The Illegal Trade in Endangered Species1


by Kathleen E du Bois
M Phil Criminology (Canterbury)

Published in African Security Review Vol 6, No 1, 1997

INTRODUCTION

The conservation of endangered fauna and flora species is an increasingly topical and controversial issue, both on a national and international level. Despite the concerted efforts of independent organisations, government agencies and private individuals, many species face the inevitable prospect of extinction due to environmental degradation and the threat of the illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products. Nor are the financial considerations to be underestimated – the illegal trade in endangered species is presently the third largest contraband business (after the trade in illegal drugs and weapons) and worth an average of $10 billion per annum.

South Africa is at the forefront of the struggle to combat the trade in endangered species and is faced, in particular, with increased poaching and a growing illegal trade in rhino horn. South Africa has a history of successful nature conservation and presently contains more than sixty per cent of the world's rhino population. Given the concentration of these animals within the borders of one country, it is likely that the poaching and smuggling of rhino horn will escalate as market demand for the product increases in the foreseeable future. In fact, as the remaining animals are decimated in East Africa, the attention of international traders has turned increasingly towards the existing viable populations, thereby placing law enforcement agencies in South Africa under extreme pressure to contain and eliminate this kind of criminal behaviour. The illegal trade is typified by the high rewards obtained, the relative lack of risk of capture, and insufficient legislative penalties and, as such, is increasingly being infiltrated by organised crime networks.

Whether the South African authorities' attempts to halt the illegal trade in rhino horn will ensure the survival of the remaining rhino populations is not certain, given the international context in which these criminals operate and the vast smuggling networks at their disposal. Clearly, the devastating and far-reaching effects of this trade present a serious threat to the national heritage and economic conditions of the host country and, as such, constitute a challenge to law enforcement bodies world-wide.

THE DECLINE OF THE RHINO


The international trade in rhino horn has been well documented as the leading factor driving the world's five species of rhinoceros towards extinction, with the result that rhino are amongst the world's most endangered animals.2 Close to 85 per cent of the world's rhino have been killed since 1970 and no other animal family has been so rapidly depleted by the pressures of commerce. The black rhino (Diceros bicornis) has the unique distinction of having declined at a faster rate than any other large land mammal in recent times. In 1960, it was the most abundant species of rhino, conservatively estimated to number at least 100 000 animals across Africa. By 1970, figures were down to 65 000 and the most recent estimates of its total population suggest levels of around 2 200 indicating that it has lost more than 95 per cent of its population in only twenty years.3 Of the estimated 2 200 black rhino that are still alive in Africa, 890 are found in South Africa, as are 6 300 of the estimated 6 800 White rhino. This leaves South Africa with 63 per cent of all living species of rhino in the world.

This severe decline has not taken place against a background of international apathy. Millions of dollars have been spent by concerned governments and private organisations in attempts to protect the rhino from well-armed and organised poachers. Hundreds of rhino have been translocated at great expense to safer areas. In Namibia and Zimbabwe, some wild rhino have been de-horned by wildlife officials in an attempt to forestall poaching, and in Kenya and Zimbabwe, a shoot on sight policy operates against poachers. Thousands of poachers, smugglers and corrupt officials have been arrested in recent years in connection with the illegal trade in rhino horn. Yet, protection of the rhino continues to be fruitless in the face of continued international demand for rhino products. Asian communities, resistant to Western medical doctrine and accustomed to the traditional use of rhino products, are willing to pay premium prices for a product that supposedly brings them physical and mental well-being thus stimulating an illegal market.

It is clear that the international trade in wildlife is big business. In 1981, the US imported and exported wildlife and wildlife products worth over $962 million – fifteen years later it has become an industry that is considerably more valuable and particularly rewarding for those prepared to trade illegally.4 When one considers that an ounce of rhino horn in an eastern medicine shop can cost more than an ounce of gold,5 the dangers to wildlife become all too clear. The demise of the rhino population in the rest of Africa and the concomitant rise in the price paid for rhino horn, leaves South Africa's rhino population in an extremely vulnerable position. Although rhino poachers at present do not receive much compensation for their dirty work, rhino horn is a lucrative commodity in the hands of the professional dealers and smugglers supplying it to the overseas markets. Should scarcity force the price of rhino horn even higher, it is possible that the professional dealers will invest in professional manpower and sophisticated equipment in order to procure it.

Given the expected offensive on endangered species and the potential growth in this trade. one must ask whether South Africa is equipped to deal with the increase in poaching and smuggling levels. In order to combat this type of crime. The authorities have established a specialised law enforcement body whose task it is to work with nature conservation organisations and international police forces.

NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT


Law enforcement pertaining to the illegal trafficking of rhino horn occurs on a local and national level under the auspices of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and operates in conjunction with anti-poaching strategies undertaken by the various nature conservation bodies. The chief law enforcement body involved in this area of investigation is a specialist police unit, known internationally as the Endangered Species Protection Unit (ESPU).

During the late 1980s, South Africa was increasingly criticised by various international conservation bodies for failing to act decisively to counter smuggling operations. For a number of reasons, South Africa provided an ideal environment to conduct illegal trading operations – the country's close and easy access to suppliers in the range states, ports and airports permitting infiltration and distribution of prohibited products, and a large Asian community with links to the chief buyers in Taiwan, Singapore and the Far East – all contributed to the considerable trade passing through South Africa's borders. As a result of increased reports of poaching within South Africa's own national parks, media exposure of the widespread smuggling, and pressure from independent organisations – such as the Endangered Wildlife Trust and TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce) – a specialist unit to investigate criminal activity in this field was formed on order of the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok. Prior to its foundation in 1989, most police investigative work regarding the illegal trade in rhino horn was done by SANAB, the Narcotics Branch of the South African Police (SAP). Success rates were poor, however, as the poaching and smuggling of rhino horn was not given priority status. It became clear that the SAP needed to address this problem directly by allocating manpower and resources to a specialist unit.

