Introduction

Structural conflict within Guinea-Bissau’s political elite has had a negative impact on the country’s attempted transition from a socialist regime to a multiparty democracy. Dissension among politicians took a violent turn in the mid-1980s, resulting in the overthrow of the Vieira regime in 1998 and the outbreak of a civil war which destroyed the gains made by decades of social and structural development initiatives in the country. Moreover, it engulfed the sub-region and former colonial authorities in a power struggle which rekindled long-smouldering grievances. Nevertheless, there were some positive effects of the political upheaval. It gave Vieira’s faltering democratisation programme new impetus, and paved the way for the holding of free and fair elections in 1999.

However, if we look at what remains of the high aspirations of Guinea’s democratic transition, there is not much cause for optimism.

The country’s development crisis is growing, and the regime of the new president, Kumba Yala, is structurally weak. It appears incapable of managing the post-conflict transition effectively, or of coping with the country’s most urgent needs. Yala’s recent political actions show an alarming shift towards an authoritarian and non-democratic mode of government.

The following analysis describes the internal and external factors that have influenced the current state of affairs, and which have aggravated the structural crisis.

The derailing of the democratisation process

Before June 1998, Guinea-Bissau had followed the typical path of African countries transforming towards democracy. Economic crisis in the 1980s was followed by the implementation of a structural adjustment programme. External pressures exerted by donor countries exacerbated a crisis of legitimacy evolving within the one-party regime of the Partido Africano da Independência do Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which finally brought about the beginning of political liberalisation in 1991. At that time Guinea-Bissau was the last of the Portuguese-speaking African countries to initiate a democratic transition.

The form political liberalisation took was determined exclusively by the principal actor, PAIGC, and entirely orchestrated from above. Indeed, reforms such as passing legislation to permit opposition parties and announcing an intention to hold multiparty elections were mainly a government response to domestic pressure exerted by ordinary citizens rendered desperate by poverty. Neither the PAIGC nor the government were genuinely interested in any kind of transformation: they tried to impede or influence the process wherever possible. Not surprisingly, it was the PAIGC that won the first parliamentary elections – classified free and fair1 – with 37.9% of the vote in July 1994. In the presidential elections, the incumbent president, João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira, defeated his opponent, Kumba Yala, from the Partido da Renovação Social (PRS).

Four years later, however, Vieira’s power was seriously challenged by an army rebellion led by former Chief of Staff, General Ansumane Mané. In February 1998, General Mané was suspended on charges of smuggling arms to the Senegalese separatist movement, Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques des Casamance (MFDC). Mané had been a comrade of Vieira during the struggle for independence, and had supported Vieira in his military coup against Luis Cabral in 1980. But his hope that he would be rewarded by appointment to a position of influence in Vieira’s government was disappointed: instead he was merely made the army’s Chief of Staff. When this position was given to someone else, Mané launched a mutiny. He was able to mobilise 90% of the soldiers formerly under his command. Despite their having supported Vieira in his coup against Cabral, the military had been marginalised by the new government, and had lost most of its funding and privileges. As a consequence, many in the army were using the proceeds of cannabis smuggling and the sale of arms to the MFDC as a self-financing mechanism.

Without sufficient protection from his own army, Vieira relied on the support of troops from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, in terms of a joint defence pact the three countries had signed in 1997. However, both Senegal and Guinea-Conakry were acting in pursuit of their own interests, as later events were to show. The Dakar government followed its fears that if an army coup in Guinea-Bissau was successful, the Casamance rebels, who had close ethnic ties with many Bissau soldiers, might find significant support in that country. Guinea-Conakry, on the other hand, had been a supporter of the PAIGC government from the days of the anti-colonial struggle. By sending its own military troops, Guinea-Conakry also hoped to counter Senegalese influence, and reduce that country’s role as a major player in regional affairs.

After months of fighting, and a peace initiative brokered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a peace agreement was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in November 1998. The deal called for elections in March 1999, an interim government comprising members from both main parties (the PAIGC and the PRS), and the withdrawal of all Guinean and Senegalese troops. These were to be replaced by peacekeeping troops of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). However, despite having committed themselves to the Abuja treaty, Mané’s forces launched a new attack on 7 May 1999. The initial cause was the resistance of Vieira to disarming his presidential guard and instead attempting to reinforce it by recruiting young militia members from the Papel and Bijagos ethnic groups.

With the support of the majority of the population, Mané’s men succeeded in ousting Vieira. The new interim president was Malan Bacai Sanhá, a PAIGC member and former President of Parliament. The position of Prime Minister in the so-called Government of National Unity was held by Francisco Fadul.

