THE SAN: SOUTHERN AFRICA'S FORGOTTEN PEOPLE

The San are the aboriginal people of Southern Africa, whose distinct hunter-gatherer culture stretches back over 20,000 years. According to recent anthropological evidence, 10,000 years ago their exclusive domain stretched from the Zambezi to the Cape of Good Hope. Now Southern Africa’s estimated 110,000 remaining San face extinction, living lives of poverty on the margins of society. Today, the Gana and Gwi—who number between 600 and 700—and who are the last remaining San of Botswana’s Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), are struggling against the government of Botswana to win back the right to roam freely in their lands.

The plight of the San of the CKGR, which is located in Botswana’s Ghanzi District, began as far back as 1896 when the Ghanzi area was ceded to Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa Company, much to the chagrin of the Batswana (one of the Tswana ethnic groups) who claimed territorial rights over the area. In 1898 the Government of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, as it was then, allocated 42 farms to a group of Afrikaner farmers to settle in the Ghanzi District. As a result of this decision to allocate the lands on the Ghanzi Limestone Ridge to these farmers, the San and the other people who lived on the farms either remained as labourers or had to find other places to live. These movements would subsequently cause the restructuring of the social landscape of the Ghanzi region and the beginning of the marginalisation and impoverishment of a sizable portion of the San population.

Recent reports from Botswana indicate that the current government is now using all means to force the last remaining San out of the CKGR. It was reported on 18 February 2002 that Botswana officials had turned off essential water supplies to the San. According to the government, this became necessary because government-sanctioned cattle ranching had lowered the water table, depriving the San of natural water.

Even though the inhumane treatment of the San by the Botswana government is not a new phenomenon in the history of this country, it raises the question as to why this government would act with such renewed zeal and determination to force the remaining Gana and Gwi off their land and truck them out to a shanty town that these San call ‘the place of death’.

Many analysts argue that the primary reason behind the eviction of the San has much to do with a ‘clandestine government policy’ which seeks to stop the San from claiming mineral rights over an area in the CKGR, reserved for the San by the constitution when Botswana gained its independence in 1966. However, the question of mineral rights is further complicated and intertwined with what can best be described as a deep-seated contempt of the San that the politically and economically dominant majority Tswana ethnic group seem to have. The government has also adopted this ‘racist’ attitude and it seems to be important in determining the way the Botswana government deals with the San. President Mogae himself has referred to the San as “stone-age creatures”.

The government, in its defence, claims that the relocation of the San from the CKGR is essential in order for them to have access to sustainable state services such as health care and formal education. This is because the government insists that it cannot currently afford to provide water and other services to the San communities in the reserve even though it costs only US$3 per person per week.

The position taken by the Botswana government seems even more baffling if one considers the fact that it turned down an offer by the European Union (EU) to cover the cost of keeping the San in the CKGR. This offer was to form part of the CKGR Management Plan that was signed by the Botswana government and the EU in 1996. One of the key provisions of this agreement was that the water supply to the San would not be turned off. It was on the basis of this assurance that the EU agreed to continue its long-standing support of conservation and management of wildlife resources in Botswana. The most important provision of this agreement (relating to the provision of services to San communities) would be rendered meaningless if, through the cutting off of services, these communities ceased to exist.

These measures taken by the Botswana government constitute a clear violation of the human rights of the San. More significantly, the eviction of the San from their tribal lands violates the Botswana constitution, which as far back as 1961 makes provision for the creation of a reserve “specifically for the Basarwa to practice their hunter gather way of life”. To make matters worse, the Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks said that it would no longer issue hunting permits to San for use within the reserve.

There seems, however, to be some light at the end of the tunnel: 243 members of the San communities living in the CKGR filed an urgent lawsuit on 8 April 2002 in the Botswana High Court, opposing the government’s decision to evict them and to cut the supply of water and other essential services. The UN special rapporteur on indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, has now gone on record “condemning the Botswana government’s actions unreservedly”, after holding talks with the communities affected by this government’s policy.

Should the government of Botswana succeed in its unofficial policy of forcing the CKGR San off their land and into government camps where their tribal life is torn away, leaving them as listless drunks and beggars, this would constitute the greatest single crime perpetrated against the San in decades. A concerted effort should be made by the international community to assist the San in their struggle against the Botswana government. This would at least ensure that the forgotten people of Southern Africa do not become the lost people of Southern Africa. – CM

ANGOLA UPDATE

Barely two months have passed since Jonas Savimbi, the leader of Angola’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was killed in an ambush by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) in this country’s eastern Moxico Province, and already we are talking about lasting peace in Angola. In fact, the events that followed the death of UNITA’s historic, yet highly controversial, leader have startled most observers of this 27-year-old civil war. This is partially because, even though Savimbi himself had for a time been viewed in several quarters as the main reason for this conflict’s intractability and his ‘removal’ essential for a peaceful resolution, no one was quite prepared for the pace at which the government of Angola and UNITA were able to sit at the negotiating table and agree on a detailed cease-fire agreement, which, among others, has resurrected the Lusaka Protocol—a comprehensive peace blueprint signed in Lusaka at the end of 1994.

