INTRODUCTION

At a time when the South African Defence Force is being cut back and reorganised, it is worth asking: has the time not come to consider the classic multi-battalion regiment as a means of constructing a viable, cost-effective and affordable new SA Infantry Corps (SAIC)? Innovative thought on this subject seems to be lacking, with most attention being paid to adapting the existing infantry force whether by plastic surgery or amputation to fit a new situation.

It could be argued that what the South African infantry actually needs is not cosmetic surgery but something rather more radical call it `constructive iconoclasm' involving not just the shattering of certain pillars of conventional wisdom, but the simultaneous resurrection of others that have long been gathering dust on the back shelf of our military development process. If so, one of the icons that may well be worth resurrecting is the principle of the true multi-battalion infantry regiment (the reasons for the word `true' will become apparent below).

There is nothing mysterious about the true multi-battalion regiment. In fact, the Oxford Illustrated Dictionary's succinct definition an "army recruiting and training unit with permanent depot and often local name, consisting of a varying number of battalions ..." provides as good a point of departure as any other. What makes it particularly relevant to the new South Africa is the fact that the concept has lived on up to the present day the most striking proof possible that its virtues are as valid in these days of mechanised warfare as they were when infantrymen wore pipe-clayed belts and carried their regimental colours on to the battlefield.

South Africa is one of the few militarily developed countries of the Commonwealth in which the concept has never taken root. As a result, few military men in this country realise that a true multi-battalion regiment is not just a regiment with more than one battalion. It is actually a philosophical concept that has been turned into an eminently practical mechanism, designed to foster a defence force's operational capability on both the micro and macro level. The success of this mechanism is evident from the fact that it survives in unaltered form elsewhere, despite more than a century of bewildering change in weaponry and equipment, the nature of warfare, and the internal organisation of fighting units. It remains the basis of the traditional British regimental system.

The phenomenon of regiments strongly linked by name and location to their local communities a basic requirement for a true multi-battalion regiment is nothing new in South Africa, at least in the Part-Time Force (PTF). Yet the true multi-battalion infantry regiment is all but unknown in the SANDF, and this fact has given rise to a basic misunderstanding of the concept in the South African Army. Ironically, the closest South African equivalent is the Commando Group, directly associated with the Dutch settlers and not the British colonies.

The SA Army, like all British-descended armed forces, customarily uses `regiment' to denote battalion-equivalent units of the SA Artillery, the SA Armoured Corps and the SA Engineer Corps, but in the case of the infantry the term seems to be used quite differently in the full-time and part-time forces. There are no regiments as such in the Permanent Force (PF) infantry, only a variety of numbered independent battalions (the last named PF unit, the Cape Corps, was rechristened 9 SAI about three years ago), whereas in the PTF both the Citizen Force (CF) and Commando (Comdo) organisations are strongly orientated towards single-battalion regiments, with names linked to their communities or home areas.

These factors have led to the belief that the term `regiment' is not necessarily applicable to a battalion-size infantry unit; that the habit of various PTF infantry units of referring to themselves as `regiments' is based on rather uncertain grounds; and that the term is now inappropriate as regards the naming or creation of future units. However, there is a definite difference in meaning between the two terms. In the infantry, a battalion is not a substitute for a regiment but complementary to it. This misconception has been abetted by American and Russian usage, in which an infantry regiment denotes a specific operational organisation that is more or less equivalent to a small brigade. In this usage, battalion is also an operational term indicating size a single unit. For better or worse, however, the SA Army is not organised along American or Russian lines and is locked into the Commonwealth, whose armies are modelled on the British pattern. This implies two things: first, that the British-style regimental system is entrenched in the SA Army, and second, if this is so, there is an obligation on the military to exploit the value and potential of this system to the maximum.

Given the far-reaching influence of the British Army the model for most of the Anglophone world the SA Army's historical failure to adopt a true multi-battalion regimental system is inexplicable. There are several reasons for this, but they all relate to past circumstances; this being the case, the appropriate question to ask is whether they are still applicable at a time when South Africa's infantry force is about to undergo radical reconstruction.

PART 1: EDWARD CARDWELL AND THE MULTI-BATTALION REGIMENT THE BIRTH OF THE BRITISH REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

The roots of the multi-battalion regimental system were planted by Edward (later Lord) Cardwell, British Secretary of State for War between 1868 and 1874. Cardwell's name is almost forgotten today, yet after 120 years the contribution he made to the development of the regimental system continues to be felt throughout the Commonwealth.

If one considers the implications of the reforms instituted by Cardwell and carried through by his successors, it would be fair to say that he deserves a place in the pantheon of great military reformers headed by Prince Maurits of Nassau, whose 17th-century `Staatsleger' was the basic model for almost all the armies of the modern world.

Cardwell was the first man to make systematic use of multi-battalion regiments, and the link between such units and their communities, for the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and producing a complete military system that was both affordable and flexible enough to satisfy very different requirements.

Cardwell's genius lay not only in his innovative thinking, but in his ability to identify the useful parts of the extremely flawed system he inherited and adapt them for his purposes, despite frenzied objections by reactionary elements in the military.

An essential ingredient of his success was his objectivity; belonging to neither a pro-army nor anti-army clique, he was not hobbled by prejudices and could give full rein to attaining his purpose, which was to forge an army that was capable of maintaining the nation's security. The multi-battalion regiment, as we know it today, and its concept of the regiment as the philosophical component of the infantry did not start emerging clearly until 1871, midway through Edward Cardwell's term as Britain's Secretary of State for War.

Cardwell was faced with a number of problems. Britain's imperial interests were expanding in various parts of the world, and required military muscle. At the same time, a new European military power was emerging: Prussia, with its formidable mix of superb regular soldiers and hundreds of thousands of well-trained and disciplined conscripts and its naked desire to play a larger role in world affairs, on the continent and further afield. To undertake the onerous task not only of garrisoning Britain's outposts and protecting her interests on a day-to-day basis, but also of providing her with the means of defending her own soil, should the need arise, Cardwell had a large but chaotic and often illogically organised land force, which in structure and outlook had barely changed since the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. The British Army was the product of two centuries of improvisation, resulting from regular cycles of hasty expansion when war threatened, and equally hasty cut-backs after hostilities had ended.

The Regular (professional, full-time) Army consisted of 91 regiments of one battalion each and 25 regiments of two battalions each, with each regiment independently organised and administered through the office of a commander-in-chief. Backing them up were a paid, part- time Militia and a further part-time element consisting of the organised units of Volunteers (infantry) and Yeomanry (light cavalry and mounted infantry). While formidable on paper, this army was in reality cost-inefficient, unwieldy and poorly suited to Britain's burgeoning external interests, and possessed almost no depth (thanks to a policy of lifetime enlistments, the trained reserve amounted to only 3 117 men nationwide).

To make it worse, the Militia was of doubtful utility controlled by the lords-lieutenant of the various counties, it was designed strictly for internal security and home defence while the Volunteers and Yeomanry more or less went their own way, and were anything but uniform as regards organisation or level of training. Cardwell was also aware that there was no question of emulating the Prussians and the French by using conscription and compulsory reserve service as a method of building a trained reserve. Unlike the Royal Navy, the British Army had not used `pressed' (forcibly enlisted) men since feudal times but had always relied on volunteers, even in the worst days of the Napoleonic wars although many a convicted felon had decided to `go for a soldier' upon being given the choice between enlisting or going to jail.

Yet another complicating factor was that its commander-in-chief, the deeply conservative Duke of Cambridge, and a large proportion of the regular British Army held that what had worked against Napoleon in 1815 was good enough for any present enemy. Cardwell knew that this was not so, and that while there was little doubt about the spirit and steadiness of the British fighting man, these could not be fully exploited because of the lack of rational, innovative thought in the command echelon of the land forces. Cardwell could not rid himself of the Duke of Cambridge, who was not only a cousin of the queen but enjoyed strong support within the army (his devotion to which could not be doubted, reactionary though his mindset was).

At that stage the chain of command between the army and parliament was a grey area, not to be clarified for many years to come. At the same time, there was no doubt about parliament's ultimate authority, and Cardwell therefore decided to reshape the army by means of legislation rather than converting the Duke of Cambridge to his way of thinking. A man of fortitude, he realised and accepted that changes such as he believed were necessary would bring on him the wrath not only of the duke but of legions of senior officers who shared their commander-in-chief's views.

Cardwell's point of departure was that every available asset and method had to be used in a systematic, calculated way to achieve certain aims some short-term, others long-term such as economies of scale, stimulation of recruiting, and the creation of an affordable defence machine which could be brought to life in a national emergency. To achieve these aims he prepared plans that, as the military writer David Ascoli has remarked, represented `a revolution in the anatomy and structure of the army'. His main thrusts centred on three aspects, all closely related.

Personnel reforms: To do this, he identified the lifetime service enlistment for other ranks and the purchase of commissions by officers as areas for special attention.

Localisation: Cardwell believed that recruitment could be systematised by linking regiments to specific communities. This was not a new idea the Duke of Cumberland had proposed such a system as far back as the mid-18th century, but had found no takers; in 1782 such a linking was ordered but did not fully succeed, since many regimental commanders paid only lip service to the order and 12 of the older and more distinguished regiments were exempted from it. Cardwell saw the value of the concept, and was determined to apply it in forceful fashion.