Although the new government faced serious political, economic and social challenges in 1999,2 it managed to hold the second round of multiparty elections in Guinea-Bissau in November 1999, according to the timetable set. However, a question arose that would have critical implications for the future stability of Guinea-Bissau: How would Mané’s military junta react to the election results? More particularly: Would General Mané – who presented himself as a safeguard for democracy – respond to the results by trying to create a military dictatorship?

The limited extent of Mané’s democratic engagement was proved two weeks before the first round of elections took place. The junta proposed a Magna Carta which would give it authority over the government for a period of ten years, and included the power to dissolve the government without consulting parliament during any situation of severe political crisis.3 The plan was scrapped after protests from the political parties, but it indicated the way in which the junta was thinking.

Elections and the chance of a new democratic dispensation

The parliamentary elections and the first round of presidential elections held on 28 November 1999 promised a new beginning for multiparty democracy in Guinea-Bissau. However, the elections were dogged by a number of endemic problems.

These included the structural weakness and inexperience of the opposition groups; the strong political role played by the military, embodied in the figure of General Mané; a powerful security apparatus; and the deterioration in both the capability and the moral probity of state officials.

With strong support from the population, Kumba Yala’s PRS won the parliamentary elections, relegating the former ruling party, the PAIGC, to third place. With 38 seats for the PRS, 29 for the Resistência da Guiné-Bissau/Movimento Bafatá (RGB-MB) and 24 for the PAIGC, the PRS lacked a comfortable majority. It therefore opted for a coalition with the RGB-MB.

Kumba Yala, who had stood for the presidency in 1994, won the presidential election in the second round of voting, on 16 January 2001. A member of the largest ethnic group in the country, the Balante, and a popular figure, Yala gained his strongest support amongst the urban young and the poor. He also succeeded in mobilising the electoral backing of the antigos combatentes from the liberation war, when he had been serving as a political officer.4

Parallel powers of the military and of the coalition government

In the run-up to the elections, Yala made it clear to the junta, which supported the PAIGC candidate Malam Bacai Sanhá, that neither he nor his party would accept the junta in a consultancy role, however that role might be defined.5

However, in the months following the elections it became apparent that the military was continuing to act as a parallel power, which contributed to a destabilisation of the transition process. Despite the official dissolution of the military junta, General Mané remained as a counterweight to the increasingly fragile presidency of Kumba Yala. When it became apparent that the factionalism within the ruling elite – expressed in continual internal wrangling – had not ceased with the inauguration of the new government, the only element apparently able to guarantee stability seemed to be General Mané. His involvement in politics went as far as forbidding the president to go on a state visit to Senegal, and accompanying him on a visit to Nigeria.6

Instead of supporting the government’s line (opposing the military) and helping to reinforce democratic structures, President Yala played off his presidential powers against those of the coalition government led by Prime Minister Caetano N’tchama, a cousin of Yala and former Minister for the Interior in the interim government of Francisco Fadul. Yala’s lack of consultation with the relevant government ministers before taking decisions created extreme friction within the government, particularly in the RGB-MB, the PRS’s coalition partner. An extreme example is the discussions the president held on the exploration of a Common Maritime Zone with Senegal,7 and the negotiation of new share percentages, without even consulting Helder Vaz, the minister for Economic and Regional Development, and leader of the RGB-MB.8 In addition, misunderstandings about government regulations, the nomination of ambassadors, the distribution of resources as well as divergent opinions on development issues put the coalition under strain right from the start.

The disputes within the coalition reached a peak when Yala arbitrarily dismissed five members of the government – all from RGB-MB – in September 2000. One of those was Helder Vaz, who had been one of the key actors in negotiating debt relief with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).9 In another manifestation of his disorientated leadership style, Kumba Yala anulled the decrees of dismissal after a week, and reinstated the government members in their former positions.

For the former ruling party (and now strongest opposition party), the PAIGC, the evident instability within the coalition government provided opportunities to make political gains. Although the PAIGC remained overtly critical of the government, they might have seen the chance of replacing the RGB-MB as partner in the coalition. In mid-July 2000 some sources even spoke of a secret alliance between Kumba Yala and Nino Vieira. “Os cordelinhos são puxados por ‘Nino’ Vieira e Kumba Yala limita-se a dançar”.10 To these observers, the political crisis had been mainly instigated by the PAIGC, resulting in a situation where “the ‘ninismo’ is coming back and colliding with the Junta’s interests.”11 In Portugal, where Vieira had been granted political asylum, the situation in Guinea-Bissau caused sufficient concern to warrant an official warning to the former president not to engage in political activities, although his supporters living in Guinea-Bissau sent him messages that people had become impatient with the situation in the country.12 In November 2000 people took to the streets, shouting for the return of Vieira [“Presidente e governo estão a fazer pior do que o PAIGC”],13 and demanding the resignation of N’tchama, the prime minister. In Portugal, Vieira’s constant travelling led to increasing suspicions that he was preparing another coup.