At present, the unit has as its main functions:
  • the identification of routes by which endangered species or their products, such as ivory and rhino horn, are smuggled in or out of the country;

  • the infiltration of existing syndicates;

  • the collection of evidence;

  • the arrest and prosecution of the individuals and/or networks involved in these schemes; and

  • the provision of assistance to law enforcement agencies throughout Africa in order to effect international co-operation in cross-border law enforcement.
While the unit was formed with the intention to stop the illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn, it broadened its base of operations to include all endangered fauna and flora.6 In addition, the global nature of illegal trading requires an international law enforcement perspective and, as such, the ESPU does not work in isolation, nor does it confine its area of operations to South Africa alone.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT


Numerous important forms of crime, of which the poaching and smuggling of endangered species is one, can no longer be controlled within state boundaries and as such, necessitate a multilateral approach. It has become commonplace that state borders do not delimit criminal activity. Similarly, activities within the territories of states are increasingly open to external influences, and even to external control, and many government agencies cannot perform their functions adequately without close international co-operation. "Today many criminals, particularly those associated with organised crime, operate at an international level. Developments in communication allow almost instantaneous direct communication with anywhere in the world. International travel is now, in most cases, as available as is domestic travel. Furthermore, the relaxation of trade and currency barriers, and the creation of free trade or preferential trade zones, all work in favour of the international operator, whether legitimate or illegitimate."7 In the last two decades, the awareness that issues of policing and crime control are international, has increased as a result of the impact of international terrorism, drug trafficking, and the internationalisation of social and economic activities. Police co-operation has a variety of forms – the exchange of intelligence about crimes and criminals, joint or co-ordinated surveillance of suspects, investigation of crimes, as well as the provision of training facilities and the exchange of information about police techniques. These activities take place on a multilateral and bilateral basis and at global, regional and local levels. While regional organisations in other parts of the world co-operate in law enforcement, the most intensive form of co-operation on case-related matters usually takes place at the bilateral level. The enormous increase in international crime has stimulated direct police-force-to-police-force contacts, with the US taking the lead in this kind of co-operation. Federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency and US Customs, now maintain permanent representatives in many countries.8

Contact between police forces of different states is always a delicate matter, because it touches on sensitivities concerning sovereignty and the principle of territoriality. The basic difficulty of formal treaty-based co-operation lies in the fact that co-operating police forces are based in legal systems of which the principles, structures, and procedures vary considerably. Accordingly, the very existence of different jurisdictions creates formidable difficulties because police cannot, under normal circumstances, have direct access to suspects, witnesses and evidence in another jurisdiction.

Despite the growing number of international agreements on environmental protection, co-ordination of enforcement of environmental rules is still in its infancy, except in the rare examples of transfrontier national parks. Economic and political interests continue to prevent this form of police co-ordination from being put on the agenda, even though it is widely recognised that some of the most troublesome problems, such as the illegal trade in endangered species, are international in character. Given that control of the trade is beyond the power of any one government or law-enforcement agency, the ESPU's work is not limited to the various provinces of South Africa. The aim of the departments of Justice and the Environment is to work towards a multilateral co-operative agreement between South Africa and its neighbours, as based on the system adopted by European law enforcement bodies. Agencies such as Interpol and the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC), co-operate on a bilateral and multilateral level in order to facilitate criminal investigations, to prevent the flight of suspect persons and to promote the successful prosecutions of international fugitives. Recent new agreements on closer co-operation regarding the combating of crime have been established and most countries in Europe, as well as the US, have passed legislation to accommodate the principle of 'Commission Regatoire'. By virtue of these agreements evidence can be taken anywhere in the Western world by such a legal commission, as long as there is co-operation between the two governments concerned. International warrants of arrest have now become commonplace and extradition orders are being revised to ensure that criminal organisations do not escape prosecution by crossing international borders.9

INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION


In order to monitor and control international criminal activities effectively, inter-agency co-operation is essential. Accordingly, the ESPU is constantly involved in international contact with other organisations, such as the US Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as government departments in the Far East and Europe. As one of the founder members of the Interpol Sub-Group on the Smuggling of Wildlife, the ESPU is able to collect, co-ordinate and disseminate all information world-wide with regard to illegal activities in wildlife.10 Similarly, on the initiative of the ESPU the formation of an international task force by members of law enforcement organisations in South and East Africa is slowly becoming a reality. A presentation by members of the unit in December 1992 led to the drafting of the Lusaka Agreement that envisages the formation of a task force to carry out cross-border investigations effectively. The present signatories to the agreement are South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, Swaziland and Lesotho. Mozambique is likely to follow suit in the near future and it is hoped that Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana will become signatories shortly. Viewed as a co-operation agreement to boost law enforcement operations, this kind of cross-border liaison has already achieved notable successes. In 1995, the ESPU, with the co-operation of the Zambian Species Protection Department, confiscated ten tusks, four rhino horns and three AK-47 rifles, and arrested fourteen people, thereby eliminating a poaching syndicate that operated out of Zambia into Botswana and Zimbabwe. Similar cross-border actions have been launched into Swaziland and Namibia and the unit currently has investigations and intelligence gathering operations involving Tanzania and Zambia under way for the early part of 1997.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ACHIEVEMENTS


