"My greatest success is also my greatest disappointment. We have established a nation - Tanzania - that is some achievement. Stable, united, proud, with immense clarity of what it wants to do, committed to the liberation of our continent. It has played an immense role - poor as it is - in the liberation of our continent and it will continue playing it. So that is what I think is our greatest achievement. But is also our failure. I never wanted a Tanzania. I really did not believe that these African countries should establish different sovereign-ties. They are artificial creations, all of them."¹

Introduction

In 1989, the World Bank issued a document which argued that, "underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance."² This document was the advent of the imposition of conditionality to effect liberal democratic government.³ More than a decade later, good governance in its various guises continues to dominate the donor agenda. The donor agenda is reminiscent of the heyday of colonialism and the civilising mission that thrust Africa into the orbit of the European world, albeit as a ‘dark continent’. This characterisation of Africa was punctuated by the very construction of Africa as an absence.⁴ It is this absence that assigns to Africa a state of nullity which makes it uniquely available as the site of whatever fantasy may be proposed. This article seeks to understand the manner in which the notion of good governance has been applied in the United Republic of Tanzania.

African perspectives on good governance

Although the need for good governance on the African continent is an issue that ultimately requires an African solution, a vast volume of western writing has dominated debates about governance in Africa. In this context, it is important to examine recent African thinking and contributions to the general debate about good governance. Bingu Wa Mutharika, the Secretary-General of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), brings the experience of someone committed to regionalism and integration to bear on this debate. His book, One Africa one destiny: Towards democracy, good governance and development, is in essence an appraisal of the failures of African development thinking over the past 30 years and makes the case for transcending Africa’s past in order to forge ahead in the new millennium. Wa Mutharika argues that Africa has remained entrapped in various externally-driven ideologies for too long and asks whether "human rights and multiparty democracy [will] be the last conditionalities for increased resource flows into Africa."⁵

Wa Mutharika argues that, if Africa is to shake off its current malaise, it has to embrace new directions which are grounded firmly in regionalism, democracy and good governance, recognising that these have to emanate from within civil society. Civil society, despite the influences and ravages of colonialism and neo-colonialism, is founded upon traditional values that continue to mould its direction and identity. This sense of tradition is essential for change in the future. He notes that "economic philosophies that are not rooted in traditionalism, are not readily applicable as a solution to the continued underdevelopment in our continent."⁶ It is against this background that a new development agenda for Africa is advocated by taking an holistic approach covering all sectors of the economy with a prime objective to reach all people at all levels. For Wa Mutharika, the most important aspects of civil society in Africa are not only its traditionalism but also its emphasis on regional economic co-operation. In this context, he argues that "African civil societies and the social framework should be redesigned to form the new basis for economic liberalisation, political reforms and democratisation."⁷

The focus on contemporary debates about democracy and the relationship between state and civil society is also the subject of Lloyd Sachikonye’s Democracy, civil society and the state. Sachikonye examines the role of social movements, an issue which has been neglected in most analyses of civil society and democratisation processes in Southern Africa. Sachikonye is concerned about the manner in which civil society has recently become a privileged site in the Southern African context where it has been abstracted from its theoretical and historical meaning. He challenges the contemporary liberal conceptions of both democracy and civil society, arguing that any analysis that seeks to separate civil society from the state is fraught with difficulty. Hence, he argues that the relationship between state and civil society is "a continuous and dialectic one."⁸ This dialectic relationship is central to the argument on social movements that, it is asserted, have been seen as autonomous from the state. He argues that social movements have a complex relationship with the state and the political process.