`Large' regiments: Cardwell was determined to systematise the existing regiments' old loose habit of creating and disbanding second and even third battalions as the occasion demanded. The first prominent appearance of this phenomenon had been in the mid-18th century, when no less than 15 infantry regiments had responded to immediate requirements by raising second battalions only to have them either disbanded or reformed as new single-battalion regiments when the need had lessened. The existing 25 second battalions Cardwell had inherited had all been raised in 1857 and 1858 by the most senior regiments, in the wake of the Indian Mutiny.

CARDWELL'S SYTEM

In 1870 Cardwell launched the first of his reform measures, the Army Enlistment Act, which abolished lifetime enlistments in the Regular Army and limited maximum full-time service by other ranks to 21 years, to be achieved by short-term enlistments consisting of a certain period on full-time duty, followed by another period on the active reserve (in its final form, each enlistment consisted of seven years with the colours and five on the active reserve). The aim of this act, apart from lowering the median age and eliminating the deadwood that results from long-term enlistments, was to create within a relatively short time an adequate reserve of about 80 000 ex-regulars who could be recalled to the colours in times of emergency.

This was followed in 1871 by the Regulation of the Forces Act, which not only abolished the notorious commission purchase system but transferred control of the Militia from the county governments to the War Office. While they were important developments, these two acts were merely the precursors of a drastic and controversial localisation scheme which was to have far-reaching consequences, up to this day.

The localisation scheme divided Britain into 66 Brigade Districts (later renamed to Regimental Districts), based on county boundaries and population density. Each district had a Regular regiment composed of two battalions of the former independent regiments either two of the old single-battalion regiments, or battalions of the few existing two-battalion units two local Militia battalions, and various Volunteer units. All these units were grouped around a permanent regimental depot, serving as an administrative headquarters and basic training centre.

Cardwell brooked no opposition, despite intense resistance by diehards in the military, and applied the scheme to the entire British Army (of all its regiments, only the Cameron Highlanders remained a single-battalion entity whether through `pull' or more legitimate factors is not known until it too succumbed in 1897). His idea was to create a series of regimental entities that would provide adequate full-time manpower for service at home and abroad, while simultaneously building up a ready reserve and also nurturing a part-time component capable of providing a second-line force in a national emergency requiring a rapid expansion of the armed forces.

• Thus one of the Regular battalions of a given regiment would serve abroad somewhere in the British Empire, with the home service Regular battalion replacing its losses through war, disease and the expiry of attestation contracts by feeding it with seasoned men or recruits trained at the regimental depot.
  
  

• Meanwhile, the Militia battalions and Volunteer units would provide the regiment's second-line force, which could be brought up to standard without delay if required (and, of course, also constituted a potential supply of motivated, evaluated recruits for the Regular units).

The scheme was adopted in spite of the diehards' protests, as none of them could table an alternative with the same sterling advantages. Firstly, it was economical of both men and money. Secondly, it stimulated recruiting. Thirdly, it provided desperately needed flexibility, because it was adequate for peacetime needs but also allowed rapid controlled expansion in time of war.

A change of government put Cardwell out of office in 1874, but his reforms stayed in place despite attempts from the Regular Army to abolish them and return to the comfortable and familiar old post-1815 situation. Within a few years Cardwell's party was back in power, and the diehards suffered a permanent defeat when the new Secretary of State for War, Hugh Childers, not only quelled all back-to-1815 initiatives but also decided that Cardwell had in fact not gone far enough. The result was General Order 41 of 1 May 1881 which created a network of four-battalion Regular regiments in England, Scotland and Wales, and five-battalion regiments in Ireland. Each of these regiments was linked by headquarters location and territorial name to its `Regimental District', as Cardwell's `Brigade Districts' had now become.

As in the case of Cardwell, Childers's reforms endured despite attacks and foot-dragging on the part of the military diehards, and in 1903 Lord Esher took the next evolutionary step, largely as a result of the bloody nose the British Army had received from the Boers during the Second Anglo-Boer War of 18991902. Esher was concerned mainly with home defence; his contribution was three recommendations, which were accepted. These called for the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief, who would be replaced by a Chief of Staff; the formation of a Committee of Defence, chaired by the Prime Minister; and the formation of an Army Council, chaired by the Secretary of State for War and made up of four military and three knowledgeable civilian members.

Although unlike Cardwell Esher was not directly concerned with reforming the structure of the army itself, his recommendation that the post of Commander-in-Chief be abolished meant the elimination of a stumbling block that had hampered Cardwell's predecessors and successors, and for the first time clearly defined a principle which until then had lacked definition namely the total control of parliament over the armed forces. In essence, it meant that after more than two centuries the army's ability to prevent, retard or water down reforms proposed by parliament had ended.

From now on, the government of the day was in total and undisputed control of the British land forces. In 1906, after Esher's changes had had time to take effect, the structural reform process initiated by Cardwell more than 30 years earlier was completed by another civilian visionary, Richard Haldane.

At first glance Haldane was unfit for the post of Secretary of State for War. An academic and man of peace, he was given the task because the newly elected government, a strongly pacifist and anti-military one, had found that no one else was willing to take the job. Haldane approached the task of restructuring in a straightforward and academic fashion by asking one fundamental question: What is the purpose and function of the British Army? It was a question no reformer not even Cardwell and Childers had bothered to ask or answer before, and it had certainly not been asked by the soldiers themselves.

Haldane's answer to his own question was that the British government had to have the military capacity to police the empire beyond the seas, and also to respond instantly and coherently to a threat to its own soil capacities it had never had in the past, resulting in wasteful, often ineffective crisis management. These requirements had not changed since Cardwell's time. What had changed were the priorities. Since Cardwell's time, the imperial colonies and territories had acquired substantial home-grown armed forces, and the empire itself had expanded more or less as far as it could; preparations for a possible war against a European enemy now took precedence. But all this had to be accomplished within the framework of two immutable limitations. Firstly, neither the nation nor his party would countenance conscription. Secondly, they would not be willing to pay for a standing army as large as those of Prussia and France.

Haldane's response implemented between 1906 and 1912 was a policy focused on five objectives, which derived from both the Cardwell-Childers reforms and those of Lord Esher. They were:

• the creation of a general staff with three staff divisions, namely operations, staff duties and training;
  
  

• confirmation of the Cardwell-Childers localisation of the full-time army and short-term service, although with some modification of service periods for members of logistics corps;
  
  

• the earmarking and preparation of units for a self-contained regular Expeditionary Force of six infantry divisions and one cavalry division, together with all support services, which could leave for foreign service within 12 days of being mobilised;
  
  

• the reorganisation of the Militia into a Special Reserve, tasked with supplying drafts of personnel to the expeditionary force in time of war.
  
  

• the reorganisation of the Volunteers and Yeomanry regiments into a Territorial Army (TA) of 14 infantry divisions and 14 light cavalry brigades, with three main wartime tasks: defending British soil; relieving Regular Army garrisons overseas; and providing a reserve of trained and organised manpower for rapid expansion of the standing army.

RESULTS

It was a masterly system, comparatively simple in structure and yet geared, even measured against today's standards, to achieve the maximum results with the minimum of expenditure.

• In Britain's shop-window was a well-trained first-line force, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), with a low median age and little deadwood (thanks to the continual infusion of trained new blood), and possessing considerable inherent depth, as a result of the regular feeder battalions. Connected to it was the Special Reserve, a source of trained ex-regular manpower which could be tapped literally within days of the BEF going on to a war footing.
  
  

• The TA component supplied the rest of the required depth by providing two part-time soldiers for every Regular infantryman, and four light cavalrymen for every Regular horseman. Costing almost nothing to maintain between hostilities, it could effectively triple the field army within a matter of weeks.
  
  

• In time of peace, the Regular battalions served at home and abroad, as they had done since Cardwell's day, while the Special Reserve and TA were engaged in continuous and non-continuous training.
  
  

• In time of war, the Regular home-service battalion would go on to an immediate operational footing and be ready for service anywhere in the world. At the same time, the Special Reserve's ex-Regular reservists would start fleshing out structures where necessary, and the TA's infantry and yeomanry units would begin full-time refresher training in preparation for either home or foreign service.

It was a simple but efficient system. It would not be going too far to say that it was thanks to the Cardwell-Childers-Haldane system that Britain was able to mount a credible military effort against Germany when World War 1 broke out, within two years of the scheme's completion. The savage initial fighting proved how accurately Haldane's calculations had been: his only slip, as combat experience showed, was the unduly high proportion of cavalry, a hangover from Britain's experiences at the hands of the ultra-mobile Boer commandos during the 1899-1902 War. The BEF, a body of superb professionals, held its own for long enough against the Germans' larger forces, and within less than two months the Territorial Army had been trained up to scratch and was in action (the first of its units to smell powder was the London Scottish, then a Cardwell-style part-time component of the Gordon Highlanders).

Both the existing BEF and the TA, the core force, suffered terribly, but they helped prevent the Germans from winning the mobile phase of the war and thereby thwarted any chance of a quick, surgical strike to victory. In addition, hundreds of temporary `service battalions' were raised with comparatively little effort by increasing the number of battalions in each regiment, their basic frameworks consisting of experienced personnel drawn from the existing Regular and part-time components of the regiments, as well as ex-Regular reservists. The scale on which these so-called `Kitchener Armies' was raised can be seen from the fact that by 1918 the British Army's oldest Regular regiment, the Royal Scots (the First of Foot), had given birth to no less than 32 service battalions.

The structure Cardwell and his successors created, although often adapted and modified to suit changing circumstances, lasted long after their lifetimes. When the BEF landed in France in 1940, a portion of it was manned by part-time units of the TA that Richard Haldane had created for just such a purpose 30 years earlier. In fact the Cardwell-Childers-Esher-Haldane structure exists to this day, albeit in modified form.

