Getting Ready for the Twenty-first Century

Brig Bill Sass (rtd)
Senior Researcher, Institute for Defence Policy

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 14, 1994



INTRODUCTION

Political decisions are made quickly but security forces evolve over years. The security forces and agencies required for South Africa in the twenty-first century will evolve from the structures, principles and allocation of resources being decided on now as part of the negotiating process. The aim of the restructuring should therefore be to produce the best possible defence force for the future and not just to satisfy temporal political whims and fashion.

This article is intended to promote discussion of the need for a single national security strategy and an integrated approach to determining requirements of the various security agencies, starting from ground level and working up, as well as showing how such an approach will impact on the size and shape of all other security agencies. It promotes an approach aimed at the establishment of a basic functional requirement to determine the correct organisation for the particular job. If South Africa wishes to enter a new era of economic revival, international respect and internal accord, then a deliberate integrated national restructuring of the security agencies is required. It will take time and money - there are no short cuts or cheap solutions to security problems.

It should be noted that the figures, organisations and strengths quoted are intended to promote discussion and form a rough guide only.

The South African Defence Force (SADF), like much of the Civil Service, is at a stage where its future role, task, organisation and development are being debated. Since the end of the Cold War modern demands, requirements and thinking in respect of military forces have undergone considerable changes. Even without the decisions made at the World Trade Centre, the normal strategic management process of the SADF has led to changes as a result of the winding down and reduction in budget, following the Namibian war. However, the SADF is only one of the security agencies providing security and stability in South Africa, and at the moment is heavily committed to assisting the South African Police (SAP) internally.

The SADF cannot be restructured in isolation. An integrated national security strategy is required. In order to serve the best interest of all concerned, including individuals whose first concern are with their careers, the entire range of security agencies in a new South Africa needs to be addressed if the SADF is not to become more deeply involved internally. The following forces are discussed in terms of the role that they are to play in the future security structure and their relationship vis-à-vis the future SADF.
  • the proposed National Peacekeeping Force;
  • Regional Police Forces;
  • the SA Police;
  • Labour and Development Battalions;
  • School Cadets; and
The article concludes with a discussion on the restructuring of the SADF itself.