Chole and Ibrahim are concerned with the kind of democratisation that has been taking place in Africa, questioning whether it is merely the form that is changing, or "more exactly, how much substance and how much form does it involve."⁹ More importantly, they seek to understand the link between economic reform and democratisation. They question the reasons behind the oscillations between arguments that a strong state is essential for economic growth to the current configuration that ties economic growth to liberalisation. They urge that uncritical adulation should not be foisted upon countries merely for holding multiparty elections. This point has been vindicated clearly by the disillusionment with the processes of democratisation that has occurred on much of the continent. As they point out, "the essence of democracy resides in the relationship between the state and the people, especially on how much control the latter have over the former."¹⁰ Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o makes the case that democracy is necessary in Africa on philosophical and moral grounds "before it becomes a political and economic" debate.¹¹ For Mamdani, it is the epistemological questions about democracy that are central when contextualised in different cultural locations: "democracy is not an artefact that can be introduced and sustained regardless of context, either as an intellectual enterprise or as part of a foreign aid package."¹² It is against this background that an evaluation of Tanzania’s adoption of the multiparty system needs to be conducted. The historical forces that have conditioned the modes of governance prevailing in Tanzania are thus considered.

The transition to independence

The United Republic of Tanzania was established in April 1964, following the amalgamation of the former independent states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The United Republic came about after a long and often severe period of colonisation. The mainland, Tanganyika, was first colonised by the Germans and later handed over to the British in 1920 under the trusteeship system through a mandate from the League of Nations. Tanganyika attained independence in December 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. The transition to independence, however, was achieved without the pattern of violence that dominated the struggle for independence in countries such as Kenya.

In 1962, when Nyerere assumed the mantle of power, the country effectively operated under a de facto one-party state. A de jure one-party state was proclaimed in 1965, after the adoption of recommendations by a presidential commission on constitutional matters. The constitution was amended by parliament. The role of national elections was retained, although the candidates for elections were selected by the (TANU). There was a stipulation that each seat could be contested only by two candidates in order to ensure that no member could be elected without commanding a majority of support. The 1965 and subsequent national elections under the one-party system were conducted under these rules. Presidential elections were held at the same time as parliamentary elections and Nyerere regularly contested elections every five years from 1965 to 1980.¹³

At independence, it was unclear which development path Tanzania would follow.¹⁴ Nyerere espoused egalitarian concerns and indicated his preference for a socialist economic policy. The first five-year development plan emphasised the Africanisation of the bureaucracy, the villagisation of the agrarian sector and the overhaul of manufacturing industries. The plan was premised on the basis of a mixed economy and articulated a strategy that sought joint investment and private capital. The failure to attract such capital led to a re-evaluation of the strategy. It was against this background that the Arusha Declaration of 1967 was proclaimed.

The Arusha Declaration

The Arusha Declaration of 1967 tried to establish a more egalitarian society, placed emphasis on self-reliance, and avoided dependence upon foreign loans. The strategy entailed that the state owns the means of production and important services. Consequently, commercial banks, mills, and leading import and export houses were nationalised. Nyerere argued:

"We in Tanzania should move from being a nation of individual peasant producers who are gradually adopting the incentives and the ethics of the capitalist system. Instead we should gradually become a nation of Ujamaa villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these small groups cooperate together for joint enterprises."¹⁵

Central to this strategy of self-reliance was the development of the agrarian sector. Nyerere’s version of socialism was based on the principles of ujamaa, which emphasised the strong family solidarity found within traditional African societies.¹⁶ By deploying the values of ujamaa, Nyerere sought to unite Tanzania, placing particular emphasis on communal living in ujamaa villages. The pursuit of such a strategy was justified by Tanzania’s predominantly rural population whom the government sought to reach and encourage to unite in co-operative production villages. For Nyerere, these villages were essential entities which would promote equality and prevent the emergence of rich farmers. Ujamaa also sought to strengthen national identity which, Nyerere argued, had been undermined by colonial domination.¹⁷

In the agrarian sector, the government introduced state marketing monopolies (parastatals) for the handling of crops and consumer goods. In 1970, under the Buildings Act, all buildings valued in excess of Shs100 000 were nationalised. The policy of villagisation or ujamaa vijijini became one of the key strategies. Initially, the government relied upon voluntary associations setting up villages in remote areas and providing inducements for settlement. However, in 1973, the leadership moved to a programme of enforced villagisation and by 1980, 91% of the rural population lived in ujamaa villages.¹⁸