• The chief of the general staff is still in command of the army, although Esher's Army Council has evolved into an Army Board which in turn is subordinate to a Defence Council representing all three arms of service. Line command of the total armed forces is now given to a Chief of Defence Staff, the appointment rotating between the various heads of service.
  
  

• The multi-battalion nature of the infantry has remained. Many ancient regiments have been amalgamated in the series of draw-downs that have taken place since the late 1950s as Britain's imperial role faded, but almost all of the regiments still existing amalgamated or otherwise have several battalions each.
  
  

• The Militia-descended Special Reserve that Haldane created has vanished, but the regular army still relies on short service with a reserve obligation for much of its manpower requirement, and the TA (consisting of many specialist units as well as infantry, artillery and yeomanry regiments) lives on, as firmly linked to the Regular units as ever.

A careful process of amalgamation and consolidation has resulted in the formation of a relatively small number of multi-battalion regiments, each with its own cluster of part-time units, providing greater coherence of training effort and savings on maintenance and facilities. The process by which the present dispensation was reached is not within the scope of this discussion. However, it is worth mentioning that for the most part it was not conducted by sweeping edicts from on high. The army top command set the guidelines and steered the process, but to ensure that the unpleasant task was carried out in the most efficient and painless way, the regiments themselves were given wide scope to hammer out the finer details in the course of consultation and negotiation.

Often this was done with great delicacy, not unmixed with a healthy regard for possible future contingencies; when the famed Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) opted not to be amalgamated in 1968, it was reduced to a total strength of one TA company but allowed to retain its number on the active list. This meant that the Cameronians did not die but went into suspended animation, its continuity and identity intact and ready to be resurrected if ever there was a call for its services again. The respect for regimental history and continuity shown in the case of the Cameronians is worth remembering in the new SANDF, as many existing CF and Comdo units may face this fate.

The physical changes wrought by Cardwell and his successors have been spelt out in the preceding passages. What might not be quite as evident is the regimental philosophy that developed as part of those changes. Before Cardwell's reforms, there was little philosophical difference between a regiment and a battalion, since most regiments were of single-battalion size. Post Cardwell, however, the concept of `regiment' changed forever. The regiment was now more a way of life than an expression of size, since the number of its battalions could and did vary in accordance with several factors. Without being fanciful, one could say that the regiment became the heart of the overall corpus, while the battalions were the regiment's fists. Besides being philosophically precise, the multi-battalion system was also a very practical one, since it allowed a relationship between the various components of a regiment which was both strong and flexible. All components of the regiment wore basically the same badges and uniforms and shared the same general traditions.

At the same time, however, each battalion also maintained a distinctive personal identity. It had its own colour, bearing only the battle honours that it had earned, and its uniform and usages usually varied slightly from those of the other components of the regiment. All were part of the same family, and inter-battalion transfers were common; this last was an important factor, given the British Army's heavy emphasis on the `mother unit' concept, which to this day makes infantrymen reluctant to transfer to other regiments. Last but not least, the arrangement encouraged a healthy spirit of competitiveness that could but enhance overall operational efficiency.

Operational efficiency was also fostered by yet another factor which was built into the multilayered system devised by Cardwell and refined by his successors. The Regular components made an effort to look after their part-time equivalents, not only for reasons of regimental sentiment but also because it was obvious that by helping their Volunteers to achieve maximum efficiency, they were also helping themselves by laying a solid foundation for any future emergency. As a result the British part-time soldier has always received much more care and attention than his South African counterpart. Every British part-time battalion receives top-of-the-line equipment, and has instructors and staff personnel permanently seconded from its Regular equivalent. Naturally, given the disparate nature of the British Army (both Regular and Territorial), there were variations in a number of cases. For example, some TA units (such as the London Scottish) maintained their own particular identities within a direct regular affiliation, but their strong sense of affiliation with their mother units served the same purpose.

PART 2: THE CARDWELL SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the main, the Cardwell system and its benefits passed South Africa by; this country has seen few real multi-battalion regiments, and those few did not come about as a result of long-term strategic planning of the type behind Cardwell's reforms. With hindsight it is possible to identify several reasons, rooted in the circumstances prevailing at the time, why this was the case.

In late 19th century South Africa there were almost no full-time combat regiments. Assured of the protection of the `imperial umbrella' with its British garrisons, the crown colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal required little full-time domestic muscle besides their paramilitary gendarmeries (the Cape Mounted Riflemen and the Natal Police), which fell under police legislation in peace time but passed into military control in wartime. If these proficient but thinly spread forces full-time police and British garrison units required reinforcement, the colonial governments called on their part-time Volunteer regiments and/or raised hostilities-only levies of all races, in pre-Cardwell fashion.

The situation was more or less the same in the two Boer republics. Their full-time forces each consisted of a small artillery regiment and a more or less paramilitary police force; in times of emergency the republics called up their commandos for compulsory service, or raised hostilities-only levies. Instead of the imperial umbrella, they relied on their commando riflemen's fearsome (and well-deserved) reputation as daring fighters who were not afraid to tackle numerically superior enemies usually beating them.

Other reasons for the lack of structural reform included government parsimony as regards spending on the full-time units; the nature of the volunteer regiments, which were run like exclusive men's clubs; and the lack of eligible manpower (ie white males), although some regiments were willing to ignore the colour bar, and the Boer republics did not hesitate to call up people of mixed race for commando service. The lack of manpower was aggravated by the fact that many employers were unsympathetic to their employees' part-time soldiering. As a result, the Cape and Natal persisted with the wasteful method of maintaining single-battalion regiments in peacetime and hastily raising hostilities-only levies of all races in time of need.

SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIMENTS

The few examples of South African multi-battalion units in what would be known today as the `statutory forces' are generally to be found in the 20th century.

The largest was the South African Mounted Rifles/Zuid-Afrikaansche Bereden Skutters, a Permanent Force unit of the early post-Union era (1913-20). The SAMR consisted of five regiments (actually battalions) of mounted infantry some observers wrongly classify the SAMR as cavalry, whereas in fact its men were trained, organised and equipped to ride into battle but to fight mainly on foot. All members of the SAMR wore similar badges and uniforms, including the 1st Battalion, which traced its origins back to the famed `colonial' Cape Mounted Riflemen and wore uniform distinctions to mark its descent. The SAMR's various battalions performed yeoman service during World War 1, but all except the senior battalion were disbanded in 1920. The latter lasted until 1926, when it too disappeared from the scene, although 4 Artillery Regiment has direct continuity with it and is in fact the oldest unit in the PF (and SANDF), with seniority going back to 1853.

The line of continuity starts with the formation of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP) in 1853, which acquired an Artillery Troop in 1874. In 1878 the FAMP, Artillery Troop and all, became the Cape Mounted Riflemen. When the CMR was disbanded in 1926, the Artillery Troop was spared and located at Potchefstroom, where it underwent many changes before becoming 4 Artillery Regiment.

A small number of infantry units of the CF have had second battalions at various times during the past 85 years. South Africa's opportunity to embark upon multi-battalion regimental systems came from the 1950s onwards, when there was an unprecedented expansion of both the full-time and part-time force. It did not happen, however, and once again several reasons can be identified.

A primary reason was an initiative launched in 1948 by the new Minister of Defence, F C Erasmus. One of Erasmus's aims was to level the playing-fields to use a 1990s phrase in the Union Defence Force, which was strongly British-oriented in usages, structures, uniforms and nomenclature (for example, of all the CF regiments, the only Afrikaans-oriented ones were six battalions that had been raised in 1934). Unfortunately this developed from an attempt at affirmative action into a politically tinged purge of the UDF, soon to be renamed the South African Defence Force. The various Commando units, previously `Skietverenigings', were later classified as Type A, B or C independent Commandos and continued as single-battalion or small independent units. At the same time, the Afrikaans-oriented single-battalion regiments founded in 1934 underwent at least one change of name and sometimes more. An early victim was the renowned Middellandse Regiment, which became Regiment Gideon Scheepers in 1954.

In 1960 there was another wave of name-changing; Regiment Gideon Scheepers became Regiment Groot Karoo, and three regiments named after famous Boer generals Regiment De La Rey (given its 13 World War 2 battle honours, the most celebrated of the 1934 battalions), Regiment Louw Wepener and Regiment De Wet were inexplicably renamed Regiment Wes-Transvaal, Regiment Oos-Vrystaat and Regiment Noord-Vrystaat. After strenuous efforts, Regiment Wes-Transvaal, Regiment Oos-Vrystaat and Regiment Noord-Vrystaat regained their honoured names, but Regiment Groot Karoo's original name, Die Middellandse Regiment, has remained in official limbo.

In addition, various new conventional infantry units (almost all single-battalion units) and large numbers of commando units were set up; in the early 1980s this initiative resulted in the birth of a substantial sub-class when various 1960s-vintage urban commando units were freed of their home areas protection role by being transferred to the CF. Since they shared the same general areas both with one another and with older units, they were ideally situated at the time of their transformation to become part of multi-battalion regiments, but this did not occur. Some of these battalions have opted for a traditional approach (such as the Cape Flats Commando, which turned itself into the Cape Light Infantry), but they have not been encouraged to do so and are subject to various rules as regards insignia and uniform distinctions which make it difficult for them to emulate their `traditional' (ie pre-1940) predecessors.

