The Restructuring of the SAPS and the Detective Service

This monograph has examined a number of issues affecting the performance of the SAPS’s detective service in post-apartheid South Africa. In the second section, it was argued that policing consisted of three key sets of services: public reassurance, visibility and patrol; crowd management; and investigation. It was further argued that the investigative function is central to the management of crime in South Africa, essentially because there is very little prospect that policing will be able to reduce crime successfully — or that social processes which have the effect of reducing crime will do so — while criminals are perceived to go unpunished.

In the third section the nature of the work performed by South African detectives was considered. The basic process of criminal investigations was examined, along with six areas relevant to effective detective work, namely resources; the role of the rest of the SAPS; personal qualities; management; the role of the community; and the role of the CJS. However, in doing so the transition to democracy and the consequent transformation of the environment in which investigations take place was ignored.

For that reason, the fourth section looked at the implications of the transition to democracy on criminal law. In doing so, the limited effect of the transformation on the law itself was demonstrated. It was found that, although some areas of South African criminal law have been affected by the adoption of the constitution, in practice the only really significant changes were the treatment of juvenile offenders by the CJS (which had been magnified by the disjuncture between processes of resourcing and policy-making in the CJS), and the attitude of the courts to the protection of the rights of the accused. The effect of the latter is that, even while the law has remained largely unchanged, achieving convictions is more difficult in practice.1

Having examined all these issues, a final one remains: the effect of the transformation of the SAPS on the functioning of the detective service. Much of this transformation was not a necessary consequence of democratisation. While the interim constitution did set certain parameters within which policing was to be restructured,2 much of its content was decided on by police senior management and the ministry for safety and security. Therefore, these changes are not strictly speaking political, and have more of a departmental, managerial character than anything else (although they do include decisions made by politicians).

Before looking at the issues raised by grass roots detectives in relation to the transformation, it is worth setting out some of its key elements. The transformation of the investigative function of policing began in the early 1990s when the security branch was closed down by then president F W de Klerk. In reality the branch was not so much closed down as redirected, receiving a new mandate designed to end its surveillance of and interference in political organisations, and reorient it towards suppressing crime.3 This process, which was not without its hiccups, really only affected the functioning of certain specialised units, whose mandates overlapped with the new mandate. Thus, the effect of that restructuring was limited to parts of the investigative service only. However, the restructuring process implemented after 1994, had a far greater impact.

The interim constitution, as well as the green paper on safety and security of 1994, the SAPS Act of 1996, and government policy more generally, directed the newly emerging SAPS to adopt, and give effect to, the philosophy of community policing. Two of the key pillars of that philosophy are that crime is best managed at a local level, and that the station commander must be accountable to the community which he or she serves. Both of these perspectives — especially when combined with the view that the SAPS should focus on preventing as opposed to investigating crime — had significant implications for the management of detectives.

Until 1994 the SAP and its sister agencies were modelled on the 1950s American corporation and its philosophy of ‘scientific management’. The central tenets of this were to break the job down to its simplest parts, select the most appropriate workers to fit the available jobs, turn them into specialists, put them on an assembly line, and design the right set of incentives to make sure they do the work.4 The effect in policing, as in many state departments, was a rigid division of labour between the component parts of the organisation, each with its own hierarchy, bureaucracy and culture.

The division of labour and consequently divided structure meant that the management of detectives at station level and the management of the uniformed branch was not consolidated in the hands of any one individual — except in the trivial sense that the commissioner of police in Pretoria was responsible for all of it. Instead, the uniform branch and the CID each had their own commander at station level, each was responsible to a different manager at district level, and so on. This separation of command and control, however, meant that the management of crime at a local level was not co-ordinated by any one person — each component had its responsibilities, but there might be no strategic co-ordination to deal with crime problems in a community.5 Thus the separation of the management of police officers was seen as an obstacle to the coherent management of crime. In order to rectify this, the management of station level detectives and the uniform branch were consolidated at the level of the station commissioner, who became responsible for both ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ policing.6 The establishment of CPFs to enhance local-level accountability reinforced this process, since it enabled the community to deal with only one face at a local level.

Thus, between 1994 and 1996, the management of detectives at a local level was radically changed. Detectives’ views on, and experiences of, this process are discussed below.