STRATEGIC GUIDELINES IN RESPECT OF A FUTURE DEFENCE FORCE


Certain decisions, both formal and informal, arising from the negotiations at the World Trade Centre and elsewhere, should be considered before restructuring any of the security agencies or changing their relationship to each other. Such restructuring should be undertaken in terms of an integrated national security strategy since 'structure follows strategy' and not vice versa.
  1. The decision to establish a National Peacekeeping Force implies eliminating or dramatically reducing the use of the SADF internally and, at the same time, means that a new, permanent security agency is being added to the South African security structure. Ideally, the SADF should not be employed internally, particularly if it is to be successful in building up a strong volunteer part-time force from all races. The SADF is in any case not primarily equipped or trained for situations requiring minimum force.
  2. The Minister of Defence has already announced the end of compulsory National Service for whites only and has indicated that it will be replaced by a Volunteer Military Service System backed up, if necessary, by a Selected Ballot System, applicable to all races. He has also indicated that the extended call-up of Citizen Force and Commandos is being reconsidered. Ultimately the strength of both the Citizen Force and the Commandos may react to the dynamics of a Volunteer Military Service System. The SADF has stated that it will recruit 5 200 volunteer matriculants in January 1994. This is considerably fewer than in the previous National Service intake. The SADF, no doubt, intends recruiting more soldiers into the Permanent Force and as contract volunteers, but the inflow into the Citizen Force and Commandos may be reduced, while their outflow remains constant or increases. The changes from the traditional conscripted militia or part-time system, which has served South Africa so well for so long, to a predominantly volunteer system, are indeed, major policy changes.
  3. The Government has agreed to negotiations with Namibia for the final handing-over of Walvis Bay. Since 1915 when General Louis Botha, who led the SA Forces to overcome German South West Africa, landed at Walvis Bay and through both World Wars, the SADF and its forerunners have been involved with Walvis Bay. In modern times, the SADF presence in the enclave dates back to the early 1960s. Long before Rundu, Katima, Oshakati or Grootfontein became known to SADF members, thousands of servicemen grew to know Rooikop, Duin 7, Kuiseb Canyon and the Walvis Bay Lagoon. This final evacuation will end the last direct links between the SADF and former South-West Africa (now Namibia) as well as removing the last SADF post outside the formal borders of the RSA.
  4. The integration of the TBVC armed forces and MK into the SADF and/or the Peacekeeping Force, has been agreed to and the integration of the police forces of the Self Governing Areas (SGAs) with the SAP, will also take place.
  5. There will be a second-level of government based on regions. One of the areas of concurrent legislative competence of the regions is regional and local policing.
  6. Civilian and governmental control over all security agencies and organisations must be guaranteed through a system of checks and balances which is acceptable to the larger contending parties. In particular, control of the budget must be transparent. A Multi-Party Defence Committee will replace the sub-council of the Transitional Executive Council after April 1994, to ensure these requirements.
  7. South Africa's economy has been in a state of recession for several years. As it begins to improve, the costs of security must be kept as low as possible. This implies making the most cost-effective use of those existing state funded institutions. Job creation instead of retrenchment is needed.
  8. The level of violence may taper off in the aftermath of elections but is unlikely to be eradicated even in the long term. Another reason, therefore, for favouring restructuring and retraining instead of retrenchment, is to maintain or improve the existing force levels. South African crime is also exhibiting many characteristics which have been evident internationally (drugs, computer crimes, major robberies, violence in petty crimes, etc.). These characteristics have become a feature of crime in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Brazil and Canada, yet South Africa remains, by comparable international standards, an under-policed country.
  9. The external military threat to South Africa, which is the legitimate concern of the SADF, has receded dramatically. The security problem at present and for a long time to come, requires a maximum police effort and not major military operations. On the other hand, as has been the experience of both England in the Falklands and the United States of America in Kuwait, a conventional warfare threat can develop so quickly that there is no time to establish new forces or acquire new equipment. Adequate, well-trained part-time forces and a modern, stable arms industry, backed up by an adequate Research and Development (R&D) program both in the SADF and the arms industry, are required to guard against such an eventuality.
  10. Since the SADF of the future will be dependent on both volunteers and part-time forces, it must strive to be popular among, and acceptable to, the broader public. This implies its acceptability, both to politicians (who are not subject to service or balloting and who lead secure and protected lives) and the broad spectrum of the public (who could be balloted, who pay taxes and who need protection). In spite of many changes, the SADF must be accepted as a Defence Force of and for all the people of South Africa.
  11. The future defence force will, like all government departments, also have to deal with some form of trade union or personnel association. This could be either one exclusively for uniform SADF personnel or a wider grouping including all security agencies or several unions divided on functional lines.
  12. As with all other state corporations and in the broader public sector, there will be massive requirements for affirmative action and both a racial and ethnic 'balance' within the military. Both affirmative action and integration of forces will have to be balanced by size and affordability constraints. Initially these requirements may even increase the Defence Budget though, in the long term, it is likely that less money will be available.

EXPANSION AND BETTER USE OF THE POLICE

Given the range of security agencies, already in existence in South Africa, it is difficult to understand why we cannot achieve more in countering the problem of internal violence. There are various police forces, starting with the SAP, through the police forces of the TBVC and Self-Governing Areas (SGA), not to mention the Provincial Police and some of the City Police Forces. In the case of the latter, one should distinguish between those municipal employees, who wander around handing out parking tickets (meter maids) and the City or Municipal Police such as those of Johannesburg, who are armed, equipped with excellent radio communication and vehicles and have dog squads and other specialist detachments. The best example of these City Police Forces is that of Durban, where the City Police have gone a long way to assist the SAP in conducting 'bobby on the beat' policing. However, all these other forces are restricted in their powers and duties, particularly in respect of combatting violence, which, although it is the worst problem, is left to the most overworked force - the SAP.