CORRECT CONDITIONS

It must be clearly understood that multi-battalion regiments only work properly if the conditions are suitable. This can be seen from the cases of two of South Africa's scanty multi-battalion CF regiments, as opposed to the co-operation existing in Comdo groups.

Barring the now vanished SA Mounted Riflemen, the most successful example of a local multi-battalion regiment is the Transvaal Scottish (TS). The TS started off as a single-battalion regiment in 1902, formed a second battalion in 1914, disbanded it in 1920 and then reformed it in 1936, adding a third battalion in 1939. The structure endured for a considerable period after World War 2, although the 3rd Battalion was converted in 1948 into the only Scottish artillery unit in South Africa's military annals. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were amalgamated in 1954, but were separated again in 1970 and survive to this day, although the 3rd Battalion was disbanded in 1960. In a way the Transvaal Scottish is very much in the Cardwell spirit of the multi-layered regiment, since the 1st Battalion is trained for conventional warfare and the 2nd Battalion for light motorised/counter-insurgency duties.

The other side of the coin is represented by Regiment Westelike Provincie (RWP), one of the 1934-vintage Afrikaans-oriented units, which underwent considerable identity trauma between 1951 and the mid-1970s. RWP was renamed Regiment Onze Jan in 1951; in 1960 its name was changed to Regiment Boland, a situation which was to endure for 14 years. It acquired another battalion in 1972, the 1st Battalion being headquartered at Paarl and the 2nd Battalion at Worcester.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion had been fighting a dogged battle to regain the original name. This succeeded in 1974, and the two battalions became independent units. The 1st Battalion became Regiment Westelike Provincie, based in the Cape Town area, while the 2nd Battalion retained the designation Regiment Boland. To this day RWP and Regiment Boland wear similar cap-badges, thanks to their former association, but that is all. They are separate units in every sense of the word even to the extent that RWP is now classed as a `traditional' regiment, while Regiment Boland is not.

The Regiment Westelike Provincie/Regiment Boland episode should be seen as a cautionary tale. The mere act of forming second or even third battalions is not enough to achieve the primary purpose that was so clearly understood by Cardwell and his successors; those battalions must be located in reasonable proximity, so that they can interact with and support one another. In a nutshell, they must share the same regimental area. The distance, in every sense, between Paarl and Worcester was simply too great for mutual support, and the battalions differed fundamentally in terms of corporate culture, since 1 Regiment Boland (later RWP) was an urban unit and 2 Regiment Boland was strongly rural in nature. Thus the split was a natural one that rectified an unnatural situation.

The concept worked in the case of the Transvaal Scottish because both battalions were and are located in the same area (Johannesburg and environs), and although they have separate battalion headquarters they share one regimental headquarters complete with a magnificent museum. The fact that a third battalion existed for 21 years and was then disbanded for extraneous reasons reinforces this view. The Transvaal Scottish has been a very good example of a Cardwell-style regiment on the South African pattern. Any of the Commando Groups, all organised on a geographical basis, all doing the same task and undergoing the same training, all working in their own area, are far more likely to co-operate well than CF units that might live cheek by jowl with each other, but operate and train separately.

RESULTS

Since the 1950s the trend has been one of fragmentation the complete antithesis of the Cardwell-Childers-Haldane philosophy. The small number of second battalions that appeared resulted from either regimental initiatives or by pure happenstance, in response to local requirements. As noted above, the multi-battalion regimental system is a dead letter in the PF infantry, which is based on independent numbered battalions; the CF and Comdos still have named units, but a second battalion is a rare exception rather than the rule. Therefore, what the SAIC has is an ad hoc mixture:

• On the one hand there is the PF, a `post-modernist' force with a purged institutional memory which regards the institution of the infantry regiment as an administrative grouping rather than a dynamic instrument for enhancing long-term operational efficiency.
  
  

• On the other is the CF, composed almost entirely of single-battalion units and heavily oriented towards the regimental system including, the Afrikaans-language units from the Erasmus era.
  
  

• In between is the Commando (Comdo) Force, whose units are named and geographically grouped into Commando Groups, which are numbered. All battalions of a particular commando group have a certain affiliation to each other, and all Comdo members wear the same badge.

In part this schism is also the result of the fact that the PF has always tended to be largely an administrative and training force, whereas the part-time service has been a functional one, geared for one purpose only, namely operations.

The post-April 1994 government has thus far acted with commendable restraint. There have been no purges and no undeclared wars; the emphasis, as far as both the full-time and part-time forces are concerned, has been on maintaining the status quo. Dynamic lateral thinking is required to ensure that what is good from the past serves as the launching pad for building the new defence force. However, from whatever angle the situation is viewed, the multi-battalion regimental structure and its virtues are almost unknown in South Africa, except in the present Comdo system. A strong case could be made that it should be systematically introduced and expanded, as the new defence force reinvents itself.

A PRE-CARDWELL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA?

These matters need to be addressed earnestly and thoroughly, as part of the recently announced defence review. Large-scale reform and rationalisation of both the full-time and part-time forces are not only overdue but inevitable. The question is how it should be carried out; army planners should not hesitate to take a hard look at the Cardwell-Childers-Haldane reforms and see if they are relevant to our present situation. While the reforms were designed for another time and another country, some of their basic principles are valid in the current evolution of the SAIC, particularly its large part-time component. The Cardwell solution is, after all, the foundation of the British regimental system and is internationally recognised as a basis for high standards of efficiency, loyalty and dedicated service.

CARDWELL-TYPE PROBLEM

Role confusion

There is confusion about the role and function of the SA Army in 1996. In 1870, Cardwell's problem was to place the British Army on an affordable peace-time footing, which would allow it to carry out its normal tasks of policing the empire while at the same time being capable of dealing with an undefined European aggressor. In 1996 the SA Army must also maintain its basic capability against an undefined future aggressor, while at the same time performing peace-time duties ranging from aiding the civil power to (potentially) serving outside its borders on United Nations-sponsored peace-keeping tasks all within the parameters of tight budget constraints.

Clarifying the modern SA Army's role and function is a matter outside the scope of this discussion. Only one observation deserves to be made in this regard. It is quite obvious that Haldane succeeded in formulating a successful conclusion to the Cardwell-Childers-Esher reform process because he, like his predecessors, was not part of any interest group, either military or political; this was despite the fact that, like them, he was a political appointee. As a result he was able to take a largely objective view of the past, present and future and marshall his thought processes accordingly. At this stage, planning of our future military structures tends to be tactical and short-term (integration, rationalisation) rather than strategic and long-term.

No conscription

One of Cardwell's basic guidelines in planning the new British Army was that there was no question of introducing conscription, as in the Prussian and French armies. The modern SA Army is in the same boat; the power to conscript might be carried over into the new Defence Act, but it is unlikely to be implemented except in extreme emergencies, and it certainly cannot be used as a basis for planning a new part-time force.

Lack of depth

Like Cardwell's 1870s British Army, the SA Army's full-time combat component in 1996 lacks depth, for somewhat similar reasons. Some members of the PF are lifetime appointees, performing staff or administrative tasks of one kind or another. Most of the 20 000 or so full-time junior soldiers in combat musterings are on short-term enlistments, but the short-term service scheme appears to be focused mainly on the provision of manpower for immediate needs. As a result, the creation of an organised ready reserve of trained ex-regulars enjoys a low priority, and former short-term servicemen simply disappear into the Reserve a nebulous reservoir containing members in no specific organisation, whether they have actually undergone regular full-time military training/service or not.

The necessity for ensuring adequate depth in the Full-Time Force (FTF) has not received serious attention during the past 25 years, because during that time the national service system ensured an endless supply of well-trained and experienced white personnel who not only satisfied the defence force's lower-level manpower requirements but were subject to an extremely long part-time obligation. Now that national service has been abolished, this situation has changed completely, but no adequate substitute has yet been evolved. As a result the PF presently has the worst of both worlds life-time employment pulling in uneasy tandem with a short-service scheme which does not coherently provide for future emergencies. It is not enough to ensure that there is an adequate number of bodies on active duty; personnel policies must be designed to allow the build-up of an adequate and organised reservoir of inactive but available manpower, particularly reserve manpower for the FTF. This is something totally different to the part-time units.

This situation is aggravated by the PF's long-standing policy to segregate the full-time and part-time forces; unlike other defence forces, it is rare to see full-time and part-time personnel serving in the same unit, or even to have units of the two components serving in the same formation. As a result, the two components have virtually no experience of serving side by side in either a unit or individually. An added complication is that the priority given to integration of the PF has obscured the requirement of co-operation between part-time and full-time elements.

The situation as regards manning of the PTF (namely the CF and Comdos) is hardly better. At present there are few details about planning in this regard; PTF manning policy at present is the so-called Voluntary Military Service scheme (VMS), in terms of which volunteers are recruited for 12 months' full-time service, followed by a part-time training obligation extending over several years. This scheme has serious defects, including the following:

• No provision is made for shorter periods of training, except in the case of members who served in the previous system.
  
  

• The PTF has not been drawn into the VMS process. This has resulted in ex-FTF members being pumped into PTF units with which they have had no connection during their full-time service and about which they usually know nothing, while the PTF units themselves face the prospect of being landed with the same problems they encountered during the national service era of having to motivate and somehow employ reluctant reservists who cannot be thrown out if they prove to be useless.
  
  

• The system remains unproven, but no other system of providing new trained members for the part-time force has been proposed to the public, who must volunteer for service.

This is an extremely important matter. The recruiting and training methods adopted for new recruits will determine the future of the PTF. Given improved conditions of service, it is possible that the PTF will be able to coast for several years on men trained under the old system. But after that it will have to stand on its own feet.

