Leaner and meaner?

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Published in Nedbank ISS Crime Index
Volume 5 2001
Number 6, November - December

At first the announcement that the special units responsible for investigating serious crimes such as murder, robbery and hijacking are being closed down, sounded alarming. But the rationale behind the restructuring is sound. It largely relates to the poor performance of the units and the need to increase detective capacity at station level.

The principle behind the restructuring of the SAPS special investigation units is to transfer most detectives working in these units to police stations, to ensure that cases are mainly investigated at the local level where they are reported.

In the first phase of restructuring, the 503 existing specialised units were reduced to approximately 200 units. This amounted to a redeployment of about 7000 detectives. Given that the rationale for restructuring was rooted in the poor performance of existing units, those with low caseloads or an unproductive record were the first to be closed.

New specialised units

Members not redeployed to station level were placed at two new specialised units - Organised Crime Units and Serious and Violent Crime Units. The number and skills of members to be transferred to the new units have and will be determined by the specific threats identified by SAPS researchers.

Although the mandate of the organised crime units has not yet been finalised, a proposal mooted in December 2000 called for 21 organised crime units and 600 detectives. However, this proposal is subject to change with changing circumstances in the SAPS.

The rationalisation detailed above is unlikely to have been reached at this point in time. In the Western Cape, for example, the first phase of rationalisation resulted in the retention of 96 detectives at organised crime units, as opposed to the 50 proposed above.

The mandate for the serious and violent crime units is to investigate:

Specific incidents relating to crimes against the state.



Murders involving prominent persons, the judiciary, politicians, or members of the SAPS.



Actual or attempted armed robberies of financial institutions and registered cash-in-transit carriers.



Vehicle hijackings in which a victim has been shot, or types of hijackings reflected in the SAPS crime threat analysis.



Specific identified robberies or the theft of firearms.



Specific identified series of crimes of a serious or violent nature, such as serial murders or serial rapes.



Inter-group violence reflected in the SAPS crime threat analysis such as taxi violence, gang violence and faction fighting.



Actual or attempted attacks on residents of farms and smallholdings.

These terms of reference assume, prior to any investigation, a fairly high degree of knowledge about the identity of the perpetrators and their motives. This may present problems for the selection of cases to be investigated by this unit.

Effect on former units

Several units will remain untouched by the restructuring: the Commercial Branch, the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Units, and Child Protection Units. The structure of the Commercial Branch is, however, currently being reconsidered.

With respect to the former anti-corruption units, a worrying development is their absorption into the new organised crime units. The anti-corruption units were in the past a separate unit because it was regarded as highly problematic for members to investigate corruption among colleagues.

The rationale for the recent decision may be that corruption is often related to organised crime and that the organised crime component should therefore investigate it. However, this undermines the ability to investigate corruption within the police. Moreover, the number of personnel involved in investigating police corruption has been reduced from 250 to about 150 members, and the units in North West, Mpumalanga, Free State and Northern Cape have been closed down. The 100 remaining members have been redeployed, mostly within the organised crime units, but some have been redeployed to station level.

Reasons for restructuring

Available statistics that reflect to some degree the performance of the specialised units raise questions about their efficacy. Between 1995 and 1998 conviction rates for serious crimes - the investigation of which was largely the responsibility of the specialised units - were lower than those for less serious crime (Tables 1-3). This tends to indicate that specialised units were performing poorly.

Table 1 Clearance rate, serious and less serious crime (%)

Clearance rate	1995	1996	1997	1998
Serious crime	52	50	48	46
Less serious crime	44	43	43	42
All crime	49	47	46	45
Source: National Expenditure Survey 2000, Department of Finance

Table 2 Convictions measured according to the number of cases sent to court, serious and less serious crime (%)

Convictions per court case	1995	1996	1997	1998
Serious crime	23	34	33	34
Less serious crime	45	45	45	44
All crime	33	39	39	39
Source: National Expenditure Survey 2000, Department of Finance

Table 3 Convictions measured according to the number of cases recorded, serious and less serious crime (%)

Convictions per recorded crime	1995	1996	1997	1998
Serious crime	6	8	8	8
Less serious crime	12	12	12	12
All crime	8	10	10	9
Source: National Expenditure Survey 2000, Department of Finance

According to senior SAPS management, the two units that will remain after restructuring will be 'leaner and meaner' and possess a renewed sense of purpose and direction. Part of the problem was that, given the nature of detective work, it was relatively easy for under-performing and under-motivated detectives to escape notice. Former special units had greater licence to operate under their own rules and in some instances became a law unto themselves.

The performance of the special units must however be seen in the context of policing and detection more broadly. Among others, the following influenced the decision to close the units down:

Confusion about responsibility

In some instances, detectives at station level neglected to investigate crimes, even relatively minor ones, that fell under the mandate of a specialised unit. In such cases, little effort was made to ensure that the initial steps in the investigation of crime were taken.

It was also not always clear which special unit should investigate a particular offence. For example, a taxi driver is murdered in Alexandra and his vehicle is hijacked. The evidence suggests that the driver is involved in a drug cartel based in Pretoria. In the past it was unclear which murder and robbery unit or hijacking unit should take the case, or whether it was the responsibility of SANAB or an organised crime unit.

In theory, the station and units consult together and on that basis decide which of them should investigate a case. In practice, a particular docket was often sent from unit to unit until someone took responsibility for it, leading to delays.

Communication between units

There was little communication, or sharing of information, between individual units, and between detectives in units and stations. Even different task teams within particular units would jealously guard information and view it as their 'property'. This led to duplication of effort and the general hindering of the investigation.

Transferral of skills to station level

The transferral of detective skills to station level is a major theme in the official motivation for the restructuring. With the proliferation of units across the country, eventually amounting to 503 such units, investigation capacity at station level was being depleted. Since the special units carried greater prestige, it was natural for detectives to aim for transferral to a unit.

With more detectives based at station level, it is envisaged that detectives will arrive at the crime scene sooner than was possible in the past, when units were located some distance from stations and some time would often pass before a docket was transferred to the special unit.

Reduction in administrative costs

Prior to restructuring, there were 503 specialised units in the country;s 42 policing areas. Each unit had its own offices, administrative staff, vehicles and equipment. This resulted in substantial duplication of resources and administrative costs, particularly in the case of small units consisting of fewer than ten detectives. These resources will be redistributed, further boosting the capacity of police stations.

The right strategy?

In principle, the strategy of increasing investigative capacity at station level makes sense. The concern is that restructuring has resulted in the lesser skilled and motivated detectives being redeployed to local level while the new serious and violent crime and organised crime units have retained the most skilled detectives.

Those who have been redeployed view the move as a loss of prestige and are demotivated. This was exacerbated by the manner in which the restructuring was announced within the SAPS. Although consultation occurred at senior management level, most detectives are likely to perceive this as yet another policy imposed upon them from head office. The new units will also have to be carefully managed to ensure that they do not replicate the problems experienced by the former units.

Jean Redpath
Technikon SA
redpath@iafrica.com

Source documents

Parliamentary Monitoring Group Minutes of the Safety and Security Portfolio Committee, February 28, 2001.

SAPS presentation to the Public Accounts Committee, Parliament, December 2000.

For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see J Redpath, Restructuring the detective service, forthcoming ISS monograph.

This article is sponsored by the European Union.