Restructuring and the management of detectives

Detectives at the grass roots, in specialised units, at head office as well as those who have left the service are virtually unanimous that the restructuring of the police has been an unmitigated disaster.7 This view, supported by anecdote, theory and opinion, probably reflects both the reality of the efficacy of the restructuring and the extent to which this change marked a radical break with organisational tradition, history and culture. To what extent each of these influences individual views is, of course, hard to establish. The manner in which different individuals justify their view that, in the words of one commanding officer, ‘the detective service is going down at an angle of 85 degrees’ varies, but certain common themes emerge. These are covered in the next few sections.

Management problems at a local level

The assumption of responsibility for station-level detectives by station commissioners coincided with the latters’ appointment. Thus, at the same time when the management of crime at a local level was being consolidated, there was open competition for the relevant posts — a competition detective commanders were able to participate in.

There were, however, a number of obstacles standing in the way of too many detectives being appointed as station commissioners. Among these were:

the widespread perception — also among detectives — that detectives make poor personnel managers;



the more extensive managerial experience of station commanders, the vast majority of whom had spent their careers in the uniformed branch;



the conception of community policing, which stresses the preventive and proactive side of policing, a conception which tended to favour the experience of uniformed police officers over detectives; and



the relative absence of experienced black detectives of officer rank, making it more difficult to find suitable black officers to command stations from the ranks of detectives.

The upshot was that the bulk of station commissioners were appointed from the ranks of the uniformed branch.8

Detectives regard this change in their local command as both gratuitous and traumatic. Much of their distress presumably emanates from the historical antagonisms and differences between the two basic components of the police. While a few detectives argue that some of their station commissioners have actively sought to undermine the strength of detectives, most view the changes as having placed in overall command an individual with no investigative experience and who frequently ignores the advice of and requests of the head of proactive policing (the commander of the detective service).9 The result has been to downgrade investigative work and render detective units less able to compete for resources in internal processes. Thus, one head of detectives complained that 12 vehicles assigned to the detectives at his station had been reassigned to the uniform branch.10

Heads of reactive policing were also given additional responsibilities, such as managing community service centres. In some cases, particularly where human resources are especially scarce, detectives have been made to staff these centres in shifts.11

In order to understand why these changes have affected the morale of detectives and their views of transformation, one must recognise that the expectations they had when joining — expectations formed in part by organisational culture and history — have been contradicted by their experience of the new detective service. Even relatively newly appointed detectives, keen to enjoy the same organisational experiences as those who went before, are dissatisfied. It is not surprising, when one’s career path and job description are changed for the worse, that this is regarded just as negatively as any other disadvantageous change in one’s basic conditions of employment.

Concerns about heads of reactive policing

Concerns over the degree to which station commissioners can effectively direct detectives are amplified by concerns over the appointment of heads of reactive policing. Detectives frequently complain that too many of these appointees do not have the necessary skills and experience.

This concern, which in some cases undoubtedly reflects an implicit or explicit racism, is not an uncommon refrain in the SAPS in general. At the same time, it is striking that white detectives will also say this of their white commanders, as will black detectives of their black commanders. It carries special conviction in the case of detectives with many years (even decades) of experience who are now being commanded by a younger person who has, until recently, been a member of the uniformed branch.12

However, the organisational basis for this concern does not lie in the transformation of the SAPS but in its rank and promotions policy, which prizes academic achievement over years of experience, resulting in relatively underqualified members being commanded by relatively inexperienced officers.13 This policy, while it does lead to instances in which individuals thought to be better suited to the job are overlooked because of a lack of academic qualifications, is not entirely irrational, however. It can help to identify potential and capacity, provided the qualifications achieved are a good proxy for skills levels. At the same time, the negative effects are accentuated in police restructuring because policemen with officer rank have had to be accommodated irrespective of their organisational history. As a result, over the past eight years, a significant number of ranking uniformed officers have ‘laterally’ entered the detective service.

Again, this has resulted in detectives feeling they are managed by members without the requisite experience. They say this means that, whereas in the past a detective could rely on his or her commanding officer for practical and accurate guidance, today that guidance is less reliable — a situation which is not helped by the perception that the law and the attitude of the courts have changed as well. This process is of serious concern in the medium term, and will be dealt with again in the concluding section.