Then there are the armies of the SADF and the TBVC, as well as MK, leaving out for the moment the smaller groupings such as AWB/Ystergarde/Wit Wolwe or APLA/AZANLA. Of these only the SA Army is regularly deployed to assist the police although it is the most conventional warfare-orientated of the forces. It often leads to the situation of white soldiers, Citizen Force or commando, being called away from their homes to separate factions, all of which are anti-army! In the past, young white conscripts seldom understood enough of the problem, people or language to be able to make an effective contribution to solving the policing problem.

Thus, we have the position of a great number of trained and paid police forces of one sort or another which play minor roles, while the SAP struggles to find sufficient personnel to do its job. Many of these other police forces were originally trained full-time members of the SAP, as were many SAP reservists. Some better system of co-ordinating and structuring all available forces dealing with stability and anti-crime operations, as an integral part of the regional police system, must be achieved if the SADF is to be freed from operating internally.

A Peacekeeping Force is a step in this direction. Integration of all these other police, quasi-police, and assistant police forces, which are already fully paid and partially authorised and trained, should be another. The simple requirement that before anyone is allowed to carry arms in public, he or she should not only have licensed it but have been selected and trained as an assistant policeman or police reservist, would no doubt make our streets much safer and probably go a long way to protecting these same people from themselves.

In his book Warfare as a Whole, Frank Kitson points out that armies as traditional enforcers of government policy date back to Biblical times, while police forces are a much more recent development. However, as he further explains, police forces internationally are developing bigger and more specialised forces to handle problems, which previously might have been dealt with by soldiers. It is obviously politically more expedient for any government to state that particular problems or groups of dissidents are being dealt with by some police agency than to admit to having to use its armed forces against its own citizens. It would certainly be more positive for the country's image internationally for any SA Government to announce that only its police agencies are dealing with its internal problems.

NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE


The establishment of this force has already been agreed upon and it may affect the future size and shape of the SADF as follows:
  1. Once the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) has been established, the SADF can be released from some of the internal duties. This implies that the NPKF be a strong, permanent organisation with its own infra-structure for administration, intelligence gathering and command and control.
  2. Initially the NPKF will fall under the sub-council of defence of the TEC and logistically be dependent upon the SADF. Eventually, this arrangement will have to be replaced by a more permanent one, implying that a clear decision be made that the NPKF either develop into an autonomous government department or a separate division of the SA Police or Department of Home Affairs.
  3. Ideally, members from the SADF or TBVC armed forces should initially be seconded to this force/department in terms of existing civil service procedures and all new members including MK should be attested in a system similar to the recently introduced SADF systems of short, medium or long term volunteer service. This would ensure that only members of proven ability make up the long-serving core of the new force.
  4. The budgets of the SADF and other security forces will eventually be affected as additional funds will have to be found to fund the NPKF.
What affects the SADF most and needs to be attended to most urgently is the following:
  • The Commander of the force and his principal staff must be appointed to undertake detailed planning and prioritisation. (This in itself may require negotiations or even public hearings.)
  • Funds and facilities must be identified and allocated and future budget limits for this and all other security forces must be determined.
  • Agreement on entry criteria needs to be reached between the various forces who are to contribute personnel, be they SADF, SAP (ISU) TBVC Forces or MK.
  • Rapid progress is required with regard to training syllabi, international training assistance, facilities required and so on.
  • The SADF can make weapons, equipment, bases, vehicles, etc. available as to be agreed upon but the administrative branch of the new force to handle pay, logistics, computer services, rations, uniforms and suchlike will have to be built up separately and very quickly before the force can be accommodated. These administrative personnel are in short supply in both the SADF and TBVC forces, so many may have to be recruited from outside these bodies, possibly from members previously retrenched.
It is essential not to force the pace in the build-up of this force. Allowing enough time for it to be established administratively and by re-training trained members from different forces, it should be possible to establish the major part of a well-trained force by the end of 1994, with the first elements hopefully already on the ground by April 1994. If this force is to be successful, it would probably be best to look to the end of 1995 before a force of 15 000 to 17 000 is established, trained and ready. Only then should the SADF be scaled down and its internal operations reduced.