There is another aspect to the question of depth. In the past the SA Army's command echelon has taken the view that part-time force strengths and structures should be based on the amount of equipment available for a particular task. Those opposed to this view take the position that trained, available manpower is more important than equipment and that to tailor trained manpower to the available equipment leaves no depth; also that while there is certainly not enough equipment to maintain a larger conventional force than at present, there is enough training equipment available to allow every existing infantry unit to be trained in a primary parachute or mechanised role. The point is made that doing so would allow maximum built-in flexibility, as a unit trained for modern mobile warfare could be temporarily converted for counter-insurgency, internal-security and peace-keeping tasks while the reverse is not true, and that the training of infantrymen for modern war should not be limited by the numbers of aircraft or Ratels expected to be available to carry them into battle.

Lack of coherence

Like Cardwell's army, the SA Army of 1996 thanks to 30 years of border war, internal unrest, the national service system, the integration of forces and a change of roles due to a changing international situation and SA's international re-entry is a mass of full-time and part-time single-battalion regiments (with the lone exceptions mentioned), embodying all the disadvantages of 1870.

Recruiting

Recruiting is a problem in the modern SA Army, although it differs slightly from that faced by Cardwell in 1871. The PF has too many recruits (thanks to the integration of forces), while the PTF is likely to have too few, unless it can offer attractive conditions of service. An alleged aggravating factor is that, generally speaking, there is no culture of part-time service among blacks. This factor is much spoken about, but there does not seem to have been any serious research into its validity or gravity, or ways of resolving such problems, if they actually exist.

Unique problems

Problems afflicting the modern SA Army that did not apply in the British Army in Cardwell's time can be defined as follows:

Overall size

It is common cause among all military-security planners and thinkers that the SA Army both full-time and part-time is far too large. Judging by likely financial constraints, the country will probably be able to afford a PF of about 75 000 uniformed members, plus a PTF, during the next decade. Given South Africa's geographical location, its far from settled internal situation and its likely role as virtually the only force for stability in Southern, Central and East Africa, this is a small force. At the very least, there should be two or preferably three part-time servicemen for every full-timer, which would not only provide the country with a substantial and instantly mobilizable citizen army but would also allow continuous `trickle employment' in the PTF without subjecting it to the sort of stresses caused by its brutal over-use during the 19751995 period.

A 150 000-man PTF would be an economical proposition; few people realise just how cost-effective such a force is. At the apogee of the old SADF, 87 percent of its total personnel strength consisted of part-time service people of the CF and Comdos, almost all in combat or combat support units. This cost a mere 2,2 percent of the entire defence budget. The provision of an adequate and employable FTF Reserve organisation would also be most cost-effective, and would round off the numbers needed by providing a `ready-to-use' complement to the FTF.

It is quite clear that considerable rationalisation will take place in the process of reforming the PTF. There are far too many units, they are too unrepresentative of the country's population, and they are not evenly distributed, being located mainly in former `white' residential areas. The money previously spent on the PTF was too little, largely, of course, as a result of low pay and virtually no perks, and this will not be possible with an all-volunteer part-time force. However, about 6 percent of the defence budget will probably be adequate to maintain a PTF of adequate size.

Diffuseness of structure

There is a school of thought which believes that the present structure of the field army in terms of which the conventional land forces are organised into formations controlled directly by the Chief of the Army, while the territorial commands control only motorised and light infantry units, namely Comdos or Rear Areas Protection Units (RAPU), is the product of a situation that no longer applies; to coin a phrase, it is a war baby that eats too much in peacetime.

Those who oppose the present system argue that there is no logic in it any more, quoting four perceived disadvantages:

• It is not cost-effective, because it introduces an additional and unnecessary administrative layer, resulting in the duplication of systems and procedures and a waste of manpower and money.
  
  

• It allows for vertical but not horizontal cross-pollination in the sense that there is very little contact social or technical between units attached to conventional formations and those of commands covering the same area.
  
  

• It takes no account of the new provincial dispensation, or the integration of former tbvc forces and their infrastructure.
  
  

• There is no geographical adhesion. For example, the present 9 SA Division (headquartered outside Cape Town) has most of its constituent units in Western Cape, but the rest are scattered as far afield as Free State and Eastern Province. Inter alia, this makes divisional unit commanders' conferences difficult to organise at short notice, and transport costs are high.

If these objections are valid, it might make more sense certainly from the PTF point of view for the SA Army to look towards a variation of the German `wehrkreis' system in which the equivalent of a territorial command or province maintained a conventional manoeuvre force which could be deployed when and where necessary, at the same time retaining a static administrative element and a home defence force.

Diffuseness of orientation

There are basically four types of infantry unit in the SA Army today: parachute, mechanised, motorised, and internal security/commando (now classified as light motorised infantry and renamed Rear Area Protection Units, or RAPU). This is a hangover from the past, and partly the result of experiences in the 1960s and 1970s which showed that when infantry were trained for both conventional and counter-insurgency roles, the doctrines tended to pollute one another; particularly in the case with the PTF, which had limited training time available.

Apart from this, there are disadvantages to this system. A principal one is that it limits PTF depth and all-round employability. The predicted reduced size of the future infantry force is another reason given for a proposal that all conventional infantry should in principle be mechanised or parachute, but deployed in whatever role is needed. This would leave the SAIC with two main branches: conventional (mechanised and parachute) infantry, deployed in mechanised, parachute or motorised roles as required, and the commando/rear areas protection light motorised force for home area defence and security.

Composite service units and sub-units

The question of devising a better way of raising composite units and sub-units than that used in the past does not seem to have been addressed as yet, although it is vitally important to the PTF. The composite unit has been appearing and disappearing from the South African military scene for generations. In its latest guise, it has been a feature of the SA Army's activities for the past 20 years, and is likely to continue. Typically, the composite unit has been employed in the past to carry out counter-insurgency and internal security tasks in support of the police, and it is unlikely that this role will die out, while in the not too distant future the composite unit may be required for deployment outside the country's borders in terms of a regional initiative or a United Nations programme.

Some members/components of the reconstituted PTF could take part in such deployments either as individuals or in company or battalion-sized contingents, but hopefully always as volunteers for a particular service period or task. It is not only likely but essential that at least a proportion of the new PTF's officers and men accumulate fresh operational experience, whether they have previous experience or not. Unblooded members would benefit by the sort of experience that cannot be simulated in even the most realistic training, and which is the final and most important ingredient needed to turn an enthusiastic `book soldier' into a mature, self-confident fighting man.

For operationally experienced members, volunteer external deployments would provide hands-on knowledge of a type of operation that is new to the SANDF and has its own peculiar imperatives; all such inputs could be added to the experience of the past in order to synthesize a new operational mind-set. The PTF in particular and the SANDF as a whole would benefit from the dissemination of such operational experience. If so, however, it is essential that the rough and ready composite unit we have known in the past be refined and formalised, instead of being implemented for immediate gains while disregarding the longer-term implications. The SA Army's approach to PTF composite units over the past two decades whether for internal or border service can be described as haphazard and devoid of sensitivity towards regimental sentiment or any systematic long-term (or even medium-term) planning, and was never based on volunteerism.

Here, too, we find an echo of the Cardwell and pre-Cardwell situation: his reforms effectively ended a century of ad hoc raisings and disbandings of temporary units, with little thought of any cost-effective long-term planning. Generally speaking, components of the PTF have previously been deployed in one of three ways:

• Individual call-ups, ie the mobilisation of individual personnel, usually performing extra-regimental part-time duties, for service in a staff or specialist capacity at one or other headquarters. This system works well, needs no changes, and will benefit from volunteerism.
  
  

• Unit call-ups, ie the mobilisation of full units for service, either in their primary role or for other duties. This system also works well South African part-time units have been used like this for many decades the only caveat being that at times heavy demands were imposed on certain units. This will now be less easy, as there is no compulsory service.
  
  

• Component service, ie the mobilisation of elements of units for service. This system has been used very extensively, not only in the border war days but very recently, as during the April 1994 general election. Broadly speaking, there are two types of component service: modular companies, in which a specific unit is required to provide a self-contained `modular company' for service either on its own or on attachment to an existing unit; and composite units, made up of elements of various other units, put together for strictly short-term purposes (one should mention a further `refinement' combining the worst elements of both, namely a composite unit made up of companies that are themselves composites, with few if any volunteers for this particular service).

The modular company/composite unit not only leaves much to be desired in terms of coherence and efficiency, but is positively harmful to the units concerned. Experience has shown that modular companies bereft as they are of any `guardian angel' to protect their interests tend to receive the sort of second-class treatment handed out to military orphans such as themselves; often they are regarded as little more than cheap labour. Apart from this, the modular company system has severely damaged the cohesiveness of the units concerned an important matter, since the PTF is firmly based on the regimental system. Continued piecemeal deployment adversely affects a unit's regimental cohesion, because it never serves as a whole and there is no opportunity for it to be led by its commanding officer, who along with the regimental sergeant-major becomes little more than a visitor.

Such deployment does not have serious consequences for technical and support units, which are used to being split up for attachment to combat units, but it has an extremely deleterious effect on infantry and armoured units, which rely heavily on team spirit and unit cohesion. Several PTF units are presently suffering from the after-effects of this situation, which in a compulsory service system are serious enough but would be virtually fatal in an all-volunteer force. An aggravating factor is that such units usually do not have enough time for settling in (during the 1994 election call-up, for example, some hastily assembled composite units were deployed within days of being formed).