Domestic problems and disillusionment with the Arusha experiment

By the mid 1970s, the Tanzanian economy began to falter rapidly as a result of the ambitious and, in most cases, unrealistic development policies that had been adopted.¹⁹ Despite the rhetoric of self-reliance, Tanzania continued to depend on foreign aid. The economy hit crisis point by the end of the decade when it found it increasingly difficult to meet its debt obligations. In light of these difficulties, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank urged the Tanzanian government to abandon its socialist policies and adopt a structural adjustment programme (SAP). President Nyerere, undaunted, refused to accede to these demands.²⁰ The economic crisis was exacerbated by the rapid decline in exports and Tanzania’s inability to import even the most basic commodities. The villagisation programme was also seen as a failure as it became evident that peasant farmers were not producing as effectively on a co-operative basis, leading to an overall decrease in agricultural production. The economy was affected adversely by the oil shocks of the 1970s, by drought and by the war with Uganda.

In an attempt to rescue the economy, a National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) was launched in 1980. This plan, however, proved dismally inadequate as it was designed on the principles of self-reliance, albeit with a large external resource component. When external funds were not forthcoming, the plan effectively collapsed. By 1982, the country had plunged further into economic chaos as smuggling became rampant and the secondary economy became the only means of survival for the majority of the population.²¹ Even though Nyerere accepted an SAP, he was never willing to accede to the demands of the international donor community. As Booth points out, the process was designed to appease the IMF and the World Bank in order to obtain sorely needed aid rather than to restructure the economy fundamentally.²²

In 1985, Nyerere stepped down as President and Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over the reins of power. Nevertheless, Nyerere continued to be an important political figure by retaining the position of chairperson of the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which had been formed in 1977 after the amalgamation of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and TANU. The departure of Nyerere from the presidency allowed the new government to embark upon a World Bank-IMF sponsored Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) that lasted for three years. The emphasis was on the correction of external imbalances, reducing budget deficits, reducing inflation and providing adequate incentives to producers, as well as exchange rate adjustment, trade liberalisation and reduction of the public sector. Little attention was paid to social services and infrastructure such as education, health and roads which, as a result, declined rapidly during the course of the recovery programme. Consequently, at the end of the life of the ERP, Tanzania remained in serious crisis with inflation hovering well in excess of 30%.

In 1989, when the term of the ERP expired, an Economic and Social Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was adopted.²³ The deleterious effects of the ERP on the population, with a real decline in wages, increasing inflation, increasing unemployment, as well as a growing unequal distribution of income coupled with a decay of social services, led the ESAP to emphasise the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the provision of essential services, albeit on a cost sharing or user pays basis.

The negative effects of the ERP and growing opposition to the government, no doubt assisted by the democratising wave that swept through Africa in the early 1990s, led to demands for political liberalisation. The impetus for liberalisation came not only from opponents of the ERP who blamed the one-party state for the country’s economic woes, but also from the fatigued international donor community under the aegis of the World Bank which advocated good governance as an essential part of the reform process. The calls for political liberalisation were spurred by the critical role of Julius Nyerere, who challenged the ruling party’s legitimacy in a public speech in February 1990, arguing that it had lost touch with the people. In 1991, Nyerere resigned from his position as chairperson of the CCM and advocated that Tanzania should move towards a competitive political system.²⁴

Political liberalisation and competitive politics

Nyerere’s influence on the politics of Tanzania meant that the CCM finally relented and President Mwinyi appointed the Nyalali Commission to recommend whether Tanzania should operate in a multiparty environment. The commission presented a draft report to the president in December 1991, in which it recommended the adoption of a multiparty system. In addition, the commission recommended that 40 pieces of repressive legislation should be repealed and a body established to oversee the transition. A constitutional commission was to be appointed and a programme of political education in democracy was to be instituted.²⁵