Whether these allegations had any substance or not, an internal rift within PAIGC became evident. Some members became very friendly with members of the new government. Other PAIGC members were declared quasi state enemies by the PR–RGB-MB coalition. Francisco Fadul, who had been prime minister in the interim government, became the main target of the newly elected government. He was suspected of being close to General Mané, and was openly accused by his successor N’tchama of inciting the military to disobey the newly constituted civil power.14

Another attempted coup

Serious conflict between General Mané and the government erupted after the firing of Navy Commander Mohamed Lamine Sanhá, who had set free a Korean trawler detained for illegal fishing in Guinean waters, against the will of the government. After his dismissal on 28 April 2000, he simply refused to step down. This incident not only highlighted the increasing political mistrust between the executive and the military chiefs; it also illustrated a climate of social insecurity, disrespect for human rights and diminishing trust in international organisations by their local counterparts.

At the beginning of November 2000, the political scenery in Guinea-Bissau was characterised by dissension within the military, a deep dissatisfaction with the N’tchama government, and growing differences between Mané and Yala. The tension between the latter escalated further when on 16 November Mané cancelled the promotions of 30 military officers ordered by President Yala, without consulting him beforehand. Mané aggravated the situation by firing the country’s Chief of Staff, Verissimo Seabra Correia, and taking over his position. He then proclaimed himself Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, a title and post belonging to the head of state. This move, which was accompanied by Mané’s order that the presidential guards must be disarmed, was interpreted as the first moves in another coup attempt.15

On 22 November, forces loyal to General Mané and troops backing Yala clashed in Bissau. After the first encounters Mané fled with a group of about 50 soldiers to the region of Quinhamel, 40 km northwest of Bissau. There he was found by troops loyal to the coalition government, and finally killed. Details of the manner of his death (whether in the course of combat or by execution) remain unclear.

Opposition party leaders like Francisco Benante of the PAIGC, ex-Attorney General Amine Saad of the UM and Fernando Gomes of the Aliança Socialista Guineense were arrested on grounds of their alleged involvement in the coup. Together with the troops loyal to Mané, about 108 Senegalese separatists who supported Mané and vice versa were also arrested.16

Speculation that the democratic transition in Guinea-Bissau would forge ahead after the demise of General Mané proved premature. The tanker ‘democracia’ is still travelling in rough and stormy waters in Guinea-Bissau, following a zigzag course towards an unknown destination. The post-conflict peace-building process continues to labour under heavy constraints.

What kind of role for the military?

The direct challenge that the military posed to the constitutional order decreased after Mané was killed.17 Nevertheless, the bleak situation within the military, the slowness with which demobilisation and the re-integration into society of combatants is taking place, and the undemocratic behaviour of key figures in the military continue to have a destabilising effect. A study recently conducted in Guinea-Bissau identified 20 000 combatants, the army’s numbers having incresed to this figure from 6000 at the start of the civil war. Some of these soldiers are veterans of the anti-colonial struggle. The publication of the study’s results raised hopes amongst the veterans that they would receive some kind of financial compensation, but the state is ill able to afford any such costs.18 Even the payment of ordinary wages is at risk. The new government has proved unable to fulfil its promise to increase the payment of the soldiers by 300%;19 to the contrary, at the beginning of 2001, soldiers – in common with other public servants – had not been paid for three months. The ordinary soldier’s diet is limited to one meal per day, which consists mainly of white rice.20 This situation, together with a lack of information regarding the legal status of those officers detained after the 22–23 November uprising, creates a climate of unrest and agitation in the army barracks.21 In such a context of severe tension, the progress of the programme for demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration is being implemented far too slowly.22 Further street demonstrations by members of the armed forces are likely.

An additional source of concern is that military leaders continue to regard themselves as guardians of democracy on the one hand, but on the other hand continually interfere with, and threaten, the political and civil rights of civilians. In July 2001, Chief of Staff Verissimo Correia Seabra accused the politicians of creating a climate of instability by interfering in the business of the military and inciting anarchy within its ranks. While making this claim, he presented the role of the military as that of defender of democracy and justice.23 However, the military’s interpretation of the term ‘democracy’ was clearly illustrated when Radio Bombolom, a private (independent) local radio station, broadcast a debate in March on the events of the uprising in November 2000 and the armed conflict in 1998–99. Afterwards a highly-placed military officer stated that the first strike in a new conflict would be launched against Radio Bombolom, as the radio staff would destabilise society through their reports.24

To alleviate some of the tension that still exists within the military, the international community and particularly the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guine-Bissau25 should help to speed up demobilisation and draft a sustainable reintegration programme which addresses the needs of former combatants. For those that remain in the army, international assistance is needed to assist it in transforming into a de-politicised and democratically accountable defence force.