REGIONAL POLICE FORCES


The second aspect requiring urgent attention is the concept of Regional Police Forces. Negotiations at the World Trade Centre have already set certain basic employment and structural principles. What is needed is detailed planning of all elements involved, to create viable, dynamic and cost effective Regional Police Forces.

To continue as we are at present, with Provincial and City Police Forces only handling traffic offenses, is a waste of what could become highly effective 'bobbies on the beat', as has been realised by various city authorities, most recently that of Pretoria. To reincorporate all the existing TBVC and SGA Police forces too, including MK elements, into the SAP alone, without providing the needed local elements for each community, would create serious problems for members who, because of personal, family or welfare reasons, are area-bound and do not wish to leave their homes. What is required is to the strengthening of local policing with people who are part of the community. Using Provincial and City Police in a broader policing role, could partially satisfy the demand for more community-based policing.

Good policing requires a direct, visible, police presence on the ground among the people. What should be planned and negotiated is not an all-powerful, single national police force but rather integrated, regional, police forces working together as well as with the SAP and the National Peacekeeping Force on a national level. Regional Police Forces could concentrate on providing a first line of police presence in their own areas, where they know the people, the language and the problems. Strong regional police should serve their own regional interests and attend to local protection and anti-crime operations. They should provide a guaranteed presence, not susceptible to being moved or withdrawn to handle other people's problems. Such forces should prove very popular. The alternatives are costly, private security organisations, or untrained, non-guaranteed, part-time informal organisations or illegal vigilante-type organisations. South Africa has experience of all three.

Major crime and high levels of violence such as on the East Rand or Natal, may require special or dedicated efforts (including the deployment of major portions of the NPKF) but for many quieter regions of the country, a strong regional police force would provide an adequate law and order presence, serving and protecting its own communities.

The full-time strength of such a regional force may vary from region to region, depending on the size of the area, the level of violence anticipated, industrial development and so on. In order to be as cost-effective as possible, a part-time or reserve element must be available to back up the full-time Regional Police. Regional Police Reserves could form the natural home for most of the SADFs Commando and Air Commando organisations (providing area protection, house and hearth protection, etc.), SAP reservists and schoolboy volunteers, and SDUs. Volunteers from these organisations could be selected, trained and earmarked to operate only in their own areas as reinforcements for the Regional Police and in support of their own people and the Regional Government.

The establishment of Regional Police Forces could affect the SADF as follows:
  1. Reducing strengths by allowing Commando and Air Commando members to transfer to the Regional Police Reserve. It may also be necessary to second Permanent Force members to assist with the administration of these members.
  2. Each Regional Police Force must be made as self-contained as possible, leading to the requirement of at least a major training depot, decentralised accommodation and inventory. Some of these resources may have to be provided by the armed forces of the TBVC countries or the SADF.
  3. Certain members of the SADF or TBVC battalions may prefer to stay in their present locations in this type of force. If they should move to a new force, it should be with all service privileges intact.
  4. Further pressure on budgets.
  5. A further reduction of the requirement for internal deployment of the SADF.
  6. SADF assistance with the training of reserve elements, in particular, may be required.