In February 1992, the CCM repealed the single-party clause and paved the way for parliament to pass the Political Parties Act in June, effectively allowing for a multiparty system. The act stipulated that new political parties had to be registered with the Registrar of Political Parties with a minimum of 200 members each from the 10 regions in the country, including Zanzibar and Pemba. In addition, parties had to satisfy the Registrar that they were not formed on an ethnic, regional, religious or sectarian basis.²⁶

The delay in implementing this legislation provided an important opportunity for the CCM to consolidate its position. During the one-party system, the state and the party had become inseparable, with the latter financially dependent upon the former. In the new environment, the CCM had to be financially self-sufficient. The party mounted a campaign to recruit new members in the light of declining numbers during the 1980s. The result of the campaign was that, in virtually all regions of the country, the party was able to increase its membership.²⁷

The delay in legalising the multiparty system proved disadvantageous to the opposition, which was unable to operate as a result of prevailing constitutional requirements. The opposition’s difficulties were compounded by the president who decreed that the debate on multipartyism was to be restricted to the Nyalali Commission, effectively gagging the opposition. The opposition, undaunted, coalesced to form the Steering Committee for the Seminar on Transition to Multiparty Democracy. After the seminar was held, the committee transformed itself into the National Committee for Constitutional Reforms (NCCR). The NCCR elected Chief Abdallah Fundikira as its chairperson and established a secretariat. The NCCR argued that the Nyalali Commission was an unnecessary waste of scarce resources, because it could not deny people their most fundamental human rights. The NCCR threatened the government that unless it legalised the multiparty system within a year, the opposition would go ahead regardless of the legal requirements. In addition, it called on the president to establish a transitional government while preparing for multiparty elections.

While the opposition initially gained a great deal of momentum and support, it began to suffer from problems of disunity once the government acceded to its demands for a multiparty system. These problems not only exposed the opposition’s poor organisational skills but also its lack of a social base. The problems of disunity in the Tanzanian opposition mirror those that plagued the Kenyan opposition that also split once a multiparty system was established.²⁸ Once the task of freeing the political system was achieved, the opposition in both countries found themselves in disarray as sectional interests became paramount. In Tanzania, the disunity of the opposition was evident with the declared intention of 24 political parties to seek registration.²⁹ The majority of these parties were led by disaffected former CCM members. They either had been marginalised by or expelled from the ruling party, had endured detention or had been exiled. This was the case with opposition parties such as the Union for Multiparty Democracy led by Chief Abdallah Fundikira, the Tanzania Democratic Alliance Party led by Oscar Kambona and the Civic United Front led by James Mapalala and Seif Hamad.

The opposition called for a national convention as was recommended by the Nyalali Commission to lay the foundations of a democratic agenda for Tanzania. Furthermore, there were calls to establish a Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution, which was to be ratified by a constituent assembly specifically convened for this purpose. However, these demands, were rejected by the CCM.

The deferred Zanzibar question

Zanzibar has always been treated as an exception. Zanzibari politics revolve around the manner in which the union was created. The violent overthrow of the Arab Sultan, and the fact that the terms of the union were never openly discussed, remain divisive. As part of this arrangement, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) was permitted to operate within the one-party system. The Nyalali Commission was forced to address the Zanzibar question as the rift between politics on the mainland and the island widened. The commission proposed institutional changes to the structure of the union - from a union with two governments to a federation with three governments. The commission’s proposal was in recognition of problems and concerns over citizenship, the control of foreign exchange, the collection and distribution of taxes and customs duties and the formula for contributions to the Republic’s expenses. The commission recognised discontent with the union agreement, which had created neither a federal nor unitary state. Rather, it had allowed for a separate Zanzibari government with its own president and institutions of power, as well as a union government which controlled the mainland with jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defence, communications, currency and higher education for the entire country. A highly contentious point was the fact that mainland citizens were denied the opportunity to purchase land on the island and required a passport to enter Zanzibar, while no such restrictions were imposed on Zanzibaris. The CCM rejected the recommendation and in a speech to parliament on 30 April 1992, the prime minister argued:

"Honourable Members will agree with me that the solution to these problems will not be obtained through the introduction of a Federation with Three Governments. On the contrary, that will be the beginning of an erosion of unity and co-operation of the Tanzania which has been built since 1964. It will create a fissure which enemies of the union will use to break it. That will not be in the interest of Tanzanians as a whole ... We do not see that there is any sound argument, legal or political, for changing the present structure of two Governments, and starting another of three. We believe that a structure of three Governments will weaken our Union politically and economically."³⁰

Despite overwhelming support for this position, however, parliament later passed a unanimous resolution demanding that the government introduced a bill that would allow for a Government of Tanganyika thereby adopting a three government structure. This change was precipitated by concerns about the election of the vice-president and Zanzibar’s decision to join the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). The election of the vice-president was necessitated by changes to the constitution as a result of the introduction of the multiparty system. In order to deal with these constitutional changes, President Mwinyi appointed a committee to recommend changes with Mark Bomani as chairperson. The Bomani Committee proposed that, in the light of the practice of having two vice-presidents, the prime minister of the union government and the president of Zanzibar, there should be a single vice-president for the United Republic. It further recommended adopting the American model of choosing the Vice-President with the proviso that the vice-president come from a different part of the union as the president thus ensuring that all of the union’s interests were represented. It was felt that the American system where the president stood for election with a vice-presidential candidate would ensure that both came from the same political party. While this recommendation received support on the mainland, it was unacceptable in Zanzibar.

The CCM Central Committee recommended to the National Executive Committee (NEC) that the system in place, in deference to Zanzibar’s opposition, should be retained. It was at this point that Nyerere aired his views, pointing out the problems that existed with the introduction of a multiparty system. The NEC, however, failed to deal with the issue and instead referred it to parliament, requesting a period of two years in which to consider the recommendation further.

In 1992, as political liberalisation became a reality, events in Zanzibar threatened the very nation which Nyerere had forged. A private newspaper, Motomoto, reported that Zanzibar had joined the OIC. Although the revelation sent reverberations around the government with regard to the making of foreign policy, President Mwinyi initially defended the Zanzibari position on the grounds that it was constitutional.³¹ However, when the Parliamentary Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee investigated the allegations, it concluded that Zanzibar’s actions were unconstitutional and recommended its withdrawal from the OIC. In addition, the committee called for those officials who were involved to be punished for undertaking such an ‘illegal’ action. During the debate in the National Assembly where the parliamentary committee’s report was being considered, the deputy speaker, Pius Mseka, cut short the debate when the National Assembly resolved to shelve the committee’s report for a year to allow the governments of Zanzibar and of the union to discuss the issue.³²

President Mwinyi, recognising the tensions within CCM, asked Julius Nyerere to mediate. At the very time that Nyerere was attempting to resolve the crisis, a large number of mainland parliamentarians from the single-party CCM parliament tabled a motion demanding the establishment of a Government of Tanganyika. Nyerere was finally able to convince Zanzibar to withdraw from the OIC, as well as to accept the Bomani Committee’s recommendations regarding the procedure for electing the vice-president.³³ However, the mainland parliamentarians did not withdraw the motion, but instead tabled a motion calling for a referendum to decide the issue. Despite the previous opposition by the government, in a surprising turn of events, parliament unanimously accepted the motion without debate. Nyerere explained this dramatic acquiescence:

"It appears that what our Leaders were actually afraid of was debate, for they would be forced to show their true colours ... So our Government simply fizzled out, like a punctured balloon. I think even the MPs who had tabled the original motion were amazed!"³⁴

The issue was decided finally by a referendum of CCM party members in which nearly 40% of the total membership voted. The vote, as reported to the NEC of the party in 1994, was that 62% of the members wished to retain the existing system, while 29% favoured a single government and only 9% supported a three government structure.³⁵

The transition to multiparty elections

The transitional period coincided with the timetable for elections that were to be held in 1995. During this time, the CCM consolidated its position and controlled all institutions. It established the rules under which new political parties were to operate and frequently intervened in the ‘national interest’. The CCM represented itself as the party that upheld Tanzania’s record of peace, stability and solidarity in contrast to the opposition that threatened the very fabric of the nation by articulating particular interests. In particular, it refused media access to the opposition by not relinquishing its hold on the sole national broadcasting agency, Radio Tanzania. In addition, it refused both to repeal the 40 pieces of repressive legislation which made it difficult for the opposition to function, as well as to mount a democracy education programme. This allowed the government to intimidate the opposition. Critically, during the transition phase, the CCM remained dominant and the boundaries between the government and the party remained blurred.