In the period between January 1991 and June 1995, the ESPU dealt with 1 428 enquiries, of which 737 resulted in criminal prosecutions, representing approximately 52 per cent of the enquiries received. The remaining 691 enquiries were concluded as unfounded, lacking sufficient evidence or were still under investigation.11 In the same time, the unit recovered 403 rhino horns, 1 045 complete raw tusks and 34 098 ivory cubes. The value of the ivory seized can be determined as follows: the average weight of a tusk coming out of Africa is eight kilograms and each tusk is normally cut into ten cubes. In other words, the unit recovered an additional 3 410 tusks, with a value of just over R30 million. Since the unit's inception, a number of breakthroughs were achieved in the investigation into the smuggling of endangered species. The following indicate a few of the outstanding successes relating specifically to rhino horn products:
  • the arrest and detention of a Taiwanese citizen for the possession of a total of 115 rhino horns during September 1990;

  • the arrest of two Taiwanese citizens for the illegal trade in 55 rhino horns during 1991;

  • the arrest of an international smuggling syndicate which operated from Malawi; and

  • the arrest of thirteen persons in connection with poaching of rhino in northern Natal during May 1995 and the confiscation of a variety of weapons;
Seizures of rhino horn include the following:
  • 21 September 1990: the interception of nine parcels containing 51 rhino horns; one Taiwanese national and one South African citizen arrested;

  • September 1990: the seizure of nine parcels containing 53 horns, posted in Manzini, Swaziland and addressed to Taipei, Taiwan; and

  • January 1991: the capture of several Zairian citizens smuggling 29 rhino horns to South Africa to exchange for stolen cars.
The reputation of the ESPU as being on the forefront of the struggle to combat the illegal trade in endangered species in Africa, is well deserved. On the face of it, the number of offences appears to be somewhat reduced. For example, in 1992, 99 persons were arrested in 52 cases and 84 rhino horns with an estimated value of R2 000 000 were recovered. In 1993, only 44 horns were confiscated in 33 cases and 56 persons were arrested.12

Nevertheless, the question of whether the ESPU is winning the war on smuggling, remains unanswered. Numerous arrests and successful prosecutions attest to due diligence and efficiency, yet serve little purpose in the long run if big-time dealers and crime syndicates are not eliminated from operating. Law enforcement agencies world-wide face valid criticism for their apparent failure to counter criminal activity at its higher levels where the most damage is done. "If law enforcement is to be effective, the dealers need to be convicted rather than the gang members."13

THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANISED CRIME


The general consensus regarding the new South Africa is that opportunities for crime have never been greater. Certainly, all law enforcement bodies in South Africa are facing a severe challenge as political and social changes affect the nature and prevalence of criminal activities. The new political dispensation has required new approaches to policing and has brought different and heavy pressures to bear on law enforcement organisations. The recent period of political transition in South Africa, coupled with the prevailing climate of economic uncertainty, has allowed crime to flourish and environmental crimes have proven to be no exception. Increasingly, police are being confronted by the emergence of criminal organisations that are able to utilise the increased violence, political instability and impoverishment of local communities to establish and expand criminal networks. KwaZulu-Natal, in particular, has been described as a window of opportunity for organisations engaged in criminal activities and is extremely vulnerable to infiltration and exploitation by organised crime syndicates for a number of reasons.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KWAZULU-NATAL


The weakening of border controls since the ending of apartheid has created new potential areas of operation for organised crime. In KwaZulu-Natal in particular, the end of the civil war between RENAMO and FRELIMO in Mozambique has resulted in an increase in the number of illegal immigrants attempting to enter South Africa – many of whom are known to be smuggling arms into the country. In this regard it should be mentioned that an estimated 1,6 million illegal immigrants are believed to reside in KwaZulu-Natal. Between 1 January and 30 September 1995 alone, the illegal immigration unit of the SAPS at Richard's Bay, consisting of only four members, arrested 1 276 illegal immigrants in connection with investigations into criminal cases.

The security situation in the areas surrounding the game reserves of northern KwaZulu-Natal, needs to be evaluated against the background of the prevailing circumstances in the province as a whole. An evaluation based on hard facts is made extraordinarily difficult in the absence of reliable statistics pertaining to the former KwaZulu part of the province. From statistics provided by the Internal Stability division of the SAPS, it is obvious that the northern areas have been a flash-point of unrest-related incidents. It further transpires that the number of such incidents reported in northern KwaZulu-Natal represents only a fraction of the incidents reported in the province as a whole. A high incidence of factional conflict occurs in these territories. In addition, power struggles are a central feature in the ongoing unstable situation in the province. A brief outline of the elements influencing the conflict will assist in clarifying the background to the security situation as it is currently encountered by law enforcement agencies.

Ideological conflict


KwaZulu-Natal is one of only two provinces in the modern South Africa ruled by an opposition party and therefore represents something of an anomaly in the new dispensation. The province has been a centre of politically motivated conflict for a considerable period. This is likely to continue, especially in view of the fact that this is also the most populous province in South Africa.

The incidence of factional conflict


This dates back over several decades and longer, and can almost be described as having become a way of life. It can also be accepted that the existence of this kind of conflict has been, and will continue to be, exploited to further exterior aims – both by the criminal element and those persons seeking to make political mileage out of the violence.

The high incidence of crime


The existing instability and sharp divisions in the province offer considerable opportunities for criminals to exploit. In the past, law enforcement has concentrated on controlling political violence, to the detriment of crime prevention. The lack of adequate policing has enabled crime to flourish, further destabilising society and contributing to the circle of violence.

