Police practices and the level of police staffing influence the recorded incidence of so-called 'victimless' crimes such as drug-related offences, gambling and prostitution. Furthermore, differences in police numbers across geographical areas also affect crime statistics, as do police management and control. For example, certain crimes which are hard to solve may be recorded less often than others in order to inflate the recorded rate at which crimes are solved by the police.1

In South Africa, many of these determinants have been complicated by historical factors. In terms of the relationship between the public and the police, the latter have, in the past, functioned more as an army enforcing and maintaining a particular system of government rather than a legitimate agency protecting the rights of the country's citizens. The deep animosity which this engendered against the police undoubtedly still affects crime reporting.

The historical exclusion from the former South African Police (SAP) records of crimes reported in the so-called bantustans implies that the 'dark figure' of unrecorded crime in the country is substantial. For example, no data has been obtainable for the former Transkei, Ciskei and parts of Bophuthatswana in the period prior to 1996. And although South African Police Service (SAPS) statistics now include these areas, the chronic shortages of infrastructure, human resources and training in them – not to mention inefficiency and corruption – mean that it may be some time before even current statistics can be considered to be a true reflection of the crime situation.

A comprehensive victimisation survey has not been undertaken throughout South Africa. By gathering information from people about their experiences of crime, these surveys attempt to provide information which escapes official sources as a result of reporting and recording tendencies. The official SAPS crime statistics are thus the only ones available. Given the problems outlined above, these figures should not be analysed for minutiae and rejected out of hand, but probed for broader trends. Measuring crime during apartheid's last decade shows, perhaps surprisingly, that at the height of political conflict in the 1980s rates of increases in some crimes appeared to slow down (figures 1-6, pages 21–23). The state of emergency from 1985 to 1990 probably suppressed crime levels, as well as the reporting and recording of crimes that did occur.

Political liberalisation in 1990 brought a crime explosion as social controls were loosened and certain new opportunities opened up for the growth of criminal activity.2 Rising crime is probably related to political, social and economic trends which began before the formal political transition but were accentuated by it. Evidence suggests that crime rates in black townships have been high for years, but that racial segregation largely insulated whites from its effects. The erosion and then collapse of apartheid boundaries allowed crime to move out of the townships and into the suburbs, where it is more likely to be recorded.

Recorded levels of almost all crime increased significantly in the period 1990 to 1994. Most crimes increased phenomenally during this period: assault increased by 18 per cent, rape by 42 per cent, robbery by 40 per cent, vehicle theft by 34 per cent, and burglary by 20 per cent. Crimes of the affluent also increased; although accurate figures are not available, commercial crimes increased significantly.

Since 1994 an analysis of the most recent crime rates per 100 000 of the population suggests that while many crimes are increasing, the rates of increase in a few serious crimes are stabilising.3 Attempted murder, rape, robbery (excluding armed robbery), serious and common assault and housebreakings have all increased. The only crimes that have stabilised to some degree are murder, armed robbery, and motor vehicle theft (table 1).4a

Stabilisation is, however, occurring at very high levels. Given the limited period of time against which this is measured, it is too soon to argue – as the SAPS has – that a downturn may follow. Indeed, reporting levels of some categories of crime, notably rape and assault, continue to increase. Comparative experience from other societies with high levels of crime suggests that unless adequate policy measures are taken, criminal activity has the potential to become institutionalised. Thus the next three to five years present a crucial window for the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies. Despite this, however, national trends should be treated with caution, since a closer analysis reveals that crime is not stabilising in all parts of the country.

Table 1: Changing crime rates, 1994–6

In fact, the impact of crime on the country is not uniform, and increases in crime appear to affect different parts of South African society in different ways. This implies that since not all South Africans are exposed to equal dangers, different strategies will need to be devised in particular areas to curb crime.

Since 1994 Gauteng, Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape have had the highest murder rates of all the provinces (figure 7,). Since that year the murder rate has declined in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Northern Province. Rates appear to be increasing in Mpumalanga, North West and Western Cape.

