Historical Parallel or Historical Amnesia?

 The Formation of the Union Defence Force

Rocky Williams

Dr Rocklyn Williams is the Co-ordinator of the Military Research Group, Research Associate at the Centre for Inter group Studies at the University of Cape Town and has recently completed a doctorate on changing South African civil-military relations between 1966-1992. The Military Research Group is an independent body of policy analysts, strategic studies researchers and academics conducting research into defence-related issues both in the current transition and in the future.

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 2, 1992



INTRODUCTION BY WAY OF ANECDOTE

Imagine the following situation. A long, bloody and costly war is waged over a number of years. A peace is eventually signed during which the victor subordinates the territories of his former adversary to his control. Civilian losses on the side of the vanquished party leave bitter memories which are never fully erased.

Yet less than a decade later Generals from both armies are serving alongside one another in a restructured General Staff. The Minister of Defence and his Secretary of Defence are officers who fought against one another a mere 8 years previously. Former adversaries are now undergoing joint staff officer training for positions in a unified national Defence Force. What is more, the new Defence force reflects a creative admixture of the traditions of both previously warring parties.

This example is not an extract from fiction. It is not some homesick Umkhonto We Sizwe soldier dreaming of a return to his country. It is an event that occurred right here in South Africa in 1912 when both Boer and British officers - all of whom had fought in the Boer War - were integrated into a national Defence Force. It was an event that was to exert a profound influence on the creation of the Union of South Africa and it was an event that was to leave an indelible imprint on the form of the Union Defence Force (UDF) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) in later years. We need not even look elsewhere for an example of how an integration process worked successfully. The organisational culture of the present SADF is vivid testimony of the success of this process.

THE ORIGINS OF THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE: FROM DIVERSITY TO UNITY

The legacy of the Boer War is well known to most South Africans. The war cost the British government a total of 500 000 000 pounds for the loss of 22 000 personnel. Boer losses totaled 26 000 women and children who died in the concentration camps, 8 000 Boer personnel and incalculable damage caused to farms and property through Kitchener's "scorched earth" policy. 1

With the termination of the Boer War, the military units of the former Boer Republics effectively ceased to exist and were replaced with volunteer regiments modeled along the lines of those existent in the Cape Colony and Natal. 2 For 8 years a variety of military structures existed in the four colonies (Transvaal, OFS, Natal and the Cape) ranging from standing indigenous Permanent Force regiments, British regular units and regular police units on the one hand to volunteer regiments and local militias on the other. Control was exercised by a provincial commander and little cooperation occurred between the different military structures. 3

Initial Boer participation in these units was limited to the lower ranks. Most of the command echelons were occupied either by British regular officers or by South African English-speaking officers. Nevertheless, former Boer combatants continued to maintain their proficiency in musketry, equestrian skills and bush craft, and an informal commando network took root, once again, in the rural areas.

EXPLORING UNITY: WHAT FORM WILL A NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE ASSUME?

The differences between the various defence structures was evident in the military cultures of the different units. No standardisation of organisation, equipment, training, discipline, service conditions or tactics existed.4 It became increasingly evident to both military and political authorities alike - whether British or Boer - that some form of unified defence command was required if political accommodation between the two major White groupings was to be reached.

A number of exploratory steps were initiated in this regard. Military Conferences were held in Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria in 1907, 1908 and 1909 respectively. All conferences recognised the need for the creation of a non-partisan, professional and national defence force consequent to the political union of the four colonies. The Durban conference in particular, laid the basis for the creation of the Union Defence Force some four years later. It stressed the importance of uniformity and standardisation; the establishment of a Sandhurst-type military academy to socialise a future officer corps; the necessity of maintaining a small full-time complement of Permanent Force soldiers to staff and administer the Union Defence Force, and the creation of volunteer units to supplement this cadre. 5

To facilitate unity between the different military units and organisational cultures, General Lord Methuen, Supreme Commander of the Imperial Forces in South Africa, recommended the creation of the post of Commandant-General and a Defence Council to advise the Ministry of Defence and parliament. These exploratory contacts and conferences constituted the pre-integration phase of the Union Defence Force. They determined priorities, recommended appropriate measures and initiated a wide range of contacts from British, Boer and Imperial quarters regarding the nature of a proposed National Defence Force. 6

A SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: STAGE ONE OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

The declaration of the Union of South Africa was a remarkable event considering the fact that it embraced hitherto warring peoples. The political will and determination displayed by the political representatives of the Boer and British translated itself into a host of pragmatic measures regarding the nature of the state during this period. The first Union Cabinet was headed by a respected Boer General - General Louis Botha - and the responsibility for Defence matters was devolved onto the shoulders of General Jan Smuts (another illustrious Boer General).

