This chapter outlines that nature of the former specialised units, the rationale underlying their restructuring, and the nature of the new units that have arisen out of the restructuring. The way in which one province planned to implemented the restructuring is also considered as a case study.

The former special investigation units

Prior to restructuring, there were 503 specialised units in the 42 policing areas of South Africa.24 Units were created to focus on a wide range of crime problems such as murder and robbery, hijacking, gangs, firearms, crimes against the state, taxi violence, organised crime, vehicle theft, cross border crime, endangered species, illegal aliens, drugs, stock theft, transito theft, diamond and gold theft, family violence, child protection and sexual offences, and crime relating to the occult.

The announcement that many of these units, including the murder and robbery units, and hijacking units, were to be closed down at first sounded rather alarming. It seemed to imply that serious crimes would no longer receive the special treatment that the units were generally assumed to provide.

Why then the restructuring? Why the move back to station level detective work? There are a number of reasons underpinning the move away from specialised units toward station level work. Most of them are rooted in the performance of the units.

Performance

Available data suggests that the performance of the specialised units was not good. The discussion on performance in chapter 3 argued that the conviction rate for serious crime, the investigation of which was largely the responsibility of the specialised units, was lower than for less serious crime. This suggests that specialised units were performing poorly (Tables 14, 15 & 16).

Table 14: Clearance rate for serious and less serious crime

Clearance rate (%)	1995	1996	1997	1998
Serious crime	52	50	48	46
Less serious crimes	44	43	43	42
All crimes	49	47	46	45

Table 15: Convictions per case sent to court for serious and less serious crime

Convictions per court case (%)	1995	1996	1997	1998
Serious crime	23	34	33	34
Less serious crime	45	45	45	44
All crimes	33	39	39	39

Table 16: Convictions per recorded crime for serious and less serious crime

Convictions per recorded crime (%)	1995	1996	1997	1998
Serious crimes	6	8	8	8
Less serious crimes	12	12	12	12
All crimes	8	10	10	9

A key motivation underlying the restructuring is that it provided an opportunity for removing detectives who were under-performing from the specialised units. While this has not been formally articulated by the SAPS, senior managers of the units interviewed noted that the new organised crime units and serious violent crime units that have emerged out of the restructuring are ‘leaner and meaner’ and also possess a renewed sense of purpose and direction.

Part of the problem with the former units was that, given the nature of detective work, it was relatively easy for under-performing and under-motivated detectives to operate at sub-optimal level and escape notice. Units were granted far greater licence to operate under their own rules and in some instances became a law unto themselves. The extra prestige attached to working at a specialised unit also resulted in some of the detectives conducting their job with a certain degree of arrogance.

Poor performance alone, however, need not necessarily justify the closure of the units. If poor performance is related to factors which can be changed without closing down the units, it would make sense first to implement these. However, several of the problems with the units described by interviewees can only be solved by closing the units. These are considered below.

Avoidance of responsibility at the station level

Detectives interviewed indicated that police at station level tended not to take responsibility for investigating crimes that fell under the mandate of a specialised unit. For example, if drugs were involved, the station level detectives would assume that investigation of the crime was the responsibility of the specialised drug investigation unit—South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB)—even in a relatively minor matter.

In cases such as these, little effort was made to ensure proper statement taking and other initial steps in the investigation of crime by the station level officials. Since all matters come to the attention of the police through police stations, this implies that these matters, subsequently passed on to units, entered the system at a disadvantage.

Confusion regarding responsibility

The mandates of the various units were reasonably clear. It was clear that a murder and robbery unit, for example, should investigate certain types of murder and robbery.25 However, it was at times unclear who was responsible for investigating the various crimes committed in a single scenario. For example, if a taxi driver was murdered in Alexandra (in Johannesburg) and his vehicle was hijacked, and the evidence suggested that the driver was involved in a drug cartel based in Pretoria, which unit should have investigated these various crimes? A decision would need to be made not only about whether it should be the murder and robbery unit, the hijacking unit, SANAB, or an organised crime unit, but whether it was the jurisdiction of a Pretoria or Johannesburg based unit.

