In the previous chapter it was argued that the main reasons for the growth in vigilantism in recent years have been rising crime, together with poor perceptions about the ability of the criminal justice system to respond, and inadequate delivery of services by the police and courts. However as the survey evidence showed, these perceptions are held by many if not most South Africans. Yet, available evidence does not show that vigilantism is supported by a majority of people and is certainly not practiced by most South Africans.

This raises the question of why vigilantism has arisen and grown to the extent that it has in certain parts of the country and not in others.

Although no comprehensive study has been undertaken that investigates all known vigilante groups in an attempt to answer this question, one explanation is that vigilantism, at its most basic, is about an organised, localised, non-state response to a particular problem or set of problems that arise in a specific place and point in time. As such, it is most likely to occur in those communities which have a strong degree of social cohesion, common values and shared identity.67 Of course, these communities would also need to be facing the crime problems and the perceived or real lack of service from the criminal justice system described in Chapter 2.

This argument can quite easily be applied to an organisation like Pagad, which draws its membership largely from the Muslim community in the Cape Town area, and operates in a fairly closed and tight-knit manner, often drawing on fundamentalist slogans.68 Indeed, this explanation would also help to understand the origins of Mapogo-a-Mathamaga (referred to as 'Mapogo' here) in a very different rural community in the Northern Province.

However, Mapogo has in many ways outgrown this explanation for why vigilantism may flourish in one community over another. The clearest evidence is that it has become a formal organisation with an established client base who pay for the service that Mapogo provides—the arrest and punishment of alleged criminals and the deterrent effect that these activities are intended to ensure. In doing so, the organisation has achieved that which no other similar structure has done: a growing and diverse membership that crosses the urban and rural divide, as well as the race and class divide. In South Africa—where these fault lines have characterised and split the country for more than a century—this is not to be underestimated.

Indeed, it is this achievement that makes Mapogo both a fascinating case study, but also a more serious threat to the new democracy in South Africa than other similar organisations. Mapogo was chosen as the case study for this monograph for exactly these reasons. The organisation:

This chapter begins with an overview of the Northern Province where Mapogo originated. The overview covers the demographics of the province and trends in policing and crime. The latter have been widely cited as the key reasons for the wide support for Mapogo in the Northern Province. The chapter then covers the origins of Mapogo, its methods and areas of operation, the reasons why people support the organisation, and the relationships between Mapogo and various stakeholders in the province, including government. Finally, the chapter tries to explain Mapogo's success.

Overview of the Northern Province

Mapogo originates in the Northern Province, which is not only South Africa's second poorest province, but also an area with high unemployment and illiteracy rates. In addition, the province is largely rural and does not have the benefit of an efficient and well resourced provincial police service. While the province undoubtedly ranks as one of the most disadvantaged in the country in terms of these indicators, the same does not apply with regard to crime levels. The Northern Province has the lowest recorded crime rate of all the provinces in South Africa. These trends—which have a bearing on the phenomenon of vigilantism—are reviewed below.

Demographic profile

The Northern Province has an estimated total population of 4 929 368 people living in an 123 280km2 area. The vast majority of the population (88%) reside in rural areas where traditional leaders still wield influence in justice matters.69 Unemployment is rife, estimated at 41%, which is second only to the Eastern Cape province where 41.4% of people are unemployed. The per capita income is the lowest in the country,70 and over 50% of the population earn less than R500 per month.71 The illiteracy rate is also high with nearly half of the population (49%) without schooling or with only some primary schooling, and only 14% completing their schooling.72

All these factors arguably create a climate conducive to the growth of vigilantism because people living in the province will struggle to gain access to the police and courts. They are likely to have a limited understanding of their functioning and few resources of their own with which to offset these deficiencies.