A fascinating feature of the first Defence Ministry was that Smuts's Defence Secretariat was headed by a certain H R H Bourne. Bourne had served as a staff officer with the British forces in the Cape during the Boer War! 7 Yet despite these differences of mustering and military background, the Defence Ministry embarked on the creation of the Union Defence Force with a remarkable unity of purpose.

It was acknowledged by all parties that a future Defence force would have to be politically non-partisan. General Lord Methuen reflected on this as a result of his ongoing discussions with General Smuts in connection with defence matters: "Politics would have no place in the South African Army and Mr Smuts knows perfectly well the curse this has been in other Colonial Forces" 8

Smuts concurred with General Lord Methuen's statement and made the trenchant observation that:
"We want an organisation that shall not be Boer or English, but a South African Army ... Do your duty in a broad national spirit" 9
On the organisational form of a future Defence Force - whether it be a small professional army or a conscript-based Defence Force - there was general agreement that the elected political representatives in parliament would have to decide on this thorny matter:
"We are both agreed that there is but one sound and economical system which is that of compulsory service in some shape or form, but how far the 4 colonies will agree to the system is a question that cannot be decided until a Union Government is formed, and which having the courage of its opinion will without doubt carry South Africa with it" 10
Smuts proceeded to utilise his considerable military expertise in determining the proposed nature of the Union Defence Force, He isolated five major issues in this regard:
  1. Ethnic differences in the Union Defence Force had to be eliminated.
  2. The UDF should utilise the different military traditions of the white population in a constructive manner. Equestrian personnel should be drawn from the rural mainly Afrikaans-speaking districts (where such talents were well developed). Infantry complements should rely on the English-speaking South Africans in the towns and cities (where a reasonably developed Citizen Force Regimental system existed).
  3. Differences between the rural and urban cultures in the UDF had to be kept to a minimum.
  4. Defence expenditure should not be a burden on the economy.
  5. The Defence Force should be small, efficient and well trained. 11
The flexibility and innovativeness displayed by Smuts and the Cabinet is in stark contrast to the intransigence of the SADF on the modalities of integration at present!

STAGE TWO OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS: CO-RDSPONSIBILITY AND THE INSTITUTION OF THE DEFENCE COUNCIL

The Union Government - and General Smuts, General Lord Methuen and Sir Roland Bourne in particular - realised the importance of ensuring the impartiality of the integration process. To this end a Defence Council was initiated with the following responsibilities:
  1. To advise the Governor-General or be available for consultation on issues connected with the exercise of the Governor-General's duties in respect of certain articles of the Defence Act of 1912.
  2. To report to parliament on the manner whereby the Governor-General executed his duties in the sphere of defence policy.
  3. To make recommendations to parliament which would be presented on a yearly basis by the Minister of Defence. 12
The Defence Council's initial responsibility was to oversee the process of integration. However, it was also intended to fulfill the long-term function of acting as a civil watchdog over the activities of the Defence Force in the future and ensuring its accountability to the political process.

The composition of the Defence Council was particularly interesting. It was headed by the Minister of Defence (General Smuts) and included four highly respected senior officers who had served in the Boer War. Two veteran Boer Generals - Generals Schalk Burger and Christiaan De Wet - and two veteran British officers - Colonels Charles Crew and Duncan Mackenzie - made up this complement. The emphasis in the Defence Council lay on equal representation and due respect being afforded to the different military cultures and experiences of both British and Boer armies. This even-handedness was to be reflected in the creation of the Union Defence Force itself. 13

STAGE THREE OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS: EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE COMMAND STRUCTURE

The Defence Act of 1912 (Act 13) immediately dissolved the 8 different military formations existent in the four former colonies and proceeded to restructure them into a national army. Posts in the executive structure of the Union Defence Force were shared between former British and Boer adversaries:
  1. No post of Supreme Commander was created - thereby avoiding allegations of political bias.
  2. The Inspector-General of the UDF's Permanent Force was General Lukin (former Commander of the Cape Defence Force).
  3. The Commandant-General of the UDF's Active Citizen Force was General Beyers (former Assistant-Commandant General of the armed forces of the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek). 14
To facilitate the upgrading and standardisation of skills it was recognised that both a military college and an extensive training program needed to be instituted. This upgrading and reorientation applied to all personnel regardless of skills level. The following steps were instituted in this regard:
  1. A Military School was established at Bloemfontein under the leadership of General Sir Aston to retrain and reorientate all senior UDF personnel.
  2. A series of training courses was initiated for officers from both British and Boer armies. These included District Staff Officers courses and infantry officers courses. However, the most significant of these courses was the senior Staff Officers Course conducted at the College in 1912. Consisting of 25 British officers and 25 Boer officers (including such illustrious personalities as Generals Kemp, Brand and Maritz), all were united in the fact that they had fought against one another in the Boer War.15 The reminiscences of an officer who participated in this course captures the poignancy of the event:

    "The ideas of the officers of regular and volunteer forces of the Cape and Natal differed vastly from those of the Commandants of the Commandos. The method adopted in the Union Defence Force created in 1912 allowed the older fighting commandants to take their place within the force alongside younger men who were fully conversant with organisation on modern lines ...