If all these units were to investigate their particular aspect of the crime, a large amount of duplication would result. In theory, the station and unit detectives would decide by consultation who should investigate. In practice, detectives said a particular docket was often sent from one unit to another until someone took responsibility for it. This led to crucial delays in starting the investigation, which in turn led to delays in gathering evidence. This became even more of a problem with the creation of more and more specialised units over time.

Another trend exacerbating the problem is the growth in organised crime. Organised criminal groups typically tend to be involved in a number of different crimes. It does not make sense for different units to investigate the various crimes committed by a single group in isolation from one another.

Communication between units

There was very little communication, or sharing of information, between individual units, and between units and station level detectives. Even different task teams within particular units would jealously guard information and view it as their ‘property’.

This led to clashes and duplication of effort and the general hindering of crime investigations. For example, in a recent mandrax haul carried out in Durban, it transpired that both the SANAB unit and the organised crime unit of the city had been independently working on the same case.

Community input to investigations

Because detectives from specialised units were often located far from the areas in which crimes they were investigating occurred, they may have lacked the local knowledge necessary for solving crimes.

In addition, detectives in specialised units have never been represented on community policing forums (CPFs). This is largely because units may have been located up to 80km away from stations. Units may also have served more than one station and time constraints would not permit such detectives to attend to the CPFs at each station.

The consequence of this was that detectives at special units became isolated from the public, had little day-to-day contact with the communities they were meant to be serving, and did not have direct access to the information that may have been provided by members of the public.

Accountability to victims

Victims of crime report their cases at police station level. Should they wish to follow and assist in the investigation, they expect to be able to visit the police station at which the crime was reported and speak to the detective responsible.

However, in the past, the majority of cases would go to the specialised units for investigation. When a case was referred to a specialised unit, victims would find themselves even further removed from the investigation. As mentioned above, a unit may have been located up to 80km from a police station, placing the detectives in those units largely out of reach of the victims of crime.

A further consequence was that detectives at units were not exposed to victims on a daily basis which could have reduced their sensitivity and sense of urgency in dealing with particular cases.

Transferal of skills to station level

A major theme of the official motivation for redeploying detectives to station level is that a large amount of skill will be transferred to station level. With the uncontrolled proliferation of units across the country, more and more detectives were lost to police stations. Very often these were the most skilled members. Since the units carried greater prestige than the stations, it was natural for all detectives to aim for transferal to a unit. As a result, police stations became largely a place where crimes are reported and processed, rather than investigated.

With more detectives based at station level as planned by the restructuring, certain practical constraints will be eased. One of these is that members of the uniform branch are often first on the scene of a crime. Given capacity constraints, these members often have little opportunity to properly secure the crime scene for evidence gathering, and leave the scene before a detective is able to arrive. With more detectives now based at station level, they should be able to reach a crime scene sooner than was possible in the past.

Reduction in administrative costs

Prior to restructuring, there were 1,104 police stations and 503 specialised units in the 42 policing areas of South Africa.26 This implies a ratio of just over two police stations for every specialised unit. Each unit had its own offices, its own administrative staff, and its own vehicles and equipment. A large amount of unnecessary duplication of resources and administrative costs resulted. This was particularly so in the case of small units consisting of fewer than ten persons. These resources will be now redistributed to station level, further boosting the capacity of police stations.

Restructuring: the new specialised units

The re-organisation of the detective service announced in early 2000 involved a few simple steps. The principle behind the proposals is that the majority of the detective service members working at specialised units are to be transferred to police stations.27 The general policy behind the restructuring is that whereas the majority of cases in the past were investigated at unit level, most will now be investigated at local level instead.

