The democratic republic of congo:

Kabila II

	On 16 January 2001, President Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo died in uncertain circumstances. He was replaced as head of state almost immediately by one of his sons, Joseph Kabila. The succession was ratified by parliament and, perhaps more significantly, his appointment indicates that he also has the blessing of the Joint Military Staff in Kinshasa and the allied forces supporting the Congolese government: Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. In public and in private meetings, Joseph Kabila mixes positive statements with echoes of his father’s hardline approach. He pledges support for a UN deployment in the DRC and emphasises the importance of launching the inter-Congolese dialogue in addition to renewed discussions with all the parties involved in the conflict, while at the same time still insisting on the unconditional withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops. For his part, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda is also sticking to his prerequisite that the Interahamwe are disarmed before his troops can withdraw from the DRC. Despite this, a window of opportunity for peace negotiations seems to have opened for the first time in months. January 2001 also saw the deployment of additional foreign troops to the DRC. Allies of the Congolese government — Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia — had a meeting less than a week after Laurent Kabila’s death and decided to deploy additional troops, equipment and aircraft to Lubumbashi and Kinshasa in support of the newly appointed president. The military situation, especially at Mbandaka and Pweto, is still tense and a small incident could develop into a major confrontation between the opposing military forces.

The Lusaka Accord is still on the table, but progress since the signing of the accord has been limited. Until now, it has been characterised by positive statements, but little implementation on the ground. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is the absence of a prominent co-ordinator for all the activities of the different roleplayers. The present situation leads to confusion, uninformed roleplayers and poorly organised meetings. Other aspects that could contribute to a further delay are the debate about the desirability of the appointment of a second or co-facilitator to assist former President Masire of Botswana in his role as facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue, and the renegotiation of aspects of the accord. There is also still a question about the political will of some of the belligerents to implement the accord. Problems are also experienced with the contents of the accord. Even if the belligerents decide to withdraw their forces from the DRC, the disarming and quartering the other rebel forces such as the Interahamwe, Mai-Mai, ex-FAR and ex-FAZ remains a major problem.

The only way to prevent the current stalemate from degenerating into fresh conflict is by testing the apparent window of political opportunity to reactivate the peace negotiations between the belligerents and the Congolese people and by embarking upon the practical implementation of the military aspects of the accord as soon as possible.

SOMALIA:

REINVENTING THE STATE

In August 2000, a Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) was inaugurated in neighbouring Djibouti, and quickly accorded international recognition. The TNG appeared to have the support of the Somali population, weary after 10 years without a government. Thus, there was much optimism in August that the time was right for a new government, that the power of the warlords had been broken, and that the political will for a new beginning was there. Since then, however, much of the initial optimism has dissipated.

The TNG finds itself hampered by a number of factors, either of its own making or of those opposed to it, and has thus been unable to assert its authority. Firstly, the TNG is dominated by members of the old, discredited Siad Barré regime, making it vulnerable to criticism from those factions opposed to it. The main threat to the TNG comes from the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, the autonomous region of Puntland and the factions in south and south-central Somalia. There have also been signs of splits within the TNG, between President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan and his supporters, on the one side, and Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galeid and his supporters, on the other. Ominously, these splits are beginning to take on the character of clan splits. The government is still cloistered in a number of hotels, unable to travel without bodyguards, and the business community and Islamic courts are rumoured to be disillusioned by its inability to assert its control.

Somaliland has stated on a number of occasions that it has no intention of reuniting with the rest of Somalia. The Somaliland population are strongly in favour of independence, having borne the brunt of political repression under the Siad Barré regime. Thus, the Somaliland government would find it almost impossible to consider reuniting with Somalia, even if it favoured such a move.

Puntland has also stated its unwillingness to consider reuniting with Somalia until the latter has established peace. However, the population of Puntland have shown strong support for the TNG, putting the Puntland authorities under increasing pressure. Puntland has moved closer to the Ethiopian government, and this has also not endeared it to its own population. The independence of the Puntland authorities was further called into question in February 2000 when, in response to a growing wave of unrest in Puntland, the region’s president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, threatened to call in Ethiopian forces to control the security situation in the region. It is unlikely that Abdullahi Yusuf would be able to survive such a move, even from his own supporters, but the fact that he could issue such a threat indicates his desperation.

