The Relationship between the Academic and Intelligence Communities in a Post-apartheid South Africa

Shaun Mc Carthy
BA-Hons (Strategic Studies), UNISA

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 13, 1993



INTRODUCTION

During the second half of 1992 a conference on security and intelligence matters was held in the Transkei and chaired by Professor Mike Hough of the South African Institute for Strategic Studies. A sincere effort on the part of the participants to analyse the future role of the intelligence community in a post-Apartheid South Africa followed. Due recognition was given to the necessity of intelligence as an essential feature of national security and decision-making, and the increasing demand for future intelligence activities to be pursued under democratic principles. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the internal and external environment and its influence on the traditional approach to national security, so prevalent during the Cold War era, was considered.

Despite differences in opinion a central concept emerged, namely the perception that national security in a post-Apartheid South Africa will have to address the need for intelligence on a wider diversity of threats and interests divorced from racism and party political interests. These may range from extremist political groups determined to undermine or subvert the transition process, the proliferation of illegal weapons, increasing crime, illegal immigration, environmental abuse, and a growing demand for scarce resources - all this in addition to traditional military, political and socio-economic threats and interests. Furthermore, South Africa will have to develop its intelligence resources with regard to its regional environment if it is to attempt to meet expectations as the region's leading power.

The reality, however, is that any normative discussion on the organisation of the intelligence community in a post-Apartheid South Africa, is subject to, and will be governed by, the nature of the political settlement. Other factors to be taken into account are those arising from the current debate on the composition and control of the security forces.

Central to the reorganisation of the intelligence community to meet the ever-changing security interests of a new South Africa is the question of the development of the community's capabilities for information evaluation and intelligence estimation. This capability is dependent upon the research capabilities of the participating organisations. Fundamental to the development of analytical methodology is the academic acumen of the research personnel. There are only two sources of training in intelligence analysis. These are the academies of the intelligence organisations and the universities. However, the primary school for analysts will remain the academic community which provides graduates for employment by the intelligence community.

This article examines the relationship between the intelligence and academic communities in South Africa. The following major topics are discussed:
  • The traditional relationship between the universities and the intelligence agencies during the Apartheid era.
  • The role of academic institutions in providing intelligence research training in conjunction with official intelligence training institutions such as the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI) academies.
  • The contribution of academic institutions to the development of intelligence management.
  • The question of a neutral body which can be consulted for a balanced perspective and which can provide the foundation for an Intelligence Oversight Committee.
  • The development of a better and more open understanding of the nature of and necessity for intelligence activity as a vital function of responsible government. Towards this aim, the creation of an Intelligence Institute similar to those that have been developed in the USA, the UK (such as the British Study Group on Intelligence, established in 1984) and Canada (such as the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, also established in 1984) will be considered.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITIES AND THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DURING THE APARTHEID ERA

When an analysis of the traditional relationship between the intelligence and academic communities during the Apartheid era is made, it is necessary to define the concepts of the intelligence and academic communities as well as the period of time known as the Apartheid era.

Without ignoring the fact that Apartheid was practiced from the inception of white rule in South Africa, for the purpose of this discussion the Apartheid era is that period from 1948, when the National Party under Dr Malan came into power, up until the present. The intelligence community is defined as those official organisations (whether of the military-or the police) which have been responsible for the gathering and evaluation of military, security, political, economic, technological and any other intelligence (and the forecasting of such requirements) for the purpose of serving the national interests of the Republic.

Traditionally the intelligence organisations in South Africa originated within the police and military establishments. Their primary objective was to gather intelligence relating to the internal security of the emergent Republic in the face of the increasing threat presented by the liberation movements, communism and growing isolation from the Commonwealth. These movements were considered to be under the direct control of imperialist communist forces. This perception was enhanced by the international climate that prevailed during the Cold War and the influence of the Afrikaner doctrine of Christian Nationalism on the intelligence organisations' office bearers and the government's policy makers. National Security was to remain focused primarily on the combating of Communist imperialism through its proxy forces of the African National Congress of Trade Unions and the Pan Africanist Congress.

In tracing the history of the development of the intelligence community of the Republic of South Africa since the 31st May 1961, the principal organisation which formed the foundation of the numerous intelligence agencies that exist today was the Special Branch of the South African Police.