In addition to the challenges posed by the demographics of the province, the area is disadvantaged in terms of the available policing resources and capacity. The province has a total number of 92 police stations staffed by a total of 7 980 police personnel.73 This amounts to the highest ratio of civilians to police officers in the country. In 2000, for every police officer there were 682 people in the Northern Province. The ratio for the rest of the country was 424 people per police officer.74 It is thus unsurprising that the police officers in the province are overworked. In 1999, Northern Province had the highest average number of cases per detective at 97 cases per detective. This was higher even than Gauteng—the province considered to be the country's crime capital —where detectives each had on average 41 cases.75

Many police stations are also understaffed and lack adequate resources to deal effectively with crime. This situation can be traced to the SAPS' inheritance, after 1994, of the many poorly trained and illiterate officers from the police forces in the former homelands of Lebowa, Venda and Gazankulu.76

Crime trends in the Northern Province and Central police area

The limited policing resources together with the demographics of the province in which Mapogo originated present an environment conducive to vigilantism. Other key factors, it has been argued, are high crime levels and negative perceptions about crime.

The major complaint that led to the establishment of Mapogo in 1996 by local business people (led by Mapogo's President, Montle Magolego) was the increase in the murders of business people, burglaries and robberies in the Nebo/Sekhukhuni area. Members of Mapogo alleged that the criminal justice system was failing to protect the lives and properties of business people in the area. They further alleged that police colluded with the criminals.

The following section looks at selected crime trends recorded between 1994 and 1999 in the Northern Province and more specifically in the Central police area of the Northern Province (where the Nebo/Sekhukhuni district is located) in an attempt to ascertain if there are any links between crime trends and vigilantism as alleged by Mapogo supporters.77 The analysis is based on the official crime statistics recorded by the SAPS. A comparison of crime ratios between provinces is drawn and the Northern Province is compared to South Africa as a whole in terms of three crime categories—violent crime, property crime and robbery (Table 2).

Table 2: Description of crime categories used in the analysis

When crime rates are compared between the provinces, the statistics show that the Western Cape, Gauteng and the Northern Cape have highest crime ratios in the country (Figure 2). The Northern Cape, followed by the Western Cape, Free State and Gauteng have the highest rates of violent crime. Property crime rates are highest in the Western Cape, Gauteng and the Northern Cape. The robbery rate is significantly higher in Gauteng than the other provinces. The Northern Province has the lowest overall recorded crime rate in the country, and has lower rates of violent crime, property crime and robbery than any other province. Based on available evidence and media coverage of vigilante activity, this questions the link between vigilantism and high crime rates: the Northern Province has the lowest crime rate in the country, and the Western Cape the highest—yet both have seen the development of widespread organised vigilante activity. Moreover, provinces like the Northern Cape, where few incidents of vigilante activity have been reported, have high overall crime rates, and the highest rate of violent crime in the country.

Figure 2: Recorded crime rates, by province, 1999

Source: SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre

Based on recorded crime rates for the provinces, the only trend that is significant in terms of vigilantism in the Northern Province, is the number of violent crimes and robberies recorded as a proportion of total crime: these two crime categories accounted for 49% of all crimes (from those listed in Table 2) in that province (Figure 3). This is only slightly less than the Northern Cape (50%) which had the highest number of violent crime and robbery as a proportion of all crime. It is also significantly higher than the proportion for South Africa as a whole (39%). This trend is important because vigilantism is most often a response to the commission of violent crimes and robberies. Trends for these crimes are considered below in detail in the Central police area in the Northern Province, where the Nebo/Sekhukhuni district is located.

Figure 3: Violent crime and robbery as a proportion of the total recorded crime, by province, 1999

Source: SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre

Violent crime increased in the Central police area by 12% between 1994 and 1999 (Figure 4). Although the concern among supporters of Mapogo was for the increasing number of murders in the area, the recorded increase in violent crimes is the result of an increase in levels of assault, not murder. Assault with the intent to commit grievous bodily harm and common assault increased by 40% and 17% respectively (Table 3). Murder on the other hand, as well as attempted murder, decreased by 47% and 73% respectively.