Continuing political instability

The effort to preserve and to strengthen democratic institutions is marred by friction, disagreement and political uncertainty in both government and the political life of Guinea-Bissau in general.

Until early January 2001, Guinea-Bissau was headed by the two-party coalition of PRS, the party of President Kumba Yala, and RGB-MB. When Prime Minister N’tchama tried to reshuffle the cabinet after Mané’s coup attempt, he provoked a mass resignation of RGB-MB ministers on 23 January. The PRS was left with a minority government, which, owing to its weakness and growing anarchy in the country, was increasingly ineffective. The N’tchama government had not managed to bring the government’s programme for the year or the budget before parliament by February. All it took to bring it down was a no-confidence motion by the RGB when parliament reconvened in February.26

The crisis continued after N’tchama had been forced to step down, partly because President Yala and his party (PRS) could not agree on a new candidate. At the end of March, Yala finally nominated Foreign Minister Faustino Imbali as the new Prime Minister. An independent sociologist, Imbali had been a special advisor to the interim government of Francisco Fadul on strategic issues, and had led the negotiations with the IMF and World Bank for Guinea-Bissau’s qualification as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC).27 For the government he constitutes an important link with the international donor community, on which the survival of Guinea-Bissau increasingly depends.

Imbali’s cabinet comprises mainly independent politicians and technocrats, and includes a number of opposition members. It consists of five ministers from the PRS, and three from the Partido da Convergência Democrática (PCD): the RGB-MB, the Partido Social-Democrata (PSD) and the Fórum Cívico Guineense each have one representative. According to Imbali, these ministers were chosen because of their competence and independence of party affiliation.28 All indications are that in appointing Imbali, Yala was attempting to create a Government of National Unity similar to that which Francisco Fadul governed during the transitional period.

Nevertheless, Imbali’s position as prime minister remains contested. Although he has the support of the PRS, all other opposition parties have challenged his appointment, citing his lack of experience. Not surprisingly, on 5 April 2001 the opposition presented a no-confidence motion against the new government one week after its swearing in.29 The argument of Helder Vaz, the opposition party leader, was that the current government represented a danger for Guinea-Bissau because it was supported by the military and not by parliament. He therefore demanded its replacement by a Government of National Unity with a broad parliamentary base. However, the no-confidence motion was dropped; instead the opposition parliamentarians decided to give Imbali two weeks to propose a government plan.30 It is believed, however, that in doing this the opposition was motivated less by the wish to make a constructive contribution than by Kumba Yala’s threat to dissolve parliament and to establish presidential rule if the opposition persisted in its no-confidence motion.31

Erosion of the separation of powers

It is obvious that Kumba Yala has an eccentric interpretation of what Guinea-Bissau’s constitution lays down, especially with regard to the independence of the judiciary. On 10 September 2001, he dismissed three Supreme Court judges, including the deputy president of the Supreme Court, Venancio Martins, who had announced that the court intended to pursue the president for “menaces, slander and meddling in internal judicial affairs”. 32 One week later, the president of the Supreme Court was forced to quit office. These acts are in defiance of the constitution, Article 20 of which states that judges can be dismissed only by the Higher Council magistrates, and not by the president. Four days earlier, in another move to bring the judiciary into line, Yala had dismissed Attorney General Rui Sanha, and installed former Prime Minister, Caetano N’tchama, as his successor.33 Since N’tchama and Yala are connected by family ties, this move seems to have been motivated by nepotism.

The president’s actions against the judiciary are symptomatic of the general neglect of political and civic rights in Guinea-Bissau by the highest authorities. Another instance is the number of occasions on which the freedom of the media has been interfered with. When the privately-owned Radio Pidjiquiti broadcast a programme about the ongoing battle between President Yala and the judiciary, N’tchama and two armed soldiers raided the studio and ordered that the cassettes of the news programme be handed over, threatening to arrest the journalists concerned.34 In June 2001, two (other) journalists were arrested after they had drawn the public’s attention to alleged illegal practices within the government apparatus, claiming that high government officials had bought more than 127 houses in Portugal, and had sent large sums of money abroad. As in similar cases, the arrests were made without any official warrant, and were carried out by the Security Service.35

A journalist who published a report on the luxurious life- style of the president’s wife was confronted by presidential bodyguards, who stormed, shooting, into the building housing the newspaper Diário de Bissau.36 In May 2000 the head of public television, Paula Melo, and one of Guinea-Bissau’s most famous journalists, Iussuf Queta, were held for two days after they had broadcast a statement by Fernando Gomes accusing the Prime Minister of corruption.37

