The main reasons for the restructuring of the special investigation units in the SAPS lie with their poor performance and consequently the performance of the detective service as a whole. Confusion and avoiding taking responsibility for cases, lack of communication between units, lack of community input to crime investigation, and unnecessary administrative costs were all problems related to the units’ performance. This led to problems with the investigation of crime generally.

In principle, the strategy of increasing the investigative capacity of the SAPS detectives at local level makes sense. The concern is, however, that the restructuring process has resulted in the lesser skilled and motivated detectives being redeployed to local level, while the new serious and violent crime units and organised crime units have been able to retain the most skilled detectives.

Those who have been redeployed view the move as a loss of prestige and are further de-motivated. The manner in which the restructuring was announced also created cause for concern among the members of the former specialised units, and did not allay the fears of detectives about their future in the SAPS. Although it appears some consultation occurred at senior management level, the hierarchical structure of the SAPS and of the detective service necessarily means that most detectives will feel this to be yet another policy imposed upon them.

Furthermore, the new units that have been created—the organised crime units and the serious and violent crime units—will have to be carefully managed to ensure that they do not replicate the problems experienced with the former units. In other words, it is possible that several of the problems outlined in this monograph relating to the former specialised units could persist to the detriment of the new units. If we accept that it is in principle better to investigate crime from station level rather than from specialised units, the existence of these remaining units needs to be further motivated.

The mandate of the serious and violent crime units is also cause for concern. The types of crimes which they will investigate are not clear and the problems listed for removing the former specialised units could apply to this unit as well. The extent to which the mandate appears to assume prior knowledge of the perpetrators’ identity is also problematic.

Another issue that may lead to problems is the overlap of the mandate of the serious and violent crime units as well as the organised crime units with that of the DSO. There may be unproductive rivalry and unnecessary duplication in the investigation of particular crimes.

The position of the anti-corruption units, whose members have been redeployed to within the organised crime units, is also problematic. It will be extremely difficult for members assigned to investigate corruption to do so from within the ranks of the organised crime component of the detective service, where they will undoubtedly be required to investigate their colleagues. The investigation of corruption within the SAPS is likely to suffer and this decision needs to be reconsidered.

The retention of the family violence and child protection units is based on the fact that highly specialised skills and facilities are needed for investigating these crimes. The ideal situation would be to have highly trained persons operating at every police station. This is particularly true given the prevalence of crimes such as domestic violence, rape and child abuse across the country. That may well be the ultimate goal. The current situation is a compromise that was influenced by a concern within the SAPS about a public outcry around the closure of any such units.

A further cause for concern is that in some measure (although this was never formally articulated) the restructuring was a means of removing ‘bad elements’ from the specialised units and placing them at station level where their work could be more closely monitored. If this is the case, it amounts to treating the symptoms of the problem and not the cause. This is unlikely to correct the underperformance of the detectives concerned. There is a sense in the SAPS that it is virtually impossible to get rid of unproductive persons. However, there are extensive regulations regarding misconduct and the national and provincial commissioners do possess powers to suspend or discharge those guilty of serious misconduct.99

In terms of these regulations, a member commits misconduct if he or she performs any act or fails to perform any act with the intention of causing harm or to prejudice the interests of the SAPS, whether financial or otherwise, or with the intention of undermining the policy of the SAPS, or with the intention not to comply with his or her duties or responsibilities, or commits an offence.100
Moving detectives around does not get rid of ‘problem’ investigators. It would be preferable for the national leadership of the SAPS to use its powers in terms of misconduct regulations to remove those who should not be there, rather than resort to restructuring as a proxy.

Recommendations

Recommendations for the detective service cannot be made in isolation—but should be considered as part of broader changes in the SAPS. The SAPS in turn, must be considered as one among several structures fighting crime in South Africa.

Restructuring the detective service alone will not be enough to improve performance—additional measures should be considered

Low conviction rates suggest that the investigation of crime has been poor in the recent past. The redeployment of detectives to station level has the potential to unlock some of the structural impediments to improved performance. However, performance will not improve without:

Improved and expanded specialised training:
While there are indications that training has improved within the SAPS, the numbers of detectives receiving specialised as opposed to general investigative training remains too small. Careful audits of training should also ensure detectives do not receive unnecessary repeats of training, and that prior skills are built upon.



A reduction in the case load of detectives:
Given the crime rate in South Africa, this can only realistically be done by increasing the number of detectives. Much crime in South Africa is effectively not being investigated at all due to such constraints.



Proper allocation of resources:
Large disparities still remain in resource allocation among police stations. There needs to be a quicker response to changes in local crime conditions and the allocation of resources accordingly. Allocation of detectives and corresponding resources (such as motor vehicles) should be based on the violent crime rate for an area.



Reduction in bureaucratic controls:
This may be difficult to implement as measures aimed at reducing corruption are largely given as the reasons for this structure. However, if more authority and responsibility were devolved to local level this might lessen the need to refer to many levels of command.



Improved performance measurement:
The performance of individual detectives, units and provinces should be carefully monitored, not only to identify poor performance, but to identify excellence and thereby identify ‘best practices’. The planned electronic linking of case records from when a crime is reported to the case outcome, should help to develop objective measures of detective performance.



Promotions without managerial role:
The SAPS plan to grant ‘pay-promotions’ which will exclude a managerial role and thereby maintain skills and reward good performance should be implemented using objective measures of performance.

Many of these changes may require more of the share of national expenditure, and the deployment of far greater numbers of detectives in the fight against crime. The suggestion is that SAPS should increase its complement of detectives beyond the approximately 20% of personnel it currently comprises.

Investigation capacity at station level requires further improvement, especially in the fields of family violence and child protection. This does not necessarily mean that such units should be closed to create that capacity. Stations need to receive skilled persons and the necessary facilities.

Capacity to investigate complaints against SAPS, and corruption within the police, should be boosted

The precarious positions of the ICD and the anti-corruption units need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. The anti-corruption unit should be a distinct entity outside of any other structure in the detective service, as it was prior to restructuring.

Currently the ICD, after conducting a preliminary investigation, investigates ‘only those cases which cannot be investigated by the SAPS or other agencies’.101 In other words, the default position is that the detective service must investigate the bulk of cases. At the very least, all deaths in police custody, or as a result of police action, should at all stages be investigated by the ICD.

Clarify the mandate of the serious and violent crime unit

The mandate of the serious and violent crime unit is problematic and needs to be clarified. There is potential for confusion, and consequently repeating many of the problems which prompted the restructuring of the detective service and the closure of most specialised units in the first place.

Reduce the duplication of functions within the detective service and between detectives, DSO and intelligence gathering agencies

There is overlap between the various structures responsible for investigating and preventing crime in South Africa. In a country with limited resources, we cannot afford the luxury of unnecessary duplication.

A proper determination should be made as to the kinds of crime to be investigated by SAPS and the DSO. Prosecution-led, group and leader-targeted investigations are only appropriate for known criminals and known criminal groups, and not for crimes in which the perpetrator is not known. It is therefore suggested that such investigations dealing with known criminals be the preserve of the DSO. There also needs to be further evaluation of the work of intelligence structures.