Socio-economic conditions


Socio-economic deprivation is likely to contribute to a great deal of the crime prevalent in the province and gives scope for political action by different role-players.

Some manifestations of the above-mentioned tensions existing in the province, include the following:
  • constitutional and institutional dilemmas in the political and social life of the province;

  • a growth of intolerance;

  • rising crime rates, a loss of faith in the law enforcement and judicial systems, and a notable increase in the vigilante actions associated with people's courts;

  • criminals lying low during security force operations only to resurface once the pressure is lifted;

  • the creation of 'no-go' areas;

  • a vicious cycle of revenge;

  • efforts aimed at expanding power bases;

  • random attacks on innocent victims;

  • land claims creating tensions among different parties;

  • attacks on farmers and land-owners which seem to be on the increase and are increasingly brutal in nature;

  • attacks on the security forces that are situated in the middle of conflict between various groups – according to available statistics, 527 attacks on members of the security forces, during which fifty members were killed and 136 injured, had been reported in KwaZulu-Natal between 1 January and 31 August 1995;

  • politicisation of almost all issues;

  • increasing brutality shown by criminals;

  • a growing market for firearms and the increasing use of such weapons;

  • the presence of large numbers of para-military cadres among different interest groups;

  • disruption of civil life through protest actions, inter alia, in the education and labour fields;

  • growing frustrations as a result of unfulfilled expectations.
The factors listed above should not be viewed in isolation as all are to a lesser or greater extent interlinked and able to feed on one another, resulting in a spiral of violence and crime in general.

These rising crime levels provide an ideal environment in which poachers can operate with relative ease of movement, enjoy access to weaponry and exploit the climate of lawlessness. KwaZulu-Natal's already high number of reported conservation offences has increased in the recent past, as this province in particular appears to have been targeted by poachers. The high levels of violent crime require intensive policing and this further limits the resources available to units, such as the wildlife squad.

SMUGGLING OF FIREARMS AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME IN KWAZULU-NATAL


The free availability of firearms in South Africa, in general, and particularly in the KwaZulu-Natal province is probably the most important factor contributing to the escalation of serious crime. Information indicates that Mozambican army personnel are the main suppliers of illegal firearms being smuggled into South Africa – even selling brand new firearms from arsenals collected at the end of the civil war in that country. Additionally, arms smuggling is an extremely lucrative trade in itself as AK-47 rifles are bought for approximately R350 and sold for between R1 800 and R2 000 a piece. The arms smuggling business is highly organised, with connections in Swaziland and Mozambique facilitating the trade. One arrested arms smuggler was found to have made use of 26 different vehicles in smuggling firearms from Mozambique into South Africa, with frequent swapping of vehicles, drivers and routes apparently occurring and the contraband being concealed very well. Despite control measures at border posts being considered somewhat lax, smugglers are able to avoid these and simply cross the border at isolated places in the bush. Although the Durban area is considered the main outlet for smuggled arms, other outlets stretch across the entire province. Identified smuggling routes from Mozambique into KwaZulu-Natal are the following:
  • via Swaziland;
  • via Kosi Bay;
  • via Mpumalanga province; and
  • by fishing boat to Richard's Bay or Durban.
Information has also been received of aircraft flying across the border below the radar range to different airfields in KwaZulu-Natal. The true extent of arms smuggling is difficult to assess. From recent investigations and the interrogation of suspects, it has been learned that a single smuggler can bring approximately thirty firearms across the border at one time and usually undertakes two trips to Mozambique per month. Five such suppliers have been arrested during a recent investigation, Implying that, between them, they had been able to smuggle approximately 300 firearms across the border per month. These smugglers are part of a single syndicate and available information indicates that several such syndicates may be involved in gun-running.

INTER-RELATEDNESS OF CRIME


Conversations held with members of the specialist unit of the SAPS in northern KwaZulu-Natal clearly underline the fact that crime is indivisible. This is even more evident from investigations into organised crime. Syndicates involved in smuggling arms into the country are also involved in the smuggling of stolen vehicles out of the country. In addition, they deal in drugs and other illegal substances, including endangered species products, should the opportunity arise. Similarly, car theft syndicates and drug syndicates, while focusing chiefly on their chosen contraband goods, will deal in any product considered lucrative.

The game reserves situated in the northern regions of KwaZulu-Natal have traditionally faced a threat of poaching but are now increasingly susceptible to crime syndicates dealing in environmental contraband. Unlike the local people who use the neighbouring protected areas for subsistence hunting and for whom meat hunting is a traditional and cultural necessity, the presence of organised poaching gangs places endangered wildlife, such as the rhino, under real threat. These networks may contain professional rhino hunters with automatic weapons. Making use of vehicles, spotlights and radios, these gangs are able to penetrate deep into the national parks. It is this kind of gang that can decimate rhino populations. The organised gangs may operate on their own initiative or recruit people from the neighbouring communities to act for them in poaching forays or for use as carriers in smuggling operations.

Unfortunately, the establishment of many of South Africa's protected areas has frequently worked against the direct economic interests of local communities. Natal's game reserves are small with a relatively high ratio between the extent of the reserve and the length of the boundary. Accordingly, the animal and plant resources are within easy reach of anyone wanting to harvest them illegally. The population density on the boundaries of the reserves is high and, in some areas, rising at an exponential rate. The inhabitants very often live below the subsistence level and many of the people reside permanently within the area due to unemployment problems. Understandably, therefore, these people do not always view the game reserves on their doorstep as an advantage, though many do benefit by harvesting grass, reeds and wood on a controlled basis. On the contrary, the game reserves are – to some – areas where meat or other products can be illegally acquired either for survival or exploitation. While there is little doubt that most rhino losses can be attributed to the work of armed gangs, there is evidence of logistical support from local people on communal lands.

