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Time to Face Facts
What Future for the National Peace-keeping Force?
INTRODUCTION
From the beginning, the notion expressed at the World Trade Centre that the National Peace-keeping Force (NPKF) should assume primary responsibility for law and order duties in the run-up to and during elections, was unattainable. Time has caught up with the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). As time passes, closer examination is forcing all parties to temper their expectations regarding the potential impact and role of the NPKF even further. Yet the NPKF remains a crucial initiative although there is room for some caution in the expectations of what can practicably be done in the short time remaining before elections.
This article examines a number of related aspects. First, it looks at the expected tasks and roles of the NPKF. Second, it speculates upon the longer term future of the force. On a more practical level it makes some remarks on recruitment and training aspects, as well as costs and the nature of international training assistance.
Rather than any exhaustive analysis, the purpose of the article is to raise issues for immediate concern and consideration in support of the establishment of a National Peace-keeping Force - but with a longer term perspective ranging well beyond 27 April 1994.
THE NATURE OF THE TASK OF PEACE-KEEPING
There is, at present, no clarity on the nature of the 'peace-keeping operations' that would be expected of the Peace-keeping Force. Are they akin to British military operations in Ulster? Or American operations in Somalia? Or will we see the development of a unique 'soft touch' military peace-keeping doctrine in violence torn South Africa?
The notion expressed within the Sub-Council of Defence appears very much orientated towards emulating United Nations practices in international, so-called blue-beret, peace-keeping along the lines of the United Nations operations in Namibia, Somalia and Cambodia. In a very useful Adelphi Paper, Mats Berdel (Wither UN Peacekeeping, no 281, October 1993, p. 12) recently identified eight categories which collectively embrace contemporary peace-keeping operations. These are:
- Electoral support.
- Humanitarian assistance: the return of refugees and displaced persons and disaster-relief operations.
- Mine-clearing, training and awareness programmes.
- The observation and verification of cease-fire agreements, buffer zones and foreign troop withdrawal.
- Preventive deployments.
- The separation of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, custody and/or destruction of weapons.
- The establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies.
- Disarming paramilitary forces, private and irregular units.
These categories also serve to describe the nature of peace-keeping operations, particularly the emphasis on military or preventative actions. It is this emphasis on a holding action rather than the restoration of law and order in areas such as the East Rand which may be inappropriate in the South African context. Is peace-keeping, the appropriate route to follow? Should the emphasis not rather be on that of public order policing? This is, after all, not an 'out-of-area' deployment of armed forces in a foreign country, but the effort of South Africans trying to improve their own law and order situation. Or is the situation in areas such as the East Rand, where the Internal Stability Division (ISD) is now being replaced by the Army, so desperate as to force us to admit to a situation of civil war beyond the control of the police in certain areas?
At present the public order function in South Africa is assigned to the much maligned Internal Stability Division. This Police division is about 7 000 men strong and has an annual operating budget in the region of R444 million. However it is disguised, the nature of the task of the ISD is one of crowd and riot-control. It is the force which is called in to assist when the local police are unable to contain a situation, or feel that they are going to be unable to do so. Although then primarily a back-up to the police, in some areas (notably the East Rand), escalating violence has led to the permanent deployment of ISD units in support, and sometimes in place of, the regular police.
In South Africa there has long been a need to move the army out of the townships, to utilise the police for crime prevention and control, and legitimise the operations of the current riot control force, the ISD. To achieve all this, there is a requirement for a separate force distinct from the police, and the military, thus preventing either of these forces from being tainted by what is undoubtedly a politically unpopular task.
There is no question that despite political change, economic conditions and failed expectations will prolong mass protest past 27 April. Here the NPKF can play a key role not only in serving as a test-run for military integration and in helping to ensure control over the elections, but it could form the basis for a permanent, legitimate, dedicated riot-control force.