Management at higher levels

Older and retired detectives are concerned about the extent to which the station commissioner’s assumption of responsibility for detectives has reduced the internal pressure on local detectives to perform. They argue that, in the past, the separation of structures meant there was a great deal of pressure on local CID commanders to perform. Each morning, for instance, they had to inform their district CID commander of every serious crime reported during the past 24 hours, as well as the state of the investigation. Because the 80-plus districts have been consolidated into 42 areas, and because the station commissioner is responsible for more than just the investigation of crime, the effective pressure on a detective’s commander (and on the detective) is significantly reduced.14

Loss of skills

It is common cause in the detective service that it has lost skills, and continues to do so. There is some dispute, however, about the consequences of this loss. Some maintain the loss is of members inappropriately ‘schooled’ in the skills and techniques of another age. Moreover, because the overwhelming majority of detectives were similarly schooled, the argument is that those who left were the ones least happy with democratisation, working for the new state, and the organisational trajectory of the SAPS. Thus those who remain are more likely to have the aptitude and willingness to adapt to the demands of the present transformation of society and policing, and that the loss of those who have left is not therefore overwhelming.

The bulk of detectives, especially the more experienced ones, do not share this view entirely. They argue that the detective service, like the SAPS as a whole, has rid itself of numerous members who reduced organisational legitimacy and hindered transformation by their presence, and whose loss is therefore not lamented. However, they argued that many managerial and investigative skills are generic, and the loss of these, despite their having been compromised and shaped by the history of apartheid policing, is a significant loss to the service.15 Indeed, they argue this loss, at precisely the moment when the organisation was at its most vulnerable, has left a deep scar which will not heal quickly, if ever.

Whether the service has in fact lost much-needed skills is hard for outsiders to verify, especially when the nature of policing and society has changed. At the same time, it seems from much of the interview material that detectives do not believe their work has been enormously affected by changes in the legal regime, nor by any changes to the principles and processes of criminal investigation. If this is true — and it appears to be — then the skills lost would have been relevant to the work of the detective service today. At the same time, it must be recognised that those who have left may not have been happy in the SAPS, and may have acted as a brake on productivity and transformation.

What is clear from all the interviews is that, given the high case loads and social pressure for increased efficacy, the loss of skilled people has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of detectives.16 More important, however, is the continuing effect that the loss of personnel has on morale.

Detectives speak at great length about the increased case load per detective over the past four to five years. This is due to the increase in crime and the coincident decline in numbers of experienced detectives. While this decline is not due solely to resignations — deaths, voluntary transfers and appointments elsewhere each play a role — the net effect is increased pressure on fewer members. This increase in workload and pressure is directly linked to lower morale, which has led to greater frustration and an increased willingness to complain — which further lowers morale.17

The redistribution of resources

All police officers regard themselves as resource-constrained, and detectives are no exception to this. The extremes, such as the case of Tsolo described in the first section where basic detective work is impossible because resources are so scarce, are hopefully quite rare. However, inequalities in resourcing are dramatic. Shaped by apartheid, they match inequalities of income, unemployment and other demographic factors. Thus policing — a function intended to pick up the pieces when other social processes break down — is weakest in precisely those areas where social problems are most extreme.

Detectives in the former bantustans and townships are generally those who have had least access to training, least support from the rest of the SAPS (which is also weaker in those areas than in former white areas), and fewest resources. They work in courts which are often the most chaotic. They are also most disappointed in the perceived failure of the SAPS to redistribute resources towards underresourced areas, stations and units.

Morale and pride

Perhaps the most consistent theme in all the interviews revolved around the extent to which detectives’ morale and pride in their work is thought to have declined. This theme was present in almost every interview, and was most dominant among senior detectives. They argue that the sum of all the aspects of transformation — changes in the law and SAPS restructuring — has resulted in a steep decline in pride and morale among detectives.

This, they point out, is particularly problematic because the nature of a detective’s work is such that micro management is impossible. It is impossible, through supervision and control, to ensure that detectives make every effort, persevere in the face of difficulties, and are willing to ‘chase the devil himself’. Detective work requires too much independence from supervision, and it is therefore too easy for detectives who are unwilling to work hard to get away with lower levels of effort.

Some of the interviewees probably overstated the extent to which individual detectives were motivated in the past. Indeed, some would have had one believe that detectives uncomplainingly worked unpaid overtime for years until the transformation of the SAPS, and the decline in morale. Nonetheless, as with many other processes, the idea of declining morale can be a self-fulfilling prophecy when repeated widely.

Many reasons are given for this, some of which have been discussed above. Having done so, it is worth thinking about the developmental trajectory of the investigative function of policing in South Africa, which will be done in the final section.

Endnotes