More alarming yet, are the indications of game guards themselves who are actively involved in poaching, or who turn a blind eye when confronted with the evidence and/or perpetrators. In Zululand, there have been a number of occasions when members of the Game Guard force have become involved in illegal hunting involving black and white rhino, together with other species of animals. The actual number of animals involved will never be accurately known, but the potential for losses is considerable, given the inside knowledge that Parks Board employees possess about animal movements and guard duties. With the resources available to organised crime networks, they are well able to co-opt these individuals through bribery.

Rumours of involvement by the security establishment in illegal trafficking of environmental contraband have surfaced recently. The findings of the Kumleben Commission of Inquiry into the alleged smuggling of, and illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn (held in October 1995) gave credence to these rumours. The Commission found that from 1978 to 1986, the military intelligence division of the former South African Defence Force (SADF) officially participated in the illicit possession and transportation of ivory and rhino horn from Angola and Namibia to South Africa. There seems little doubt that some members of the military who are no longer in active service, are making use of their extensive training and special skills for financial gain and are playing a role in illicit activities, such as poaching and smuggling.

SMUGGLING OPERATIONS


According to Fraser, "[i]nternational 'crime' and 'smuggling' go hand in glove, as the criminal resorts to smuggling and the smuggler to crime."14 The international trade in wildlife products is generally considered to be one of the world's largest black markets. While no-one knows the exact dimensions of the trade, experts suspect it may amount to $10 billion per annum, second only to the drugs and arms trades. Estimates by customs officials, commodities traders, international policing organisations and those involved in illicit trade, placed the world-wide value of smuggled goods at an excess $200 billion in 1992.15 The trafficking of rhino horn and related products comprises a fair proportion of the international smuggling trade. Given the sheer volume of international trade these days, plus the speed of clearance that is demanded as the air-freight business develops, it is virtually impossible for customs officials to carry out more than a few token searches of travellers and cargo. Much smuggling can therefore be carried out simply through the use of false customs declarations and other forms of creative paperwork. The detection of outright smuggling depends largely on good information – painstaking investigation and tip-offs. The value of such information is not just that it enables the customs officer to pinpoint a smuggler when he arrives, but that it can lead him to the heart of a smuggling outfit.

For many years, South African ports have been the main point of exit for poached ivory and rhino horn that are smuggled in from neighbouring countries in trucks. Upon reaching South Africa, rhino horn is typically concealed in packages and sent to its final destination by air or sea freight or by post. The major problem facing the South African authorities in the regulation of illegal trade, is the lack of efficient customs control. Poor customs controls, at all ports of entry and exit, permit smugglers to operate largely unchecked and without fear of capture. Customs operations tend to focus chiefly on tax collection rather than law enforcement. Additionally, the Department of Customs and Excise is not equipped to mount operations to curtail illegal activities. Insufficient manpower and a lack of experience in wildlife crime result in the creation of loopholes that are readily exploited by unscrupulous traders. The unchecked transit of contraband materials and the failure to identify banned products, allow smugglers ease of movement while the risk of capture remains small. It is a well-known fact that it is possible to fly into one of the smaller airports in South Africa during the night and no Customs officials will be on duty. While one is required to report to Customs the following morning, no security measures exist to prevent the removal of smuggled goods prior to that time.16

According to Toufexis, "[i]n nations with tough regulations, poached animals are often slipped through porous borders where export permits are easily obtained."17 As a result of the Customs Union entered into between South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which permits free movement across borders without the need for customs documentation, containers sealed and presumed checked in a neighbouring state are not rechecked upon entry into South Africa. The border posts between Botswana and Zambia are notoriously weak, bribery is endemic and payments to officials ensure that no searches are conducted on those occasions when contraband goods are being conveyed. Once within the territories governed by the Customs Union, no further checks are deemed necessary and goods are legitimately transported.

In addition, a lack of facilities to handle container traffic has contributed to a bottleneck effect arising in many of the country's largest ports. Approximately 60 000 containers enter Durban harbour as imports annually.18 Due to inadequate staffing, officials effectively check only basic documentation and administrative details. Should a query arise as a result thereof, a physical check will be authorised – however, this rarely amounts to more than approximately three per cent of all incoming containers. The Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – an international protectionist measure designed to regulate the commercial exploitation of endangered species – urges each party to designate special ports of exit and entry through which all exports and imports of wildlife must pass. Recognising that identification of wildlife, especially parts and derivatives, is very difficult and that enforcement of CITES is a complex matter, the parties were encouraged to build up expertise among their enforcement officers in a few ports and then to channel all trade through those ports. It was hoped that this would minimise delay for legal traders and would help reduce smuggling, because it would enable a few experts in species identification to inspect the bulk of the trade. However, only a few parties have so far adopted the system of restricted ports of exit and entry for wildlife, but in the US, where the system has been adopted – just nine ports are authorised to handle wildlife exports and imports – the evidence suggests that it has helped combat the illegal trade.19 Given South Africa's lax customs control, it is essential that the CITES recommendations are adopted in order to reduce the proportion of goods being smuggled out through ports.