Table 3: Change in number of recorded crimes, Central police area, 1994 - 1999

Source: SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre
* Assault with grievous bodily harm

Figure 5: Changing level of recorded robbery, Central area, Northern Province, 1994-99

Source: SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre

Robbery was also noted as a problem by members and supporters of Mapogo. Figure 5 shows that robbery actually decreased by 39% between 1994 and 1997. Since then, the number of recorded robberies has increased by 13%. This trend is interesting, given that Mapogo started operating in the area in 1996.

Figure 6: Changing level of recorded property crime, Central area, Northern Province, 1994-99

Source: SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre

Crimes against property, and in particular burglaries of business and residential premises were cited as reasons for the formation of Mapogo. According to the statistics, property crimes increased gradually between 1994 and 1999 in the Central police area (Figure 6). In particular, burglary of residential premises increased (by 58%) and theft other (by 53%). Interestingly, burglary of business premises—which was specifically mentioned as a problem in the area by Mapogo supporters—decreased by 2% between 1994 and 1999 (Table 3). Given Mapogo's focus on combating property crime, it is possible that the organisation's activities, which began in 1996, helped to reduce the level of business burglaries. However, burglaries of businesses actually increased between 1996 and 1997, after which they decreased slightly in 1998 and increased again in 1999. There is no clear trend with regard to business burglaries, and it is difficult to gauge what the impact of Mapogo was, using these statistics.

The changing crime trends in the Central police area of the Northern Province show that levels of violent crime, property crime and robbery have increased between 1994 and 1997—a trend which could help explain the formation of, and support for, Mapogo in the area. However, a closer examination of the particular crime types that were cited by supporters of Mapogo as the reason for the formation of the group, provides no clear link either to why the organisation was formed in 1996, or to the possible impact it may have had on crime levels between 1996 and 1999.

This review of crime trends in the Northern Province and Central police area shows that it is difficult to link vigilantism directly to crime levels—on the basis of official recorded crime at any rate. It is true that many crimes are not recorded in the official statistics, and that crime levels may have been higher in the years before Mapogo was formed. It would also have been preferable to analyse official statistics for the Nebo/Sekhukhuni area where Mapogo originated, rather than for the whole Central police area. Unfortunately, figures for this specific area were not available.

The origins of Mapogo-a-Mathamaga

For many, the name Mapogo-a-Mathamaga conjures up images of severe assaults using an assortment of weapons, shootings, feeding people to crocodiles and displacements. Mapogo-a-Mathamaga (a name derived from the Northern Sotho proverb Ge ole nkwe nna ke lepogo ka moka re mathamaga meaning 'if you are a leopard then I am a tiger—we are all equal in strength') started as an organisation to protect businessmen and their property. Now better known as a prominent vigilante group in the Northern Province, Mapogo was formed in August 1996 after the murder of the eighth businessman in the Sekhukhuni/Nebo area. According to one of its founder members, the organisation was established against the backdrop of unprecedented levels of crime including car hijacking, housebreaking, murder and assault: "Businessmen felt that they were being targeted by criminals in the area and that the police and the criminal justice system were failing them." 78

Initially Mapogo was formed to protect business people, but owing to its perceived success in fighting crime, particularly in the Nebo/Sekhukhuni area, other members of the community started joining the organisation. In order to serve the whole community, Mapogo changed its name from Mapogo—Business Shield, to Mapogo—Community and Business Shield. Mapogo has its head-offices in Jane Furse under the leadership of the organisation's President, Montle Magolego. Today the group boasts 72 branches with over 70 000 members throughout South Africa. Branches have recently been opened in areas as diverse as Bronkhorstspruit in Mpumalanga, Pretoria, Diepsloot, Lanseria airport in Gauteng and in Kroonstad in the Free State. Despite its healthy membership, Mapogo has, since its inception, been beset by internal conflict largely as a result of Magolego's leadership style which is perceived by many as despotic. In 1999 eight executive members left Mapogo following disagreements with Magolego after he refused their advice on various occasions regarding the method of punishment to be used against suspected offenders. Magolego's refusal to meet with government representatives and his lack of financial accountability was also thought to be divisive. When the breakaway group was unilaterally suspended by Magolego, they formed a competing organisation, Sekhukhuni se bonwa ke Sebataladi (Sebokese), which had similar objectives to Mapogo but opposed the arbitrary punishment of suspects.79