THE SAP

The SAP would still need to be a large, highly skilled, modern, professional national force with personnel stationed nationwide. It would also be the force responsible for senior training of all Warrant Officers and Commissioned officers of the SAP, the Regional Police Forces and the National Peacekeeping Force, as well as the provision of assistance to regions with manpower, facilities and advice on their request. Without considering the details of the organisation, there are functions only the SAP - a National Police Force - can fulfil. Its organisation, therefore, would be built around these functions, which should include the following:
  • The provision of centralised senior, specialised technical and academic training for all police forces.
  • The establishment of a national Inspector Generals section, reporting annually to Parliament in respect of Regional Police Forces.
  • The establishment of a Special Branch (Security Branch) responsible for intelligence gathering in respect of threats to the internal security and stability of the country.
  • International Border Control and Protection, which will probably require a full-time Police Air Wing and Harbour or Maritime Security organisation, with particular attention paid to control at official crossing points. The SADF would be responsible for border defence against armed incursion, while the SAP would handle smugglers and poachers, customs and excise, the return of refugees, harbour and airport policing, etc.
  • The training and provision of the Special Task Forces (SWAT) for anti-hijack, anti-hostage and similar operations.
  • Specialised facilities such as the Forensic Sciences Laboratory, maintenance of a central Criminal Record Service Centre, as well as specialised elements such as fraud squads, gold and diamond squads, anti-drug squads and so on.
  • A Guard-Unit for protection of VIPs, Government Installations, National Key Points, areas and buildings of importance, etc.
  • Liaison with Interpol, foreign police and other forces.
If the SAP is to require long term SADF assistance, for example to train or equip air wing or harbour personnel, that need must be identified now.

LABOUR AND DEVELOPMENT BATTALIONS (SERVICE BRIGADES)


This function rightly belongs with the Department of Manpower, assisted by the Education Authorities, and not with the SADF or any other security agency or force. However, the relevant department may still require assistance in the form of base camps, vehicles, tents and camping equipment and other military equipment, as well as instructors in driving and maintenance of vehicles, cooking, medical and hygiene orderlies and other vocational skills, all of which could be provided, at least in part, by the security forces. The SADF could, therefore, assist but do no more. These battalions would not be made up of soldiers and would not be carried against the Defence Budget.

SCHOOL CADETS


The Minister of National Education has already announced that the present whites-only school cadet system is to be scrapped from 1 January 1994. It cannot be transformed and extended to all schools and all races even if it becomes part of the Regional Education System. The Defence Budget cannot support such an expansion. In any case, without conscription, teachers do not receive military training, and without them the school cadets cannot be administered, trained or commanded.

The purpose of this type of training was to provide friendship, discipline, leadership development and adventure training based on sound military principles. Such education, if it were to occur, should not only involve the military, but also health, environmental and conservation organisations. Good citizenship and personal character development are secondary aims of any education system. If the Regional Education System requests and can afford assistance from the SADF, this will probably be forthcoming but if not, then School Cadets as far as the SADF is concerned, will end.

THE SADF


Having examined the contribution of the SADF to the forces outlined above, let us consider the roles of the SADF. Both of the first two major steps - first, the establishment of the National Peacekeeping Force and second, more emphasis on regional policing - will have a significant material impact on the SADF, TBVC forces and the SAP in terms of men, equipment, vehicles and bases. In particular, the SADF could be stripped of its commandos and responsibility for area protection inside the country, including the security of National Key Points.

We can now turn our attention to the tasks for which the SADF must be prepared in terms of structure and training.
  1. Defence of South Africa and the Security of its Borders

    This is the classical role of armed forces. It is in the first instance a deterrent role but should deterrence fail, the ability to fight and win must be guaranteed.
  2. Aid to Friendly Nations and Allies

    This could take the form of military training assistance or humanitarian assistance. Recent examples of aid include SAAF support during the Angolan elections; engineer support for mine lifting and bridge construction rendered to Angola and Malawi; naval support to Zaire and the delivering of aid to refugees. The SAAF already train pilots for other African countries.
  3. Air-Sea Space Control (including rescue)

    Given the dangerous conditions existing naturally in and around South Africa, the ability to monitor sea and air traffic and effect rescues at sea or on mountains, plays an important international role. Sea and airspace control, therefore, remains an essential task.
  4. Support of the SAP Internally

    With the discontinuation of National Service and the transfer of the commando organisation to the Regional Police as recommended above, the military manpower available to assist the SAP would be limited. Yet the possible use of the SADF internally, in support of the SAP for use in an extreme case should remain. This role should not mean special equipment or training. Any prolonged deployment of the SADF in this role would inevitably lead to additional recruitment and budgetary demands.
  5. Assistance to the Civil Powers

    This is the classical role of assistance during floods, fires and disasters. In a disaster, immediate aid can best be generated within the region in order to provide timely assistance and aid. Regional forces supported by labour/development battalions, offer a better solution than that represented by (expensive) defence force manpower.