A growing body of evidence indicates that Taiwanese nationals living in Southern Africa are still closely involved in purchasing poached ivory and rhino horn, and that most of the horn leaving Southern Africa for Asia is going to Taiwan. Organised crime links between the two countries are clearly well established. These networks wield considerable influence and operate on a significant scale. In September 1990, three Taiwanese nationals were arrested with a total of 110 rhino horns in their possession with an additional forty horns reportedly having already been sent to Taiwan. A major importer of horn from 1979 to 1985, Taiwan banned imports in 1985 and internal trade in such items in 1989. Registration of privately held rhino horn stocks was required in November 1990, and the ban on domestic sale of rhino horn was reiterated in 1992. Due to the fact that Taiwan is not recognised by the United Nations, it is not eligible to become a party to CITES and thus cannot be forced to comply with any resolutions or Conference recommendations. As a result of considerable international pressure, Taiwan has attempted to take steps to control the trade and establish law enforcement mechanisms. In order to regulate both international and domestic trade in protected species, the Council of Agriculture's Department of Natural Resources Conservation has assigned two people out of their total staff of five and other government departments have allocated several officials to monitor the trade. However, these conservation authorities do not have policing powers, making the enforcement of wildlife conservation legislation even more difficult. A notable success was achieved in September 1993, when customs inspectors at the Taipei International Airport confiscated 22 horns found in the luggage of a member of the royal family of Bhutan, who carried a diplomatic passport. Regretfully, these convictions remain isolated incidents and, while it is clear that the authorities have made attempts to control the trade, rhino horn remains available illegally. It thus ensures that Taiwan continues to be the predominant consumer in a world-wide market.20

Without inside information, there is little hope that customs control, as it presently operates, can eliminate or prevent the smuggling of endangered species products. Extensive international co-operation, stricter controls at points of exit and the deployment of specialised units qualified in anti-smuggling operations, will be required if any progress is to be made on this front.

INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION


Since 1977, CITES has prohibited commercial international trade in all rhinoceros parts, derivatives or products. However, actual demand for horn, as evidenced by the continued loss of rhinos in the wild, is a function both of the degree to which speculators are stockpiling horn and consumers are using horn. The lack of success has been partly attributed to the fact that certain countries, such as Taiwan, have failed to put forward culture-specific public relations campaigns to change the habits of rhino horn users. It is not clear whether such campaigns can succeed, particularly when rhino horn is seen by many consumers as being, if not a necessity, at least of great benefit to them as a medicine.21 Aware that past efforts to halt the illegal trade have largely failed, the most recent CITES Conference acknowledged that law enforcement efforts had driven the illicit trade further underground. While CITES and other national bans have slowed the rhino horn trade, they have been unable to halt it. Control of domestic possession and sale of rhino parts and products is beyond the specific mandate of CITES and still remains unregulated in most consuming nations in Asia. As such, the incentive to smuggle the prohibited items into the countries where they are required continues to exist, laws will continue to be flouted and law enforcement authorities will continue to struggle to catch up with illegal traders.

ANTI-POACHING STRATEGIES


While law enforcement operations will vary tactically from place to place, the fundamental strategy for dealing with criminal activities relating to wildlife will not vary significantly. In every situation, the prime objective is to detect the activities of the criminal as early as possible. South Africa has had the unparalleled ability of being able to commit more resources to general park management and rhino protection than any other range state in the world. Indeed, South African government bodies alone spend more on rhino conservation than the total combined expenditure of all other African governments.22 Nevertheless, in the event of a sustained poaching crisis, as experienced by other African countries, it is unlikely that even seemingly secure populations will be protected adequately in the long run. Accordingly, the need for a sophisticated and highly-developed anti-poaching operation cannot be over-emphasised. The methods currently in place must therefore be upgraded and improved if the survival of South Africa's rhino populations is to be ensured.

PREVENTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS


The key to effective deterrence remains simple in principle – it requires a law enforcement body that is well-manned, well-equipped and enjoys effective logistical support. In order to increase patrol coverage of vulnerable areas, the operational units will require greater infrastructural input, as well as improved vehicular and mechanical support. The upgrading of existing radio equipment is essential and the increased use of cellular telephones and technical equipment, such as night-vision instruments, should be encouraged. In view of the necessity to operate in areas with a poorly-developed infrastructure, the use of motor-cycles and four-wheel drive vehicles equipped with winches may well enhance the effectiveness of field operatives. The rapid reaction time of helicopters means that their use is crucial in rapid response deployment and may serve as a deterrent to potential poachers. Accordingly, the use thereof should be authorised as quickly as possible.

Manpower is one of the biggest constraints to successful operations and both the SAPS and Parks Board are in urgent need of more, and better paid, staff. According to Martin and Martin, "[t]here is no substitute for the old-fashioned foot patrols combing game paths, looking for poachers' tracks, and keeping an alert eye on happenings in the bush."23 However, the threat from within the boundaries of the reserves is as great as that from outside. With the high prices being paid by rhino poaching syndicates, staff members have become a potential target for these groups. Given the poor salaries earned by both police officers and game guards in particular, these men are vulnerable to criminal inducements. "A minority of enforcement agents will always decide that the monetary benefit of a bribe is more important than the moral cost and legal risk, particularly when it becomes clear that their legitimate enforcement efforts have been futile."24 In order to counter these threats, an intelligence gathering network is in the process of being set up. Informers are recruited within the potential threat areas surrounding the reserves, as well as from within the staff complement. Information is gathered from as wide a field as possible, including the neighbouring states that face many of the same problems. At present, however, the informer system is poorly developed due to transport and other logistical problems as well as the fact that people with a suitable temperament are needed to run an informer network. Given that informer networks can ensure that potential threats are identified and increase the likelihood of detection, it is imperative that the current system is upgraded and enhanced if inroads are to be made.