The result is a body of men one could scarcely call it a unit lacking the cohesion and corporate identity that is born of working together, or regimental spirit of the kind which is so essential to military operations but which cannot be created by means of a few days of refresher training. This sort of hand-to-mouth arrangement might be acceptable in the case of low-intensity operations, but could be extremely detrimental if such units were to be committed to serious action.

In this context it is interesting to note that Scandinavian servicemen most of them volunteer part-time citizen-soldiers with high standards of self-discipline, and at least some special training have traditionally proved to be excellent peacemakers/keepers in Cyprus and elsewhere, whereas elite assault troops have tended to be overly aggressive and at times insensitive. The truth is that composite units of the type assembled by the SA Army over the past 20 years worked because they were not subjected to great stress, and in the process they did great harm to the part-time component.

Yet another grave disadvantage of the ad hoc method is that upon completion of service there is no orderly, systematic trickle-down of lessons learnt, because few of the sub-units ever have the full picture. There is no systematic addition to the institutional memory of the units concerned, no accumulation of such experience, and therefore little corporate benefit to the units from the service performed. There is an urgent need for a systematic approach to the question of how, or even whether, composite infantry units and sub-units should be composed and employed.

Against all this stands the Cardwell system, which permits different battalions of the same regiment to work together, and at least provide some semblance of a cohesive unit when volunteers from the several battalions work together in a composite unit formed from a single multi-battalion regiment.

PART 3: APPLYING THE CARDWELL PRINCIPLES TO THE SA ARMY

If the Cardwell-Childers-Haldane structural philosophy is to be applied to the SA Army, some of the defects and problems raised earlier would have to be addressed. A number of these might be regarded as falling outside the scope of this discussion, but cannot be ignored because they would impinge on any reconstruction or reconstitution of the PTF.

THE SA ARMY'S ROLE AND FUNCTION

This falls outside this discussion, except in one respect. In the United States and Britain, which maintain volunteer-only part-time forces, maximum cost-effectiveness is achieved by a close correlation between full-time and part-time force strengths and roles; any reduction or expansion of the FTF is paralleled by a carbon copy process in the PTF. Therefore, any definition of the SA Army's role and functions would be followed by a closely correlated allocation of tasks between the full-time and part-time forces, part of which would be the establishment of a very specific ratio of strengths as regards both manpower and units of each force.

SIZE

Undoubtedly the PTF rationalisation process will involve amalgamations and/or disbandments of existing units and the creation of new ones to ensure a better geographic/ethnic spread; it might also have to incorporate a systematic culture creation programme, to introduce and popularise the concept of part-time military service to the black population at large. If this process is to succeed and for the sake of the common good, it must not only succeed but must do so in the shortest time possible the SANDF will have to learn from past errors. A deliberate and specific review by experts to plan and reconstruct the PTF system is not a simple task.

TYPE OF TRAINING

The training now given to SAIC members would certainly have to change considerably. The question should be viewed from two perspectives:

• Overall training policy, ie whether all infantry units should be trained (and thus structured) as mechanised battalions which would be optional, but not necessarily crucial.
  
  

• The nature and methods of such training, given the requirements of maximum localisation and the requirements of an all-volunteer force; such a rethink would be mandatory.

THE INTEGRATION OF FORMATIONS

Serious questions should be asked at this point about whether the present separation of formations and territorial commands still applies, or whether it would make more sense to re-unite them. One option foresees the following situation:

a) Each province would constitute a territorial command.

b) Each territorial command would include a volunteer PTF organisation comprising:

• a PTF headquarters;
  
  

• a part-time manoeuvre formation (a division, brigade or combat group, as per circumstances), trained and structured (although not necessarily equipped) for conventional warfare; and
  
  

• an equally substantial territorial defence formation (essentially the successor to the present Comdo/RAPU force).

c) Full-time conventional units would remain under the direct control of the chief of the SANDF, regardless of their location, but each battalion in a particular command should be directly associated with the training and organisation of the particular PTF units of that command/province.

Such a development would certainly benefit PTF units in terms of localisation of effort, as discussed previously. Political factors would exert a strong influence on such changes. For example, restructuring the PTF along provincial or other territorial command lines would provide an important opportunity to pacify regional sentiments; on the other hand, such a restructuring could encourage secessionist sentiment.

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INFANTRY FORCE

There are two options available in the event of a decision to reconstruct the infantry force on the Cardwell-Childers-Esher-Haldane principles. One option is to reconstruct the PTF only. The other is to reconstruct the entire infantry force, both full-time and part-time. Both these options appear to be viable, and are discussed below.

Option 1: Cardwell and the total infantry force

A CLASSIC CARDWELL STRUCTURE

In this scenario the existing PF battalions would be turned into localised and suitably named regiments, each consisting of one or more full-time battalions and three or even four part-time infantry regiments located in the command or provincial area. They would then operate along general Cardwell-Haldane principles. In peacetime, for example, such a regiment might function as follows:

• The 1st (PF) Battalion would perform border patrol and/or external/internal peace-keeping/peacemaking duties.
  
  

• The 2nd (PF) Battalion would train recruits, feed the 1st Battalion and conduct training for the PTF regiments.
  
  

• The PTF battalions would train under the aegis of their regimental depots, and supply organised manpower when and as necessary. Each would have its own regimental district within the command area.

An alternative arrangement could be to have only one PF battalion and a larger number of PTF battalions. Once again, questions of numbers and administrative arrangements between the full-time and part-time components would be determined according to the local circumstances. This concept is not necessarily easy to implement, but would certainly promote co-operation between full-time and part-time elements as well as part-time training. It would be affected by:

• The belief in the full-time army that a strong regimental system will work in the PTF but not the FTF. This is not based on known solid evidence, and flies in the face of experience in other countries; it is probably little more than another hangover (its origins now forgotten) from the era when anything smacking of British practice was frowned on in the PF. Nevertheless, it is a strong belief which would have to be considered.
  
  

• A reluctance by many PTF units to work in close conjunction with the PF the result of the long-standing and lamentable lack of identification between the full-time and part-time units therefore, marketing it to these units would have to enjoy a high priority.

Option 2: reorganising the PTF infantry only

Placing the CF and Comdo/RAPU force on a multi-battalion regimental system footing à la Cardwell should proceed with caution; as the experiences of Regiment Westelike Provincie/Regiment Boland and the Transvaal Scottish show, the multi-battalion regiment system in its classic form, for all its simplicity and proven efficiency, is not a magic formula that can be applied successfully without regard for circumstances. A flexible dispensation would have to be designed to cater for the widely varying conditions in various parts of the country, the long-established single-battalion usage, and the nature of the future PTF itself.

A Cardwell-style process, even when handled with delicacy and sympathy, could be extremely painful, leading inevitably to morale and organisational problems in established part-time units, which tend to be fiercely individualistic and much more protective of their particular usages than any PF regiment, and yet will in future have to depend only on volunteers. There might be cases where multi-battalion units are not practical, for one reason or another, such as low population density. The parameters within which reconstitution should take place will also have to be carefully considered. The reconstitution of the PTF has been discussed since the 1994 general election, but as yet there has not been much innovative thinking on how this should be done and the key word here is `innovative'.

Reconstitution should not be merely an expansion of the existing part-time service system. This means that it cannot be accomplished by simply recruiting large numbers of people of colour into the existing PTF. The PTF system developed along certain lines because it was designed to cater for a category of people who were relatively homogeneous as far as culture and outlook were concerned, ie whites. Since 1912 it has not been significantly redesigned, partly because its basic functional form was not affected by the entry of substantial numbers of people of colour who have not shared the cultural and linguistic background of whites. Very few blacks were absorbed into the PTF, except in some Transvaal Comdo units, as a result of which the existing part-time service culture is thought not to be an established part of black community life.

In addition, the new PTF will be made up of many different military-cultural strands. Its members could be drawn from the old PTF; Umkhonto weSizwe; Apla; elements of the TBVC forces; forces of the former autonomous homelands; and former members of `Self-Defence Units' and `Self-Protection Units'. People who traditionally were outside the `statutory' part-time service culture may not wish to be drawn into existing units; this could apply particularly to former members of the liberation movements, whose military wings have a developmental history as long, or longer, than some `statutory' units.

In addition, no research has yet been done into whether the traditional attractions of part-time service are the same in the black as in the white community. Handled correctly, all this can be an advantage, and a phenomenon that fits into revising long-standing South African military practice. Traditionally, South African CF, but not Comdo, units have been allowed a fairly free hand as regards such things as uniforms, badges and customs reflecting their diverse backgrounds the rationale being that anything contributing to a strong unit identity and team spirit was an aid to operational efficiency. This diversity should also be the rule in the future PTF.

The new PTF will have to serve several purposes besides its primary military and military support tasks. The essence of an all-volunteer PTF is that each unit must be located within the community it serves, and from which it will draw its recruits. The future PTF will find itself drawn into community upliftment work of various types. At the same time, the future PTF will have to be structured to bring units and individuals of different cultural backgrounds together in a common cause. The unsegregated units of the United States Army that fought in Korea laid the foundation for the later general desegregation of American society; similarly, the steady desegregation of the SA Army from the mid-1970s onwards a process that was often ahead of what was happening in other government organisations played a role in the relative ease of general desegregation in later years. This implies that the system itself must be wholly or partly redesigned to answer to new conditions and urgent social imperatives which were not crucial to the previous dispensation.