The national picture for assault is quite different. By far the highest rates of serious assault were recorded in Northern and Western Cape (figure 10). Also, unlike the murder figures, rates have generally remained the same since 1994 throughout the country, except for those in Northern Cape, which have steadily increased. Common assault trends show similar patterns (figure 11, page 26). The spatial distribution of rape is similar to that of assault, with most rapes per head of population occurring in Northern Cape, Gauteng, and Western Cape (figure 9).

Turning to property crimes, aggravated robbery – which is also a violent crime – displays a very different trend to the other violent crimes. By far the highest rates occur in Gauteng, followed at much lower levels by KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape (figure 12). Other robberies of a less violent nature also occur at a higher rate in Gauteng, although rates are higher in Western and Northern Cape than for aggravated robbery (figure 13). These less serious robberies have also increased markedly in 1996, particularly in Gauteng and North West provinces.

Housebreaking is generally stabilising in many provinces (figure 14). Thefts from business premises occur most frequently in Western and Northern Cape, although these figures are hard to interpret and would be more comparable if measured off business ownership rather than unit of population. Housebreaking involving residential premises clearly afflicts Gauteng more than other provinces, although rates in Western Cape are also high. As with other property crimes, housebreaking rates are also high in Northern Cape and Free State.

Within provinces, crime patterns also vary between rural and urban areas. Crime rates are usually higher in cities than in rural areas; in the former, factors associated with high crime rates predominate, such as greater population density, increased opportunities for crime, urbanisation and attendant overcrowding, unemployment, gang activity, and the availability of firearms. The anonymity of cities, particularly in respect of the perpetration of property crimes, is also relevant.4b

These factors, along with the history of years of political (and, in the case of Cape Town, gang) violence, rapid urbanisation, burgeoning informal settlements and related dynamics associated with the 'breakdown of apartheid cities',5 would account for the higher crime rates in Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, where the urban complexes around Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban respectively are located. But high violent crime rates in Northern Cape are less easy to explain, since there are no comparable urban areas in this province.

The complexity of spatial crime patterns is highlighted by an analysis of crime rates in 1994 in urban and 'non-urban' areas of the former provinces.6 Higher violent crime rates were found in the non-urban than the urban areas of Northern Cape, Western Cape and former Natal. In the other provinces, crime rates generally were higher in the urban complexes than in the surrounding non-urban areas. This shapes explanations of the high violent crime rates in Northern and Western Cape, since it suggests that many of these crimes occur outside the urban areas. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal, this trend is more easily explained by the spread of political violence to rural areas of the province after 1990.7

VULNERABILITY TO VICTIMISATION

Crime, then, does not affect all citizens uniformly – race, class and gender are significant determinants of the nature of victimisation in South Africa. In comparative terms, the wealthy are victims of property crime, while the poor are the victims of violent crime as well as of property crime.

Ironically, it was not until 1988 that the commissioner of the SAP again began to provide race-specific crime statistics. Marks and Andersson have shown that Africans are 20 times more at risk from a homicide death than whites.8 Indeed, SAP figures for the late 1980s – when crime began to grow rapidly – show that whites were victims of only 4,2 per cent of rapes and 2,8 per cent of murders.9

The disproportionate risk of violence for black (and poor) people is also illustrated by a hospital-based survey of non-fatal injuries due to external causes in Johannesburg–Soweto between 1989 and 1990. Butchart et al found that among victims of interpersonal violence, 22 per cent were coloured (8 per cent of the denominator population), and 68 per cent were African (62 per cent of the population).10 According to the authors these findings are not surprising, given the 'well-documented observation that interpersonal violence the world over and in colonial societies in particular occurs most frequently among people subject to the dual pressures of structurally entrenched economic and racial inequalities'.11

Similar results were reported by the Cape Metropolitan Study in respect of rates of violence against women in 1990: the annual incidence of violence measured per 100 000 of the population was 3 546 for African women, 2 169 for coloureds, and 313 for whites.12