Early in 2001, Mapogo split again following allegations that Magolego allegedly misused funds, failed to declare money gained from the sale of t-shirts and stickers, violated Mapogo's constitution (joining political parties and using harsh punishment), refused to engage with the government and his persistent attempts to form a hit squad. These internal problems seem likely to result in added competition for Mapogo: after the last fall-out, one of Magolego's bodyguards who had been involved in plans to start a hitsquad for Magolego, left to form his own private security company by the name of Mapogo Crime Stop (MCS). Parking attendants in Pretoria can be spotted wearing aprons displaying MCS logo (see box below).

Areas of operation
Northern Province

Mapogo's activities are concentrated in the Nebo/Sekhukhuni area of the Northern Province. Mapogo was first established here and many founder members reside in the area. Most incidents implicating Mapogo in violence that are reported to the police are recorded mainly in the Central police area (which includes Lebowakgomo, Nebo, Motetema and Seshego) and to a lesser extent the Bushveld police area.

Mpumalanga

Mapogo is mainly active in Witbank, Nelspruit and Bronkhorstspruit where the organisation enjoys widespread support. Mapogo is also active in the several farming areas in Mpumalanga, where white farmers have complained about increased attacks against themselves and their property. According to members of Mapogo, many white farmers who feel that the police ignore their plight, yet are afraid of taking the law into their own hands, have sought the services of Mapogo-a-Mathamaga.

Gauteng

Regional offices are based in an informal settlement of Diepsloot near Pretoria and Mapogo also has offices in central Pretoria. Most clients in Gauteng are business people and farmers. Stickers and signs advertising Mapogo's service can be spotted in restaurants, private homes, at shopping malls and farm gates around Pretoria.

North West

Mapogo has even extended its operations to the heart of the ultra conservative white Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (AWB) in the town of Ventersdorp. The leader of the AWB, Eugene Terreblanche, was recently sentenced to six years in prison for the attempted murder of a black security officer. This is not the only association that Mapogo has struck up with the white right-wing. One of its former members in Pretoria was Gaye Derby-Lewis, the wife of Clive Derby-Lewis, a Conservative Party member convicted to life imprisonment for the murder of South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani in 1993.

Free State

Although details on the exact nature of Mapogo's membership and influence in the Free State were not known at the time of writing, the organisation is believed to have opened offices in Kroonstad in 2001.

Method of operation

After its establishment, Mapogo initially worked within the parameters of the law as indicated in its constitution and the memorandum handed to the former Minister of the Executive Committee (MEC) for Safety and Security in the Northern Province, Seth Nthai. In practice this meant that suspects were arrested and handed over to the police.

However, this lawful approach changed after the police released a number of suspects.80 This shift from co-operating with the police to using force illegitimately, is a common phenomenon in the development of vigilantism.81 Vigilantes resort to violence when police are perceived to be soft on criminals, when criminals begin to counter the vigilante threat, or when criminals are perceived to be invincible and thus deserving of harsh measures.

What distinguishes Mapogo from other vigilante groups however, is that interested parties are required to join and pay a membership fee. Generally membership of vigilante groups is voluntary and any community member can lay charges with them or seek their assistance. In this sense, Mapogo's operation is similar to that of a registered security company in which only paying members or clients receive protection.

In order to receive Mapogo's protection, a joining fee is payable at a local branch, after which monthly payments are required. In a unique approach to providing security services, the joining fee is determined by the applicant's financial status (Table 4). Generally, fees range from between R100 and R10 000. However, there appears to be no standard fee set up by the national office, with individual branches determining their own fees. For example, in Diepsloot in Gauteng, the joining fee is R2 800 per annum across the board except for pensioners, who pay R1 000 per annum.