Allied to these new requirements is the unavoidable need for speed. Experience has shown that PTF regiments usually take years or even decades to develop fully, learning lessons about themselves, their corporate identity and their internal management by empirical or `bash-your-head' methods which cannot be taught in formal training courses, because each unit is unique. Unfortunately the new PTF will not have decades or even years to spend on an empirical learning process. The initial `shake-down' period including the introduction and popularisation of the part-time service concept in black communities will have to be short, so that the more serious restructuring problems can be addressed. The requirement is to institute a system in which the empirical experience accumulated in the past 150 years can be systematically applied to pre-empting problems before they occur. Total success is unlikely to be achieved in this regard, but it is realistic to expect that the initial processes can be substantially smoothed out and shortened. In the long term, the benefit will be that solid relationships will have been forged during the initial stages which can then serve as a foundation for greater enterprises.

For this reason, two alternatives are discussed below, each based on the Cardwell-Childers-Haldane concept but incorporating certain modifications in line with South African conditions. Both these alternatives resemble the brigade system previously used to group the conventional element of the part-time forces or the existing Comdo groups, but in both cases with the adoption of a single regimental identity. The first is the classic multi-battalion regiment, closely modelled on the Cardwell-Childers-Haldane system but adapted to South African conditions and the nature of the local infantry force. The second is what might be called the administrative regiment, similar to the multi-battalion regiment in structure and internal functioning but composed of a number of single-battalion regiments that retain their specific identities.

Multi-battalion regiments

In this scenario, a multi-battalion regiment is created out of existing CF and Comdo units as well as newly established ones, where circumstances favour this option instead of an administrative regiment dispensation. The battalions would all adopt a new identity based on the regiment. All units would be non-racial, and the best possible mix of available key personnel and new volunteers. It would be organised as follows:

REGIMENTAL DISTRICT

The regiment would be assigned a specific regimental district or recruiting area within the command/provincial area determined according to factors such as population density, historical/traditional boundaries, etc from which it would recruit its members.

THE REGIMENTAL DEPOT

The regimental depot would be located at some suitable point in the regimental district, either separate from the regiment's components at one of the battalion headquarters, or at an available SANDF training base, depending on the premises available. It would consist of two parts:

Regimental headquarters, consisting of the honorary colonel or `colonel of the regiment' (see below), the regimental archives and museum, and the officers' and sergeants' messes.

The regimental depot itself, commanded full-time by a suitable officer, either FTF or PTF, supported by some permanent staff (similar to the small PF organisation of the previous Brigade Headquarters), who would be tasked to:

a) handle all regimental administration except matters of concern to the individual battalions only;

b) assist with training; and

c) help to man not only of the operational battalions, but also of any composite unit/sub-unit that might be raised.

OPERATIONAL BATTALIONS

There would be two, three or even four operational battalions headquartered separately or together, according to the premises available which would concentrate on being operationally available. Each such battalion could consist of:

• a battalion headquarters;
  
  

• a support company;
  
  

• three rifle companies;
  
  

• a reserve company, consisting of time-expired members who still maintain a connection with the battalion although they are not fully active; and
  
  

• a `junior soldier' company, whose members either belong to local school cadet detachments or are recruited from all parts of the regimental district.

SERVICE BATTALION

This would consist of nothing more than the skeleton of a battalion literally no more than a name, a regimental colour, dress regulations and basic standing orders, all of it lodged in a filing cabinet at the regimental depot which would be held in suspended animation in case the need for a further battalion should arise, for example as a composite battalion of the regiment.

Administrative regiments

This scenario strongly resembles that of the classic multi-battalion, with the exception that the constituent units would all be existing single-battalion CF battalions, Comdos or new units formed in former black areas, for example, which would maintain their own identities but form part of an `administrative regiment' with a distinctive, all-inclusive name for example, the `1st Western Cape Volunteers' for a grouping located in one Western Cape area. Such a regiment would be organised into a regimental district, depot and operation battalions similar to that for the multi-battalion regiment.

The service battalion would be a skeleton unit, as for the multi-battalion regiment, the only difference being that it would bear the name of the administrative regiment. Thus, if an administrative regiment named `1st Western Cape Volunteers' fielded a composite service battalion made up of elements of its constituent units, the battalion would be termed `1st Battalion, 1st Western Cape Volunteers'.

An alliance of this kind would provide a flexible system, allowing participating units to maintain their own identity and customs while still permitting cross-pollination and all the other benefits of the classic multi-battalion regiment. It is almost identical to the concept underlying the present Comdo group. The potential benefits to a new-era PTF of establishing a series of such administrative regiments, with one or two well-established units playing the mentor or `elder brother' to two or three younger or newly established units, is obvious.

It would answer the requirement of flexibility. The alliance could be of any suitable length, ie it could be short-term, lasting until the younger or new regiments decided to hive off on their own, or it could become a permanent one if all the participants wished it to do so.

It could even result in a hybrid arrangement, with participating regiments having more than one battalion, so that it would combine the virtues of the multi-battalion regiment with those of the administrative battalion system. This system could be taken to lower levels as well, to cater for rural situations where time, distance and sparse populations are significant factors. In this scenario there would be a widely scattered network of companies, each with its own `company district' and small, independent units, but under the `ownership' of a single-battalion regiment located at a central point.

Advantages

The advantages of such an arrangement would include the following:

• Financial benefits: Money would be saved in a multi-battalion regiment situation in which two or three battalions wore the same cap badge and other distinctive uniform items, but enjoyed a combined general administration system.
  
  

• Enhancement of activities: Lessening the burden of common administration (by means of the regimental depot) would enable the participant units in both scenarios to make maximum use of their non-continuous service time for training and related activities.
  
  

• Healthy competition: Healthy competition would be engendered between the participating units, which would result in enhanced operational efficiency.
  
  

• Sharing of facilities/resources: Headquarters and/or training facilities would be more intensively and evenly utilised (see also the section on `switch units' below).
  
  

• Sharing of expertise: Such a system would result in the sharing not only of technical knowledge but also empirical knowledge about running an effective part-time unit, with new or young units picking up the tricks of the trade from the more established units.
  
  

• Nation-building: It would encourage nation-building, because it would bring battalions and individuals from different backgrounds together while maintaining the unitcommunity link that is so vital in an all-volunteer force.
  
  

• Simplified training: It would simplify training and in many cases shorten `away time' by allowing intensive short courses (or some phases of courses) to be presented at the regimental depot, employing visiting instructors from the appropriate institutions, backed up by local based PTF instructors. The academic aspects of a given course could be taught at a regimental depot, followed by a practical phase at institutions such as the School for Infantry the Army Battle School. But the greatest advantage would be that volunteer recruits could be prepared for basic training. The regimental depot could also be used for providing non-continuous training for recruits, in the event of a system that allows for shorter training periods than the existing 12-month VMS system.
  
  

• Coherent composite units: It would enable the easy formation of coherent volunteer composite units.
  
  

• Force reductions: It would be easier to maintain inherent capacity, as participant battalions of a given regiment could be placed in suspended animation rather than being disbanded thus making it easier to re-expand in the event of emergencies or better times or a battalion could be reduced to, say, company strength and attached to the remaining full-strength battalion as a fourth company pro tem.

PART 4: UTILISING MULTI-BATTALION AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGIMENTS

The multi-battalion/administrative regiment concept would result in an extremely flexible yet cost-efficient structure for the PTF infantry; two possible examples are discussed below.

`Switch units'

Under the switch unit system, every slot in the landward defence machine would be occupied by at least two battalions drawn from the same regiment one on `active status', and the other on `inactive status' with the two battalions exchanging roles annually according to a laid-down schedule. The entire regiment could even be allocated the task of filling the one operational battalion slot. The system would operate as follows:

Regiment X, a typical multi-battalion regiment, would consist of, inter alia, a regimental depot and two operational battalions, the latter exchanging roles on 1 January every year. Thus in any given year one of Regiment X's operational battalions would be on active duty status, meaning that:

• it carries out scheduled non-continuous training on week-nights and at weekends;
  
  

• it stages an annual training camp; and
  
  

• it is on a 72-hour standby for operational service in case of a nationwide mobilisation.

In the meantime, Regiment X's other operational battalion or battalions is or are on inactive duty status, meaning that:

• it carries out scheduled non-continuous training;
  
  

• selected members attend advanced or conversion training, either at the regimental depot or elsewhere;
  
  

• selected officers and non-commissioned officers attend promotion courses;
  
  

• it is on stand-by to provide a limited number of sub-units manned by personnel other than the special or course trainees above, in case of sudden unrest or civil disasters;
  
  

• it carries out ceremonial duties, if required to do so; and
  
  

• it is on 144-hour stand-by in case the PTF is mobilised nationally.

Both employers and employees would benefit, since employees would only spend long periods away every second year no small consideration, in an all-volunteer PTF. If based on rotation between three battalions, ie one battalion on active duty and two battalions on inactive duty status in any one year, this would be even better for recruiting volunteers. In the case of an administrative regiment the same scenario would apply, except that the switch units would be allied single-battalion regiments instead of two (or three) battalions of the same regiment.

There is a third alternative that takes a leaf out of Cardwell's book as originally conceived, and that may be a preferable option in some circumstances. In this scenario, Regiment X's 1st Battalion is permanently on active status, while the 2nd Battalion is permanently inactive and acts as a feeder and training unit for new recruits.

COMPOSITE BATTALIONS

If suitably structured à la Cardwell, PTF units could provide an suitably institutionalised composite battalion system, instead of ad hoc arrangements.