It is our view that, in time, the responsibility of the NPKF will become similar to that of the ISD, requiring essentially the same training, equipment and use of force. This will affect perceptions of their role and concomitant popularity markedly. Even in France, which has a legitimate political system and established democratic, multi party control - neither of the two riot control units, not the Gendarmerie Mobile (EGM) nor the Compagnies Répubilicaines de Sécurité (CRS) - can really be considered to be popular. They have a tough and uncompromising image which is inevitable and arguably necessary to combat riot situations. And they are undeniably effective.
The nature of the task of public order policing does not endear its practitioners to the citizenry, in particular to those politically active or aggrieved members of the populace who stand to be at the wrong end of a baton. How acceptable do we think that the Peace-keeping Force really could be - particularly if the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is not represented in a force operating in areas of intense IFP and African National Congress (ANC) rivalry? Once the novelty of a reconstituted Peace-keeping Force has disappeared, once the edge of international training assistance has worn off, we may end up with a NPKF which does very much what the ISD does at present, including the use of force. We think this is inevitable. Who but the NPKF or the ISD will evict squatters from illegally occupied houses, or from illegally occupied land?
The NPKF will not be a popular force if it survives the transition to a New South Africa. This is, therefore, the first word of warning that must be sounded to temper unrealistic expectations.
WHAT FUTURE THE NPKF?
A second, and even more important issue which we want to raise concerns the longer term function, size, structure and responsibilities of the NPKF. As noted above, there will remain, for many years to come, a requirement for a public order police force in addition to a community police service. If the Internal Stability Division has become so discredited so as to be beyond redemption, a replacement will have to be created. The real challenge then is how to use the NPKF to legitimise the function of public order policing in South Africa. The long-standing differences between the interests represented in the Sub-Councils of Defence and Law and Order on the importance and role of the NPKF have recently burst into the open with the publication by various newspapers of internal SA Police planning documentation for the election period. The Police argue for the revamping of the ISD and have little time or inclination for the NPKF. Privately they believe that the NPKF will either be disbanded after elections, absorbed into the ISD, or be tasked with border control duties as part of the SA Police. The SADF, on the other hand, believe that the NPKF should, according to General Meiring '... evolve into an independent stabilising force.' (Taking the SA Army into the Future, elsewhere in this Review)
The lack of SA Police enthusiasm for the NPKF is evident from the fact that the total SA Police contribution to the NPKF numbers less than 220 men and women, with the bulk of the Force being supplied by the SADF, MK and the Defence Forces of Transkei, Venda and Ciskei. The SADF and MK agreed to the establishment of the NPKF bilaterally as part of the negotiations at the World Trade Centre. At that time the planning was that the NPKF would also have included the KwaZulu Police - a crucial inclusion still absent at the time of writing.
Perhaps the SA Police feel secure in the knowledge that, according to the post-April 1994 constitution, the function of public order policing is constitutionally allocated to the police (section 218). If this is to occur, what will then be the future of the NPKF? Why should people of calibre join the NPKF with no clarity on longer term career prospects? What is the purpose of establishing a NPKF at great cost if it will serve no real medium or long-term purpose? In fact, Chapter 14 of the interim constitution provides for only two distinct Security Forces under a newly elected Government, a Defence Force and a National Police Service, with the responsibility to 'establish and maintain a national public order policing unit' allocated to the National Police Commissioner. The post-election Police Service is also tasked with border control. No mention is made of the future of the newly established National Peace-keeping Force in the interim constitution. Where are we headed with the NPKF after the elections?
Given time and other constraints, it is quite obvious that the NPKF will at best play a symbolic role during the elections, and then only in a geographically defined area(s) such as the East Rand. If it is to be a force with a maximum strength of 10 000, it can only be incorporated into one of the existing Security Forces after elections. This suggests that the real purpose of the NPKF is to serve as a temporary catchment area for MK until then. Should that be the case, why not start with the integration of the various armed forces now?