Organisation

Before discussing the composition of the SADF, let us summarise the proposed re-allocations from the SADF to other forces.
  1. National Service

    National Service is to be replaced by the Voluntary Military Service System backed up by Selected Ballotees, if necessary. These men, after training, along with any full-time members whose contracts have expired, are intended to form the bulk of the Citizen Force. The end of the National Service System means that the SADF will also lose its National Service professionals - teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc. - since very few of those members trained for specific professions, will still be prepared to volunteer to serve. Only a limited number will join the Permanent Force. Assistance, which the SADF previously gave in this respect, to Welfare Departments and governments of SGA or TBVC states, will necessarily be dramatically curtailed.
  2. Commandos and Air Commandos

    It has been suggested above that the natural home for most of those personnel intended for local area and house and hearth protection would be the proposed Regional Police Reserves. Without a National Service System to supply the Commando with men and relying on volunteers to build up their strength, their numbers (including the SAP Reservists), would shrink. Regions would have to work hard to encourage new recruits to sign on. Some of the present Permanent Force structures of the SA Army and SAAF would also have to be transferred together with these elements to the Regional Police Force in order to provide administrative and training services and to build strong Regional Police Reserves.
  3. Personnel

    Members of the Permanent Force, present Service Volunteers (contract servicemen), TBVC forces, SAP, MK and all other forces would now be divided between:

    * the National Peacekeeping Force;
    * the various Regional Police Forces;
    * the SA Police;
    * possible Labour Battalions / Service Brigades; and
    * the SA Defence Force.

    The SADF should obviously have first choice of those members with special military qualifications such as trained pilots and TBVC Air Wing personnel, trained naval personnel, military medical personnel, army personnel trained for conventional operations and equipment. Similarly the SAP and Regional Police should have first choice of members trained as policemen. The ability and desire of individual members to be categorised as 'area bound' will be an important determinant of the force in which they serve. The SADF has, over the past few years, retrenched more than 7 000 full-time members. However, all the other existing forces should cease further retrenchments and disposal of equipment until an integrated National Security Strategy has been agreed upon.

    Given the new Citizen Force service commitment of only 8 periods of 30 days, it would appear logical that many Citizen Force veterans could now be released to the reserve, as having completed their duty. Provision must obviously be made for volunteers to join or stay with the new Citizen Force.
  4. Equipment

    From the existing SADF, Provincial Police Forces, SAP and TBVC holdings of equipment, vehicles, weapons and installations, sufficient 'dowry' would have to be provided to establish the new organisations and enable them to start operations, until their own budgets can take over. Given the likely size of the SADF, as discussed below, it should be possible, following the give and take of restructuring (by 1998 perhaps), to be very close to a SADF budget which is equivalent to 2% of the Gross Domestic Product, as has been proposed.