The long transitional period meant that it was difficult for the opposition to maintain a coherent position. The initial euphoria of multipartyism waned as the opposition was unable to provide a viable alternative set of policies. A further problem for the opposition was that it found it extremely difficult to penetrate the rural areas where the CCM had its strongest support, making them largely an urban party.

By the time of the 1995 multiparty elections, 13 political parties were granted registration. The government’s rules prohibited any independent candidates from contesting either the presidential or parliamentary elections. This stipulation was successfully challenged in the High Court, which ruled that these provisions were unconstitutional as they impinged on the rights of all citizens to participate in government. Despite the High Court ruling, the government successfully passed a constitutional amendment which made these provisions subject to the newly enacted electoral laws. The problems with such a tactic were highlighted by Nyerere who argued:

"This is very dangerous. Where can we stop? If one section of the Bill of Rights can be amended, what is to stop the whole Bill of Rights being made meaningless by qualifications of, and amendments to, all provisions? I am saying that the basic Rights of the Citizens of this country must be regarded as sacrosanct. The right to participate in Government is essential to democracy. The Right to vote and the Right to stand for elective office are Rights of Citizenship."³⁶

The main opposition political parties included Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), under the leadership of its founder Edwin Mtei. Mtei was a former CCM treasury minister who had resigned after differences with Nyerere over adopting IMF policies. CHADEMA did not contest the presidential election, but established close connections with another opposition party, the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), which had fielded a candidate. The two parties also agreed to an arrangement that they would form a coalition if they were called to form the government. The NCCR-Mageuzi was the party which gained prominence after Augustine Lyatonga Mrema, a former CCM deputy prime minister, took over the leadership.

The party with the greatest links to Zanzibar was the Civic United Front (CUF) led by Shariff Hamid. It was the most significant party in Pemba and most observers predicted that the CCM would find it difficult to compete with the CUF on the islands. Although it did not have much support on the mainland, it fielded a presidential candidate, Ibrahim Lipumba. Some of the other major political parties included the National Resistance Alliance (NRA), the National League for Democracy (NLD), the Popular National Party (PONA), the Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA), the Tanzania Peoples Party (TPP), the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD) and the United Peoples Democratic Party (UPDP). The large number of opposition parties, as well as opposition disunity clearly favoured the CCM. Nevertheless, the opposition presented a potential challenge to the CCM and was able to point to the rampant corruption and economic mismanagement that had occurred under the aegis of the ruling party.

Leadership in the CCM

While the multiparty elections heralded a new phase in Tanzanian politics, the most important political machinations remained within the CCM. President Mwinyi, under the stipulations of the constitution, was only permitted to serve two terms and this necessitated the identification of a presidential candidate by the CCM. In order to elect the CCM presidential candidate, the party established an elaborate procedure. Aspiring candidates’ names had to be submitted to the party’s Secretary-General who, in turn, submitted them to the Central Committee. The committee was empowered with the task of drawing up a shortlist of five candidates who were recommended to the NEC which could either accept or alter the list. Finally, the NEC presented these names to the party congress which elected the candidate by secret ballot.

Although there were 17 candidates for the CCM presidential nomination, based on party’s procedures, Benjamin Mkapa was elected by the party congress. The influence of Julius Nyerere in the election was paramount. In May 1995, he castigated the CCM leadership for corruption and exposed major problems in the party. He made it clear that he would support a candidate who was untainted regardless of the political party which such a candidate represented. Mkapa’s election was endorsed by Nyerere in a speech at Chimwaga. Mkapa, a journalist by profession, had been Nyerere’s press secretary and had served as foreign minister both under Nyerere and Mwinyi.

