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Striking a Balance between Civil Control of the Armed Forces and Effective Defence
INTRODUCTION
In the national debate there are many points of disagreement. On one point there is, however, absolute agreement among all observers: that the commander-in-chief of a national defence force, the State President will be obeyed by the nation's military, regardless of disagreements over personality or policy. In other words, civilian command of the military is not at issue. But there is a difference between obedience to military orders and the unreserved commitment to duly appointed superiors. Since the military is a foreign policy instrument, it has direct interest in how the political chief executive pursues his foreign policy goals.
It stands to reason that there ought to be a special relationship - akin to a marriage - between the President and the military. Neither should be trapped in a loveless marriage: unhappy, suspicious, sometimes bitter - and stuck with each other. Part of the problem, and its solution, is psychological. The military has traditionally required strong and decisive leadership: clear missions, finite objectives, and well defined commands are articles of faith.
But the military is not only a foreign policy instrument; it is often used as an extension of national policy. For this reason, also, there is an unshakeable conviction among the public that civilian control of the armed services is an essential aspect of government of, by and for the people. Democratic nations must maintain armed forces. From time to time external threats develop, and on occasion, internal conflicts also occur, such as those which the Republic of South Africa unhappily experienced over the last few decades. The presence of forces in towns and townships, however necessary it may be at times, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people. 'Even when there is a necessity of the military power, within a land, a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and jealous eye over it; for the genius of a free people, and the laws of a free government' (Samual Adams).
The purpose of this article is to consider the complications of civilian control of the military in a democracy and to indicate what choices are to be made in order to solve it.
THE PROBLEM
From the introduction, the problem appears to be how to adjust the traditional relations between the civil authority and the military establishment sufficiently to mount a credible deterrent. The prominent American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, speculated that the 'conservative realism' characteristic of the military might clash with the 'liberal idealism' of the public, creating serious conflicts and perhaps compromising security. In 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that 'the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist'. The outlook of both civilian and military professionals is reflected in the search for effective institutional arrangements to ensure sound civil-military cooperation in the post-apartheid period.
CIVILIAN CONTROL: VARIETIES
The concept of civilian control has never been satisfactorily defined. Presumably, civilian control has to do with the relative power of civilian and military groups (Huntington, 1957). Presumably, also, civilian control is achieved to the extent to which the power of military groups is reduced. From a civilian point of view, the basic problem in defining civilian control is: how can military power be minimised? In general two broad answers exist:
- Subjective civilian control: maximising civilian power
- Objective civilian control: maximising military professionalism
Obviously, the two answers represent the extremes on a continuum of possibilities. However, the simplest way of minimising military power appears to be to maximise the power (control) of the civilian groups in relation to the military. Like all rights, civilian control may cover a variety of sins. It is always necessary to ask which civilians are to do the controlling. According to Huntington (1957), subjective civilian control has been identified with the maximisation of the power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms. Broad public perception appears to relate civilian control with democratic government and military control with absolute or totalitarian government. It is also argued that the military, who control the most powerful instrument of violence, will be more powerful in totalitarian countries than in democratic ones. The rise of the military profession, however, while making the particular forms of subjective civilian control difficult (if not obsolete), also made possible a new and more meaningful definition of civilian control: objective control, by maximising military professionalism.
Civilian control in the objective sense is the maximising of military professionalism. It also means the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarising the military, making them the tool of the state. According to Huntington (1957), the antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere. As Huntington puts it, 'At the same time it preserves that essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of a military profession'.
The distribution of power between civilian and military groups which maximise military professionalism and objective civilian control varies with the compatibility between the ideology prevailing in society and the professional military ethic. According to Huntington (1957), if the ideology is inherently anti-military (such as liberalism), the military acquires substantial political power but only by sacrificing their professionalism and adhering to the values and attitudes dominant within the community. On the other hand, in a society dominated by an ideology favourable to the military viewpoint, military power may be increased greatly without becoming incompatible with a high level of professionalism. The realisation of objective civilian control thus depends upon the achievement of an appropriate equilibrium between the power of the military and the ideology of society.
In most societies the relations between power, professionalism, and ideology is a dynamic one, reflecting shifts in the relative power of groups, changing current opinion and thought, and varying threats to national security. Unfortunately the tension between the civilian and military groups can never be removed; it can only be ordered so as to make it more or less durable.
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC GOALS
Civilian control of the military exemplifies the principle that military force is not an end in itself but a means that the civil authority can use to bring about certain political objectives.
The military naturally wishes to preserve considerable freedom of action in making local tactical judgements that they are uniquely qualified to make and their superiors - both civilian and military - acquiesce in this arrangement. The determination of national political objectives and strategic design, however always remains in civilian hands. This distinction between tactical and political decisions is of great importance. The South African tendency has been to grant considerable freedom of action to commanders in the field, provided their operational decisions do not contradict political-strategic guidelines.
The prospect that overwhelming security requirements might erode civilian control of an expanding military is real. This was the case in South Africa in the 70's and 80's. The intensity and long duration of conflict in Southern Africa has, no doubt, tipped the balance of power in favour of the military. The distinction between tactical and political-strategic goals became decidedly unclear.
Continuous public discussion of defence issues will ensure that all points of view receive consideration as the cabinet and parliament reach decisions on national security matters. For instance, a close watch on national security policy will restrain undue accumulation of power by interest groups that stand to gain from high levels of military expenditure. In December 1993, the Democratic Party's Colin Eglin told parliament: 'The ending of apartheid in no way guarantees democracy and human rights. The constitution will help but it will need more than a constitution. It will require constant vigilance to guard against the emergence of new authoritarianism in the future...'
THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVILIAN CONTROL
By far the most important military clause in the proposed constitution is that 'the President shall be the commander-in-chief of the National Defence Force'. Given his dual roles of chief executive and commander-in-chief, the President heads both the civil government and the military services. This arrangement ensures that the civilian chief executive stands at the head of the military chain of command; through command authority, he ensures civilian control over the making of military policy.
In keeping with the proposed constitution, the President shall appoint a chief of the National Defence Force (NDF), who shall exercise military executive command of the NDF. He will, however, be subject to the direction of the Minister of Defence, and in time of war, that of the President.
The NDF will be accountable to Parliament, which shall provide annually for the defence of the Republic. Parliament will also create suitable mechanisms to ensure the military's ultimate accountability to public will. This can, amongst others, be achieved through the following methods or mechanisms:
- Careful monitoring of military activities.
- Budgetary allocations for the military forces.
- Creation of a parliamentary sub-committee to exercise parliamentary oversight over the national Defence Force as prescribed by law.
- Authorisation of special investigations regarding alleged malpractices.
- Utilisation of investigative powers to ensure military accountability to public will.
- Creation of a Military Ombudsman or Parliamentary Commissioner.
According to international democratic practice it is expected that a constitution will provide for the division of responsibilities of the central government among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. The allocation of power among the different branches of government is such that each is protected against the others - and the public against all - by requiring the approval by one branch of certain decisions made by the others.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Certain criteria govern the civil-military relation in democratic states. These criteria will influence the governmental structure of the Republic of South Africa. Among these are the following:
- The executive branch is led by civilians, who are held accountable to a popular majority through frequent and regular elections.
- The civilian executive stands at the head of the military chain of command, supported by civilian subordinates who oversee the day-to-day activities of the armed forces.
- The elected legislative representatives of the people enact laws that define the defence organisation and policies of the nation. The chief executive enforces these directives. Parliament passes legislation that defines the scope of military activity.
- The judiciary prevents the military from compromising civil liberties, including those of the members of the armed forces.
Civilian control not only guards against military subversion, it recognises that military strategy is a servant of national political goals. The founders of many democracies have assumed that the principle source of manpower in emergencies would be state militias (e.g., the Citizen Force). This reflects the traditional reliance on citizen soldiers instead of on a standing army. Constitutional provisions of this kind illustrate the application of federalism to divide power and thwart arbitrary government. The nation's reliance on the citizen-soldier, and the consequent identification of all people in South Africa with the nation's armed forces, could pave the way for sound civil-military relations in the future.
STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Several structural devices are available to guard against an unduly powerful central government. These include:
- Decentralisation of political power. This could, for example, be achieved by adopting federalism as a form of government, to divide important powers between the state/provincial governments and the central government.
- Separation of powers. The division of the responsibilities of the central government among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
- Checks and balances. The allocation of power among the different branches of government such that each is protected against the others - and the people against all - by requiring the approval by one branch of certain decisions made by the others.
The central organisation of the Department of Defence will probably comprise of the following components: the office of the Minister of Defence; the civilian component of the ministry (the Secretariat of Defence); and the military component (the Chiefs of Staff and/or armed forces). These components and their relationships with each other are amongst the key determinants of the organisational structure and the process of defence management. But there are other important considerations too.
To ensure national security, decision-makers would be well advised if they acknowledge that there is continuous flux in the conditions of global and national stability. Very often conflict arises without a formal declaration of war. Nevertheless, civilian control of the military exemplifies the principle that military force is not an end in itself but a means that civil authority can use to bring about political objectives.
Tactical decisions regarding military operations in the field must serve the political and strategic goals established by the civil authority. Soldiers must accept the principle of civilian control as a requirement of military professionalism. During peace time, civilian officials should head the effort to provide the resources needed for the military. This situation should continue in time of war when civilians should remain in charge of marshalling the national resources needed to conduct successful combat operations. Consequently, the creation of a Ministry of Defence or central defence organisation cannot be done without taking cognisance of the constitutional structure of government and operational needs and requirements of the armed forces themselves.
It is also apparent that detailed structuring/ restructuring of the various components cannot be mutually exclusive. Finally, it cannot be done until the roles and responsibilities of the Minister and the chain of command and control between the President and the military commander have been clearly defined.
CONCLUSIONS
The problem of how to modify the traditional relations between the civil and military authorities and still maintain a credible deterrent appears to be a vexing one. The choice between subjective and objective civilian control will determine the equilibrium and distribution of power between civilian and military groups.
Whether or not future ideologies will be favourable towards the military or not, it would appear that the concept of a citizen-in-uniform (i.e., the establishment of a militia), would best serve the requirements of democracy.
Notwithstanding the need for military freedom of action in tactical situations, it is clear that these actions should always be subjected to civilian authority - underpinning the principle that military force is not an end in itself but a means that the civil authority can use to bring about political objectives.
The duality of roles, both political and military, is only found at the highest executive level, i.e. the President. The roles of political and military subordinates should be defined according to the macro structural choice of the organisational model which determines the relation between government structures, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces itself.
The macro structural choice should as far as possible appropriate political functions to the President and the Minister. Subordinate to the Minister, but on the same hierarchical level (equilibrium of power), the functions of the military and the administration should be separated. The military commander will act as chief military advisor to the Minister and assume command of the armed forces. Civil and military functions should be clearly separated and the latter are subordinate to the former.
Before the macro structure choice can be made, however, decision-makers must have a clear understanding and mutual agreement on the relevant concepts. A synthesis of sciences; political, military, public administration and generally accepted management practices, is clearly called for.
WORK CITED
S P. Huntington, Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations in Theory, in The Soldier and the State. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957.
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