Race classification in South Africa often, but not always, reflects income differences between groups of people. Hence victimisation statistics for black South Africans are used here to represent victimisation of the country's poor. The Cape Metropolitan Study confirms this association: most of the women who were victims of violence in 1990 were unemployed or occupied low-income jobs, and 93 per cent reported a monthly household income of less than R1 000.13

Violence against women, rich and poor, largely occurs in the home environment or is perpetrated by people known to the woman. Poverty can, however, predispose women and children to becoming victims of domestic violence. High unemployment and the marginalisation of men increase the risk of domestic violence for these family members.14 Research conducted in working class townships around Durban revealed a link between domestic (and political) violence and the erosive effects of apartheid and poverty on men's ability to generate and control the resources of the community and family – traditionally the basis of their respect and power.

Compensation, sometimes through violence, may be sought within the family where authority over women and children – still largely regarded as men's property – is socially more acceptable.15

Problems which begin as conflict within the family over money or food reportedly often result in violence.16 The fact that women and children often feel 'trapped' and powerless in abusive relationships due to their dependence on partners for food, shelter and money enables this violence to continue – thus exposing poor women to greater levels of repeat victimisation. Dependencies of this sort have been associated with cases of assault and rape within the domestic environment being withdrawn after charges are laid with the police.17 Women, particularly those with children, fear the loss of support which separation from or a jail term for a breadwinner might result in.18 Independence of men and the ability to get and keep adequately paid jobs are crucial for women to permanently leave abusive relationships.19 For poor women, these opportunities are especially limited.

Victims of rape, perhaps more so than those of domestic violence, seem to be concentrated among the poor: in 1995 the SAPS estimated that 95 per cent of rapes were reported by African women. More specifically, in 1992 65 per cent of rapes reported in Johannesburg, Alexandra and Soweto occurred in Soweto. And in Hillbrow, 71 per cent of rape victims in cases reported to the police were African, although the 1991 census recorded three times as many white women as Africans in the area.20

A countrywide survey of perceptions of crime conducted in 1995 (henceforth referred to as the 1995 HSRC survey) analysed according to per capita income reinforces these conclusions: a much higher proportion of those in the lowest income quartile reported being the victims of violent crimes than those in higher income brackets.21 Half of the 'very poor' category of respondents (with a per capita income of less than R116 a month) reported assault as being 'the most important crime' committed against them or a member of their household, as opposed to only one in 10 of the highest income category (with a per capita income of R713). After assault, the most commonly reported crime by the 'very poor' was child abuse and rape, accounting for 17 per cent of victimisation. None of the respondents in the remaining income categories listed this crime.

The predominance of violent crime among the poor is reinforced by further survey material on whether injuries were sustained as a result of most commonly reported crimes. The proportion of crimes in which no injuries occurred increased with income: 36,2 per cent of the first (poorest) income quartile reported no injuries, followed by 43,4 per cent of the second quartile, 65,6 per cent of the third, and 77,3 per cent of the highest income group. More crimes committed against the poorest group therefore involved violence.22

Crimes of property, unlike violent crimes, affect South Africans across the racial and class spectrum, reflecting patterns of wealth and ownership. In the late 1980s, for example, 48,6 per cent of all burglaries occurred on white residential premises, 24,1 per cent on black residential premises, and the rest on business premises.23 The 1995 HSRC survey shows a more even distribution of property crime victimisation than of violent crime. However, it suggests that the 'very poor' are less likely to be victims of property crime than the moderately better off (with monthly per capita incomes of between R116 and R713). One in five of the latter reported having been victimised by housebreakings, as opposed to only 5,4 per cent of the 'very poor'. In fact, the 'very poor' and the highest earners reported being victims of housebreaking, robbery and theft of motor vehicles less often than the middle income category. The most commonly reported crime in the highest income group was the theft of goods. This is probably a function of different degrees of property ownership combined with differential access to security measures.