• A certain number of members of the depot and each operational battalion (serving or battalion reserve) would be authorised to belong to a `Ready Component', ie, they would sign 12-month contracts under which they receive a monthly tax-free bounty in return for being available at short notice for external service.
  
  

• Any of the battalions which contributes at least one company of volunteers to the composite battalion would be entitled to any campaign honours awarded to that service battalion. The campaign honours would also be borne on the battalion's own colour.

This regimental system could be used with flexibility to address almost any situation in an effective way. In one scenario, the entire regiment simply goes on to a war footing. The regimental depot mobilises its `rats and mice' and begins to function at full capacity. The operational battalions are called up for continuous service and deployed as circumstances require, and the service battalion is activated if and as required to start preparing reserves and reliefs.

In a second scenario, one of two things could happen:

• Whichever of the two operational units is on active duty status is mobilised, any last-minute personnel shortages being plugged by means of drafts/transfers from either the inactive battalion or the regimental depot personnel, or both; or
  
  

• The service (composite) battalion is activated and manned with drafts from the two operational battalions and the regimental depot, allowing time (in the event of a long deployment) to further prepare 100 percent replacements for continued service.

In a third scenario, the composite battalion is activated as above, except that it is manned by members of the `Ready Component' serving in the various components, as well as by any inactive regimental reservists who decide to volunteer when the activation is announced.

Such an arrangement would not only be cost-effective, but profitable to the regiment and the SA Army alike:

• There would be no gaps in the army's conventional deployment, which could lead to under-strength units or ones with unqualified personnel in some posts.
  
  

• In the case of a composite-unit scenario, the `shake-down' period would be shorter and more effective, because leader groups and many of the lower ranks would be familiar with one another, and would all share in a common regimental culture.
  
  

• With several manpower sources available to provide personnel, it would be comparatively easy to provide full manning.
  
  

• The volunteer service battalion could be activated annually, or even twice a year, for periods of several months without causing undue `employer fatigue'.
  
  

• Welfare of next of kin would be easier to manage, because it could be done in an orderly and consolidated way.
  
  

• All the units would benefit from a consolidated infusion of fresh operational experience which they could absorb and re-work in an orderly fashion, to their advantage and ultimately that of the SANDF.
  
  

• The bonds between the component regiments/battalions would be strengthened as a result of their joint service.

PREREQUISITES FOR PROPER FUNCTIONING

The proper conditions must be created to allow such a system to function properly. The main ones appear to be the following:

Choice of system

The flexibility of the proposed system must be exploited to the full by allowing various units (and intended units) to pick the system, or variations thereof, that would suit their requirements best; the choice might vary from one regimental district to the next, depending on the circumstances. The most sensible way to handle this process would be to allow the choice to emerge from negotiations between existing units and designated Comdo groups or new units yet to be created, leading to voluntary alliances or regimental mergers.

Regimental districts/recruiting areas

The allocation of clearly defined regimental districts or recruiting areas would be crucial. This is not simply a reflection of Cardwell's thinking; the allocation of recruiting areas was a mainstay of the South African part-time regiments in the days before national service. In that era, each regiment had a specific recruiting area allocated to it, to which it was linked by virtue of its name and place in the community. This system was destroyed during the national service era by allocating ex-national servicemen to PTF units on a seemingly haphazard basis which often left, say, a regiment headquartered in Cape Town with half its members located anywhere from Johannesburg and Durban to Windhoek and Upington. This approach might have worked during the era of compulsory service, but it would not be acceptable in an all-volunteer force.

Ease of inter-unit transfers

Transfers between the regiment's components would have to be made as easy as movements within a battalion, rather than requiring that they be routed through the local formation and Army HQ a cumbersome and necessarily time-consuming process. Regimental transfers should only require an administrative directive, and be accomplished by a system in terms of which all personnel were listed on the regimental depot's nominal roll instead of that of the participant units, making a transfer a simple, speedy paper transaction.

The way to protect this system from abuse would be to ensure that the participant units' commanders retained the right to approve transfers into and out of their units, ie the depot commander would work with their consent; or alternatively by a requirement that transfers would have to be cleared ex post facto by the local command or formation. The point behind this is that it would allow the unit to be composed of the best available volunteers for the task, chosen out of the full regimental complement.

The honorary colonel/`Colonel of the Regiment' system

The present honorary colonel system could play a dynamic and indeed vital role in making the system function at full efficiency, provided that incumbents were people of the right background and experience, were suitably empowered, and were then placed in a position to exert the weight of their experience and connections. At present many PTF honorary colonels are what their name applies, namely figureheads often with little or no military experience appointed for sentimental reasons or because they are thought to have influence which they can exert on behalf of the unit.

However, the honorary-colonel system could be turned into a dynamic instrument with the stroke of a pen. Although they may no longer be active as commanders, many former senior PF and PTF senior officers still have a great deal to contribute. In this connexion, it is worth examining the British approach to their multi-battalion system. Unlike the situation in South Africa, it is not the honorary colonel but the colonel-in-chief who is the influential figurehead; the `colonel of the regiment' (the term `honorary colonel' is not used) has specific powers and plays an extremely active role in the affairs of the regiment concerned.

Each battalion (but particularly units still to be established) could have an experienced honorary colonel, preferably a previous commander, to assist a newly appointed battalion commander the operational `boss' with non-operational matters.

Facilities

Present practice in the United States and Great Britain, and experience in South Africa before national service, indicates that part-time regiments must have adequate permanent headquarters if they are to function properly. The provision of such facilities, or the re-allocation of existing facilities, would have to enjoy priority attention in the reconstruction of the PTF, which has experienced serious neglect in this regard in the past. As a result, many PTF units are housed in ways that are unsuited to their future activities, particularly the weekend training which plays such an important role in an all-volunteer force. An added problem is a lack of maintenance and a total lack of security of tenure, which vitiates any motivation to improve and maintain the premises.

Yet another problem is that PTF headquarters are not always located in their recruiting areas, thereby making it very difficult for them to interact with local communities. The ideal would be to return to the system of providing a headquarters/training facility ('drill hall' in our parlance, `armoury' in the United States Army), either a purpose-built one, or one that conforms to certain minimum requirements. Classically, a drill hall is a purpose-designed building, permanently assigned to a unit or units, consisting of a substantial hall with adjoining administrative offices, stores, messes, armouries and cooking facilities.

The drill hall generally has several important characteristics. Firstly, it is located in the community in which the regiment recruits its members. Secondly, it provides a facility in which after-hours/after-dark training could be carried out in all weathers; serves as a regimental headquarters; and acts as a mobilisation facility/operational base if needed.

Drill halls in South Africa like those in Great Britain and the United States not only provide a venue for purely military activities, but also invariably became community centres of a kind as well, because in normal times the occupying units would only need them on certain week-nights and at weekends. Typically the hall, grounds and kitchen of the average drill hall would be used (in return for a donation to the regimental fund) for wedding receptions, dances, community fairs, concerts, prize-givings, carnivals, exhibitions, lectures and mass meetings of various kinds; on more than one occasion they were also pressed into use for emergency services such as casualty stations in the event of a disaster (a drill hall might also be suitable for use as a Regimental Depot). If the complex is large enough, it can serve several units. The provision and use of drill halls could be a major factor linking the regiment to a community.

Similar duties

It would be essential, in a Cardwell-Haldane scenario, for battalions of a multi-battalion regiment to fall under the same local command and control structure, and to be of the same type ie, conventional infantry or RAPU infants. For example, the system would not work properly if, say, half of a multi-battalion regiment were `owned' by the local brigade and the other half by the local territorial command; nor would it work if units of different corps were grouped into an administrative regiment. Flexibility of choice and application would be of cardinal importance in implementing any system.

Whatever the disadvantages, there can be little doubt that the overall application of the Cardwell-Haldane principles to the entire infantry force would be cost-effective, and could also succeed in reshaping a key element of the future SANDF along the lines of a system with a proven record of success.

SUMMARY

There appears to be a prima facie case for applying Cardwell-style reforms to the SA Infantry Corps, either to the PTF only or to the entire infantry force. There is no overwhelming reason why such a reconstruction could or should not take place. There certainly is no reason to doubt the value of the regimental system as developed in the British Army over the years. Such an application could be largely based on existing assets and institutions, either using them as is or adapting them to the changed circumstances.

It would be necessary to formulate a `cocktail' of applications to allow flexibility in application. Implementation would have to be handled with tact and diplomacy. Finally, the basic needs of the PTF as regards facilities, etc, would have to be satisfied.

A current saying in the SANDF is that one should not attempt to reinvent the wheel. It certainly applies in the above case, seeing that the wheel in question has been turning easily for 120 years and shows no signs of coming off the axle. The key to the entire exercise is flexible thinking and unselfish, intellectually honest implementation.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

David Ascoli, A Companion to the British Army, 1660-1983, London, Harrap, 1983.

Christopher Chant, Handbook of the British Army, London, Routledge, 1988.

Captain R J Bouch (ed), Infantry in South Africa, Pretoria, Documentation Services SADF, 1977.

Anthony Beevor, Inside the British Army, London, Corgi Books, 1990.

Oxford Illustrated Dictionary, 1962 edition.

H H Curson, Regimental Devices in South Africa, 1783-1954, Pretoria, 1954.

Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa, Cape Town, Nasou, 1965.

The Gordon Highlanders, Standing Orders.

Francis Coleman, The Kaffrarian Rifles 1876-1986, East London, The Kaffrarian Rifles Association, 1988.

C T Binns, The Last Zulu King, London, Longmans, 1963.

Various local and foreign publications.

Various personal accounts.