Taking the SA Army into the Future*

Gen G L Meiring, SSAS, SD, SM, MMM
Chief of the South African Defence Force

*Edited version of a paper presented at a conference on Taking the South African Army into the Future, hosted by the Institute for Defence Policy in conjunction with the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Department of Political Sciences, UNISA on Monday 15 November 1993, Pretoria

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 14, 1994



INTRODUCTION


Firstly, I want to thank all who made this day possible, and created the opportunity for me to deliver this paper. It is important that we in South Africa think and plan for the future in which we want to live. During the course of this paper you will often hear the word 'reality'. It is a reality that if one does not plan one's own future it is very likely that someone else will do it for you and you may not like what you eventually get.

I think it is also important that we, at the start, make sure that we all have the same points of departure.
  • In considering the role and tasks of an Army and the nature of warfare in the situation we are facing in the RSA at present and in the foreseeable future, one has the problem of politics. I call it a problem, because we, as soldiers, are not - nor do we want to be - involved in the political debate but have to accept it as reality in a democratic society. Spin-offs of the differences between political parties, inevitably, have an influence on the Army. The South African Defence Force, and thus the Army, could easily become a ball in the political field of play. We know it is dangerous, they - the politicians - know it as well, but it still happens. In this paper I will refrain from expressing any party political point of view. The South African Army is, and must remain, apolitical.
  • We in South Africa are in a process of change. Because of the changes in the environment in which the South African Army must serve, we are also in a process of adaptation. Part of this process is to take note of and, if possible, accommodate as many of the different viewpoints as possible. Believe me, there are many different points of view in respect of where we should go with the South African Army. I am not presenting this paper as the final word on this matter. We fully acknowledge the need to discuss the future of the South African Army with many different parties before we finalise the strategy for the future. However, there are certain realities that must form the basis for discussion. I will concentrate on these realities and their influence on the future of the South African Army.

REALITIES AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND DEVELOPMENT

The major determinants of the RSA's security position have changed considerably in recent years. These changes have made it necessary to revise the whole defence strategy. The most significant events precipitating these changes have been the demise of the USSR, the policy statement of State President De Klerk on 2 February 1990 and the developments on the political scene in South Africa since then. Realities such as large scale unemployment and internal instability arose. These realities still dominate the security situation in our country. Other issues that also need to be considered in shaping the SADF for the future are changing financial priorities, our manpower composition, control over the Defence Force, logistic capabilities, and so on. It is unfortunately so that historical and emotional factors in the hearts and minds of our people tend to distort these realities and their influence on the development of the South African Defence Force.

The South African Defence Force made a concerted effort towards zero-based planning of a new defence strategy in 1992. The aim was to provide the RSA with a defence force that is credible, cost-effective, and legitimate. Further, it had to be non-threatening, whilst retaining a deterrent capability against potential aggressors. The extremely diverse composition of the population of our country, the participation in conflicts internationally and internally in the past, the lack of full participation in the military are all historical factors which have affected the status of the Defence Force in different ways among different sections of the population. To make a simplistic comparison with Switzerland or a number of other countries does not, to my mind, take into account the emotional and deeply rooted perceptions of many sections of our community. These factors will certainly influence the speed at which we can hope to legitimise the South African Defence Force in the eyes of our people as a whole. If not done correctly it will merely create a legitimacy problem for the South African Defence Force in the minds of one or other section of the population.