In the first phase of the restructuring, the progress of which will vary from province to province, the existing 503 specialised units will be reduced to approximately 200 units.28 This will enable the establishment of integrated crime combat teams at police station level staffed by detectives from various fields of expertise. Approximately 7,000 detective experts would be redeployed in the first phase.29

Given that the rationale for restructuring was rooted in the poor performance of the existing specialised units, those with low caseloads or an unproductive record were the first to be closed.30 For example, units of SANAB, or the diamond and gold unit, originally established in rural towns simply because those towns were situated on smuggling routes, were among the first to close.31

Members not redeployed to station level will be placed at two new specialised units that will take over some of the functions of the former units. These two new units are the organised crime units and the serious and violent crime units. The exact mandate, or terms of reference, of the organised crime units has not yet been finalised.32 However, the mandate of the serious and violent crime units has been approved.

The number and skills of members to be transferred to the new units will be determined by the SAPS’ organised crime threat analysis (OCTA) and crime threat analysis (CTA) in each province.33 An example of how such a determination might be implemented, is considered in the example of the Western Cape (see below).

It was planned that phased reductions, varying from province to province, will ultimately see 21 units with 600 detectives based in the organised crime units throughout the country.34 Serious and violent crime units may have different numbers of units and different numbers of detectives working in each province from those in the organised crime units. Further detail on the numbers of serious and violent crime units and their capacity was not available at the time of writing.

Several units will remained untouched by the restructuring announced thus far. These include the commercial branch and the family violence, child protection and sexual offences units, and child protection units (see below).35 The structure of the commercial branch is, however, currently being re-considered. By contrast, it is worrying that the anti-corruption units are set to be absorbed into the organised crime units (see below).

New serious and violent crime units

The terms of reference now finalised for the serious and violent crime units provides that these units investigate:

Specific incidents relating to crimes against the state, as determined by the national commissioner or the relevant provincial commissioner.



Murders involving prominent persons, the judiciary, politicians, or members of the SAPS.



Actual or attempted armed robberies of financial institutions, as determined by the crime threat analysis (CTA) or organised crime threat analysis (OCTA).



Actual or attempted armed robberies of registered cash-in-transit carriers.



Vehicle hijackings in which a victim has been shot, or vehicle hijackings that appear on the CTA or OCTA. In other words, isolated hijackings are to be investigated at local level.



Specific identified robberies of the theft of firearms at the discretion of the national commissioner or the relevant provincial commissioner.



Specific identified series of crimes of a serious or violent nature, such as serial murders or serial rapes.



Inter-group violence which appears on the CTA or OCTA under the heading ‘flashpoint areas’, including political violence, taxi violence, train violence, gang violence, and faction fighting.



Actual or attempted attacks on residents of farms and smallholdings and all actions aimed at disrupting the farming activities of commercial concerns for ideological purposes in terms of economic or political theory, or as a result of labour disputes, land issues, revenge, grievances, or ‘racist concerns such as intimidation’ (sic). The terms state that such attacks usually involve murder, attempted murder, rape, assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, robbery, armed robbery, arson, and malicious damage to property in excess of R10,000. Cases involving domestic violence, drunkenness or the social interaction between farm residents should however be investigated at local level.36

It is interesting to note the extent to which these terms of reference assume, prior to any investigation, a high degree of knowledge regarding the possible identity of perpetrators as well as his, her or their underlying motivations. For example, how is it known that a hijacking is random, prior to its investigation? How is it known if a murder or a rape has been perpetrated by a serial murderer or rapist, prior to its investigation? How is it known if an incident involving a taxi was an incident of ‘taxi violence’ or merely coincidentally involved a taxi? Or whether a farm attack was motivated by racism?

In the latter instance, even after investigation and identification of the perpetrators, the underlying motive of the attack may never be known. Indeed, the phenomenon of farm attacks is the subject of great debate and a government committee of inquiry at present. At least one study, after interviewing in excess of 90 perpetrators, found that the overwhelming majority of such attacks were not racially motivated.37

Furthermore, to what extent is it sensible to have a small serious and violent crime unit, most likely based in an urban centre, responsible for investigating farm attacks, the majority of which occur in rural areas some distance from the urban centre?