The staff who were appointed to these security intelligence departments were primarily operational members whose expertise lay in investigative skills, as opposed to analytical methodology. Hence research was the product of investigative acumen and intuition, as opposed to academic insight and scientific analysis. The intelligence infrastructure and the evaluation expertise was a product of the British colonial services which had been carried over and which has also influenced South African intelligence methodology.

As the internal, regional and international resistance to the policy of Apartheid increased and the threat of Communist expansionism increased, the reorganisation and development of the intelligence agencies continued. The South African Police Security Branch (from which officers and detectives were seconded to Republican Intelligence, the forerunner of the Bureau for State Security [BOSS] and the current NIS) and the Department of Military Intelligence were officially recognised and assigned the responsibility of gathering, evaluating and disseminating intelligence estimates for the government. In time, however, these organisations were not the only agencies that fulfilled intelligence functions. Other government bodies such as the Department of Information, Foreign Affairs, the Railways Police Security Branch and the Prisons Service also conducted intelligence activities.

As these organisations developed and their manpower requirements expanded, officers who possessed post-academic qualifications began to number among intelligence researchers. This process reached maturity in 1978 with the appointment of Dr Neil Barnard, a leading academic from the University of the Orange Free State, as the Director General of the National Intelligence Service. Dr Barnard's appointment endorsed former State President P W Botha's policy of reorganising the activities of the former BOSS and effectively relegating it to a national security 'think tank'.1

During the 'Total Strategy' era under President Botha, the relationship between the intelligence and academic communities gradually developed on an ad hoc basis. This was brought about through contact between the officers of the intelligence community who had been students at the various university faculties throughout the country offering course in international politics and strategic studies.

Unfortunately, intelligence as a subject or course in its own right is not included in any university curriculum. Nor does the Military Academy at Saldanha Bay, which is affiliated to the University of Stellenbosch, offer any courses in intelligence. Training in intelligence is conducted at the Military Intelligence Academy in Pretoria and at the National Intelligence Service Academy outside Pretoria. Both these academies are staffed by members of the intelligence organisations with no formal links to any university. Limited interaction has taken place on an ad hoc basis when the heads of the university departments, as well as visiting speakers from private research organisations have been invited to deliver papers on specific topics. Apart from this ad hoc relationship, however, no formalised connection between the academic and intelligence communities exists.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s the tendency within the National Intelligence Service was to recruit its research and operational officers from among the students of the conservative universities, such as the Universities of the Orange Free State, Potchefstroom, Stellenbosch and Pretoria. The latter is the only university in the country which maintains a formal institute for strategic studies.

The Military Academy and the various universities throughout the country have contributed to academic development within the intelligence establishment by providing graduate and post-graduate courses in related subjects including Public Administration, Political Science, International Politics, Military History and Strategic Studies. Unfortunately, however, no South African university offers a course on intelligence per se. This subject is dealt with only as a section in the strategic studies courses at UNISA, the Rand Afrikaans University and the University of Pretoria, whereas Salford University in the United Kingdom, for example, offers a taught Master's degree in Intelligence under the auspices of the Department of Politics and Contemporary History.

For at least the past decade the content of university courses offered in post-graduate degrees in international politics and strategic studies has focused on traditional, internal and nuclear warfare. Intelligence as a course in its own right has not been included in curricula and has only featured within the context of intelligence failures, deception and surprise. Notably, intelligence failures such as those at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Egypt's decision to go to war in 1973 and the overthrow of the Shah of Iran have received attention. The need for the development of intelligence as a recognised course in its own right is long overdue. With the end of the Cold War and the changing international political climate which has so much potential for destabilisation, intelligence should, more than ever, be considered as an essential activity.

THE ROLE OF ACADEMIA IN PROMOTING ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY AND UPHOLDING DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES


Within an intelligence context, analytical methodology can be defined as the study of the technique of intelligence analysis and evaluation. Very little research or academic attention has been focused on the method of intelligence analysis with the result that no well-developed theory of intelligence analysis has been developed. It is unfortunate that no research in this field has been carried out by academics in South Africa.