Given the lack of a standard fee structure for Mapogo members, and the absence of a central account, it is difficult to calculate the organisation's annual turn over. Branches are obliged to pay only 15% of their earnings into the president's account. This arrangement allows for much misuse of funds and lead to the split in the organisation (noted above) after funds went missing and could not be accounted for.

Table 4: Approximate fee structure for Mapogo members*

Source: Mapogo-a-Mathamaga headquarters in Jane Furse, May 2000 82
* Despite several attempts, it has been difficult to clarify whether all these fees are paid for joining or as a monthly contribution.
** Monthly contribution

Once a person has registered with Mapogo, they are supplied with stickers depicting two leopards’ heads (Mapogo's symbol). The intention is that the markings are displayed at a business site, house or on a car, where they serve as a warning (and hopefully a deterrent) to would-be criminals. This assertion was supported by a SAPS police officer at the Erasmia police station near Pretoria, who alleged that property bearing Mapogo's stickers was often left untouched.83

With the exception of survivors of rape, only registered members are entitled to Mapogo's protection. According to Mashilo, the general-secretary of the organisation, the reason Mapogo cannot help everyone is that "Mapogo is a little against the law— often members are arrested by the police—so if Mapogo helps someone who has not paid fees, it creates problems when it comes to paying bail (for Mapogo employees)." 84

Thomas Moeng, Mapogo's leader in Diepsloot, smiled with content when he described Mapogo's methods of dealing with criminals. Supporters of Mapogo claim that its success in fighting crime is due to its method of administering sethlare ('medicine', referring to a sjambok or whip that is dipped in traditional herbs and salt) to criminals. Mapogo's controversial president, Montle Magolego believes that "crime cannot be stopped by talking—crime can be stopped through action." 85 This action often amounts to little more than the torture of suspects until they either confess or identify other likely suspects (see adjacent box).

Magolego firmly believes the government's current response to crime will not succeed: "Crime is out of hand and the government cannot cope. Corporal punishment is the best approach. There are no suspects, just criminals. If you are caught red-handed, you are a thief. The case is not remanded, street justice is applied." 86

Within Mapogo however, there are different views about the possibilities of working with government and the administration of punishment. According to the general-secretary of Mapogo they are not going to stop administering setlhare, "but we want to talk to the government about destroying crime. There is interest to stop setlhare as the crime has gone down and more so because our members are being arrested for administering the medicine. If we work with the community policing forums, setlhare will be changed." 87

Indeed, Mapogo's methods have landed many of its members behind bars. While the organisation claims its success is due the use of the sjambok, various media and community reports indicate that Mapogo uses more than just a sjambok. Over 20 people have died at the hands of Mapogo and scores have been injured and incapacitated after being beaten with rods, shot, electrocuted or thrown in to crocodile infested rivers. This suggests that Mapogo is not merely an anti-crime group but is also engaged in criminal activity. As such, their methods have undermined popular support for the rule of law.

Why do people support Mapogo?

Despite the negative image of Mapogo, the organisation appears to enjoy widespread support in the areas in which it operates. However the reasons for this support differ from one community to another. Within the business community in the Northern Province the feeling is that since Mapogo was formed, the number of break-ins have decreased considerably and the organisation therefore acts as a deterrent. Their success is attributed to their speedy reaction when a crime is reported, the apprehension of the alleged criminals and the recovery of the stolen goods. Other community members in the Northern Province similarly believe that the areas where Mapogo operates have become much safer. Even the police in Nebo claim that levels of assault and robbery, especially over weekends, have dramatically decreased with the arrival of Mapogo.88