The multiparty elections

The official election campaign was punctuated by confusion. The elections were conducted first in Zanzibar and then on the mainland. The separate Zanzibari elections, made problematic by the major debates over the way in which the union was to be governed, exposed major divisions on the island. The election process was plagued from the beginning by CUF complaints that it was being hindered and intimidated by the CCM. There was a general feeling among the opposition that a free and fair election was not possible. The CUF campaign emphasised economic liberalisation and closer co-operation with the Arab Gulf states. It was precisely these close ties with the Islamic states that the CCM played upon, arguing that this was an attempt to exert Arab control over the islands. On 25 October 1995, the CUF claimed victory. However, the final election results were delayed, and the electoral commission declared the CCM presidential candidate, Salmin Armour, as duly elected after attaining 1 565 more votes than the CUF candidate, Seif Shariff Hamad. In the parliamentary elections, the CCM was declared to have won 26 out of 50 seats. Despite efforts to monitor the election process, it was apparent that the elections were fraught with difficulties when the number of votes counted in two constituencies exceeded the number of voters registered. It was not surprising, therefore, that international election monitors noted major discrepancies in the election process.³⁷ CUF members have since boycotted the Zanzibar House of Representatives. The European Union and other donors cut aid in what was perceived to be fraudulent elections.

The union elections, which were held on 29 October 1995, were also disrupted by administrative disorganisation in Dar es Salaam where the elections were postponed and rescheduled for 19 November. The opposition argued that this was a means to promote disorder in areas where the opposition had support. In protest, the opposition refused to contest the presidential elections in the re-run in Dar es Salaam. This was an important mechanism for the opposition to gain legitimacy, given that provincial results ensured a CCM victory. Nevertheless, the opposition contested the parliamentary elections.

The election results witnessed the return of the CCM to power. In the presidential race, where four candidates had sought election, Mkapa received 62% of the vote while the opposition candidates amassed 38%. The election results showed that the CCM was being challenged and that it could not attain the kind of popular support it enjoyed under Nyerere. In the parliamentary elections, the CCM won 186 of the contested seats with the CUF attaining 24 and the NCCR-Mageuzi 16. Because the National Assembly includes a number of nominated seats, the final configuration consisted of the CCM with 214 seats and the opposition with 60.

Although the ruling party, the CCM, retained power, it confronted an economy riddled with problems. There was rising unemployment exacerbated by SAPs, the collapse of infrastructure and poor industrial performance. The state was unable to provide even the most meagre of social services. This is reflected in the fall of life expectancy figures from 52 years in the early 1990s to 48 years in 2000, as well as the highest infant mortality rate on the continent. The decay of health services can be seen in the banning of x-ray services because of defective machines. The Tanzanian government has faced an ever increasingly vigilant donor community demanding accountability and transparency. The most pressing concern for international agencies was the failure of the government to collect taxes and curtail the high levels of corruption. The World Bank’s refusal to disburse funds was echoed by the donor community which refused the balance of support payments as a result of the Paris Club meeting in 1995.

The 2000 elections

In 2000, Tanzania held its second multiparty elections. These elections were seen as a foregone conclusion with President Mkapa assured of a second term in office. The opposition parties’ inability to field a single candidate meant that Tanzanians were highly sceptical of the electoral process. For the average voter, the real issue was the continuing decline in their standard of living. Although the government adopted and met World Bank-IMF expectations, high unemployment, insufficient health care, a lack of educational facilities and sheer poverty remain.

The 2000 elections were not different from the 1995 elections with the CCM able to ensure that they were not operating on a level playing field. The abolition of state subsidies to political parties meant that the opposition was unable to fund their campaign adequately. The problem of the differentiation between the CCM and the state remained. The CCM was again able to intimidate the opposition through the use of police supervising political rallies. In addition, it denied the opposition access to the dominant government media. Although the private media has been permitted to operate, in general, it had little impact on the political agenda. Most significantly, the media, public or private, failed to raise the key issue of economic management.