If that is not the intention at present, we wish to propose that the establishment of the NPKF indeed become a serious and long term initiative. Then the recent announcements by the Sub-Council on Defence on the establishment of a National Peace-keeping Force Command Council (NPKFCC) and related measures are welcome ones. South Africa can hardly move quickly enough in this regard.
Internationally there appear to be four approaches that this country could follow in deciding on a medium to long-term future for the NPKF. Each is discussed very briefly below.
Examples of two of the possible configurations that South Africans could investigate are to be found in France which has some 8 000 demonstrations a year involving roughly a million people. Of these, 1 500 demonstrations occur in Paris alone.The right to public protest is an ingrained one in France where dispersal of a demonstration takes place only once certain 'rules of the game' are contravened. To cope with this, the French have composed a system of riot control which draws both from the urban-focused civilian police force (the Police Nationale) and the parallel police in the military, the Gendarmerie Nationale, who operate almost exclusively in the rural areas and smaller towns. Each of these in turn have their own specialist riot-force. The 14 000 strong Compagnies Répubilicaines de Sécurité is a division of the National Police (125 000 strong in total) and, as such, falls under the Department of the Interior. The CRS is a force with a fearsome reputation. The para-military Gendarmerie Mobile, on the other hand, is some 17 000 strong and part of the military. The total strength of the Gendarmerie Nationale numbers 92 000 men and women. The structure of the ISD in South Africa is, therefore, in the same tradition as the CRS, a division within the Police. It provides for career movement from the public order to the community police force and vice versa.
Similarly to most countries, France has an escalating system of riot-police employment. First the police or Gendarmerie attempt to deal with the problem. Second, the CRS or the slightly more powerful Gendarmerie Mobile are called in. These always remain under civilian control and authority. The Army, as in most countries, is used as a final recourse. It is important to note that neither of the rest of the French police forces appear to be tainted through the actions of the riot-control forces. The public order forces are viewed as distinct and dedicated organisations.
Although the two French public order police forces have roughly the same training, knowledge and powers, they are distinct in their dress, equipment, function, organisation and action. While the normal police acts individually, as policemen or -women, the public order police act only collectively, within a set organisational context, normally that of a company or squadron. Of the two, it would appear as if the Gendarmerie Mobile is the better trained, more disciplined and higher calibre force. The Gendarmerie Mobile also have a number of other duties, of course, such as management of the military reserve and call-up system during time of peace, mountain rescue, and so on. In time of war the Gendarmerie Mobile is responsible for area-defence and internal order in much the same manner as the present South African commando system.
In the third approach, there is the German example where, by deliberate design after the Second World War, the military (Bundeswehr) have virtually no internal function during peace, and its internal functions during time of war are severely constrained. In Germany the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrentzschutz) fulfill the riot-control and public order duties. Even in times of a national emergency, the internal duties of the Bundeswehr are essentially restricted to traffic control duties (see the article by Wittman elsewhere in this Review). German constitutional safeguards and military culture have evolved to such an extent that German military officers react with alarm with the slightest mention of any internal role for the armed forces - even in time of war. It is possible, therefore, to consider combining the functions of border control and public order peace-keeping in a single organisation. That organisation may, also in turn, be either part of the police or the military. Interestingly enough, this appears to be the direction which South Africa is taking to some extent, with the South African Police apparently considering making the ISD responsible for both border control and public order policing after elections. There are, however, some concerns which arise from this option. It would, for example, imply the disbandment of the SA Army territorial military system without which South Africa would not have blanket security coverage over large stretches of countryside - areas which are increasingly rife with banditry and crime.
Another variation of this third option is a completely separate public order police organisation, distinct from either the military or the police. Such an organisation would, in South Africa, probably fall under the Department of Home Affairs. For a small country such as South Africa, confronted with huge demands on state expenditure this is inherently unattractive. Setting up a completely separate government department to handle a small separate security agency, with all the overheads that would result from this, would be prohibitively expensive. In particular it would negate the cost-savings which could result from such an organisation sharing the nationwide infrastructure already in place within either the SA Police and/or Defence Force.