The most prominent thinkers in this area are to be found in the United States, where Sherman Kent published his important article Strategic Intelligence. Kent's publication, however, concentrates on the definition of intelligence as 'a special category of knowledge' and fails to explain the theory and method of intelligence analysis.2

There still exists a need for academic research into the methods and techniques applicable to intelligence analysis. This requirement is becoming increasingly important as intelligence objectives become more dynamic. As the domestic, regional and international environments change from those of the Cold War era and the Apartheid system to ones in which a multitude of political, socio-economic and environmental issues exercise increasing demands on the government, the need for a more versatile intelligence organisation to serve the new South Africa is increasingly apparent.

Traditionally, the principles of freedom of speech, enquiry and thought have conflicted with the principle of secrecy which is governed by the 'need to know' principle. Keesing states that, 'higher education's role as one of the checks and balances on government is a well-established fact not only in the United States but around the world'.3 Substantiating his argument, he refers to the frequency with which universities are closed during coups and times of social crises.4 The academic community, Keesing believes, maintains a dual interest in protecting its own neutral integrity and in enquiring into the workings of government.

Intelligence analysts and operatives tend to be practical individuals who have little time for reflection upon the methodology or the scientific validity of evaluation procedures. They are also inclined to adhere to the belief of the 'ends justifying the means' which, in practical terms, implies that they are not always acutely aware of the need for conformance to democratic principles. They operate in an environment where deadlines and the satisfaction of the consumers of intelligence are the overriding considerations.

Academics, on the other hand, tend to place greater emphasis on scientific procedure and the integrity of freedom of the individual and his or her rights in a democratic society. As a result, their responses to the operational methods of intelligence agencies range from tolerance to outright condemnation. An additional complication is the problem of political expediency versus science. This relates to the difference between homogeneity - an expectation from the consumers of intelligence that the analyst should display a sense of alignment with the consumer's objectives - and the academic practice of seeking the maximum possible number of answers to a specific problem. Keesing states that one of the problems related to the contention between academics and intelligence analysts is that, 'the management of intelligence inexorably leads to convergent thinking'.5

Against this background the influence of academia in promoting analytical methodology in the intelligence community, while simultaneously upholding democracy, would appear to some to be a paradox. In truth, however, these two principles are not irreconcilable. One of the major areas in which the academic community can contribute to the integrity and utility of intelligence analysis for policy-makers is ithe education of the consumer of intelligence as to the advantages of developing an atmosphere of cognitive liberalism, within which the analyst can 'speak his mind', free from the risk of being branded as opposed to the consumer's objectives.

South Africa is undergoing a radical change in its political structure. There is no reason why a simultaneous change in the relationship between the disseminators and consumers of intelligence should not take place, too.

According to the ANC's official policy guidelines adopted at its National Policy Conference during May 1992, the intelligence institution shall
  • be accountable to parliament and subject to parliamentary oversight; and
  • be politically non-partisan
In addition, the public shall have the right to information gathered by any intelligence agency, subject to the limitation of classification consistent with an open and democratic South Africa.6

This implies that, where the intelligence consumer is a member of both the public as well as a policy-making body, the consumer should be entitled to receive the full spectrum of intelligence available. Where more than one estimate version is available, the consumer should be furnished with all the estimates with the proviso that the desseminator is free to disclose the estimations with confidence and candour. With the intelligence agencies accountable to parliament, and not to any single political party, the convergence of thought between the consumers and disseminators should be minimised. The practice of 'shooting the messenger' must be abandoned if we are to become a new nation, a responsible regional power and if we are to develop our intelligence capabilities in order to cope with the growing complexity and demands of our environment.

Furthermore, it is not the disseminator's prerogative to decide what is of importance to the consumer and what is not. Convergent thinking should be discouraged on the basis that the disseminator has no brief to tailor intelligence to suit the policy-makers' needs, let alone the right to decide what intelligence should be put at the disposal of policy-makers. Policy-makers can arrive at informed decisions only if all the information available is made available to them. Let the disseminator disseminate intelligence and let the consumer apply it.