The opposition, under the aegis of the National Convention for Construction and Reform-Change called for the resignation of Lewis Makame, the chairperson of the National Electoral Commission, on the grounds that he favoured the CCM. The opposition, however, was unable to make any significant electoral inroads. The same four presidential candidates ran for office and it appeared that the opposition had learned nothing from the previous election. International observer teams reported that the election was relatively fair and free on the mainland. As expected, President Mkapa and the CCM easily retained power.

In the first multiparty elections in 1995, the CCM, with less than a 1% margin, claimed victory in Zanzibar. The opposition CUF claimed widespread rigging and boycotted the assembly. This led to the suspension of donor aid to the island. The 2000 election sadly mirrored the 1995 election. The 2000 election was marred by claims of electoral fraud and violence with troops patrolling the streets. Although the constitution prohibits religion to be the basis of a political party, the ruling CCM accused the CUF to be an essentially Muslim party.³⁸ Ironically, the label of an Islamic party helped the CUF to gain further support from the Islamic community. The detention of 18 CUF members without trial for treason exacerbated tensions further. These CUF members were declared to be ‘prisoners of conscience’ by Amnesty International.

The election was annulled due to irregularities in 16 of the 50 constituencies. The Commonwealth team of observers commented that the election was a shambles. Despite the opposition’s demand that a new election should be held, the CCM rejected this, leading to further violence on the island. The re-run was boycotted by the CUF and Amani Abeid Karume was sworn in as Zanzibar’s president and the vice-president of Tanzania. In an attempt to forge unity, Karume’s first act was to release the 18 CUF members. The opposition to CCM rule on Zanzibar has nevertheless continued with clashes between the opposition and government. The repression of the opposition has resulted in the fleeing of a large number of Zanzibaris to Kenya, including 14 CUF members of parliament. This crisis represents the largest challenge to the Tanzanian government, which has always prided itself as a peaceloving nation. It is clear, however, that the events in Zanzibar represent the repressive nature of the system that continues to exist in the country.

Conclusion

While most sub-Saharan African countries have endured a great deal of instability - marked by ethnic rivalry, military takeovers, regional and religious conflict - Tanzania has been, until recently, a stalwart of stability. It has been at the forefront of the liberation struggles, a haven for refugees from surrounding countries, and has played an important role in fulfilling the ideals of pan-Africanism. These achievements are in no small measure a testament to the legacy of its founding father, President Julius Nyerere who died in October 2000. Although obituaries from all sides of the political spectrum praised Nyerere’s achievements, there have been dissenting voices such as that of R W Johnson who portrayed him as a flawed hero.³⁹ The neo-liberal agenda epitomised by Johnson fails to recognise Nyerere’s achievements primarily because of his vehement opposition to western domination.

In the 2000 IMF review of its loans to Tanzania, the IMF commended the Mkapa government for implementing macroeconomic reform. The World Bank and the IMF, which have become the major proponents of contemporary modernisation theory, currently set not only the economic but also the political agenda for sub-Saharan Africa. The chief executives of the IMF and the World Bank recently travelled to Tanzania to set the economic and political agenda. It is clear that policy makers in these institutions have the power to determine what counts as knowledge by setting the agenda — whether ‘basic needs’, ‘sustainable development’ or ‘good governance’ - which in turn legitimises their very authority.

Although Tanzania has escaped the more overt political turmoil that its neighbouring countries have endured, in the aftermath of the 2000 multiparty elections, the country appears to be open to inter-ethnic rivalry due largely to the Zanzibar question which threatens the union itself. Zanzibar is the site of the greatest opposition to the ruling CCM party which has been in power since independence. The challenge ahead for President Mkapa is to deal with the dysfunctional economy and to meet the ever growing demands of its population who have seen social services decline rapidly. The ideal of self-reliance which was espoused by Nyerere is no longer a choice but increasingly a necessity.

Notes