Areas inhabited by the poor are less likely to have the kinds of infrastructural development – such as street lighting and urban planning – which facilitate personal crime prevention. For example, woman in rural areas of Northern Province rated electrification as a high priority in improving their life circumstances, given that it reduced their vulnerability to physical attack and sexual assault.24 The same would apply to people living in urban and particularly informal settlements, where a lack of infrastructural development also places the poor at greater risk: the layout of overcrowded squatter camps where access roads are absent have been linked to violence between households as well as more random attacks.25 A recent study of violence and injury in a Johannesburg township found that the rate of both fatal and non-fatal attacks was almost twice as high in the informal settlements – which are also the poorest – than in the other neighbourhoods.26

Also, having to walk long distances to collect water and firewood in rural areas increases women's chances of victimisation. In the former homeland of KaNgwane, for example, most rapes which advice workers were aware of were committed while women were away from their homes performing these chores; they believed that 'basic utilities would greatly increase women's safety'.27 A similar problem has been reported in urban areas. In a squatter settlement outside Somerset West in the Western Cape, 'stories of rape and attacks on women collecting wood fuel in the forests abounded, and each women had at least one story of being accosted by unknown men. The forests were renowned as places of evil and danger, where skollies roamed.Women were very aware of the dangers of rape, but their only protection was one another.'28 Given that 48,6 per cent of the three million African rural households in South Africa have no access to piped water, 55 per cent and 57 per cent rely on wood for cooking and heating respectively, and 20 per cent have no access to sanitation,29 the implications in terms of safety are evident.

Another perspective in terms of access to infrastructure is that poor communities can be 'entrapped' in a deprived environment if crime acts as a disincentive to infrastructural investments, or if infrastructure is destroyed or stolen. People in the rural community of Blinkwater in Northern Province, for example, reported that the pump which supplied the local water reservoir was too far from the community to be secure, and that one pump had already been stolen.30

The installation of infrastructure such as telephones and roads may also facilitate policing. In a survey in Northern Cape, 99 per cent of respondents said they would feel safer from crime if they had access to a telephone.31 (In the case of roads, though, it has been shown that the development of rural road networks in the former Transkei makes communities more accessible not only to the police but also to criminals.32)

One key survival strategy of the poor to rising levels of insecurity – of which declining feelings of physical safety are only one component – is to move.33 Environmental factors which heighten the vulnerability of the poor to crime contribute to this decision. Political violence has been identified as a reason for migration both to and within informal settlements in KwaZulu-Natal.34 The 1995 HSRC survey showed that substantially more people in poorer income groups 'seriously considered' moving as a response to declining levels of safety: 13 per cent of the 'very poor' agreed that moving was one response to crime, as opposed to 4 per cent of the wealthiest category of respondents.

The poor are also less able to install physical security measures such as burglar proofing and electronic alarms to protect their property. In any event, patterns of victimisation of the poor in relation to violent crime suggest that the installation of such security devices would have less effect than for wealthier groups, because poorer people are more likely to be victimised by those whom they know (or even live with). In a Johannesburg township, between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of all violence was found to be intimate or 'acquaintance' violence – as opposed to stranger or gang violence, for example – which occurred most often in homes or in other private settings.35 In the 1995 HSRC survey, 42 per cent of the 'very poor' group reported the offender being known by the victim, as opposed to only 6 per cent of the highest income group. This suggests that the provision of physical security measures would not prevent victimisation.

On another level, those who are wealthier are in a position to hire physical protection measures in the form of private security, which the poor cannot afford. In South Africa this has wider consequences: the pervasive use of private security in the (white) suburbs means that a critical mass of private policing is reached which provides a greater degree of overall protection to wealthier areas. In comparative terms, poorer areas are doubly disadvantaged: not only are similar levels of private policing unavailable, but public policing resources too are generally underdeveloped. In fact, the poor – and thus the majority of South Africans – are more likely to be policed solely by the public police than those who are economically better off.