However, some Mapogo supporters are motivated by more than the desire for crime prevention. Mapogo has also attracted the support of some opposition parties, in what appears to be an attempt to discredit the ruling ANC government and question its ability to control crime. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), for example, believes that the ANC government has failed in the war against crime and as a result it supports Magolego's actions.89 Mostly however, Magolego is associated with the political right. He is believed to have been a supporter of the National Party during the 1980s. It is alleged that to have acquired a business or a political position in the former Lebowa homeland, support for the National Party was a prerequisite. Prior to the 1994 elections, Magolego had approached the Inkatha Freedom Party to negotiate membership and in the 1999 elections he stood as a candidate for the United Democratic Movement (UDM).90

In 1999, Magolego joined the UDM and was due to take up a seat in parliament but withdrew due to the crisis that this brought about within his own organisation. There is ample evidence that Magolego has political aspirations. During an interview in Glencowie in 2000, he declared "I would like to bring together all other anti-crime groups to form a coalition. The main focus of the coalition would be to advocate for harsher measures [against crime]. I do not exclude the possibility of turning this into a political party." 91

More intriguing is the support for Mapogo from conservative quarters. The fear of violent attacks, particularly among commercial farmers, has resulted in desperate measures being taken. These include reporting visitors to the local commandos and setting up access controls in certain farms. In some cases, farmers have been accused of racism and there have been reports of innocent people being beaten and murdered by farmers. It has also been alleged that some farmers use Mapogo to settle labour disputes with their labourers. Workers claim that every time they raise concerns about working conditions, the threat is made that Mapogo will be asked to intervene.92 In some cases Mapogo members have actually been called to farms and have threatened or assaulted farm workers.93

Magolego has made it no secret that his organization is more than willing to assist farmers in their efforts to control activities on their farms: "When a farmer beats up a black person, it is called racism. We in Mapogo have invited farmers to join and Mapogo will do the beating on their behalf" says Magolego in response to allegations that some white members of Mapogo are racist.94 Several media reports about why farmers have joined Mapogo suggest that farmers have jumped at the opportunity offered by the vigilante organisation. There is the belief among some in the sector that crime is largely a 'cultural' phenomenon in the black community and thus requires a solution that draws on this 'culture' (see box below).95

This issue has influenced support for Mapogo among traditional leaders. Some traditional leaders have been angered by Magolego's assertion that his methods are akin to the African model of justice. To ease tensions, he would visit their homes to pay homage. Not all traditional leaders however hold this view. Some support Magolego, believing that the new constitution's position on the abolishment of corporal punishment is unreasonable and contributes to the increase in crime. They believe Magolego is helping to revive disciplinary measures familiar to African culture. It is also likely that some traditional leaders, aggrieved by the ANC-led government's attempts to eradicate traditional leaders from the political landscape, see Magolego as asserting the need for traditional means of dealing with issues in African communities. Among the traditional leaders supporting Mapogo are also those who simply want the businesses that they own, protected.96

For the general population however, the attraction to Mapogo is simply that it responds to the growing sentiment that the new constitution and the government are 'crime friendly'. In the words of its leader, "We do not consider that a criminal has human rights. He has got no right to keep his mouth shut when asked to tell the truth about crime…we believe in corporal punishment."97

This view even extends to members of the ruling party: in the recent past Mapogo has managed to contract its services to the ANC provincial office in Mpumalanga. During 2000, ANC officials in Mpumalanga hired Mapogo to protect the new legislature building. The building was still under construction and had been the target of many incidents of theft and vandalism. Although the issue of hiring Mapogo was controversial and irked the ANC national office, it pointed to Mapogo's wide ranging influence on security matters in South Africa. Magolego's relations with the ANC and its allies remains confrontational. In 2000, the ANC sent out a memorandum calling all its members in Mapogo to resign with immediate effect or face disciplinary action.