It is also interesting to note the extent to which these terms of reference appear to be identifying crimes which are essentially political in nature, for example, crimes against the state, the murder of prominent persons, and inter-group violence. Is it sensible to treat such ‘political’ crimes in a manner different from other crimes? To what extent do these terms of reference allow a small unit to be manipulated? A number of journalists working closely with the SAPS have noticed signs in recent months that the SAPS is becoming increasingly ‘politicised’.38 These terms of reference may give them further cause for concern.

New organised crime units

While the exact terms of reference of the organised crime units has not yet been finalised, some detail regarding the ultimate rationalisation of the units across the country is available.

There will ultimately be 21 organised crime units employing 600 detectives. The number of units per province is likely to vary, from a proposed five in Gauteng, employing 196 detectives, to three in KwaZulu-Natal with 123 detectives, to one in the Free State and Western Cape with 23 and 50 detectives respectively.39 These proposals may change once input is received from the provinces.

Furthermore, the proposed rationalisation is unlikely already to have been reached. The example of the Western Cape below shows the first phase of rationalisation to have resulted in the retention of 96 detectives at organised crime units, as opposed to the 50 originally proposed above.

Issues regarding the nature of the organised crime units’ work, their role in relation to the DSO, and questions regarding the prioritisation of organised crime, are considered in chapter 5.

Example of restructuring in the Western Cape

To illustrate how the restructuring might take effect, it is useful to consider developments in one province. While general policy is set by the national office of the SAPS, how that policy is implemented in a particular province can differ from one province to the next.

The implementation of the first phase of restructuring in the Western Cape is discussed below. The exact details may have changed since January 2001 when this restructuring was originally agreed upon. Through consultation, it was determined that the organised crime threats faced by the Western Cape are: vehicle crime, taxi violence, fraud, murder and robbery, illegal firearms, corruption, diamond and gold smuggling, drugs, and stock theft.40 Geographically, these threats required organised crime units in Cape Town, Paarl and George, with 50, 23 and 23 investigators each (Table 17).41

Table 17: Requirements for new organised crime units, Western Cape42

Threats	Number of detectives with specific skills needed for organised crime units to address identified threats as at  11-01-2001
	Cape Town unit	Paarl unit	George unit	Total
Vehicle crime	11	5	5	21
Taxi violence	3	2	2	7
Fraud	10	5	5	20
Murder and robbery	5	2	2	9
Illegal firearms	3	1	1	5
Anti-corruption	5	2	2	9
Diamond and gold	3	1	1	5
SANAB	7	3	3	13
Stock theft	3	2	2	7
Total	50	23	23	96

It was also determined that a serious and violent crime unit would be required; this is to be established at Bishop Lavis in Metropolitan Cape Town.43 The number of detectives to be deployed here is not yet known.

The illegal firearms unit, the murder and robbery unit, the taxi violence unit, and the crimes against the state unit, all also located at Bishop Lavis, were closed and replaced with the serious and violent crime unit. The new unit is not however an amalgamation of the old units—instead an entirely new unit has been established. Selected personnel and equipment are utilised in the new unit.44

Other specialised units closed concurrently with the opening of the three organised crime units and the opening of the Bishop Lavis serious and violent crime unit, were the stock theft units in Beaufort West and Faure, the theft in transit unit in Bellville, the gangs and hijacking unit in Bishop Lavis, SANAB in George and Paarl, the organised crime unit in Mossel Bay, the diamond and gold units in Vredendal and Bellville, and the vehicle crime investigation units at George, Paarl, and Beaufort West (Table 18).45

Table 18: Specialised units to be closed, Western Cape46

Unit	Location
Stock theft unit	Beaufort West
Stock theft unit	Faure
Theft in transit unit	Bellville
Taxi violence unit	Bishop Lavis
Gangs and hijacking unit	Bishop Lavis
SANAB	George
SANAB	Paarl
Organised crime unit	Mossel Bay
Diamond and gold unit	Vredendal
Diamond and gold unit	Bellville
Vehicle crime investigation unit	George
Vehicle crime investigation unit	Paarl
Vehicle crime investigation unit	Beaufort West
Crimes against the state unit	Bishop Lavis
Illegal firearms unit	Bishop Lavis
Murder and robbery unit	Bishop Lavis

Implications of restructuring for specific units

As mentioned above, the commercial branch, and the family violence, child protection and sexual offences units, and the child protection units, will not be affected by the current restructuring. The reasons for this will be discussed below. However, the work of the anti-corruption unit will be compromised.