Lately, Amnesty International has confirmed that there has been a regression in the field of human rights in Guinea-Bissau since the time of the transitional government (before the elections in 1999).38 Considering the latest events, it seems likely that the democratic rights of citizens will be further eroded in the future. Especially in 2001 journalists have been targets of arbitrary detention and threats in retaliation for criticism of government policies, or the reporting of issues deemed sensitive by the authorities. When debates about the events of November 2000 and the manner of General Mané’s death under disputed circumstances were published in Bissau’s media, the Vice-Attorney General advised journalists to practise “self-censorship”.39

It seems clear that the rule of law is upheld in an unequal and rudimentary way in Guinea-Bissau. For example, the officers detained for alleged involvement in the Mané coup of November 2000 remained in prison for months, without any formal charge being laid, and without having appeared before any court. Incidents of this kind and the harassment and intimidation of the media demonstrate the neglect of civil liberties by the authorities. The international community should make it a priority to help the government of Guinea-Bissau to reform, to strengthen its judiciary, to pay much more attention to human rights training, and to place special emphasis on upholding the rights of citizens.

Instruments of power

Yala, whose position is contested within his own party, is attempting to retain power by seeking support from ethnic networks, patrimonial relationships and the security forces. His bringing back N’tchama, who is known to be loyal, after his dismissal as prime minister, was a move that enabled Yala to exert some control within the judicicary. Also, the creation of a Secretariat for Internal Administration within the ministry and the appointment as the new secretary of Antero João Correia, former head of the secret service under Vieira,40 clearly show the importance of the security forces to Yala’s political leadership.41 It is also noteworthy that the primary positions in government are held by Balante, an ethnic group comprising about 25% of the population. Yala, although belonging to the subgroup of Pepel, is a Balante. The majority of soldiers in the army are also members of this formerly marginalised ethnic group, which supported Yala in the 1994 elections. (General Mané was a Mandinga, which meant that he could not mobilise army support on ethnic grounds.)

It might be an exaggeration to speak of a ‘balantização’ in Guinean politics or an instrumentalisation of ethnicity. However, taking into account the dictatorial and arbitrary behaviour of the Yala regime and the socio-economic situation of the population (most of whom have no access to running water or to electricity), the dominance of one ethnic group which monopolises access to resources is a destabilising factor.

Another factor likely to lead to instability is the cleavage between religious groups within Guinean society. Mandingas, for example, belong to the Muslim community, which comprises about 40% of the population. However, there is a strong Christian element. President Yala is a Catholic, and read theology at the Catholic University in Lisbon. It was one of Yala’s most urgent tasks after the death of General Mané to appease the Muslim community, and to reassure them as to their equal position as citizens of Guinea-Bissau.

Structural weaknesses in the party system

Yala’s biggest aid to remaining in power is the fact that the opposition continues to be as fragmented as in the past. In that respect, nothing has changed from the early days of the liberation process, when Vieira was still in power.

Instead of uniting to overthrow the PAIGC government, the opposition perceive their main enemy as being within their own camp. Various attempts to unite opposition parties have failed, and the party landscape in Guinea-Bissau was, and is, fraught with inter- and intra-party quarrels. It is not surprising that it took the military, which had no party connection, to drive Vieira out of office.

At present, most of the opposition parties lack any specific programme for the future of Guinea-Bissau. Support for parties is dependent on the personalities of the party leaders, and is often restricted to one area. As developments since the first multiparty elections have shown, besides the PAIGC, only the PRS and the RGB-MB have managed to establish themselves nation-wide. Besides those parties, only the União de Mudança (UM) and the Aliança Socialista Guineense (ASG) of Fernando Gomes, former president of the human rights league, have presented any public profile recently. However, the UM has become infected by the Bissau party virus, factionalism, and split after two of the party leaders, Manuel Barcelos and Agnello Regalla, were arrested following Mané’s failed coup.42

Intra-party quarrels undermine the larger political groupings as well. In many ways, they are not parties as such, but loose groupings of individuals using a party apparatus to fulfil particular objectives. They are not coherent associations with a programmatic approach and a cohesive internal discipline.

Oscar Baldé, a high-ranking official of the RGB-MB, which initially rejected the new government of Faustino Imbali, accepted a position within the new cabinet. This offer by Imbali was interpreted by Baldé’s party colleagues as an attempt to destabilise the opposition. After Helder Vaz had lost the election for leadership of the RGB-MB at the third party congress in September 2001, his supporters brought the results of the voting to the Supreme Court, which finally annulled them. According to the new party leader, Fernando Vaz, Kumba Yala was behind the court’s decision. He claimed that Yala’s motive was to promote Salvador Tchongo to the forefront of the opposition.43 These events illustrate both the depth of the differences within the country’s largest opposition party and the ease with which these can be exploited by the ruling party.