In January 2001, the Puntland government, together with a number of dissident factions from southern and south-central Somalia, formed a National Restoration Council. In terms of the El-Berde Declaration, released after the group’s meeting, the Council shall "strive to achieve an all-encompassing and representative national institution." Ironically, the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), a major party in this new council, was one of the parties that had participated in the Arta process, and was included in the government. Many believe it withdrew from the TNG after pressure by Ethiopia. Its leader, Colonel Hassan Muhammad Nur ‘Shaargadud’, did not attend the El-Berde meeting, and was reportedly in Addis Ababa receiving medical treatment.
Ethiopia’s interference in Somali affairs has led to a rapid deterioration in relations with the TNG, and is causing concern in the region. Despite denials, it is clear that Ethiopia has at least one battalion stationed in south-west Somalia in the Gedo region.

Ironically, Ethiopian interference in Somali affairs can only help the Somali transitional government. Those factions who have allied themselves to Ethiopia may have legitimate grievances, but their complicity in an Ethiopian occupation of their country alienates them from ordinary Somalis. The Ethiopian government now finds itself under pressure not only from the Somali government and the international community (including the UN, the Arab world, and its neighbour Djibouti, on which it relies for sea access), but also increasingly from sections of its own population. There has been growing criticism in the Ethiopian media of Ethiopia’s incursions into Somalia, as well as the government’s support for those factions opposed to the Somali TNG, especially the government’s bankrolling of these factions. The very actions of the Ethiopian government, which are designed to weaken the Somali TNG, could ironically provide it with a new lease on life, and help to shore up its crumbling legitimacy.

Tanzania:

All spiced-up

Political relations between the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and the mainland of Tanzania have reached their lowest point in decades, following what most foreign observers saw as overreaction by security forces to what had begun as a peaceful demonstration by the Zanzibari opposition, the Civic United Front (CUF). The opposition was protesting against the 29 October 2000 elections in Zanzibar where the controversial conduct of the poll allowed the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party candidate, Abed Karume, to gain the presidency of Zanzibar. Election observers described the polls in Zanzibar as a ‘shambles’ and said elections on the islands should be rerun. The opposition parties are disputing the result and demanding new elections.

When the CUF applied to hold island-wide demonstrations, the police banned the meetings and arrested the CUF chairperson, Professor Ibrahim Lipunda and 52 other party officials. On Saturday 27 January 2001, the security forces reacted against the demonstrators on Zanzibar and Pemba. Within two days, the unofficial death toll had risen to over 200, prompting the European Union to issue a statement sharply criticising the government in Dar es Salaam for using excessive force against the opposition. There were numerous reports of police firing live ammunition at protesters and helicopters firing on boats carrying islanders who were trying to flee to Kenya.

Since the 1964 revolution that overthrew the Arab Sultanate on Zanzibar and Pemba, there have been strong undercurrents of separatism. The islands’ traditional quest for more autonomy from the mainland has been overtaken by frequent calls for independence. The opposition claims that the government refused to enter into discussions with them on how to restructure the relationship between the islands and the mainland, a union that has been troubled since then. In what might become the defining feature of his second term in office, President Mkapa’s reaction to the violence and ensuing criticism is confrontational rather than his normal visionary self. "Their demands for fresh elections are baseless … there is no legal reason why the Zanzibar elections should be repeated." On the EU council of ministers’ criticism of his government’s heavy handedness, he remarked, "I despise this aid stick that is dangled to us like small children … better to be poor and free than rich and a slave." The evidence to date, however, indicates that President Mkapa would serve the cause of his country and his people better by ensuring that his police force is trained and equipped to deal with situations of civil unrest. As was the case with their Mozambican counterparts in the northern provinces in 2000, the Tanzanian police had to do their job with the tools at hand — live ammunition and assault rifles — an untenable situation for those who must uphold law and order.