Together with the effects of the internal policies that were followed in the RSA, the international situation was a major determinant in our national security until fairly recently. The two major powers in the world played their game on a global scale. Africa, and Southern Africa in particular, formed part of this chess board. The RSA was situated strategically, possessed a considerable range of strategic minerals - the USSR was the only other country with major deposits of some of these minerals - and we had, and still have, the best infra-structure, which is still a key to trade in this region. The RSA was, and is, also anti-Communist and thus could not be ignored by Soviet and Western strategists. African states provided a significant block of votes in the UN. The already existing unfriendly relationships between the RSA and other African states could thus be exploited in the interest of certain superpowers. This situation has changed significantly, and the following must be carefully considered:
  • New power blocks are forming in the world and Africa is increasingly being ignored. The stabilisation and reconstruction of Eastern European states is a high priority for Western Europe. South Africa should not expect much help from a 'big brother' - we will have to help ourselves.
  • The USSR has disappeared as a major influence on the African scene. This of course led directly to the feasibility of real independence in Namibia and the withdrawal of the RSA from Namibia and Southern Angola. Africa has, however, not yet recovered from the scars of Soviet expansionism and the aftermath of the resulting conflicts. I am referring especially to the large quantities of war matériel that was left behind.
  • Although it will take some time to produce real fruits, democracy and capitalism are steadily gaining ground all over Africa.
  • The RSA is losing its pariah status.
  • South African minerals and the Cape sea route have lost some of their strategic importance. The Iron curtain has been torn down and free world trade has become the key to purchasing at the lowest price, anywhere.
Here in our country it is probably unrealistic to expect internal stability to be achieved within the next decade. There are too many factors pointing to possible prolonged periods of instability. The state will have to provide mechanisms to quell internal unrest and violence on a large scale. The SA Army must therefore expect to be used in this role for a considerable number of years unless an alternative can be developed. Given a choice, the South African Army would rather not be involved in trying to quell internal instability. Any newly elected government will need to address the underlying socio-economic causes of instability. It must be assumed that the national financial priority is going to be socio-economic development. However, given the fact that no state can afford to be without a defence force and also that the SA Army has considerable inherent public utility to promote socio-economic development, the SA Army expects to be given additional functions in this regard.

The national security of the RSA cannot be separated from that of other states on the subcontinent, nor from regional realities. Overflow from regional conflicts is the most likely threat to our national security, mainly in two ways:
  • A large-scale influx of illegal immigrants and refugees from countries in the region. This is happening as I speak here today; and
  • the RSA inadvertently being drawn into regional conflict.
The need for socio-economic development in Southern Africa is urgent. The poor living conditions of the people of the region are aggravated further by disease, malnutrition and hunger. These conditions, together with social instability and political strife, may result in a mass influx of destitute people into the RSA. This probably poses the major threat to our national security. It is therefore in the interest of the RSA to promote the welfare of states in the region and regional security in general.

We in the South African Army have accepted three principles, or pillars as we call them, for taking the South African Army into the future - my topic here today. It is essential that these pillars be widely accepted and fully appreciated if we are to succeed in building a better South African Army.
  • The South African Defence Force and therefore, the Army, must remain apolitical. We do not mean by this pillar that our members, as individuals, must be politically insensitive. We acknowledge the fact that this is not possible. Every one of us comes from a specific background and therefore have our own particular sentiments and beliefs. It would not be realistic if we did not accept this as a reality. What is important, however, is that we in the South African Army must rise above our individual differences and always act professionally. In spite of our differences we must always act in a professional manner. Our members may never, even when off duty, behave in such a way as to create the perception that they are acting in support of a specific political party.
  • In any uncertain environment, such as we are experiencing today and will be experiencing in the foreseeable future, people and organisations look for something sound and stable in which to put their trust. Such an anchor is the South African Defence Force and, in particular, the South African Army. The Army can only remain such a bastion of strength if it maintains the high standards of military professionalism for which it has become known. It is therefore necessary for its members to be trained to achieve these high standards and to be deployed in effective, proven structures to meet the demands of our diverse country. Let us not forget that our Army is by the people, for the people and that, through hard experience and good planning, we have developed an Army second to none in our region and also in the eyes of the professional military community world-wide. What counts in the end is the ability of the trained soldier, and not a piece of paper that merely states that he attended a training course. We in the South African Army have to maintain our standards and norms as soldiers. We are prepared and ready to train any new members, but not to lower our standards. If that is allowed the South African Army has a very bleak future.
  • Our third pillar is that the South African Army must maintain its large part-time component. Such a component offers many advantages. It is a comparatively inexpensive source of manpower. It can expand and decrease according to requirements. Because it includes people of all political beliefs, it is not possible to misuse these forces for party political purposes and it ensures a bond between the general population and the Army.