Much has and is being made of the potential use of the National Peace-keeping Force to get the SADF 'out of the townships and back to the barracks'. About 7 000 soldiers generally act in support of the SA Police in law and order duties at any given stage under 'normal' conditions. In fact, these forces generally operate as a back-up to the police. In the strict sense of the word they do not serve as a public order type squad.
The assumption underlying the call to remove the military from any internal activities in support of the SA Police is that the country should have a non-military public order police organisation. This premise is itself open to challenge. Observers have noted that the South African security forces do not have the political interventionist tendencies of many other armed forces in Africa and Latin America (excluding the TBVC armed forces, of course). Why could South Africa not, for all practical purposes, place the public order police function as a separate arm of the service within the military - perhaps combining that duty and the responsibility for general border security in a single organisation?
This may not be as dramatic a solution as may appear at first blush. It would allow the SADF to regroup, restructure and reorganise the totality of its territorial army forces and resources (10 commands, 40 group headquarters and 200 commandos) into a public order and border control force, still under SADF control as a fifth arm of service like the Air Force or Navy. The counter-insurgency component of the SA Army comprises a nationwide, established infrastructure, ready for use, replete with communications, buildings, vehicles, a logistic supply system and so on. This would free the conventional forces to focus on their legitimate external defensive function. It would enable the commandos, for one, to be restructured in a much more positive manner as opposed to their simple disbandment as many are calling for. The disbandment of the commandos could result in a loss of control which could, in turn, play into the hands of the right-wing. But much more importantly, such an approach would remove the public order police function from the SA Police and allow them to concentrate on being a community police service, as so many wish them. On a more mundane note, the French military (including theGendarmerie) may not strike and are not paid overtime, while the French police (including the CRS) allow trade unions and are paid overtime. An approach, therefore, which will appeal to pragmatists and financiers alike!
Admittedly this is a radical solution, and one that would require a boldness on the part of the authorities (not to mention a constitutional amendment). It, along with any other option, certainly warrants serious and transparent investigation by the Sub-Councils of Defence and Law and Order. More important than any other consideration, it will require South Africans to consider the building blocks for national security. (see the article by Sass on a similar topic in this issue of the African Defence Review.)
COST CONSIDERATIONS
In an earlier article, Cilliers (A South African Peacekeeping Force - is it practicable?, issue no 11 of the South African Defence Review) made some rough estimates on the costs associated with the establishment and operating costs of the NPKF. As a rough calculation these figures do not appear to be excessive. We will, therefore, only make a few additional remarks.
The equipment costs for a company of the NPKF are estimated at about R2,5 million. This is based on a comparative study of the costs to equip a CRS company. These costs exclude the more obvious items such as normal uniforms, etc. which could be estimated at roughly R2 000 per person, making a total of about R3 million per company of 250 men and women. This figure excludes operating costs. Taking the ISD as a benchmark, the annual operating expense of a company would be about R16 million. Thus the annual operating budget for a force of 10 000 force (40 companies), would be about R640 million and total annual budget around R760 million. Where, one may ask, will this money come from, and, perhaps even more importantly, who will budget for control these funds after 27 April 1994?
Repeated questions in this regard addressed to the SADF, which is responsible for the provision of the uniforms, vehicles and suchlike for the NPKF, elicits only the response that the Sub-Council of Defence will be allocated financial resources for this purpose and that it will not and cannot come out of the Defence budget. But this begs the question: where is the Sub-Council of Defence (i.e., South Africa) going to find an additional half a billion rand and more. This is, after all, only one of the many demands being made upon the TEC and an incoming government. Spending such an amount of money on a temporary force with no clarity on its longer term future does not augur well for transparent and accountable government.
INTERNATIONAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE
According to the TEC Act the Sub-council of Defence, in consultation with the National Peace-keeping Force Command Council, must:
(a) establish and see to the training of a unit of the National Peace-keeping Force instructors, who may be drawn from the participating military forces and policing agencies but shall also include foreign experts;
(b) formulate the philosophy, doctrine, syllabi and training policy of the National Peace-keeping Force;
The first batch of a South African training contingent has already been assembled at the De Brug training area near Bloemfontein. Here they will be joined by the first intake of 3 300 to 3 500 peace keepers before, or on, 24 January 1994.
The involvement of the international community is obligatory in terms of the TEC Act. Such assistance should, in our opinion, include four elements, namely: expert policy advice; assistance with the selection of members for the Force; the provision of training for the South African training contingent; and, finally, ongoing oversight and refresher courses (including overseas visits and courses) for some period afterwards. Each is discussed in greater detail below.
These four levels are not mutually exclusive, but could and should overlap. Varying degrees of expertise on these issues exist within South Africa. The full utilisation of this expertise is, however, hugely complicated by the high levels of mistrust between the various negotiation parties. The participation of foreigners could, therefore, provide an unbiased source of expertise in a much more effective manner than a 'politically balanced' South African effort. It could also serve a useful arbitration function. Neither does such assistance imply a loss of South African sovereignty or control. It is simply assistance.
The first element of assistance, policy advice regarding the mission, command structure, operational and training doctrine, is the most important. Such advice could, most cost-effectively, simply involve bringing one or more experts on public order policing duties to South Africa at the earliest opportunity to assist in the start-up planning process which, by now, is well underway. The earlier section on the longer term future of the NPKF provides some indication of the importance of such advice and assistance.
Second, assistance with determining and adjudicating standards of admission to the Peace-keeping Force. The TEC Act specifically mandates the Sub-Council of Defence to:
(c) establish criteria for the recruitment, training and selection of members of the National Peace-keeping Force;
Recruitment, we now know, will only occur from trained members of the various armed and para-military forces in South Africa. Prospective members will, therefore, all have some basic military skills in weapon handling, signals procedure and so on. But there is little public indication of common standards such as age for rank, fitness, education, experience, psychometric test requirements, etc. While each participating party has probably decided upon some own criteria upon which to call for volunteers, it would be the task of either the National Peace-keeping Command Council or the command of the Force itself to establish common criteria. The latter appears to be the more probable choice for this task, on the basis that members should meet certain exit as opposed to entry standards. In other words that persons may require varying levels of training to meet a common standard before graduating, but that this final standard should be high and uniform to all recruits. This would be a complicated system, but not impossible given the fact that successive intakes are planned. By implication an individual could 'fall-back' from an earlier to a later intake.
Should the NPKF become a prime component of the South African security forces, tasked with public order policing, it would have to be a high calibre force - selecting the best candidates and providing the most comprehensive training possible. This is a policy best instituted earlier rather than later and one that sits uncomfortably with the requirement for political correctness.
The third area of assistance concerns the training of the trainers. Even despite any direct training assistance that the international community can or will give, there can be little doubt that the bulk of the training task for the Peace-keeping Force will fall upon the shoulders of South Africans themselves.
Finally, when such a South African training team trains its first group of Peace-keepers, it should do so with the guidance of the international community and not in isolation. At present it would appear that this is probably the role that is either planned or that will materialise for the international community. A role then, in adjudicating South African training methods and standards. And if the training is done in accordance with the doctrine of UN peacekeeping missions, that is what will need to be verified.
COMPARATIVE TRAINING GUIDELINES
In recent discussions with senior members of the CRS in France, they repeatedly stressed the importance of the quality of the leader group, which they divided into two levels. Junior leaders, essentially comprising platoon leaders, they argued, could be crash-trained in 2 month, but if this is to be achieved, they require 5-8 years of prior appropriate (generally police) experience with a minimum of a standard eight education. Company commanders and more senior officers could be trained in a month, but required at least 10 years appropriate experience and a matric. The catch lies, of course, in the definition of 'appropriate'. There will not be easy agreement on the what constitutes such appropriate experience. In fact, the only viable approach would appear to be to conduct individual selection according to some independent standards. Such a selection process, in France, typically extends over two weeks to include various tests, depending very much on the preparatory work and numbers involved, followed by either one or two months of training (for senior and junior leaders respectively) and a further two weeks of evaluation and examination.
