Illegal Weapons Proliferation in Swaziland

Swaziland is not a supply country for weapons nor is it an end-user to the extent that South Africa is. It has, instead, acted largely as a transit country as weapons have moved from Mozambique through Swaziland, with which it shares a border, into the provinces of South Africa. The end of the war in Mozambique saw an upsurge in the number of weapons seized by the Swazi police, many of which initially were AK-47 assault rifles though later, from 1994 onwards, handguns appeared. However, in comparison to the number of weapons being seized by South African police along borders with Mozambique, the number of illicit weapons seized by the Swazi police is very small. It seems that there could be two possible hypotheses: either poor policing of border areas is allowing large numbers of weapons to pass through Swaziland or the number of weapons being moved through is smaller than estimated. Oosthuysen, however, disagrees with the latter hypothesis, stating, "[t]he route from Mozambique through Swaziland into KwaZulu-Natal has been one of the largest (if not the largest) smuggling route for illegal weapons into South Africa ...".1 Swazi authorities acknowledge that Swaziland was at one time the major transit route into KwaZulu-Natal, but claim that, with the opening of the Kosi Bay border post between Mozambique and the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal, this trafficking has subsided.

Many weapons, in passing through Swaziland, ‘fell off the truck’ and were absorbed into that country, which previously had enjoyed relatively low levels of crime and violence, little of which was gun-related. The exception for Swaziland is the murder rate, which is the highest reported rate per 100 000 among reporting countries, at almost 80 murders per 100 000 people compared to 64 per 100 000 in South Africa and less than 15 per 100 000 in Botswana.2 However traditionally few of these murders have been committed with firearms. Now, anecdotal evidence suggests that the presence of cattle rustlers armed with assault rifles has changed a traditional way of life, increasing rural dwellers’ fear of victimisation and convincing some that it is necessary to obtain a weapon to protect themselves, their families, homes and livestock from well-armed adversaries. Answering questions posed to them by enumerators, rural-dwellers indicated that they had felt safer before 1992: currently they feared cattle rustlers and ‘bandits’ armed with guns and had responded by barricading themselves in their homes at night and considering purchasing firearms.3 Another respondent, a police officer on duty at the Tikhuba police post bordering Mozambique, also commented on the changing nature of life in Swaziland, as a consequence of independence in Mozambique: "[C]rime is going up. There is much more armed robbery using AK-47s which have entered the [country] illegally. The Swazi police get many reports on AK-47s being traded at the fence on the border, but the reporting is not accurate and by the time the police are informed, it is too late."4

Table 1 - Arms Seizures in Swaziland 1994-1997

Type of weapon	1994	1995	1996	1997 (trough October)
Handguns	53	62	46	77
Shotguns	9	20	12	12
Ak-47 rifles	20	10	29	8
Other rifles	17	6	6	3
Rocket launcers	-	2	-	-
Landmines	-	-	1	1
FI bombs		-	1	-
Total	99	100	95	100

Firearms Control

The possession of firearms in Swaziland is regulated by the 1964 act which permits a civilian to own a firearm. However, the licensing procedure system is based on a tribal system, according to which an applicant must obtain a licence application from the police station but ask the approval of the village elders to validate the licence. Once issued, the owner is required to renew the licence annually. In practice, a lack of manpower and automation make this provision difficult to enforce.

In 1996 and 1997 approximately 1 000 firearm licences were issued by the Royal Swazi Police (RSP) (see Table 2). The cumulative totals show that Swaziland currently has approximately 11 200 registered firearms in the country, for a population of less than one million (see Table 3). Of these licensed firearms, about 73 per cent are shotguns and rifles. The theft of firearms from licensed owners also increases the number of illicit weapons in the country, although accounting for only a small percentage.

Table 2 - Firearms Registered for 1996-1997

Type of Firearm	1996	1997
Shotguns	397	283
Rifles	82	67
Pistols	117	73
Revolvers	27	12
Total	623	435

 Table 3 — Total Registered Firearms 1995-1997

Type of Firearm	1995	1996	1997
Rifles	2 217	2 299	2 366
Shotguns	5 056	5 453	5 736
Revolvers	667	694	706
Pistols	2 101	2 218	2 291
Combinations	41
Miscellaneous	53
Total	10 135	10 664	11 099

Source: Royal Swaziland Police and G Oosthuysen, Small Arms in Southern Africa, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1996, p. 67.

The various steps that must be taken in Swaziland to acquire a firearm make the legislation and registration process quite sound. The annual licensing process, in which the firearm must be presented to the local police commander, also maintains a fairly accurate count of licensed firearms. However, as in other developing countries, Swaziland has limited computer infrastructure and much of the licensing paperwork is done by hand — a process that is both time-consuming and potentially less effective than a computerised central register of all firearm owners and registered firearms.

Swaziland and its neighbours have recognised the need for a regional approach in combating weapons trafficking in the region, combined with enhanced national action. For this reason, in the years since the end of the civil war in Mozambique and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, various steps have been taken by Swazi officials to reduce the number of weapons transiting through (as well as staying in) Swaziland. At a regional level, Swaziland, South Africa and Mozambique have signed a Tripartite Co-operation Agreement which provides for information sharing between the members of arms smuggling routes and organisations.