In fact, the pace at which the military leaders of the FAA and the FALA (UNITA’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) were able to produce and agree on a comprehensive cease-fire after just two weeks of negotiations in Luena (Moxico Province) has been interpreted as early, yet unmistakable, evidence that Jonas Savimbi was the main stumbling block to peace in Angola. It reinforces the view that if in the absence of the ‘Savimbi factor’ the military leaders of both parties were able to put a stop to the war, the historically elusive goal of political agreement between the government of Angola and UNITA might after all be possible.

The FAA’s and UNITA’s military commanders were in a fortnight able to achieve the difficult task of drafting a Memorandum of Understanding, covering the modalities of a cease-fire and defining in detail all aspects related to the quartering and demobilisation of UNITA’s military forces. On 4 April, in a historic ceremony attended by more than 4,000 people and held in the Angolan Parliament in Luanda, this Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol, was signed by the two chiefs of staff (FAA’s General Armando da Cruz Neto and UNITA’s General Abreu Muengo Ucuatchitembo ‘Kamorteiro’) as well as by the chief of the UN Mission in Angola and the ambassadors of the troika of observer countries (Portugal, the United States and Russia). Following the signature and under the watchful eye of an unusually relaxed President Dos Santos, the two military commanders embraced each other ‘as brothers’, reflecting in this symbolic way the wishes of some 12.5 million Angolans who have longed for peace in a country that has been devastated by three decades of civil warfare.

This detailed cease-fire agreement provides for the quartering of 50,000 UNITA soldiers in 27 quartering locations, as well as provisions for 300,000 family members to be taken care of in areas adjunct to the quartering locations. A Mixed Military Commission comprising members of both the government and UNITA will undertake the steering of this complex process, and an observer role is given to military representatives of the troika of observer countries as well as a military representative of the UN. As a consequence, there is no provision in the agreement for a formal monitoring or verification role for the UN or any other body or country, leaving out of the picture a possible peacekeeping operation with the size and mandate of the UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) that was set up to monitor and verify the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol with a 7,500-strong peacekeeping force. The parties have returned to the formula used in 1991 after the signature of the first peace accords (known as the Bicesse Peace Accords) whereby the responsibility for verifying compliance lay directly with them under the CCPM (Joint Political Military Commission) and in which the UN participated by invitation only. Nevertheless, both UNITA and the Angolan government have kept the UN and the troika of observer countries on board, and have publicly called for assistance in the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

President Dos Santos’ high spirits are therefore justified, his political skill and swift reaction to events having proved successful and having earned him international acclaim. Following the death of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002, the president seized the moment by declaring a unilateral truce and announcing on 14 March a ‘15-Point Peace Plan’, which officially halted any military activities of an offensive nature against UNITA, promised a ‘blanket amnesty’ to all individuals involved in the war as well as a reintegration programme for all demobilised soldiers and promised to speed up the implementation of the necessary conditions for elections to be held, including the approval of the new constitution currently being discussed in parliament. This 15-Point Peace Plan opened the way for the negotiations that followed in Moxico Province between the military delegations of the government and UNITA.

Yet, President Dos Santos’ skillful leadership of this process has also been a function of the relative balance of forces on the ground, which gives the FAA a degree of leverage against UNITA that it has not enjoyed in the recent past.

Although the Angolan government has shied away from mediatic triumphalism, from a purely military perspective the signs that the FAA’s eastern advance has been a success, are unmistakable. This may go a long way to explaining the pace at which a cease-fire was concluded, since the conditions prevailing at the negotiating table mirrored the highly asymmetrical situation on the ground. – JP

MONUC PHASE 3: DDRRR ON TRACK IN THE DRC

The current programme of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement and repatriation (DDRRR) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is specific to that country. It is not a traditional DDRRR programme, if such a thing exists. Many regard the situation in the DRC as one of the most complex in which such an operation has been undertaken. This is because of the nature of the conflict; the multiplicity of actors involved; its numerous links with other countries and peace processes; as well as the sheer size of the country and the ensuing logistical constraints.

Both the specific skills of the lead agency for DDRRR in the DRC—in this case MONUC, which is a peacekeeping mission and therefore not equipped to undertake certain DDRRR tasks—and the expertise of other agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have meant that this plan has been developed as an inclusive plan, whereby each specialised agency is expected to play to its strengths. This is also in line with lessons learnt and recommendations from numerous other DDRRR exercises studied when establishing Phase 3 of MONUC.

The relative stability after the implementation of a ceasefire in January 2000 and the ongoing Inter-Congolese Dialogue, held at Sun City since February 2002, have created consensus that a window of opportunity would allow for the DDRRR of the armed groups operating in the DRC. If this situation can be exploited in the manner described in the MONUC plan, a great step will have been made in restoring peace to the DRC and stability to the Great Lakes Region.