Based on CRS experience and the minimum criteria listed above, a proposed crash training schedule for appropriately trained members is outlined in the table below.
Gendarmerie Mobile training requirements are even more strict than those for the CRS. For example, officers are selected only from Gendarmerie NCO's who have already a minimum of 30 months of training and experience, or from the Gendarmerie reserve, the Army, Air Force or Navy.
As noted, training for the NPKF is to commence on 24 January and the first group is scheduled to be operational by mid-March. This amounts to a total period of five to six weeks training. In accordance with the views expressed on training above, such a time frame would only allow the completion of the training of the senior leadership cadre, provided that these persons have sufficient prior experience. The concerns that these comparisons raise regarding the calibre and expertise of the NPKF are self-evident. It is for this reason that the accusations of a repeat of the 'kitskonstabel' fiasco of some years ago may once again haunt South African security planners in the months ahead. The fact that this compressed training schedule was forced upon the NPKF through no fault of its own is, unfortunately, a moot point.
Once again a comparison is constructive. Training and deployment within the CRS occurs at company level. Each company is composed of four platoons and has a total strength of about 250 members, all in all. The front-line strength of a company is less - about 110 members.(The basic unit in the case of the Gendamerie Mobile is the squadron, commanded by a captain, and with a front-line strength of 75 men. Each squadron is divided into three platoons. Generally the Gendamerie Mobile follows a more monolithic doctrine that that of the CRS. (The basic unit in the case of the Gendamerie Mobile is the squadron, commanded by a captain, and with a front-line strength of 75 men. Each squadron is divided into three platoons. Generally the Gendamerie Mobile follows a more monolithic doctrine that that of the CRS.) Using CRS standards as a benchmark, a training team of ten members per company is required, i.e. to train a NPKF of 1 000 men (four companies) simultaneously would require a team of 40 full-time trainers. Theoretically such a team could quite readily be assembled and trained by a foreign country in South Africa or in the country of origin, provided ample preparatory time remained. But practical constraints in terms of training preparation (i.e. training the trainers and deciding on doctrine, etc.) are sure to have a significant impact.
| Company Commander and Senior Officers |
2 weeks selection |
1 month training |
2 weeks evaluation |
1 week for integration |
|
9 weeks total |
| Platoon Commander and Junior Officers |
2 weeks selection |
1 month training |
1 month training |
2 weeks evaluation |
1 week integration |
13 weeks total |
| Squad Members |
2 weeks selection |
1 month training |
1 month training |
1 month training |
2 weeks evaluation |
16 weeks total |
CONCLUSION
The key factor for the use of any public order force in South Africa must be that such a force be placed under local or regional civilian control in its area of operation - as opposed to national military or police control. This is an issue that we have not discussed above, but that would require clear guidelines, procedures and structures.
Given the time constraints the TEC finds itself facing, coupled with problems of role definition and training of the NPKF, the recent announcement that France would assist in the provision of a small training team is a welcome one. The comparative experience upon which much of this article is based is derived from that of France, a fact which illustrates the role that that country could play. Yet foreign military assistance to South Africa is an issue fraught with national and professional pride. A degree of sensitivity and prudence will therefore be required from all parties concerned.
An embryonic NPKF will be a brand new security agency taken over by the new Government in May 1994. It will not be tainted by the partisan legacy of either the SADF, MK nor that of the TBVC countries. It could, therefore, serve as an important building block for the future. But then those decisions that are taken now must be based on a medium to long term analysis rather than short term expediency. We must provide a new Government with a real asset to use against violence, and not a bureaucratic millstone and a drain on already limited resources.
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