to represent both the professional and ‘shop floor’ issues of police members.

The establishment of police unions and collective bargaining in the SAPS seem to have had little impact on policing in Namibia. There has been no attempt to emulate police labour relations in South Africa, and no desire to encourage or create a police union. In fact, the Chief Officer of Directives stated that the perceived ‘indiscipline’ of POPCRU had cautioned the Namibian Police rather than encouraged them to form unions. He also added that conflict between the two police unions in South Africa—POPCRU and SAPU—had given rise to an image of the SAPS as highly divided and internally conflictual.

None of the police managers in Swaziland believed that South African police labour relations had had a real impact on the Royal Swaziland Police’s labour relations. In fact, it was stated by police management that when looking for a role model in terms of police labour arrangements and legislation, they were most impressed by Botswana.

However, it must be stated that police and union representatives from Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia indicated that they were keen to learn more about police labour relations in the rest of SADC and in the rest of the world. They were extremely enthusiastic about the prospect of a conference or workshop that would look at the different models of police labour relations.

Conclusion

Police labour relations in Southern Africa remain autocratic and are arguably outdated. Despite stated commitments to civilianising the police, they are not afforded the same rights as other civilian workers. They are prohibited from joining representative organisations that can engage in collective bargaining. This means that either conditions of service are unilaterally decided upon by police management or the state as employer, or are decided upon in public service forums that are not concerned with the unique interests of the police.

While in some countries police associations do exist, these are more like welfare/entertainment bodies and are prohibited from engaging in any significant collective action or bargaining.

There is little or no understanding of the role and nature of police unions. Police managers maintain a simplistic and inaccurate belief that if police are able to organise into representative bodies, they will automatically engage in strike action. The potential for police to engage in collective action (especially withholding of labour) is terrifying to governments that are struggling to maintain social order and to provide citizens with a basic sense of security.

The police are seen as key state agents whose loyalty to government is a primary concern. Faced with potential or actual political instability, the liberalising of police organisations is simply not on the agenda of either the police or the government in the region. Even trade union federations are hesitant to organise the police in Southern Africa, given that this is illegal. Governments in the region fail to realise that if collective grievances and conditions of service are not dealt with adequately, disruptive police collective action is likely at some point (as happened in both South Africa and Lesotho). Without some representative body for the police, there is no collective body that would allow police management and employers to resolve disputes. This vacuum renders police agencies unstable, far more so than would the presence of bona fide police representative bodies.

Finally, the decision to impose restraints on collective bargaining processes and representative organisations in police forces in the region is short-sighted. The internal democratisation of police organisations is not only beneficial to police members. Police members who feel valued and respected are more likely to have reputable relations with their clients than police who have no direct experience of democracy in their own work environment.11 This is a crucial point to bear in mind in attempts to develop community-oriented professional policing.

Notes

S Christie, Collective bargaining in the public service. Paper written for the Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1992.



This forum is now called the Safety and Security Sectorial Bargaining Chamber (SSSBC). The SSSBC was formally constituted on 17 August 1999. The functions of the SSSBC are to negotiate collective agreements on matters of mutual interest; implement, monitor and enforce collective agreements; prevent and resolve labour disputes; develop policy proposals that may affect the police; and to promote and establish training and education schemes for the police (Marks, 2000).



There are other police representative organisations in South Africa. However, these are small and while recognised, are not allowed to participate in collective bargaining forums because of their small size.



In fact, only the defence force and intelligence services are excluded from the act. It should be noted, however, that when the act was first devised, police were not included. After a process of discussion and negotiation with police management, labour lawyers and non-governmental organisations, were the police included in the act.



For more information about the police unions in South Africa, refer to M Marks, Labour relations in the South African Police Service, in G Adler (ed) Public service labour relations in a democratic South Africa, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2000.



See J Burpo, Police unions and the civil service setting. Paper written for the United States Department of Justice, 1973.



The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, however, is challenging this. It is currently organising campaigning for the inclusion of police and prison workers in the act and for the freedom of association of these workers.



The commission was established in 1973 in accordance with the then Constitution of Zambia. The commission is able to appoint persons to the police force or the prisons service, promote officers, decide on retirement, direct compensation in cases of death or accidents, exercise disciplinary control, review appeals of aggrieved officers against punishment imposed departmentally, and direct transfers of officers.



It is important to note that police management in the Lesotho Mounted Police Service believe that the key causes for complaints and grievances are poor working conditions and the actions of commanders. Blame is thus not immediately attributed to the individual grievant.



This act is obviously very old. It dates back prior to independence, which was achieved in 1968. A new bill has been drafted and is currently being discussed in parliament.



See H Goldstein, Problem-solving policing, United States of America, McGraw Hill, 1990.