ACADEMIC ASSISTANCE IN INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH TRAINING

As in any relationship, there should be a balance between give and take. Academic institutions which become involved in intelligence research training will have to consider the advantages and disadvantages in their relationship with the intelligence community. In this regard, the immediate question of academic integrity and neutrality comes to mind. However, this relationship should not transcend the boundaries of scholarly development. Universities should not become voluntarily involved in talent-hunting on behalf of the intelligence agencies. This does not mean that this activity will not take place. It is only logical that one of the prime hunting grounds for talent will always be the campus. Traditionally, the South African intelligence agencies recruited informers among the student fraternity. Many of these informers were schooled further and became fully fledged agents of the Security Branch and the National Intelligence Service. The Security Branch's successful infiltration of the South African Students' Organisation on the Wits campus during the late sixties and early seventies is a case in point.

Keesing warns against the perception being formed that academic institutions identify with the interests of the intelligence agencies and the danger of creating the belief that they act in collusion. In addition, he cautions against the adverse consequences that such erroneous perceptions may have. Keesing states that an academic institution which is identified as a front for any intelligence organisation may find that its access, and that of its scholars, to the international academic community is denied.7

To guard against such damaging perceptions, the academic community should strive to publish constructive criticism of intelligence shortcomings, particularly in the field of analytical methodology. Interaction between universities in South Africa and other academic institutions abroad and throughout the African continent should also be encouraged. It can be argued that this interaction could contribute towards an improved understanding of the nature and function of intelligence worldwide. This, in turn, could enhance intelligence analysis and afford a better interpretation of adversaries' intentions and so promote the maintenance of peace.

The advantages for the academic institutions are to be found in the possibility of guaranteed government subsidies and the benefit of increased access and exposure to intelligence methods and administration. This can only enhance the students' knowledge of the reality of intelligence organisations and contribute towards a better understanding and appreciation of the practical problems encountered by researchers and disseminators of intelligence.

Furthermore, the relationship between the disseminators and the consumers of intelligence can be explored with greater insight. This, in turn, could assist academics in developing the theory of analytical methodology relevant to intelligence. Similarly, the intelligence training institutions must take stock of the trade-offs in the partnership. Keesing argues that the most fundamental disadvantage that may be perceived by the intelligence community is the potential loss of secrecy and confidentiality of the modi operandi8 of these organisations. On the other hand, the increased interaction with academics and students will afford the intelligence researcher wider exposure, not only to the subject matter pertinent to his or her desk, but to other relevant fields of interest as well, thereby contributing towards a broader perspective.

Another advantage for intelligence organisations would be an effective rationalisation in training facilities. This does not imply that academic institutions will provide training in operational techniques at all, but that the universities which prepare and educate analysts (at least up to honours level), would simply cater for advanced post-graduate scholarship courses. Analysts could be sent to universities for training in analytical methodology instead of attending in-house courses which would represent a saving in intelligence training budgets. Effectively, a division of labour could be realised, with the intelligence academies providing training in trade craft and operational techniques, and the universities specialising in research and analytical methodology.

A major change in attitude and a revision of the objectives of the intelligence organisations in South Africa are needed. The academic community could make a significant contribution, acting as the catalyst for change in the mission of the intelligence agencies. Further, those in academia could improve the relationship between the disseminators and the consumers of intelligence so that a more balanced perspective is desired and pursued.

THE ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT


The importance of minimising convergent thinking and political expediency in the dissemination of intelligence should not be underestimated. However, the policy-maker should not be swamped with a multitude of intelligence estimates, either. Such a situation may lead to confusion. Despite the objective of making all the possible alternatives known to the consumer, a balanced yet persuasive estimate should always be the analyst's goal. This emphasises the need for intelligence co-ordination, which was the raison d'être for the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the USA.9

Intelligence management can be defined as the administration of the intelligence process from the receit of the intelligence priorities from the consumer to the collation, evaluation, estimation and dissemination of the relevant intelligence as well as any other intelligence not ordered but which has incidentally come to light and which may have an influence on the subject matter during that process.

Intelligence management does not refer to the structures that were created in terms of the 'National Security Management System' under the PW Botha administration when the government, security forces and the executive organisations were co-ordinated on a national, regional and local level to combat what was perceived as a total onslaught against the country. Intelligence management refers to the process whereby intelligence priorities are determined primarily in accordance with the preservation of the security of the state, the pursuit of the national interest and subservience to the principles of democracy and the constitution. This process should be managed according to the requirements of the consumers who are entrusted with this responsibility.