CHANGES AT THE SADF LEVEL


The requirement for transparency, civilian and multi-party control is common to all the Security Forces. It is particularly important in the case of the SADF. At the highest levels (i.e., CSADF and the Minister of Defence), the following non-uniformed organisations could provide some functions, thus changing the procedure and organisations at the Staff Divisions and the Ministry.
  1. A multi-party committee could advise and assist the minister. This could involve participation by opposition parties and allow for the representation of other government departments or private sector organisations. In the case of the SADF, this could initially be the sub-council of the TEC. Both it and an eventual Multi-Party Committee on Defence should be advised by a small specialist Defence Council, independent of the SADF.
  2. An Ombudsman to deal with complaints of junior members or the general public, could be appointed. The original Complaints Office of the SADF fulfilled something like this role but the Ombudsman does not replace normal processes of redress of wrongs or complaints and grievances procedures. The Ombudsman, preferably a retired judge, should work directly with and through the uniform head of department (i.e., CSADF).
  3. All Government employees will have the right to join or form trade unions or personnel association's, and the ombudsman could also help in dealing with them. A SADF liaison committee to work directly with trade unions made up of the Secretary for Defence, the Inspector General of the SADF and the Ombudsman, among others, would ensure regular liaison and resolve minor matters before CSADF and the Minister are involved.
  4. In each of the uniformed services, the Commander will fill the position as Head (Director General) of the Department, responsible directly and overall for the entire department, to the Minister. He could be assisted by a civilian organisation dealing with certain financial, budgeting, personnel and logistic arrangements involving outside agencies, as well as legal matters involving non-departmental organisations, and so on. This could be similar to the old Secretary of Defence concept, except it is proposed that he be responsible through CSADF and not directly to the Minister. Alternatively, the Secretary of Defence and his staff could form part of the Ministry itself and be responsible directly to the Minister, releasing CSADF from certain responsibilities. In the SADF, these functions are at present those of the defence staff divisions, the structure of which would be adjusted accordingly.
  5. Armscor could be moved from the Department of Defence to the Department of State Enterprises. It should be the agency serving all Security Forces, organisations and agencies of South Africa (the SADF, the SAP, Regional Police, Peacekeeping Force, Prisons and, perhaps, the Labour and Development Battalions). It must also look to promoting foreign orders and exports as a way of increasing job opportunities.
  6. After April 1994, it is likely that there will be a new Minister of Defence. It is unlikely that two such important ministries as Defence and Justice will share one minister in a multi-party cabinet The appointment as CSADF of General Meiring, has already taken place. Between now and April 1994, there are other general offices who may retire and be replaced. After the election such posts could be considered for appointments from outside the SADF for a variety of reasons. This is likely to be the case across the security and indeed, the government establishment.

Given all of the above possibilities considerable change in the SADF Staff Divisions and at the Ministry of Defence in respect of structures and procedures can be expected.

DETAILED ORGANISATIONS OF ARMS OF THE SERVICE


A South African Defence Force of approximately 70 000 full-time men and women serving in various service systems, including civilian employees, is the probable requirement. This could comprise the following elements:
  • A South African Air Force (SAAF) with all its present and planned equipment with a full-time strength not exceeding 15 000 members. This is much as it is at present, though allowing for a limited personnel expansion if new, modern fighter aircraft can be obtained and if the Air Defence Group could be strengthened, particularly for research and training.
  • A South African Navy (SAN) with a full-time strength not exceeding 10 000 members, much as it is at present. The SAN badly needs new modern corvettes and from a training point of view, should consider re-introducing marines on a limited basis particularly for research and training reasons. In any case, the Navy has the equipment for marine training already in place.
  • A South African Medical Services (SAMS) with its present equipment and a full-time strength not exceeding 10 000 members, much as it is at present. It would continue to render medical support to the other Security Agencies against reimbursement.
  • In contrast to the other arms of the Service discussed above, it is in the SA Army, in addition to the highest levels of the SADF command and control structure, that the greatest changes will initially occur. Notably a change in size will be effected since it will hopefully no longer be employed in police duties. Changes in composition, are also certain since most of the TBVC and MK members who will join, will go into the Army. At present the South African Army (SA Army) consists of approximately 70 000 full-time members and 200 000 to 300 000 part-time members. A full-time strength of about 35 000 members, mostly earmarked for administration and training would probably be sufficient. This should be supported by a part-time, mainly volunteer, strength - a Citizen Force of 80 000 men and women. A limited number of the Citizen Force could be available to the SAAF, SAN and SAMS, bringing the total Citizen Force up to the figure of perhaps 100 000.
The SA Army's ability to deploy full-time members for operations other than border security would be reduced. With the exception of its training units, the Army would perhaps have three under-strength brigades of full-time members as Rapid Deployment Force (one brigade) and for border security (two brigades), under an operational divisional headquarters. Call-up periods for volunteers could probably be limited to eleven months in the year of initial training. Special training of Citizen Force leader-groups could be undertaken as required and might lead to the return of the system of training periods for all members every alternate year, with only leader group/specialist training in the other years. The present geographic system of Commands used by the SA Army could be changed to a functional one, falling under the SADFs geographic Commands. This would promote liaison and co-operation between a national organisation and the various regional authorities, with all Arms of Service using functional commands. The SA Army would probably require a Citizen Force brigade or divisional headquarters in each region to command all the Citizen Force units in the region.