    ... these officers had all served in the South African War. Nothing exceptional about this except that they had been bitter enemies. It is not possible to say that they were impressed by each other's methods but they did adapt themselves to changing conditions and laid the foundations of the South African Defence Force"     16
This fascinating extract also provides an interesting account of a confidence-building measure initiated within the ranks of the UDF's officer corps:
"It is interesting to note that on one such course in 1913 that Colonel Skinner, Commandant of the Military School, remarked on the sad fact that some of the officers present who had fought so valiantly in the Burgher Forces were without medal ribbons whilst their brother officers, attending the course, who had served with the British Forces were well decorated. Colonel Skinner subsequently made representations to Defence Headquarters to have the omission rectified and the Union Government then instituted the decoration "Dekoratie Voor Trouwe Dienst, Anglo-Boer Oorlog" and "Lint Verwonden" to cover the omission."17
A remarkable magnanimity given the history of both parties!

LESSONS FROM THE PAST PROVIDING US WITH LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

The integration process characterising the formation of the early UDF represented a diverse synthesis of military traditions and structures - a conventional armed force on the one hand and a tradition of guerrilla-type warfare on the other. Within the Boer units a rough, patriarchal equality existed with the tradition of men electing their officers and all men, regardless of rank (of which there was very little), jointly deliberating on strategy. Within the British units a conventional force structure prevailed with its corresponding emphasis on hierarchy and discipline. 18

Yet despite their numerical and organisation disadvantages at the time of Union (most Boer soldiers had been demobilised after the war and no original Boer units existed in 1912), the Boers were to leave a strong imprint on the constitution of the Union Defence Force. This was largely the result of two factors: political compromise and political pragmatism. Although vanquished in battle, the civilian and military authorities conceded to a large measure of Boer influence within the Union Defence (and actually felt that this was highly desirable) precisely because of the legitimacy that would accrue to the Union Defence Force in the process.

The British armed forces continued to remain influential in determining the corporate identity and certain structures of the Union Defence Force. However, the mere fact that they had accepted the principle of integrating their structures with those of their former adversaries inevitably saw the extensive "South Africanisation" of the UDF in forthcoming decades. Indeed in 1914 - a mere two years after the formation of the Union Defence Force - the first General Staff featured no less than 6 senior Boer officers out of a staff of 8.

In a relatively short period of time the UDF (or at least its major component in the form of the Army) became strongly indigenised in character. This was not the product of a palace coup or a conspiracy. It simply reflected the political flexibility adopted towards defence issues by the reigning of political and military authorities. The present SADF is living proof of the success of such an integration process. A largely Afrikaans-speaking officer corps dominates the SA Army whilst the SA Navy and the SA Air Force remain strongly "English" in military culture. The SADF represents a creative mixture of different influences - a British rank and discipline structure combined with the tactical and organisational flexibility enshrined in Boer military doctrine. (In addition to this phenomenon one should also observe that the present SADF is becoming increasingly Africanised within the lower reaches of its rank structure - estimated at 52% by reliable sources. This "silent" process of integration contradicts the SADF's assertion that such a process cannot occur with other non-SADF structures.) 19

A number of lessons can be learned by the SADF from their own institutional past. These include:
  1. In essence, the integration of the various soldiers, structures and traditions was secondary to the restructuring process effected upon the armed forces from forces outside of their structures. Although integration remains important for symbolic and practical reasons, it will ultimately be the capacity of political society, and its organisational forms, to influence this restructuring process that will prove primary in this regard.
  2. The institution of a Council of Defence provided the new Defence Force with the requisite military-technical inputs whilst at the same time remaining largely non-partisan in nature.
  3. Despite the fact that the British and Boer armies had fought a far bloodier war than that waged between MK and the SADF they managed to effect a successful reconciliation within the structures of a new Defence Force.
  4. Unlike the present integration process in which three main military structures are contending for integration (the SADF, MK and the homeland armies), the creation of the UDF represented a synthesis of no less than 8 different major military structures!
  5. The infusion of Boer guerrilla experience into the structures of a largely conventional Defence Force did not undermine standards and efficiency but actually enhanced it! The following extract from a former UDF officer reflects this reality:

    "How successful this [integration] was, was soon proved in the campaign in German South West Africa where the South Africans showed their fighting qualities, courage and leadership of their forebears - Afrikaner and Englishmen, the horsemanship of the Boer and his skill in the choice of ground allied to the discipline and sheer determination that have long been recognised by the World as the mark of the British soldier. Added to these qualities was the South African's inherent instinct to conserve manpower and a recognition of the importance of mobility seldom before appreciated by the larger European armies of Europe. Better material would be hard to find"     20
  6. Despite the numerical and organisational weaknesses of the Boers on the ground, they were afforded equal representation in the creation of the Union Defence Force. This went beyond the crude mechanical determinism regarding force levels and integration being advocated by the SADF today.
  7. Supreme authority over the UDF was vested not in its General Staff but in a relatively impartial Defence Council during the transition (on which senior officers from both armies were represented). This council acted as both an overseer and a public watchdog and also ensured that public and military confidence in the Union Defence Force was not eroded.
  8. The acknowledgment that no side had a monopoly over skills and experience and that a thorough retraining and reorientation program was required for ALL officers.
  9. The importance of confidence-building measures within the officer corps was acknowledged. This was reflected in the recognition afforded the Boer officers for their actions in the Boer War (medals, ribbons etc).
  10. Dialogue regarding the nature of a future Defence force was initiated between different parties prior to the creation of the Union Defence Force (see the Johannesburg, Durban and Pretoria conferences).
  11. Politically sensitive issues such as conscription were not decided upon by small groups of military experts. They were delegated to parliament to debate and legislate on. However, conscription was to prove one of the major problems facing the newly constituted Union Defence Force in its early years. Serious defections and disertions within the conscript musterings were to occur in both 1914 and 1922 over the utilisation of the Union Defence Force in the crushing of the 1914 Rebellion and the 1922 strike respectively. This, in itself, provides a powerful argument against the institution of conscription in any form for a society that has recently emerged from a transition. Not only does it equip adversarial groupings with access to military materiel, but it also threatens the internal cohesion and legitimacy of a new Defence Force.
  12. Related to (9) above is the use of the armed forces in internal urban counter-insurgency roles. Tasks relating to internal disorder should remain the prerogative of either the police or, when manpower becomes stretched, a militia system which does not fall under the military hierarchy (something akin to the National Guard in the USA for instance). The words of one of the first Commanders of the Union Defence Force reflect the problems they faced as a result of their deployment in a police-supportive role:
  13. "The Defence Force was in bad odour owing to the stern measures it was called upon to adopt during the 1914 Rebellion and the 1922 Revolt" 20
But perhaps the most important factor influencing the restructuring/integration process was the political will displayed by the former adversaries. It is a lesson that the present command echelons of the SADF would do well to study.

REFERENCES
  1. Uit die Voorgeskiedenis van die SAW: 1902-1910, published in the first edition of Militaria, 1969, page 1.
  2. History of the SADF, in the South African Defence Force Review, 1989, SADF Directorate of Public Relations, Pretoria, page 25.
  3. Du Toit, J J, Die Geskiedenis van die Personeelfunksie in die SA Weermag sedert WO1 tot 31 Januarie 1981, in Militaria, 18/4, pages 14-16.
  4. Militaria, 1969, op cit, page 8.
  5. Meyers, E M (Lt), Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van 'n Unie-Verdedigingsmag, in Militaria, 1982, page 3.
  6. Militaria, 1969, op cit, page 9.
  7. Commando (journal of the Union Defence Force), May 1960, page 14.
  8. Quoted in Van die Totstandkoming tot die Verdedigingswet van 1912, Militaria, 1969, page 20.
  9. Quoted in Militaria, 1969, op cit, page 28.
  10. Quoted in Militaria, 1969, op cit, page 20.
  11. Commando, May 1960, page 14.
  12. Document on the formation of the Union Defence Force located in the archives of the South African Museum for National Military History, Saxonwold, Johannesburg, March 1992.
  13. Document referred to in (12) above.
  14. The Union Defence Force before 1933 (Appendix 1 to Vol 1) in Orpen, N East African and Abyssinian Campaigns: South African Armed Forces in World War Two, Vols 1-4, Purnell, Johannesburg, page 331.
  15. Die Univerdedigingsmag van 1912-1914 on Militaria, 1969, page 32.
  16. Observations of a former Union Defence Force officer who participated in the training course. Reminiscences located in archival material at the South African Museum for National Military History, Saxonwold, Johannesburg, March 1992.
  17. Document referred to in (16) above.
  18. Tylden, G, The Armed Forces of South Africa, City of Johannesburg Africana Museum, Johannesburg, Trophy Press, 1982.
  19. Interview with two serving officers from Chief-of-Army Staff Intelligence (GS2), conducted in October 1991.
  20. Lt General G E Brink quoted in the Introduction to Orpens 4 volume series on South African forces in the Second World War, op cit, page vii.