Evaluation and estimation is the core activity of intelligence. Intelligence which is collated but not evaluated is of little value to the consumer. It can be argued therefore, that the research division of the intelligence organisation is not only the heart of the organisation, but is primarily responsible for determining the collation objectives. Furthermore, the research division is that body within the intelligence organisation that is exposed to the wider diversity of intelligence which is processed and which has a bearing on the national interest. It is also the section of the executive that receives forewarning of any impending threat.

This is not to propose that the research division should itself usurp the role of the cabinet in determining the nation's intelligence priorities. Rather, the research division is in the best position to guide the collators of intelligence as far as their priorities in the field are concerned. The research division is also responsible for separating the 'wheat from the chaff'. Notwithstanding the need for the widest range of relevant estimates pertinent to the objective at hand, intelligence which has no bearing on the objectives should be eliminated from the estimates. The establishment of a formal process for the achievement of this goal is the essence of intelligence management. The academic community could promote this rigorous approach through its interaction with, and guidance of, intelligence analysts.

The envisaged contribution of the academic community towards determining intelligence priorities in the national interest is to be made through its role in entrenching the principle of the intelligence community's subordination to the constitution and the national interest. In their education programmes, the universities should actively discourage the practice whereby intelligence priorities are set in support of party political interests. The Watergate scandal in the United States of America provides a classic example of the misuse of intelligence resources. It can also be argued that the intelligence resources of South Africa have been misused for the purposes of interfering with the democratic process, by reporting on and suppressing the liberation movements.

According to Berkowitz and Goodman, 'security impedes creative analysis'.10 Maintaining a division between the academic and intelligence communities does little to enhance the academic community's contribution towards analytical development. It precludes interaction between academics and analysts which, in turn, limits the positive influence that academics can bring to bear on those in intelligence. The restrictions on contact and, in particular, on more open discussion between academics and intelligence researchers stifles intellectual discourse.

The reluctance of the intelligence community to enter into in-depth debate with university scholars is, of course, based on the general perception that academics are 'liberal' and that they fraternise with the 'enemy' or opposition. Hence the belief that academics are incapable of maintaining confidentiality.

However, there is much to be gained through increased communication between academics and intelligence researchers. It could provide the basis for interaction across the spectrum of intelligence, between intelligence researchers from the police, military and national intelligence services, as well as researchers from private institutions, particularly those institutions which enjoy access internationally and throughout Africa. These institutions could provide a wealth of expertise and in-depth knowledge to intelligence organisations on socio-economic, political and military matters pertaining to Africa. The insight that could be gained into the structure and functioning of other post-colonial intelligence organisations, particularly those in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Kenya, could contribute towards the progressive adaptation of the existing intelligence organisations in South Africa. This is of inestimable importance for a future South African government, especially if it intends to fulfill its role as a regional power.

THE NEED FOR A NEURAL BODY AS THE BASIS FOR AN INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE


Southall asserts that 'the role of intelligence in South Africa must become perpetually contested'.11 Section (iii) of the ANC's guidelines on security and intelligence stipulates that 'the intelligence agency shall be regulated by legislation, the Bill of Rights, the constitution and an appropriate code of conduct'. Section (iv) stipulates that 'all parliamentary oversight', and section (vi) stipulates that they 'shall be politically non-partisan'.12

Given the legacy of the South African intelligence community, South Africans need a guarantee that the intelligence organisations adhere to democratic principles and guidelines (as set out in the ANC's policy) through legislation and supervision.

An intelligence oversight committee made up of individuals who are able to maintain a balanced perspective between the principles of democracy and the reality of safeguarding national security in an international environment (where democracy, to many, means 'not getting caught') would be the ideal. An understanding, among members, of the practicalities of intelligence operations would be further to the good.

The function of the oversight committee would be to review the intelligence operations conducted by the intelligence organisations against the objectives which are determined by the consumers. The committee should be empowered to summons any member or officer of the intelligence organisations to explain the relevance of any action or objective. In addition, the committee should also have the authority to summons any other individual from any executive branch of government when necessary, including the Auditor General to assist it in its audits.