The competition within the PRS, which became evident during the search for a new prime minister, might lead to greater factionalism or even fragmentation. Artur Sanhá (Minister for Internal Administration) and Jose de Pina (Ministry for Health), both former ministers and aspirants to the post of prime minister, have had to step down, losing their former prestige and power.

Currently, the most homogeneous party seems to be PAIGC. Although even this party was divided over the no-confidence motion, it seems that the PAIGC took up the opportunities created by break-up of the coalition government and the intra-party struggles of other opposition parties. It even seems that certain politicians from the PRS and PAIGC have reached consensus on a plan to revise the constitution in Guinea-Bissau.44

Economic challenges

The structural crisis in which Guinea-Bissau finds itself, which was aggravated by the formation of a minority government in January 2001, is not restricted to the institutional dimension. It is also an economic crisis. Adding to the political pressure on the new government, the National Workers’ Union (which has 6000 members) launched a strike in March to press for the payment of four months’ wage arrears in the public sector.45 To be able to pay the salaries owed, the government had to apply for credit with the West African Bank, conceding funds promised by the European Union (EU) as mortgage.46 These financial acrobatics clearly demonstrate the extreme disarray of Guinea-Bissau’s state budget. The country belongs to the Least Developed Countries (LDC) category, with about 88% of its population subsisting on less than $1 a day. Its gross domestic product (GDP) stood at $218.3 million in 1999, and according to the World Bank, the value of the country’s debt in 1999 totalled about $709 million – about three times its GDP.47

Against this background, the World Bank and IMF agreed in January 2001 to support a comprehensive debt-reduction package for Guinea-Bissau under an enhanced HIPC Initiative.48 However, this agreement was suspended when the government missed several financial deadlines in sequence, and after the IMF had analysed the country’s public accounts in the first quarter of 2001. An audit by the World Bank in June 2001 revealed a shortfall of 11 billion CFA francs in the state budget, making all institutions aware of the presence of corruption and fraud within the state apparatus. Although the ‘black hole’ in the budget was first declared to be a consequence of several mistakes made in the administrative process and not to be interpreted as corruption within the State Treasury, two public servants were subsequently arrested in July, under charges of misappropriation of funds.49

So far the government has not presented any programme for poverty reduction, although it is urgently needed. Another source of serious concern is that economic experts are unanimous in saying that Guinea-Bissau has not achieved sufficient macroeconomic stability to enable it to re-launch the economy.50

In most African countries, democracy is mainly perceived by the population as entailing an improvement of their living conditions. Measured against this criterion, democracy in Guinea-Bissau has yet to arrive. The precarious state of Guinea-Bissau’s economy, and the challenges it faces, present an urgent case for further developmental assistance. Aid provided by the international community dropped from $106.4 per capita in 1995 to $44.2 in 1999. (The population of Guinea-Bissau is 1.2 million.) Substantial financial support is needed from the international community to strengthen the capacities of the country’s democratic institutions. Without it, the country may plunge into anarchy, and the military may once again take over the government.

Military ventures in the subregion

Speaking of anarchy in the context of Guinea-Bissau encompasses not only its own political instabilities but also the regional conflicts in which the country is embroiled. Conflict has spread along the West African coast during the past few years, as the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia have spilled over into Guinea-Conakry and exacerbated weapons proliferation in the region.

Senegal in particular, burdened by another unstable neighbour (the Ivory Coast, which is riven by ethnic strife and army mutinies), has been affected both by regional conflict and the security threat posed by its long-term conflict in Casamance Province, which is situated on its southern border adjoining Guinea-Bissau. For many years this region of Senegal, which is cut off from the rest of the country by the Gambia, has showed secessionist tendencies. With the outbreak of guerilla attacks by the separatist MFDC51 in 1982, the Senegalese government was exposed to severe threats to its internal security, which also placed strain on its relations with neighbouring countries.

Under Vieira, Guinea-Bissau attempted to mediate between Dakar and the rebel movement, but cross-border raids conducted by Senegalese troops in pursuit of MFDC rebels led to atrocities being committed against Guinea-Bissau’s border population. These affected relations between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau on several occasions during the 1990s. Another reason for strained relations between the two countries had to do with weapons being supplied to the rebels. According to Senegal, General Mané supported the MFDC rebels and was responsible for the destabilisation not only of Guinea-Bissau but of other countries in the sub-region. (This was also the reason why Senegal came to the support of the Vieira regime.)

However, Guinea-Bissau’s role in the conflict between the Senegalese state and the MFDC has changed since 1998: it no longer plays a mediating role in the conflict, but is a participant.