Because the divide is ethnic, religious and cultural, however, the national government in Dar es Salaam views the increase in opposition assertiveness on Zanzibar and Pemba as a threat to both national security and unity. Zanzibar constitutes the troubled eastern-most point of the religious and cultural divide between Muslims, on the one hand, and Christians and Animists, on the other, that stretches from the Indian Ocean to Dakar on the Atlantic seaboard. As in many other places along this divide, the knee-jerk reaction of the authorities to political or religious demonstrations by either group has been the use of excessive force. Mr Mkapa has two options to deal with this problem: he can either deal with it in a responsible manner by accommodating more of the opposition leaders in the island government, thereby defusing the situation, or ignore it and face protracted violence in the next year. Current indications suggest that he is opting for the latter alternative.

Ghana:

Ashanti gold?

Ghana follows Senegal into the rare columns of potential political successes in West Africa. Both countries have seen the gracious public acceptance of electoral defeat by incumbent regimes, albeit in the case of Ghana, that the unsuccessful candidate was not President Rawlings, but his anointed successor John Atta Mills, then serving vice-president. There are some who would argue that the choice of so mild a character in such contrast with the flamboyant and mercurial Rawlings, indicated a certain reluctance on the part of the erstwhile flight lieutenant and his powerful and ambitious wife to concede anything more than a temporary lien on the leadership of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). In the event, the gamble — if indeed that is what it was — proved politically expensive in the short term. Thanks to an uncommon solidarity on the part of the opposition parties, John Kufuor of the National People’s Party has not only secured the presidency, but also half of the 200 seats in parliament.

The Kufuor administration has sought to reassure the departing head of state that he need not fear pursuit over the gross human rights violations that marked the early years of his rule. There was also applause for the UN Secretary-General’s appointment of Rawlings as a UN Eminent Person for Voluntary Work. The position, which carries no stipend, will allow Rawlings to continue promoting awareness of the mortal damage being done to Africa by the twin scourges of HIV/AIDS and malaria. At the end of 2001, Rawlings will have the opportunity to decide whether he wishes to continue this personal crusade.

Whether Rawlings’s attentions will be occupied by his advocacy campaign into 2002 is a moot point. The sudden resignation from the armed forces of hundreds of men personally loyal to the former president, and requests that the latter should be afforded the protection of a bodyguard of 120 men from his favourite regiment have raised concerns that this may presage a descent into the militianisation of politics — a phenomenon that has bedevilled so many African states embracing multiparty competition. The attempted spoiling role played by some soldiers in the second round of the elections will have added to this fear. President Kufuor is sufficiently concerned to have appointed his younger brother, a medical doctor, to the key position of minister of Defence, ignoring the inevitable outcry about nepotism so early in his term of office.

Another worrisome aspect of the electoral contest was the attempt to exploit fears of Akan, and particularly Ashanti, domination. This has also echoed throughout the process of the formation of the new cabinet, and could be exploited should there be an attempt to undermine the cohesion of the post-Rawlings dispensation.

Having made the appalling state of the economy the cornerstone of its campaign, and denying the NDC’s explanation that the crisis was the result of a massively adverse shift in the country’s terms of trade — the collapse of gold and cocoa prices and the simultaneous rise in the price of oil — the Kufuor administration will be expected to provide evidence for its thesis that corruption and economic mismanagement lay at the heart of the problem. The new government has begun its daunting task on an uncertain footing, claiming that the economic situation is far more dire than it had imagined. Indeed, Kufuor has gone so far as to warn that the sacrifices required in any attempt to effect repairs may test popular belief in and enthusiasm for the democratic system itself. This is hardly promising, though it does constitute a recognition, long overdue in neoliberal circles, that democratisation and structural adjustment make uncomfortable bedfellows.

Some Western donors have already indicated a willingness to assist the Kufuor government in its quest to consolidate the country’s protracted democratic transition, in the hope that Ghana will play an increasing role in promoting peaceful change in this troubled region.