The records of all the intelligence organisations should also be open to scrutiny by the committee. The committee itself should be answerable to Parliament as a whole and not to the Cabinet or any single individual. No doubt the above proposal will meet with an immediate outcry from current intelligence practitioners. Their objections would probably be based on their understanding of democratic principles to mean subservience to the cabinet and not to the electorate. This is an attitude entrenched in a Machiavellian approach that the ends always justify the means. However, in the light of a changing South Africa, a corresponding change in the accountability of the intelligence community, towards greater transparency should not be considered out of line. On the contrary, it should be expected.

An intelligence oversight committee in South Africa might comprise a cross section of the following individuals:
  • The Chairman: A Supreme court judge whose responsibility it would be to ensure that the committee performs its functions with due regard to the necessity for the protection of information which may endanger or compromise the national interest. Most important, however, would be the chairman's responsibility to ensure that a balance is maintained between the principles of the constitution, the intelligence code of conduct and the national interest.
  • An Intelligence Operations Adviser: A retired intelligence officer who has held a senior position within the intelligence community and whose task it would be to advise and consult on the practical problems experienced by intelligence operators in the field.
  • A Technical Adviser: A technically qualified adviser whose area of speciality is in the field of electronic surveillance and communications.
  • A Research Adviser: A former or retired research officer who will be able to advise on the problems related to intelligence analysis, evaluation, forecasting and dissemination.
  • Independent Researchers: Individuals from the private sector and the universities who would be able to enlighten the chairman on the broader issues of research as well as international relations. Each one of these research advisers should be independently qualified in the field of public administration or international politics or strategic studies and, ideally, intelligence. The academic community might contribute through the secondment of leading academics. Thinkers who are members of an intelligence oversight committee could uphold the need for propriety without necessarily compromising efficacy.
  • Legal Advisers: Members of the legal profession who are specialists in international and constitutional law.
  • An Economic Adviser: A specialist in the economics field who is able to advise the committee on domestic as well as international economics matters.
  • A Chartered Accountant: A leading auditor who could scrutinise the financial affairs of the intelligence organisations.
Furthermore, the committee should comprise observers from each of the parliamentary groups who are the party spokesmen for political, economic, technological, military, police and social affairs. This would guarantee that intelligence activities are not incompatible with the principles of democracy and the intelligence code of conduct. The abuse of intelligence resources for the purposes of domestic political espionage could thereby be detected and deterred. Under the circumstances of the changing political dispensation, with inherent problems of mistrust and insecurity displayed by minorities, this arrangement could contribute significantly towards confidence-building among the various ethnic and minority sectors of the population.

Needless to say, the members of the committee must be sworn to secrecy. They will be obliged to guarantee the security of the information to which they will be privy. However, a balance will have to be maintained between the need for secrecy and the fundamental responsibility of members - to ensure that the intelligence organisations adhere to the principles of parliament's code of conduct and the constitution.

The following diagram illustrates the organisational arrangement of the proposed committee.

THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE AS A VITAL FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT


Secrecy has eroded the integrity of intelligence. As a result, the need for intelligence has been obscured. Intelligence has also been dramatised and glamourised by romantic literature and film. The Cold War era and the polarisation of the world into Eastern and Western blocks has contributed no less towards misperceptions. This lack of understanding has tarnished intelligence as a worthy and vital function of responsible government. Unfortunately, the nature of covert intelligence activities is responsible for the perception of intelligence as an abhorrent practice and this has also eroded its integrity.

What is long overdue, therefore, is the need for an exposé of the nature and function of intelligence as an essential element of good government. This is perhaps a difficult, if not idealistic goal, given the emotive nature of the subject of intelligence, and its part in the old regime. Towards this objective there are a number of initiatives that could be undertaken. A number of proposals are discussed below.
  • The creation of a South African Intelligence Institute:

    Such an institute might comprise academics from different universities and private research institutions. Its role would be to further the relationship between the intelligence and academic communities. It should also facilitate interaction between the spokesmen from the organisations and those members of the public and press who seek more information about the aims, objectives and functions of the intelligence organisations. Furthermore, such an institute could facilitate introductions and career guidance to prospective students and civil servants. Yet another positive contribution could be made through the hosting of regular seminars or conferences on intelligence, where open discussions on contemporary intelligence and issues of national interest are encouraged.