Financial constraints, will restrict the personnel size of the SADF and force it to allocate the maximum number of trained, able-bodied members for 'teeth' as opposed to 'tail' duties. This should lead to more joint or combined SADF units and fewer single service units. Also, once the necessary bases and other equipment has been provided to other forces, the SADF will have considerably less resources. Greater use will therefore have to be made of joint SADF bases, facilities or agencies. For example logistic or military police training might be conducted by a joint Agency and or joint Command and Staff Training System/Unit formed.

With this proposed strength and structure the SADF would only be able to meet prolonged internal or external commitments by additional recruitment and the allocation of additional funds. For too long the deployment of forces necessitated by the South African security situation has been underwritten by the SADF alone. Future national security and stability must be based on organisations which best meet the needs of the country. The SADF should not be turned to, short of a national emergency. After all, the old Artillery motto holds true for all military forces: 'Ultima Ratio Regis - 'The King's final argument'.' Hopefully a new South African Government may never have to turn to its last resort.

CONCLUSION


In this article an attempt has been made to set out an approach regarding the restructuring of the SADF, based on the following:
  1. An integrated security strategy involving all security forces and agencies of the state which meet the requirements of the state. A single integrated national security strategy must be created in order to co-ordinate the existence and development of all South Africa's security forces. Centrally, 'structure follows strategy'.
  2. Restructuring of the SADF cannot be undertaken in isolation but must be done from the bottom up for all forces. It is at local or community level where our immediate and most critical problems lie. These must be addressed satisfactorily before other requirements are met.
  3. The appropriate organisation must be designed and created to handle each task. We must ensure that an effective police or peacekeeping forces are established suited to their tasks. Each force must be self-contained as regards intelligence, logistics and finances, as well as deployable strengths. This will take years and much effort to realise. However, unless a start is made soon (the appointment of the Commander and staff for the NPKF, etc.), there is no hope of being on a sound footing in time for the new South Africa by the turn of the century. Good results will not be achieved overnight.
The end result of these proposals should be a smaller but more professional, high technology, sophisticated, modern military force which is the pride of the country and the leading military force of the region. A force which carries out its specific allocated tasks with obedience, courage and high standards - characteristics which the SADF has prided itself upon in the past. The SADF, along with all security forces, must meet the challenge of the twenty-first century which means not just absorbing existing structures, men and equipment but recruiting the best of the youth and preparing its equipment and training for the future.

What is needed now is careful thought and advice by experts - not emotional statements founded on desires instead of facts. If the Multi-Party Committee on Defence requires such expert suggestions and advice from a Defence Council, perhaps what is required now, is a National Security Strategy Planning Group of experts to advise the TEC and its various sub-committees on an integrated national security strategy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Specific references have not been quoted but the information quoted in the following sources has served as basis for the proposals.

H Heitman, South African War Machine, Johannesburg, CNA, 1985.

A de la Rey, South African Defence Force Review, Walker-Ramus Trading Co, Durban, 1989.

A de la Rey, 1990, South African Defence Force Review, Walker-Ramus Trading Co, Durban, 1990.

Institute for Defence Policy, South African Defence Review, Issues No 1 to 12, 1992 and 1993.

F Kitson, Warfare as a Whole, Faber and Faber, London, 1987.