SAPS anti-corruption unit

The decision to establish national and provincial anti-corruption units in the SAPS was made in September 1995 at the request of the national commissioner. A special investigation unit, operating from Pretoria, with a branch office in Johannesburg, had previously been tasked with such investigations.47

Other bodies also responsible for the investigation of corruption in South Africa are the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), the SAPS’ commercial branch, the Investigation Directorate for Serious Economic Offences, the Public Protector, and the former Heath Commission.

The national anti-corruption unit of the South African Police Service came into being on 1 January 1996 with offices in Pretoria and Johannesburg with the mandate to investigate corruption within the SAPS. The unit then consisted of the national head office and nine provincial anti-corruption units. The commanders in each of the provinces were appointed, and each was then responsible for the further development of a unit within the province.

Prior to the restructuring, approximately 4,000 cases across South Africa were being investigated by the unit’s 250 members.48 This would have implied a relatively manageable case load of 16 cases per detective. The restructuring of the detective service has resulted in the anti-corruption unit now becoming part of the new organised crime unit of the detective service.49

In the past, the anti-corruption unit was structured under the national inspectorate component as part of the management services division. As such the anti-corruption units did not fall under the umbrella of the detective service. Under the new structure, the units will fall under the detective service. This is anomalous as the original intention of placing the anti-corruption units outside the detective service was that it would be highly problematic for members of such a unit to investigate their fellow detectives.

The rationale for the recent decision may have been that corruption is often related to organised crime and that the organised crime component should therefore investigate it. However, some highly publicised cases of corruption have in fact involved members of the organised crime component.50 It is likely to be difficult for anti-corruption investigators redeployed to within the organised crime component to identify and investigate such cases in future.

The number of police investigating corruption within the SAPS has also been reduced from 250 to about 150 members.51 In addition, the units in North-West, Mpumalanga, Free State and Northern Cape have been closed down.

The 100 other members have been redeployed, mostly within the organised crime component, but some have been redeployed to station level. This raises another concern about the difficulty that station level detectives face in investigating corruption within the SAPS.

Another casualty of restructuring has been the collection of statistics on police corruption. These have until now relied on the pro-active investigation of corruption by the anti-corruption units. Each unit also compiled and documented its own figures. In other words, the units’ work was not solely complaint-driven. Currently, however, no complete statistics are being kept, especially in view of the closure of the units in four provinces.52 As no unit-driven investigation will be carried out in those provinces, no statistics will emanate from them.

Child protection and family violence units

The need to establish a unit focusing on crimes against children, that is, a child protection unit, was first identified by the then South African Police during 1986. The primary task of the child protection unit (CPU) is to render a sensitive service to the child victim and to investigate crimes committed against children. (For the purpose of the CPU’s activities, a person is regarded a child if he or she is not yet 18 years of age.53) The general terms used to describe crimes against children are ‘sexual molestation’ and ‘child molestation’ although these specific categories do not exist in terms of the law.

All CPUs are in the process of being transformed into family violence, child protection and sexual offences units, depending on available resources and the occurrence of the relevant types of crimes. The first branch of the family violence, child protection and sexual offences unit (FCS) (Gesinsgeweld, Kinderbeskerming en Seksuele Misdrywe-eenheid) was established in March 1996 in Braamfontein in Johannesburg. Other units have since been established. The concept for establishing single units that cover family violence, child protection and sexual offences arose as a result of a greater focus on human rights and community policing and a greater sensitivity regarding the policing of crimes such as rape. Each unit should, where possible, include a component to address family violence, child protection and sexual offences.