Although the Senegalese have tried to involve Guinea-Bissau in the fight against the MFDC since the time of Senegalese president Abdou Diouf, they have only recently succeeded. Interestingly, the rapprochement between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal on the Casamance question occurred at a time when Yala was under increasing pressure from the opposition and the military at home.52 It seems likely that Yala is motivated by a wish to secure military assistance from Senegal53 in the event of a threat to his government by another military coup d’etat, and also a need to keep the military otherwise employed by committing them to combat along the Senegalese border.

In order to please Senegal, Yala changed the Guinea-Bissau military commander of the forces deployed along the common border, as the former incumbent had been affiliated with the previous military junta. He also agreed to the creation of a joint observer mission to investigate recent incidents along the border.54

Since Yala came to power, the military in Guinea-Bissau has been actively engaged in closing down the rearguard bases of the MFDC. The rebels were known to have a strong presence in Guinea-Bissau north of the Cacheu River, and including the area around São Vicente, which is about 25 km south of the border. Several violent clashes between Guinea-Bissau’s army and the hard-line faction of MFDC under Salif Sadio55 took place in this region. At the beginning of 2001 the Guinea-Bissau army succeeded in dislodging the MFDC from its bases in Varela and Susana, less than 15 km south of the border to Senegal. The new provincial military commander, Coronel Tagme Na Wai, became known for his forceful and even violent repatriation of the many Casamance refugees who had fled over the border into Senegalese territory.56

According to the latest reports, the Guinea-Bissau military has forced Salif Sadio’s rebels back into Casamance territory, and in July 2001 started to withdraw approximately 1500 of the troops deployed along the border.57 Nevertheless, the ongoing conflict within Senegal will remain one of the biggest challenges to regional stability faced by the executive as well as parliament in Bissau. The MFDC may infiltrate Guinea-Bissau territory again, making use of their ethnic affiliations. (Generally, guerillas coming from the same ethnic group as members of the local population are indistinguishable from them.) The rebels might also find support among political groupings in Bissau, which could use the MFDC’s military strength to pursue their own political agendas.

Conclusion

Today, Guinea-Bissau finds itself in a structural crisis from which it is unlikely to be able to emerge unassisted. The country will need the support of the international community to resume the path leading towards a meaningful democracy. This means that financial aid is essential, but under certain conditions. A president who violates the democratic principle of separation of powers in order to place members of his own clique in positions of control cannot be given unqualified support.

To find a way out of its crisis, Guinea-Bissau needs a stable and democratic government. However, this presupposes the existence of parties that are capable of fulfilling their role as aggregators and articulators of the population’s interests. This role is not served by individuals whose aim is to serve only their own political advantage. This characterisation includes members of the ruling party as well as those of the opposition parties.

Also, a maturing civil society needs practical support from abroad that can exercise sufficient supervision and control to compensate for the state’s weakness in crucial sectors. Compared with the large-scale atrocities committed in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the hardships suffered by the population of Guinea-Bissau are less likely to feature on the political agenda of the international community. Nevertheless, achieving political stability in this West African country is not only crucial to its development and to the fight to alleviate poverty, but is also strategically important for the national security of its immediate neighbours and of the whole sub-region.

Notes

1 UN expresses satisfaction with Guinea-Bissau poll, in: The Guardian, 5 July 1994.



Andrea E. Ostheimer, Guinea-Bissau’s rocky path to peace and democracy, in: South African Journal of International Affairs, 7(1), Summer 2000.



Discussão da Magna Charta foi adiada em Bissau, in: Diário de Noticias, 18 November 1999.



Dirk Kohnert, Aussenpolitische Hintergründe des gesellschaftspolitischen Umbruchs in Guinea-Bissau, in: Afrika Spectrum, 35(1), 2000, pp. 41-63, p. 59.



Ibid.



Indefinição do poder na Guiné, in: Diário de Noticias, 4 May 2000, Crise política agrava-se com a doença do Primeiro Ministro, in: Público, 27 October 2000.



Yala, once severely criticising Vieira for selling out the country’s interests in the negotiations with Senegal about the oil quota of both states within the joint society, now in his own function as President only succeeded to augment Guinea-Bissau’s share from 15% to 20%. Petróleo e Casamança fazem subir tensões poíticas na Guiné, in: Público, 23 August 2000.



PR dá o dito por não dito, in: Expresso, 23 September 2000.



Ruptura no governo agrava crise política na Guiné Bissau, in: Público, 7 September 2000.



[Transl.: President and government are doing worse than the PAIGC did.] Presidente e governo estão a ser contestados, in: Público, 13 November 2000.



[Transl.: The strings are pulled by Nino Vieira and Kumba Yala is restricted to dance] ‘Nino’ Vieira poderá estar por detrás da crise política em Bissau, in: Jornal de Noticias, 7 September 2000.