In the crime prevention field, it has been suggested that the homes or kraals of identified suspects should be regularly visited by the police, even making use of helicopters. Systematic visits may serve to restrain suspects and potential suspects from indulging in poaching activities, in addition to creating an awareness of the implications of poaching among the suspects' neighbours. Furthermore, experiences show that the recruitment of witchdoctors as informers may bear fruit.

According to Hawkins, "[l]aw enforcement demands a moral as well as a legislative mandate. Enforcement premised on moral notions is recognisable to people, and a perceived identity of values shared by the enforcer, the regulated, and their interested publics grants the enforcement of regulation a more secure footing in an environment of ambivalence."25 Law enforcement bodies need to prioritise relations with communities in affected areas. While it remains the responsibility of nature conservation officials to involve these communities in the case of conservation – by somehow giving them a stake in the continued existence of the reserves – their support is vital to the SAPS in the combating of poaching. There are numerous benefits to the establishment of community initiatives. Where members of a Tribal Authority are included in management programmes, a sense of inclusion, responsibility and custodianship is engendered. An activity such as poaching affects all members negatively and thus it is more likely that information of any intended poaching activity, or of those who participated, will be given to the right people in order to effect an early arrest. Once would-be poachers become aware of this kind of co-operation, poaching levels are likely to decrease as the co-operative nature of the community acts as a deterrent and hampers the successful execution of illegal activities.

Co-operation between government departments at national and provincial level is essential to maximise efforts aimed at combating crimes associated with the trade in endangered species and their products. All government departments involved in issues affecting the environment and the movement of goods across the borders, especially the departments of Agriculture and Customs and Excise, have a part to play in this regard. Secrecy clauses contained in legislation pertaining to these departments, which form an obstacle to investigations by provincial environmental agencies, should be reviewed. Furthermore, it is essential to enlist the services of non-government organisations, such as the Endangered Wildlife Trust and TRAFFIC, as they may be able to provide valuable information regarding some of the issues under consideration. With the necessary co-ordination, duplication of research may be avoided and the efficient use of financial resources can be enhanced.

In order to facilitate investigation and operational planning, the compilation of an effective and detailed data base is imperative. No criminal data base has as yet been created by either the Parks Board or the ESPU, mainly as a result of work pressures and the lack of administrative staff. Most useful information is at present only available in the heads of the people concerned. It is essential to develop a simple computerised system for use by both organisations on a shared system and based on particulars gleaned from dockets investigated. With regular updating by Parks Board staff at ground level, this data base can then serve as a management, crime prevention and investigation tool. Computer communications between the two organisations concerned would facilitate more efficient information processing, enable the co-ordination of operations and investigations, and assist in identifying trends and targeted areas. Given that crime syndicates are becoming increasingly professional and have access to modern technology and facilities, it is essential that the law enforcement bodies are adequately equipped to counter the threat.

As far as legislation is concerned, it would be of great assistance to the law enforcement bodies if uniform legislation is adopted in all provinces to deal with protection of endangered species and related matters. All too often diverse, confusing and inadequate legislation contributes to the illegal trader's success. In terms of the Financial Relations Act No 65 of 1976, the responsibility for the preservation of flora and fauna and the regulation and control of hunting of game and other animals vests in the provincial administrations. Each of the provinces has its own nature conservation ordinance containing extensive provisions relating to wildlife, i.e. the Orange Free State Nature Conservation Ordinance No 8 of 1969, and the Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance No 15 of 1974. It appears that the frequency of illegal trade is dependent to a greater or lesser degree on the area in which it is committed, due to the fact that penalties vary from province to province. In addition, the listings in the class schedules differ from province to province, with the result that, what may be an offence in regard to a particular species in one province, will not necessarily be an offence in regard to that species in another province. Even recognising that different regions may have different conservation needs, the current dispensation lacks uniformity and is clearly in need of reform. An additional constraint on the effectiveness of wildlife law is the fact that there are too many statutes and ordinances on the books at present. This complex plethora of laws is not conducive to effective law enforcement and the need for a national policy and uniform legislation is both urgent and appropriate in the light of the changed constitutional and political conditions in South Africa.

In order to facilitate successful criminal prosecutions, the investigating officers need to build sound relations and co-operate closely with the personnel at the Attorney-General's office in the province concerned, as well as with senior state prosecutors. Their advice may well be invaluable as it does occur on occasion that court cases are lost, because game scouts lack the requisite knowledge of, and experience in court procedures. The Parks Board members responsible for court matters are doing their utmost to see that maximum penalties are delivered for contravening the legislation. It is hoped that any new legislation will contain more stringent penalties than the current R200 000 and/or ten years imprisonment available to magistrates.

Law enforcement operations are often undertaken in hazardous circumstances where operatives are forced to deal with sophisticated crime syndicates. If they are to combat these organisations, they must be provided with the resources and technical expertise to do so effectively. Clearly, in order to achieve the desired containment and reduction of poaching levels and the elimination of smuggling networks, the assistance and co-operation of Government is required on all issues, ranging from increased manpower and equipment, to financial assistance and legislation. Without concerted state intervention the fight against crime cannot be won.