The existing child protection units and family violence units will not be closed down.54 This is because of the highly specialised and intensive training required for interviewing and managing children, which cannot be left to a general investigator.55 In the majority of cases referred to such units, the perpetrator is known to the victim, and investigation revolves around securing evidence and managing difficult witness circumstances rather than identifying a perpetrator.

The latest available figures show there are now 27 child protection units (CPU), 15 family violence, child protection and sexual offences units (FCS) and four indecent crimes units situated across the country. Individuals with special skills police crimes against children in 156 other towns across the country.

The following crimes are policed by the family violence, child protection and sexual offences units:56

Family violence (intra familial, victims of 18 years of age and older)

Assault with the intention to do grievous bodily harm


Attempted murder


Applicable crimes in terms of the Domestic Violence Act no 116 of 1998



Child protection (victims under the age of 18 years)

Rape


Sodomy


Incest


Indecent assault


Attempted murder


Assault with the intention to do grievous bodily harm


Common assault (only if there were three or more incidents over a period of time—intra familial)


Kidnapping


Abduction


The Prevention of Family Violence Act no 133 of 1993


Domestic Violence Act no 116 of 1998


Crimes with regard to the sexual exploitation of children, under the Sexual Offences Act no 23 of 1957, as amended


Child Care Act no 74 of 1983, as amended)


Films and Publication Act no 65 of 1996 with regard to child pornography.



Sexual offences (victims of 18 years of age and older)


Rape


Incest


Indecent assault


Crimes with regard to the sexual exploitation of adults, under the Sexual Offences Act no 23 of 1957, as amended

Crimes with regard to sexual offences against adults, under the Prevention of Family Violence Act no 133 of 1993 and Domestic Violence Act no 116 of 1998.

Members attached to the child protection unit and family violence, child protection and sexual offences unit must complete basic police training at one of the police colleges, after which they gain some experience of general policing.

They then receive in-service training and follow a task orientated course, stretching over a three week period. The contents of the course are evaluated continuously. Lectures are presented by experienced members of the SAPS, lecturers from universities, educational psychologists, social welfare workers, criminologists, members of the Family Advocate's Office, Lawyers for Human Rights, Department of Justice (Justice College) and other community organisations. The following subjects, which are not part of the standard police training, form part of the curriculum:

Crisis intervention



Psychological aspects (for example, the stages of development of a child; the interviewing of a child)



Specific investigation skills (for example, obtaining statements from children; conduct at a scene of a crime)



Fundamental human rights (with the emphasis on children’s rights)



Information regarding investigation aids, such as the SAPS Criminal Record Centre (fingerprint experts, photographers, etc), and the Forensic Science Laboratory



Legal requirements regarding relevant crimes



Court procedures regarding children



Role of the family advocate



Role of the district surgeon



Role of the social worker



Public speaking



Specific instructions regarding the policing of crimes against children.

The activities of the child protection units and the family violence, child protection and sexual offences units focus on the investigation of offences that are brought to the attention of unit detectives. During the investigation and court process, the unit provides support to the child or adult witness during the court procedures in conjunction with social workers, educators, and victim support organisations

The ability of these units to prevent crimes against children is very limited since most of these offences are committed in private and often by family members. However, the units do attempt to educate members of the public about the existence of these crimes, the role of the public in preventing and combating these crimes and the role of the child protection unit and the family violence, child protection and sexual offences unit. Awareness is fostered by articles in the media and the presentation of lectures and talks at schools, universities, youth and church organisations. The lectures are presented to people of all ages, ranging from children to adults.

The management of the CPU’s maintain that performance of these units cannot be measured in the usual way by, for example, the number of items seized, or the number of arrests and convictions. The argument is that the mere fact that a case is reported can be seen as a success because it can assist in breaking the cycle of abuse.

However, there has been no significant change since 1997—the year after the establishment of the family violence units (FVU)—in the national level of reporting either of cruelty toward children, or of rape, two types of crimes which are meant to be addressed by the CPU’s and FVU’s (Table 19).