    The creation of such an institute could serve the interests of the academic community on an ad hoc     or consultancy basis, while simultaneously retaining its own separate identity. It could also facilitate the requirement for non-partisan affiliation of the universities to the intelligence community. So might the integrity of the universities be maintained.
  • Historical Publications of the Intelligence Community in South Africa:

    Through the encouragement of publications by students both within and outside the various intelligence organisations (including the Black liberation organisations), academics and the general public would be afforded new and factual insight into the various organisations. The distribution of these publications could go a long way towards eradicating the aura of mystery so endemic to the intelligence community. A recent statement by the incumbent Director General of the National Intelligence Service, Mr Mike Louw, certainly appears to indicate a move towards a more enlightened and open approach on the part of the authorities.13
  • The Establishment of a Political, Economic and Scientific-Technical Information Exchange Forum:

    This is a platform for information exchange, upon which unclassified information can be freely exchanged and discussed. The various interest groups, including a delegation from the intelligence community, could benefit from increased exposure to one another and from access to a wide range of information. Such interaction would also help to dispel the myth of the 'spy syndrome' so long associated with intelligence organisations.
  • The Promotion of Intelligence as an Essential Feature of Responsible Government in Universities:

    Academic institutions and scholars have a responsibility towards the community not only to promote, but also to uphold democracy. Through their interaction with students in the social sciences, additional exposure to the necessity of intelligence, its function as an essential element of government and national welfare, as well as the machinations of intelligence organisations, should receive greater emphasis. This should go towards creating a greater awareness and understanding of the role and nature of intelligence in the interests of the nation.
However, a prerequisite has to be confidence-building measures between the academic and intelligence communities themselves. Unless common ground is reached where the academic community is can come to understand the intelligence community better, understanding between the two will remain limited.

CONCLUSION


The primary school for analysts will remain the academic community which provides post-graduate students for employment in the intelligence community. It stands to reason that, in order to achieve development in the analytical acumen of its researchers, the intelligence organisations will have to turn to the academic institutions. The development and refininement of the curricula of universities which can offer post-graduate courses in the fields of intelligence and national security policy studies is an essential area of co-operation between them.

In South Africa, where society is in the process of transition, change is painful for some and long overdue for others. The same is true for the intelligence community. A positive and balanced relationship between the academic and intelligence communities could play a central role in developing a democratically responsible intelligence in South Africa. Together, those communities could show an expectant international community how to arrive at a balance between democratic integrity and serving the national interest.

REFERENCES

  1. Subsequent to P W botha taking over from B J Vorster, he wasted no time in clipping the wings of the former Bureau for State Security. This was a natural outcome following years of internecine fighting between the BOSS and Military Intelligence. The two organisations had been at loggerheads particularly over a disagreement in the approach to the Civil Wars in Angola and Mozambique. Botha sought to limit the role and influence of the NIS in favour of the Military and the Security Branch which enjoyed prominence during the 'total onslaught era'.
  2. R Godson, Comapring Foreign Intelligence, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers, Inc. Washington, 1988: pp 9&10.
  3. H Keesing, Academics and Analysts: Fraternity or Fratricide?, Military Intelligence and the Universities, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984: p 45.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Ibid, p 49.
  6. African National Congress (ANC), ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, as adopted at its National Conference, 28-31 May 1992 publication.
  7. H Keesing, Ibid, p 52.
  8. Ibid, p 53.
  9. W J Breytenbach, Security and Intelligence Structures in "New" South Africa with special reference to Regionalism within the context of the Federal/Unitary Debate, Conference Issue: Security and Intelligence in a Post Apartheid South Africa, SAISS Strategic Review for South Africa, Vol XIV, No 2, 1992: pp 32-33.
  10. B D Berkowitz & A E Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989: p 88.
  11. R Southall, Restructuring Intelligence for a Post-Apartheid South Africa, Conference Issue: Security and Intelligence in a Post-Apartheid South Africa, SAISS Strategic Review for South Africa, Vol XIV, No 2, 1992: p 14
  12. African National Congress (ANC), ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, as adopted at its National Conference, 28-31 May 1992 publication.
  13. M Hough, The SATBVC and Liberation Movements, Intelligence Services in a Changing South Africa, Conference Issue: Security and Intelligence in a Post Apartheid South Africa, SAISS Strategic Review for South Africa, Vol XIV, No 2, 1992: p 53.