POSSIBLE ROLES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY OF THE FUTURE


From what I have said thus far, it appears that the future SA Army will have three roles:
  • The primary role will have to be the countering of external threats. I believe that the possibility of a direct conventional attack on the RSA in the near future is highly unlikely. However, in the short term and especially during the transitional process, with its expected increase in violence, the possibility of external military intervention in South Africa will be high. The United Nations, under pressure from the USA, has already expressed its willingness to intervene in areas such as Kuwait and Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia.
  • The second role will be the rendering of assistance to some or other body in ensuring internal stability.
  • The third role will be to use its inherent public utility in promoting socio-economic development and providing other essential non-military services.

POSSIBLE STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY OF THE FUTURE

In planning for a future SA Army strategy, we were led by the realities of environmental factors to select both a threat-independent approach as well as a core approach. A threat independent approach is selected as the most prudent course of action considering the uncertainties and wide range of possible contingencies for armed conflict. A core approach is selected as the most prudent course of action considering that an external conventional military threat is unlikely over the medium and long term and in view of the urgent socio-economic priorities of the state. In addition, it is also evident that the RSA, in the interest of its own security, will have to focus on a regional and/or common security approach.

In planning for a defence force, one needs a frame of reference with respect to the nature of the operational tasks at hand in order to develop the required capabilities. In the absence of a high degree of certainty regarding the future operational scenario and possible military opponents, a threat-independent frame of reference should be used for planning the future of the South African Defence Force, and therefore also of the Army. A threat-independent approach involves the following principles :
  • Planning is based on principles, as opposed to specialist doctrine. Preparation for defence aims at adhering to the principles of war - a generalised set of guidelines applicable to a wide range of conflict situations and drawn from collective experience over many centuries of military operations. One should avoid the narrowing of perceptions created by recent own experiences.
  • It must be assumed that the enemy will be strong and sophisticated. The SA Army therefore needs to improve fighting quality consistently through investment in the following areas :
    • Research and development.
    • Technology, including aspects such as defensive chemical warfare capability.
    • Wargaming and operational research.
    • Force multipliers such as electronic warfare and night-fighting capability.
    • Mobility, reach and staying power of forces.
    • The force structure must be balanced and allow for maximum flexibility like our part-time forces. Over-specialisation must be avoided. A wide range of capabilities must be maintained, even if only low force levels are affordable. Operational capabilities must also be designed and structured in such a way as to maximise flexibility. Multipurpose characteristics must be enhanced. Mutual support among different capabilities has to be a design feature.
  • Focusing of the defensive effort and force structure is of course required as the nature of the threat becomes more clear. For this purpose it is imperative for ongoing study of the strategic and operational environment through intelligence assessments and wargaming in order to adapt continuously the force structure.
  • Continuous focus on education, training and maintaining standards is needed.
If the RSA should be faced with an imminent threat of large scale armed conflict, it would require a corresponding force-in-being. According to the present threat analysis, as already described, a large-scale armed conflict involving the RSA is unlikely within the medium to long term. In the short term, international military intervention will have to be dealt with by available forces and contingency planning. In the medium and long term, provision will have to be made for the types of conflict as I have already mentioned. The following factors, however, are pertinent for the maintenance of defence preparedness:
  • It cannot be accurately forecast that a large-scale conflict will not occur in the long term (more than 5 years).
  • There is a possibility of small-scale involvement in an external conflict in the medium term as part of an international force.
  • The probability of armed conflict is likely to increase as a result of failure to prepare for conflict, thereby enticing potential adversaries to use military options.
  • The lead time for acquiring and bringing weapon systems into full operational readiness from a zero base is approximately a decade. The lead time for creating a viable military force from a zero base, is about two to three decades. The lead time for significant changes in the political scenario is considerably shorter than the ability of a defence force to detect and react to it from a cold start.
In view of these realistic factors, a core approach to the force structure of the future SA Army was selected. In terms of this approach, the SA Army should scale down in accordance with the established threat levels and financial priorities, but it is imperative that it retains the ability to reconstitute itself within a reasonably short time. The Army is very well positioned for reconstitution through its use of part-time forces.