Table 19: Change in level of reporting of cruelty towards children and rape, 1997-2000

Crime	1997	1998	1999	2000	% change, 1997-2000
Cruelty towards children	2,368	2,083	2,407	2,477	+5%
Rape	52,159	49,280	51,249	53,008	+2%

The conviction rates relevant to the work of these units do not show a much better record than for most crimes in South Africa, as illustrated in Maps 10 and 11. However, it must be said that the work of the unit, which often involves persuading reluctant victims to go to court, and furthermore, securing a conviction, is more difficult than is the case with other crimes.

Map 10: Convictions per crime recorded (%) for cruelty towards children and rape combined, 2000




Map 11: Convictions per court case (%) for cruelty towards children and rape combined, 2000

The commercial crime branch

The origins of the commercial crime branch can be found in the Johannesburg Company Fraud Staff established in 1947, then the only one of its kind. Complex and significant commercial crimes that were committed anywhere in the country were referred to this unit for investigation.57 Due to increasing demand, it was restructured and expanded in 1969 to form the commercial crime branch. While the headquarters remained in Johannesburg, branches were established in Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban, Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth and later Klerksdorp. After further changes in 1988-1991, the commercial crime branch’s headquarters were moved to their present location in Pretoria at the SAPS head office.

The commercial crime branch has since established offices in each of the nine provinces, each with their own commercial crime units, syndicate fraud units and fraud units.58 While a recent audit of detectives is not available, there are in the region of 1,000 members responsible for investigating, preventing and administering commercial crime cases in South Africa.

The commercial branch is responsible for conducting investigations that fall within the ambit of the respective mandates for each unit, which include charges ranging from fraud and related crimes, corruption, money laundering, kite-flying, syndicate fraud to various types of conduct prohibited by certain acts and statutes.59

The commercial branch has established working relationships with organisations such as Business Against Crime (BAC), the Banking Council of South Africa, the Heath Special Investigating Unit, Escom, Unisa, the Department of Justice, and the Economic Crime Combating and Research Institute of South Africa (ECCRISA).60 Many reported cases are time consuming and very complex. The commercial branch utilises the expertise of auditing firms from time to time to assist with investigations and to compile forensic reports to be presented in court as evidence.61

In terms of performace, Map 12 shows the ratio of all reported frauds, forgeries, misappropriations, and other similar crimes in 2000, to the number of convictions obtained for those crimes in 2000, by province. This provides a crude conviction rate for commercial crime and therefore a measure of performance of the commercial crime branch. Map 12 shows that the conviction rate varies between 3% and 12% in the various provinces.

Map 12: Convictions per recorded crime (%) for fraud, 2000

This is a similar conviction rate to that for most crimes in South Africa, indicating that the commercial branch is not performing any better or worse than other branches of the detective service. However, it must be borne in mind that commercial crimes are generally difficult to investigate and require a higher level of specialisation and skill than do most other crimes.

Furthermore, during 2000 there were 5,107 convictions (of 67,076 reported cases) for this kind of crime, implying in the region of five convictions for each commercial crime detective, assuming that all such crimes were investigated by the approximately 1,000 detectives in the commercial crime branch. This would imply quite a high success rate for the detectives concerned. In addition, the conviction rate per court case finds a rate of as much as 50% in the Western Cape—a relatively good performance (Map 13). This indicates that cases brought to court must be relatively well prepared.

Map 13: Convictions per court case (%) for fraud, 2000

The commercial crime units were not rationalised as part of the restructuring of specialised units in early 2001. However, the units are currently the subject of what the SAPS call an intensive ‘work study investigation’ or ‘business process re-engineering’ by the national head office, in which they will be scrutinised in terms of the most recent policy for detectives in the SAPS.62

In this process, each unit comes under the spotlight in terms of having a mandate arising from policy. A unit’s strategy, procedures and processes, structure and resources are evaluated to determine what is needed to carry out the mandate, and what can be re-allocated and redistributed to station level.63

The commercial branch is part of the next phase of the reorganisation of the detective service. While the details of any changes are not yet known, it is however foreseen that the functions performed by the various sub-components of the commercial branch will be clustered in a fashion similar to that effected with the organised crime and the serious and violent crime components.64