CONCLUSION


Today's rhino populations are estimated to be approximately ten per cent of what they were in the early 1960s and their decline has been especially severe since 1970. There is little doubt that the rhino is threatened with extinction, largely because of the need that its horn fulfils in traditional Asian culture. As long as the reliance on rhino horn as a medicine persists, the safety of the rhino cannot be secured. Illegal trading will continue, despite the implementation of legislative measures prohibiting its use, if a large enough market continues to demand the supply of such a product. Both domestic and international legislation cannot be effective unless combined with a grassroots programme of education designed to alter the perceptions of the consumer. Clearly, this process is a long term one and the changes in attitude and behaviour required to eliminate the desire for rhino products will be a long time coming.

Until such time as such changes can be wrought, the protection of the rhino will remain in the hands of the nature conservationists and law enforcement agencies. With only a handful of rhino remaining world-wide and the majority existing in South Africa, it is certain that the last line of defence for the rhino lies within the borders of this country. Clive Walker, Chairman of the Rhino and Elephant Foundation describes the problem as follows: "My long-term view on poaching: I believe we are a long way off from having the situation fully under control. For the moment, we do not have the type of poaching that affected Kenya, Zambia and more recently Zimbabwe, although our rhinos continue to remain vulnerable."

The onus thus lies on law enforcement agencies, such as the ESPU, to continue their attempts to close down all smuggling routes and eliminate the poaching of and dealing in rhino horn – both in South Africa and the foreign countries in which the illegal wildlife trade flourishes. In addition to the difficulties of fighting what is a global battle against crime, these police units are forced to operate within the African context, giving rise to unique problems. An analysis of syndicate crime in South Africa, indicates that the organised crime networks have not hesitated to exploit the recent period of political transition and current climate of lawlessness in order to establish their presence in a variety of fields, not least of which is the illegal traffic of environmental contraband.

The financial rewards of this trade are such that, in many instances, dealers are prepared to take bold risks. Not only do they regard the chances of detection, capture and conviction as minimal, but they capitalise on the often limited resources at the disposal of the host countries in which they operate. In addition, any progress achieved by the authorities may be temporary if viewed in the light of 'perpetrator displacement' that occurs in situations where a crime opportunity is so compelling that should one dealer be eliminated, another is available to take her or his place. Accordingly, only supremely effective policing methods exercised in concert with international co-operation can hope to limit the extent of this trade. The implementation of new detection methods and effective crime prevention strategies are essential, if the growth in organised crime operations is to be curtailed. Whether this task can be achieved, remains to be seen. Should it fail, the consequences for South Africa and other nations with endangered wildlife will be dire. Martin is clear in his warning: "This trade must cease if any insurance is to be given for the survival of the remaining numbers of rhinos."26

ENDNOTED

  1. This article is published as part of the Crime and Policing project (CAP), a venture jointly sponsored by the British High Commission, the Hanns Seidel Foundation of Germany, the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, Q Data Consulting, The Rand Merchant Bank, the Royal Netherlands Embassy in South Africa, and the United Nations Development Programme.

  2. E B Martin, The International Trade in Rhinoceros Horn, IUCN/WW, Gland, 1979; C Song and T Milliken, The Rhino Trade in South Korea: Still Cause for Concern, Pachyderm, 13, 1990, pp. 5 - 11; D Balfour and S Balfour, Rhino – The Story of the Rhinoceros and a Plea for its Conservation, Struik Publishers, Cape Town, 1991.

  3. Proceedings of the Meeting of the African Rhino Specialist Group, Mombassa, Kenya, 23 - 27 May 1994, IUCN Species Survival Commission, Pietermaritzburg, 1994.

  4. P Fuhrman and A Tanzer, The Tai Fei Know The Way, Forbes, 21 December 1992, pp. 172 - 175.

  5. S Lyster, International Wildlife Law, Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 1985.

  6. P Lategan, ESPU, Pretoria, 1995.

  7. B A K Rider, The Promotion and Development of International Co-operation to Combat Commercial and Economic Crime, Meeting of the Commonwealth Law Ministers, Barbados, 1990.

  8. M Anderson, Policing the World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.

  9. J Wright, Law Enforcement Pertaining to Illicit Trafficking in Rhinoceros Horn and other Trophies, Koedoe, 32, 1989, pp. 76 - 80.

  10. Kumleben Commission, Commission of Inquiry into the Alleged Smuggling of and Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhinoceros Horn in South Africa: Evidence presented to the Inquiry, (chairman: the Honourable Mr Justice M E Kumleben), Durban, September - October 1995.

  11. Ibid.

  12. Lategan, op. cit.

  13. T M Swanson and E B Barbier (eds.), Economics for the Wilds, Earthscan Publications, London, 1992.

  14. G Fraser, Modern Transportation and International Crime, Charles Thomas Publishers, Springfield, 1970.

  15. Fuhrman and Tanzer, op. cit., pp. 172 - 175.

  16. Kumleben Commission of Inquiry, op. cit.

  17. A Toufexis, Rape of the Wild, Time, 29, July 1993, pp. 52 - 57.

  18. Kumleben Commission of Inquiry, op. cit.

  19. Lyster, op. cit.

  20. K Nowell, W L Chyi and C J Pei, Horns of a Dilemma: the Market for Rhino Horn in Taiwan, TRAFFIC International: Species in Danger Series, 1992.

  21. M Sas-Rolfes, Rhinos: Conservation, Economics and Trade-Offs, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1995.

  22. N Leader-Williams, The World Trade in Rhino Horn: A Review, TRAFFIC International: Species in Danger Series, 1992.

  23. C Martin and E B Martin, Run Rhino Run, Chatto and Windus, London, 1982.

  24. M Sas-Rolfes, R Bate and J Morris, The World Trade in Rhino Horn, unpublished manuscript, WWF International, 1994.

  25. K Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.

  26. Martin, op. cit.