The poor are further disadvantaged by the fact that public police resources were (and still are) concentrated almost entirely in white areas: in 1996, 74,6 per cent of police stations nationally were based in white areas.36 South Africa thus has a legacy of uneven policing, which has contributed to the popular perception that the country is underpoliced in comparison with other societies. In fact, the SAPS is not much smaller proportionately than forces in other countries. Its combined police strength is 3,1 active force members for every 1 000 people – not much less than the European average of 3,5.37

In South Africa, these factors combined mean that the poor are particularly disadvantaged in respect of policing: the reliance by lower income groups on (in many cases inadequate and even non-existent) public transport, and the necessity of walking long distances in public areas, puts them at risk. For example, in the Johannesburg inner city in 1992, many rapes were committed while women were travelling to and from work.

By contrast, reported rapes in white suburbs were less common and occurred mainly in situations of housebreaking and theft.38 In addition to the higher situational risk associated with public places, the transformation of the public police has not (and will not in the short to medium term) produce safer working and living environments.

Given that the environment – public transport and shopping areas – in which the poor live their day-to-day lives is more likely to be policed publicly than privately , and that historically sufficient police resources have not been allocated to these areas, the risk of victimisation may be greater.

This growing divide between how the rich and poor are policed has important longer-term policy implications. Greater public pressure (in many cases from the wealthy) for police to concentrate on law enforcement accentuates this dualism: 'The rich will be increasingly policed preventively by commercial security, while the poor will be policed reactively by enforcement-oriented public police. Moreover, since there seems to be a qualitative difference in the efficacy of these approaches – deterrence versus protection – the poor will also be relatively less secure.'39

A counter to this might be that community networks in poorer areas help to prevent crime, given the stronger community surveillance networks which they may provide. Yet research on the experience and perceptions of poverty in South Africa strongly indicates that 'the notion of community is extremely tenuous ... The result is that many communities are extremely divided, with little commonality in terms of needs and aspirations.'40

This has important implications for, inter alia, community policing initiatives. Experiences in townships in Eastern Cape, for example, have shown that the success of community police forums depends on issues such as sustaining the community's interest, participation and long-term commitment, and an ability to resolve internal community (or police–community) conflicts.41 The importance of cohesion and common purpose suggests that the chances of community policing succeeding as a crime prevention strategy in poorer areas are greatly reduced.

VULNERABILITY TO THE EFFECTS OF VICTIMISATION

An old police adage illustrates that it is difficult to prioritise crime according to the value of the property stolen or influence of the victim: the impact of the loss of an uninsured bicycle on someone with no other means of transport is greater than that of a BMW to its typical owner, who is covered by insurance and access to other means of transport. This suggests that while the actual loss of the 'haves' as a result of criminal activity may be substantial in financial terms, the cost of crime for the 'have-nots' is greater, given fewer available mechanisms – such as insurance and alternative means of transport – to cushion the effects of being victimised.

This introduces the concept of vulnerability – a crucial component of conceptualising poverty, 'whereby poverty is not only about being poor, it is also about the risk of becoming poor or poorer in the face of change'.42 The shock of being victimised by crime makes the poor more vulnerable by eroding the means available to them to withstand its effects, and to recover afterwards. Described in terms of 'assets', these means may take a variety of forms: stores of wealth; productive resources (such as land and housing); human assets such as labour, health and education; and social networks. In some cases, heightened vulnerability may force victims to resort to criminal activity as a means of survival – beginning a process whereby the poor are criminalised by the desperate nature of their plight.