Despite the support for Mapogo's methods, evidenced by its substantial membership base, those who have been exposed to the violence of the vigilante group think differently: "I am afraid of Mapogo's medicine" is how most people interviewed for this monograph responded to the question of how they perceived Mapogo. Although many agreed that since Mapogo was formed, crime has decreased remarkably, they nevertheless do not approve of the methods used. Mapogo's brutality led youths in Mphanama and Eenzaam in the Northern Province to openly defy the organisation and boycott businesses owned by Mapogo members. In Mphanama youths stoned and burnt shops and houses belonging to Mapogo members following the murder of Whitey Makola by Mapogo footsoldiers in August 1997. In Tafelkop in Mpumalanga, the anti-Mapogo group Maputla re tla ja kae was established. Although Maputla forced the closure of a number of shops displaying the Mapogo logo, little has been heard of the group since. The rejection of Mapogo is encouraging, but these cases illustrate how vigilante activity inevitably leads to more violence rather than less.

What then is the reason for Mapogo's success? It is clear that Magolego bravely and openly challenges the government's failure to curb crime. More importantly his methods find favour with many members of the public. Magolego is famous for not just talking tough but acting tough. It is his maverick, fearless and committed leadership style the makes Mapogo what it is. Proof that Mapogo relies heavily on its president's personality lies in the failed attempts to oust him from this position. It is likely that the leadership and personality provided by Magolego are key factors that explain the origins and support for Mapogo, when other communities with higher crime levels and equally poor perceptions of the criminal justice system do not engage in similar vigilante action.

The state's response to Mapogo

Soon after its formation, Mapogo made several attempts to engage the Northern Province office for Safety and Security. On 25 August 1997 the MEC for Safety and Security signed an agreement with Mapogo in which both parties acknowledged that poor service delivery had resulted in increased crime levels. The MEC promised to look into Mapogo's allegations that the SAPS failed to respond to their complaints, and in turn Mapogo was requested to co-operate with the police and not assault suspected criminals. The relationship appeared to work at first but soon floundered owing to Mapogo's use of brutal and illegal means to fight crime. Magolego believes that the clash between his organisation and the ANC-led Northern Province government intensified when he announced his candidature for the United Democratic Movement.

The SAPS in the Northern Province subsequently arrested hundreds of Mapogo members including Magolego himself on various charges such as murder, assault and attempted murder. Between 1996 and May 2000, at least 308 Mapogo footsoldiers were arrested.98 In August 2000 Magolego and 11 other members were acquitted of murder and assault charges due to conflicting eye-witness evidence.

It does however appear that Magolego's luck is running out. In October 2001 he was arrested for the murder of a former chairperson and Mapogo member, after eluding the courts in the Northern Province for over four years. The case began in May 1999 when the chairperson of Mapogo in Greater Phalaborwa, Motlatsi Mafisa, went missing. Mafisa was later found dead with multiple wounds. According to the investigating officer, Mafisa was accused of failing to account for R60 000 of the organisation's money. Magolego and seven other suspects were initially refused bail because of fears that he would tamper with the investigation and interfere with witnesses. However, he was eventually granted R50 000 bail. The other suspects were granted bail of R10 000 each. All but one suspect is out on bail and the case has been postponed until February 2002 for the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Despite the high number of arrests, at the time of writing, only 14 of Mapogo’s footsoldiers had been convicted of various offences including murder, theft, robbery, attempted murder and assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. According to a police investigating officer, the reason for the low conviction rate is the intimidation by members of Mapogo of witnesses and police officers involved in the investigations.99 The low conviction rate and large number of cases against Mapogo that were withdrawn, prompted the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to announce in October 2000 that it would set up a special task team to probe the group's activities in the Northern Province and investigate the more than 200 cases against Mapogo.100 At the time of writing however, there have been few developments in this regard.

The importance of prosecutions and convictions cannot be overstated. Already the arrest and prosecution of Mapogo footsoldiers has decreased the group’s activities. It appears that most of the people who have been arrested were those who carried out the beatings of suspected criminals. This, together with concerns about police and NPA investigations, could be the reason for the recent decrease in Mapogo's activities, particularly in the Northern Province. The Gijima Tsotsi, a specialised police unit, was also investigating cases against Mapogo members in Mpumalanga.