Ibid.



Portugal advertiu Nino Vieira, in: Público, 7 July 2000.



Polémica na Guiné Bissau, in: Público, 22 October 2000.



Ansumane Mané proclaims himself Bissau Army Chief of Staff, in: Panafrican News Agency, 20 November 2000.



Guiné Bissau: Golpistas Presos, in: Público, 28 November 2000.



Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country, S/2001/237, 16 March 2001.



Presidente e governo estão a ser contestados, in: Público, 13 November 2000.



Kohnert, op cit p. 54.



Presse et armée n’émettent pas sur la même longueur d’onde, in: Panafrican News Agency, 1 April 2001.



Political tension rising, in: Panafrican News Agency, 28 April 2001.



Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country, S/2001/237, 16.03.2001.



"Militar guineense acusa políticos de ignorancia", in: Diário de Noticias, 13.07.2001.



"Sustained attack against freedom of expression", Amnesty International Press Release, 27.06.2001.



United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau.



Guinea-Bissau: Focus on political and military developments, in: IRIN, 31 January 2001.



Um desgoverno!, in: Expresso, 24 March 2001.



Imbali pede ‘o beneficio da dúvida, in: Diário de Noticias, 27 March 2001.



RTP Reporter, 2-6 April, 2001.



Opposition drops no-confidence motion, in: IRIN, 2 May 2001; Le parlement fustige la gestion du gouvernement, in: Panafriacan News Agency, 3 May 2001.



Parlamento critica Presidente, in: Expresso, 5 May 2001.



RSF condemns Guinea-Bissau prosecutor’s raid on radio station, AFP, 11 September 2001.



Le limogeage de trois juges: aucune valeur juridique, in: AFP, 12 September 2001.



RSF condemns Guinea-Bissau prosecutor’s raid on radio station, AFP, 11 September 2001.



Críticas a Yala levam jornalista à prisão, in: Diário de Noticias, 19 June 2001.



Bissau Human Rights League Threatened, in: Panafrican News Agency, 22 May 2000.



Intchamá levanta suspensão a jornalistas, in: Diário de Noticias, 1 May 2000.



Prisões arbitrárias e tortura, in: Jornal Digital, 16 March 2001.



Sustained attack against freedom of expression, Amnesty International Press Release, 27 June 2001.



Ex-chefe da secreta de Nino integra o Governo de Bissau, in: Diário de Noticias, 30 August 2001.



Ex-chefe da secreta de Nino integra no Governo de Bissau, in: Diário de Noticias, 30 August 2001.



Social solidarity secretary dismissed, in Panafrican News Agency, 15 January 2001.



Guiné-Bissau sob espectro de nova crise, in: Jornal de Noticias, 2 September 2001.



Politicians wish to tighten nationality provisions for the president, prime minister and ambassadors, ensuring that they have Guinean parents on both sides. This becomes particularly crucial for those who are coming from a crioulo background, or like Francisco Fadul, belong to the group of Lebanese trader families.



The minimum monthly wage for civil servants does not reach approximately $22, not enough to pay most housing rentals. RTP Reporter, 9-13 April, 2001.



Um desgoverno, in: Expresso, 24 March2001.



<http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/ dgprofile.asp?rmdk=82593&w=0&L=E>



Guinea-Bissau to receive US$790 million in Debt-Service Relief, World Bank Press Release, 2 January 2001.



Ministro das Finanças confirme irregularidades no tesouro público, in: Noticias Lusofonas 26 June 2001; Ministro da Justiça confirme detenção de funcionários do Tesouro, in: Noticias Lusofonas, 19 July 2001.



Bissau é ‘mau aluno’ e Maputo o exemplar, in: Diário de Noticias, 3 September 2001.



The main long-term aim of the MFDC is the creation of a Federation of Gabú – similar to the kingdom that once existed in the 16th century. That federation is meant to comprise an independent Casamance, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. A Guiné-Bissau fará parte da federação do Gabú, in: Público, 5 June 1999.



Petróleo e Casamansa fazem subir tensões políticas na Guiné, in: Público, 23 September 2000.



However, Senegal has outlined that in another round of conflict it would only participate as part of an international contigent.



O factor Casamança, in: Expresso, 27 May 2000.



The movement headed by the Catholic Priest Diamacoune Senghor is split up between the hardline faction of Salif Sadio who is not sticking to the peace pacts that were signed in March 2001 with the Dakar government of President Wade, and the chief of staff of MFDC, Leopold Sagna.



Guinea-Bissau: Focus on political and military developmens, in: IRIN 31 January 2001; Um desgoverno!, in: Expresso, 24 March 2001.



Suspensa operação militar na fronteira com Casamança, in: Notícias Lusofonas, 19 July 2001.