As I stated earlier, it is in the interest of the RSA to promote common regional security. It is not the intention to provide armed forces for standing international military structures or specifically to design or designate forces for foreign participation. Our participation in international operations will be by using forces designed for the defence of the RSA. The SA Army will, however, structure and manage itself in such a way that combined operations with international forces are facilitated should the need arise. This implies the use of NATO standards in logistics and operational procedures.

More specific measures must, however, be taken in the context of regional security. A collective security system with a common command and control structure, such as NATO, will probably not be feasible in the region for a considerable time to come. The following goals will have to be pursued however:
  • Defusing threat perceptions by a non-threatening force design, as already described, as well as through military co-operation.
  • Enhancement of the defence capabilities of states in the region through military co-operation and assistance.
  • Improvement of the SA Army's ability to conduct combined operations in the region through improved reach and mobility, as well as promotion of common standards and procedures.
It is hoped that these goals can be reached by promoting military co-operation in the following areas:
  • Opening of SA Army training establishments and perhaps some of its logistics facilities for use by other regional forces as mutually agreed upon.
  • The secondment of personnel from states in the region to the SA Army. This applies especially to those force elements that can lead to threat perceptions and those from which experiences for development of their own capabilities can be obtained, and vice versa.
  • Combined exercises with armed services of the region.
  • Goodwill visits and exchange of military personnel at attaché level.
  • Inviting observers from the region to SA Army exercises.
Military co-operation and assistance should not be seen as an exercise in supplying the needy with a few hand-outs. Training aid should be provided against repayment at applicable rates, and be of mutual benefit to the SA Army and the armed forces of the states concerned.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY IN THE INTERNAL STABILITY ROLE


At present, the SA Army's role in ensuring internal security must receive top priority, taking into account the importance of stability in creating a suitable climate for future political change. The Army must therefore position itself in such a way as to play this role effectively while not affecting its primary task of countering any external threat to the sovereignty of the state. The SA Army has been lawfully entrusted with the following responsibilities within the RSA:
  • Border Protection. This entails ensuring the integrity of our borders, excluding border posts. This is the primary task of the Army internally.
  • Area Protection. This entails providing a security blanket over the whole country with the aim of protecting home and hearth against any form of insurgency and terrorism. This task is also regarded as a high priority for the Army.
  • Stabilisation Operations. These are operations conducted in conjunction with the SAP in urban areas to stabilise situations where the SAP cannot cope. Although the Army regards this as a low priority activity, the present situation has forced the Army into being more involved than they would have preferred.
The Army's internal security role in the future should be based on border and area protection, while withdrawing from stability operations and other SAP orientated tasks. Border protection can be closely linked to the traditional task of ensuring the sovereignty of the state. It forms the first line of defence and should be performed mainly by full-time forces with the support, when required, of part-time forces.

Area protection should form the second line of defence and ensure protection of the hinterland against any form of attack. To maintain a permanent presence, it will be essential that forces thus employed should comprise area-bound, part-time elements, supported by full-time forces, mainly in the form of reaction forces, when required. Part-time forces must be seen as fully representative of the total populace of South Africa. The concept is one of protection of the community by the community.

The stability of urban areas is not envisaged as an Army task. However, until such time as the SAP or a National Peace-keeping Force is able to enforce stability, the South African Army will have to support them. This could apply countrywide or to a particular area. The following options can be considered to minimise this role of the Army:
  • The expansion of the SAP to enable them to cope fully with every situation.
  • The establishment of a National Peace-keeping Force with initial assistance from the Army, which can then evolve into an independent stabilising force. The SAP can, once the stabilising force is in position, continue with its traditional task of crime prevention.
Should the Army be requested to assist the SAP or the Peace-keeping Force to ensure stability in a particular area, it must execute its tasks autonomously with its own doctrine using its own equipment and weapons. Everybody involved must fully understand the implications of this. Once the area has been stabilised, military forces are to hand responsibility over to the SAP or the Peace-keeping Force and withdraw. The Army cannot be permanently involved in internal stability operations. There are many reasons why this approach is preferred.

PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES


As I have already pointed out, socio-economic development is expected to be a national priority. The SA Army has considerable ability in this area. Although the SA Army should be designed primarily for conducting conventional operations, pragmatic considerations dictate that it may sometimes be used for non-military tasks. The driving principle throughout should be that the return on investment in the SA Army should be maximised by putting its community utility value to good use without, however, impairing its primary role. The question is: how should this be done? I have three ideas.

Firstly, one possible use that comes to mind, is that in which the military was used in the USA during the Great Depression of the 1930's. The vast pool of management skills and knowledge that is inherently part of any defence force was used, rather than military equipment per se, for upliftment projects. Some military personnel with the necessary expertise were seconded to other state departments for use in the socio-economic environment. This ensured that military equipment, which is needed for war and developed at great cost, could be reserved for its original purpose. Knowledge and expertise that had public application, which the taxpayer had in any case paid for, thus became available for use to the advantage of the country as a whole. In South Africa, this approach could see qualified personnel from the Defence Force helping out in mathematics and science classes in schools where there is a shortage of qualified teachers. Medical orderlies could help in teaching and promoting the concept of basic hygiene and primary health care in various communities, and so on.

Secondly, it is no secret that a vast number of the youth of South Africa have not been sufficiently trained to pursue a profession or career that will assure them of a viable future. A possible partial solution to this problem is to develop an organisation that can equip these people with the necessary skills so as to enable them to make a decent living. For want of a better name, let us call it a Community Support Corps. I foresee that the SA Army can be used to train people for a better future. We have the training facilities, the training expertise and the will to help!

Thirdly, there are a large number of individuals who have received military training of some sort and who will not be accommodated in the South African Army. To leave these individuals jobless in the streets is to invite trouble. An idea is to establish a Services Brigade to accommodate and train them. This Brigade could be used on non-military tasks, like building projects. After a period of service in the Brigade they can leave the Brigade and make a decent living for themselves in the private sector.

Please allow me to develop these concepts a little further, knowing full well that they stand a chance of being criticised purely because people will try to ascribe hidden motives to them.
  • These ideas could be developed and put into service separately or as a combination.
  • What is needed, is not to give a person a fish for today's supper, but to teach him to fish so that he can have food for all his future suppers. The SA Army can help in this.
  • The possibilities are virtually endless and are only restricted by the availability of sufficient personnel and funds to pursue this avenue of public service.
  • These ideas only become feasible once all the people of South Africa perceive the Army to be their own.
  • It will have to be developed further and must be seen as a joint venture by all parties concerned. The aid of the private sector in the form of funds, continuous input during training and even overall involvement by way of some or other board of control, will be needed.
  • Given sufficient funds, I am of the opinion that the Army can train large numbers of people every year in this way. Not only will these people then be trained in various skills, but they will have received training within the discipline of a military environment. As part of their training, I foresee that they will also receive training in basic social skills.
  • During training this brigade or corps can be used to help eradicate the vast backlog in the building of houses, schools, roads, etc.
  • These organisations lend themselves to be utilised on a regional, national or even international level in addressing the socio-economic problems of the Southern African region.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion: I have mentioned earlier that it was not my intention to state our way of thinking as a fait accompli. I want to repeat and emphasise that again. The future of the South African Army must be determined by the people of South Africa. We have the skills, experience and good intentions to build an Army that is truly an Army for the people. This has been the case for a number of decades. It is important that we, and I mean the people of South Africa, participate in this process for the sake of South Africa and not with any other aims in mind. We must not allow the Army to become a ball in the political playing field. This will destroy all good intentions in a situation where there will be no winners. We must use all available know-how and really have the will to succeed. We must build, not destroy. Frankly, there are no alternatives.