South African research has substantiated the argument that 'the main asset of most poor people is their body'43 – the link between their ability to work and earn an income. If this is the case, violent crime levels in South Africa mean that the odds are heavily stacked against the majority of the country's people: trauma has been identified as the major cause of potential and actual loss of productive work time in the country. More than 16 per cent of all deaths in South Africa occur as a result of trauma, compared to the World Health Organisation's global figure of 5,2 per cent. This ranks trauma as the second largest cause of overall deaths (after circulatory diseases), compared to a ranking of fourth place in the United States – considered to be a violent society – and even lower in most other countries.44

Not all trauma is the result of crime, but in South Africa it is the leading cause of injury and death: of the trauma cases recorded in the Cape Metropolitan area in 1990, 34 per cent of injuries and 53,2 per cent of deaths were caused by violence.45 Violent crime, it has been argued, takes its toll on the health and lives of the poor in particular. In the most extreme cases, the death of income-generating family members appears to be one of the most severe shocks which cause vulnerable households to rapidly become poverty-stricken.46

Crime also affects people's ability to work in less direct ways. For example, restrictions on movement in high crime areas, intimidation associated with gang activity, intimidation associated with political conflict (and work stayaways), transport problems associated with taxi or train violence, and the loss of employment opportunities when business premises are destroyed, causes businesses to close. In a study of the perceptions of violence among residents of the Phola Park squatter camp on the East Rand, 16 per cent of people said they or their partners had lost their jobs as a result of violence – mainly because they could not get to work during prolonged periods of violence.47 Research in South Africa and other developing countries has shown that the loss of the ability to seek employment is the shock which has the greatest impact on many poor people.48

Health and education are 'human assets' closely linked to people's ability to work, since they are two factors which determine the returns on labour. In terms of mental and physical health, the conditions faced by children in poor households in South Africa are dire. At least part of the problem is attributable to violence. Research among the country's poor showed that 'children are being abused and neglected on an unacceptable scale', aspects of which include sexual abuse and rape, and children being forced into prostitution.49 According to the poor themselves, alcohol abuse also leads to child abuse. Children are also not continuously parented or schooled, having to often relocate due to crises or as a coping strategy for poverty.50

Violent crime quite obviously affects people's health – but the poor face not only greater chances of victimisation, but also limited access to health services. In fact, research suggests that public health services do not reach the poor, particularly those in isolated rural areas.51 This problem is magnified where mental health care is concerned. Mental health in general and the provision of related services have been neglected in the past. There is a high burn-out and turnover rate among social workers, because the health and welfare system is poorly resourced and its staff overburdened. Even when social work services are available, they often achieve little more than crisis management. In rural Tsolo and Qumbu in the former Transkei, where violence has claimed more than 400 lives since 1993, the three social workers can provide only material support for victims for the first 24 hours – no counselling and support for families and children are possible.52 When considered in conjunction with the country's high levels of violent crime, the absence of mental health care bodes ill for this society's long-term productivity and stability.

Crime affects access to education when schools are closed as a result of violence and gang-related activity, or if pupils and teachers fear attending due to the threat of victimisation. Research among the poor, for example, has found that sexual harassment contributes to girls' failure to continue education, since it often leads to pregnancy.53 Crime, or the threat of crime, in turn reduces the ability of the poor to improve their chances of gaining employment. While this is an obvious point, it remains important, since education has consistently been listed as a priority area for improved access to income generation by the poor themselves.54

Social networks, in the form of household and broader community relations, constitute additional non-material resources which enable people to withstand conditions of poverty. The family size and number of workers in a home determines the disposable income available to the household. Broader social networks also link individuals and families, allowing for co-operation and support around common problems. Within the household, crimes such as domestic violence undermine these networks. Women are unable to leave when they or their children need the housing and/or income which an abuser provides. In cases where there is a history of abuse, they are often afraid to ask their partners for money, or are forced to hand over the income they themselves have earned.55

Violence more generally may also result in the dispersal and relocation of the family.56 After suffering similar effects from years of 'institutional violence' brought about by mass removals and migrant labour, the disintegration of family life – particularly for those barely able to ensure members' survival and development – is compounded by violence.57

The poor are therefore not only the most vulnerable to certain categories of crime, but are also vulnerable to the effects that victimisation may have. While it has been argued that the poor in general are vulnerable to victimisation, the degree of vulnerability and the nature of victimisation vary according to specific circumstances. This relationship is explored by examining two case studies.