In addition, the Umbuto Swaziland Defence Force (USDF) and the South African National Defence Force co-operate on an ad hoc basis, as do the respective police forces, in co-ordinating activities and sharing information on smugglers and smuggling routes. Co-operation with Mozambique is also increasing, as that country tackles corruption within its security forces and makes a concerted effort to reduce the number of weapons in the country and those which leave Mozambique for neighbouring countries. In addition to the Tri-partite Agreement, the three countries work together through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its sub-committees, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), which is a sub-organisation of the ISDSC.

The ISDSC is a forum in which ministers of member countries responsible for defence, home affairs, public security and state security meet to discuss issues relevant to national and regional security. Within its Public Security sub-committee, members are encouraged to exchange experience and information on issues related to public security, including arms trafficking. SARPCCO presents a forum in which police commissioners from eleven Southern African countries (including Angola, Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa) can meet to discuss issues related to the effective functioning of their duties. The organisation encourages the sharing of information and joint monitoring of cross border crime, critical elements of the increased co-operation amongst Swaziland, Mozambique and South Africa, leading to improved effectiveness in combating arms smuggling along their respective borders.

Internally, Swaziland has increased the co-ordination between its national defence and police forces to provide better border control and secure borders and crossing points. As is the case in other countries with less human resource capacity, Swaziland does not have within its police structure a unit which specifically handles arms trafficking-related issues. For the present, arms trafficking incidences are investigated by officers within the murder and robbery unit of the police force. While the police are responsible for investigating cases related to arms smuggling, the defence force is responsible for patrolling the border and apprehending suspects, who are then transferred into police custody.

Countries in Southern Africa have been forced to respond to the upsurge in arms proliferation that followed the advent of peace in Mozambique. Initially, the deleterious effects thousands of poorly controlled weapons could have on the region simply were not realised by policy makers. Of necessity, therefore, actions have been reactive rather than proactive. Many of the steps taken have been highly successful, including the joint operations between South Africa and Mozambique (Operations Rachel) and the sharing of information among regional partners. The weapons, however, continue to be shifted across borders. While the numbers leaving Mozambique have perhaps decreased, the number in the region has, in all probability, remained stable or increased. Thus there remains a need to improve existing controls and develop additional, effective, regional ones that can be implemented nationally, or through regional co-operation, in order to combat not only cross-border smuggling, but also the internal circulation of weapons, as well as the importation of additional arms into the region.

There are key elements which must be initiated for long-term, effective control over weapons diffusion in the region to take place. Discussions with Swazi authorities have identified those which are particularly relevant to that country, which are presented below. However it is important to recognise that many of the elements are equally relevant to South Africa and Mozambique, and indeed other countries in the region and further afield.7

National Initiatives

The lack of infrastructure and resources has hampered efforts by Swazi authorities to gain control over weapons smugglers using routes through the country to move weapons from Mozambique into South Africa. Enhanced co-ordination between police and defence forces, however, has been a nominal cost response that has had significant benefits. Further improvements could include the verification of existing statistics on firearm licensing, use of firearms in criminal activities, cases of cross-border smuggling, losses and thefts from civilians and members of the security forces, followed by an assessment of whether the existing data collection methods and the types of information collected are sufficient for the needs of the country and for possible sharing regionally.

With regards to civilian possession of firearms, Swazi officials have suggested that a review could be made of penalties for possessing an unlicensed firearm to determine whether existing legislation is stringent enough. Additionally, improving training and education among gun owners on safe use and storage of their firearm could potentially reduce the number of lost and stolen weapons in the country.

Regional Initiatives

As the diffusion of weapons from Mozambique into the sub-region has graphically shown, the proliferation of arms cannot be contained nationally nor can neighbouring countries ignore understaffed and undersupplied departments and porous neighbouring borders. Thus, while actions are taken nationally to assess and address the control of weapons, concomitant regional initiatives should be discussed and implemented to provide a further tier of control.

Central to increasing regional co-ordination is the building of networks between ministries and departments and between functionaries. Southern Africa has already developed these interactions, although some have originated through ad hoc arrangements and mechanisms, and through the existing structures of SADC, the ISDSC and SARPCCO.

Swazi officials have identified practical steps that could be taken in addition to those already in place. These include:

Development of a regional information centre which would provide access to information on known arms smugglers, routes and methods used, etc., plus a monitoring function that would allow continual updating of information;



Sharing of other relevant information among intelligence agencies in the region;



Development of a database of stolen weapons that could be accessed by police services in the region;



Combined operations by security forces along borders and into countries (similar to that done by Operation Rachel exercises);



Co-ordination between customs officials in neighbouring countries;



Enhancing the function of SADC and ISDSC on issues related to weapons smuggling (perhaps giving SADC the responsibility for promoting the issue at the political level, while the ISDSC addresses issues of planning and implementation);



Increasing the ability of joint operations to respond quickly to intelligence and the utilisation of standardised equipment (radios on the same frequencies, for example); and



Considering discussions on the eventual regional sharing of information on stocks of weapons held by national security forces.

It would be unrealistic to expect any of these actions taken unilaterally, or even in combination, to halt the smuggling of weapons in the sub-region. The smugglers will, in all probability, always be one step ahead of the security forces, as their livelihood depends on the smuggling of commodities. However, by developing these controls and increasing regional integration on an issue of common concern, steps can be taken towards combating the problem and reducing, perhaps significantly, the amount of weaponry moving around the region.