The general objective of this phase of the MONUC operation is to disarm, demobilise, repatriate, resettle and reintegrate all armed groups in the DRC and to hand over mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals to the appropriate authorities. The DDRRR operations in the DRC will take place in a more complex setting than usual. Whereas most DDRRR programmes involve the bilateral disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of a regular army and a rebel group, in the DRC, such a programme involves large numbers of armed groups, many of whom are fragmented, foreign and involved in operations across borders. In light of this, MONUC has adopted guiding principles when planning DDRRR in the DRC. These include voluntary disarmament; links with the peace process; co-operation with other agencies; and co-operation with national and regional governments.

There are to be three phases:

Phase 1: 1 January 2001 to 1 July 2002—a preparatory phase, divided into two steps:

– Step 1: 1 January 2001 to 30 March 2002—dedicated to setting up the DDRRR division and to establishing work procedures.

– Step 2: 1 April 2002 to 30 June 2002—aimed at deploying the different units according to the plan.



Phase 2: 1 July 2002 to 1 July 2003—this includes implementation of practical procedures to disarm, demobilise and further reintegrate or resettle all demobilised personnel of the armed groups in one year’s time, according to available resources.

After completion of Phase 1, Step 1 of the operation, the necessary conditions for the DDRRR programme have been created, inter alia, the demilitarisation of Kisangani, the deployment of the staging area at Bangoka airfield in Kisangani, the establishment of the Kisangani–Kindu link and the establishment of a forward mounting base in Kindu for occupation by a forward force capable of creating the necessary conditions for DDRRR activities.

Disarmament is to take place in a number of disarmament camps. The Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) suggested locations for 23 disarmament camps in its draft plan for disarmament in the DRC. However, following an assessment by the MONUC DDRRR planning unit, 16 locations were suggested, some of them different from those suggested by the JMC. It has been established that 12 camps would be necessary in view of the resources likely to be available as part of MONUC’s Phase 3 operation.

MONUC has started with Step 2 of Phase 2 of its DDRRR operation in the eastern part of the DRC, deploying the Uruguayan Railway Company and the Uruguayan Infantry Battalion at Kisangani. The positive outcome of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue will give impetus to the DDRRR process and determine the aims of phase three. – HB

THE OAU MILITARY OBSERVER MISSION TO THE COMORES, DECEMBER 2001–JANUARY 2002

The Central Organ of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 27 November 2001 approved the deployment of an OAU Military Observer Mission to the Comores (OMIC), to oversee the operation of arms collection in Anjouan.

The mission comprised two officers from Togo, four officers from South Africa, four officers from Mozambique and four officers from Mauritius. It was due to start on 1 December 2001 but only began to run effectively on 25 December 2001.

The mission was also involved in three activities. The first was static collection, whereby gun holders were requested and sensitised to turn in their weapons voluntary at any of the three collection sites set up by the mission in the towns of Hombo, Mirontsy and Domoni, with the consent of the Anjouanese authorities. The other was a mobile collection whereby the mission collected weapons at specific addresses that had been given to them and inspected all other areas where weapons could be collected. In both activities, weapons were checked against the available lists and collected for storage.

During the mission in Anjouan, the 14 observers from South Africa, Mauritius, Mozambique and Togo worked with the local gendarmerie and the Comorian Defence Force to ensure that procedures were put in place to encourage the responsible stockpiling, management and use of weapons by civilians and government forces on the island.

The OAU observers were given lists by the Anjouanese authorities of all weapons known to be in the possession of the gendarmerie, armed forces and civilians. These lists gave a total of 415 weapons in circulation on the island, 346 of which (83%) were inspected and collected during the mission. In addition to these 415 weapons, another 253 were identified by serial numbers during weapons’ collection and inspection operations. Some of these weapons were collected, while others were retained by gendarmerie and defence force personnel or could not be located.

The observer mission also recognised the need to ensure that defence force and gendarmerie personnel were not hoarding weapons, and so undertook inspections at the four defence force bases and 11 gendarmerie posts on the island. Each official was allocated one weapon and a set amount of ammunition. In some instances, this required the collection of additional weapons from officers.

The three armouries on the island were also checked and lists were made of all weapons contained in the armouries. To ensure that the collected weapons were secure, a dual-key system was initiated, whereby OMIC held one key and the defence force the other. The OMIC key was returned to the Anjouan armed forces at a public ceremony in early February.

Key recommendations of the observer mission were to ensure that the collected weapons were secured for the long-term and any obsolete weapons or weapons inappropriate for use by the defence forces be destroyed.

The results of the observer mission go beyond the number of weapons collected. The mission drew in the support of local government officials and the public, raising awareness regarding the availability of weapons in the Comores. Another key component of the mission was to create conditions conducive to the holding of presidential elections in March 2002. By decreasing the number of weapons in circulation and increasing control over government weapons, OMIC played an important role in increasing confidence in the security situation on the island. – HB and SM