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NGOLESE DIALOGUE: THE WAY FORWARD?
After seven weeks of negotiations at Sun City, South Africa, a partial agreement was reached on 19 April 2002 between Bemba’s MLC (Mouvement Pour la Liberation du Congo) and the government of Joseph Kabila. Although the agreement represented the end of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), confusion still reigns. The negotiations are incomplete and the future of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains as uncertain as ever.
The accord, endorsed by the international community and signed by 258 of the 368 delegates from unarmed opposition as well as civil society groups, represents the beginning of a new political realignment in the DRC conflict. This agreement effectively transformed the discussions between the Lusaka signatories into a bilateral negotiation between a Kabila–Bemba axis backed by the international community on one side and a politically weak RCD–Goma backed by a military strong Rwanda on the other.
The new partners announced that they would install a transitional government in Kinshasa on 15 May 2002. At the same time they declared the Lusaka accords ‘dead’ but committed themselves to continue negotiations with the RCD–Goma and Rwanda. The initiative by President Mbeki to get the main players together in Cape Town over the period 7–9 May 2002 failed because although the RCD–Goma and their supporters, Tshisekedi’s UPDS (Union Pour la Democracie et le Progress Social) were present, the Congolese government and the MLC did not show up. As a result, the meeting was adjourned without any planning for follow up discussions.
A representative of the DRC government said that although the lights may have gone out at Sun City, the conclusion of the dialogue was not an end in itself since it was necessary to move forward discussions on several outstanding provisions of the Lusaka Peace Accord. Among these were the establishment of new institutions; the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process; the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces; and normalisation of the security situation along the country’s recognised international borders.
In an effort to contribute to the ‘success’ of the ICD, the UN sent to the Great Lakes area a special envoy, Jean-David Levitte. Between 27 April and 7 May 2002 Levitte met with the Congolese government, the MLC, the RCD–Goma, and the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Furthermore, Levitte met President Masire, the facilitator of the ICD, as well as South Africa’s President Mbeki.
In his final report to the UN Security Council, Levitte considered that a number of conditions were critical to guarantee and advance further the peace process in the DRC. These conditions—considered the basis for a sustained peace process—included the establishment of a transitional government in Kinshasa, the disarmament of rebel groups and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC. In addition, the mission highlighted the need for the parties to the conflict to respect the ceasefire, calling for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC in accordance with the Lusaka Peace Accord. Furthermore, emphasising the need for an inclusive agreement between all stakeholders, the report considers that the relaunching of negotiations between the three parties of the Lusaka Agreement should be undertaken in the spirit of openness and without preconditions.
At a political level, the report recommends the establishment of a fully inclusive Congolese ‘Transitional Authority’ suggesting that MONUC’s future mandate should be broadened to include its participation in the organisation and the conduct of free and fair elections in the country. At a military level, the report suggests that, if requested by the parties, the secretary-general should instruct MONUC to facilitate the development and implementation of a ‘curtain of troops’ as an interim measure aimed at ensuring border security in the final stages of the withdrawal.
Currently, this process is hampered by the continuing fighting in the east of the DRC and the reluctance of the RCD–Goma backed by Rwanda to withdraw from Kisangani. The situation has been worsened by reported mutiny within RCD–Goma’s ranks in Kisangani and Pweto. The Kabila–Bemba deal is also in trouble, partially because consensus could not be reached on the allocation of power between Kabila and Bemba in terms of the new transitional constitution.
Nevertheless, once the ICD gets back on track and MONUC’s forces are deployed in Kindu, the peace process is poised to enter a new, more complex and dynamic phase. In this new phase increased support by the international community will be needed in convincing all stakeholders to return to the negotiating table and re-address the outstanding issues concerning the creation of new political institutions and the transition to democratic government. – HB
SIERRA LEONE: STATE-BUILDING IN A TOUGH NEIGHBOURHOOD
As the euphoria about Sierra Leone’s 14 May elections gradually wanes, attention shifts to the performance of the various parties and their presidential candidates and the priorities of the incoming government and Parliament. The day itself marked an important turning point in the history of the country as nine political parties contested the presidency and 11 parties the 112 parliamentary seats. Final results indicate a clear victory for the incumbent 70-year-old Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who, by winning more than 70% of the vote, has secured another five-year term. His Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) will also retain a majority in Parliament by winning 83 seats. To a great extent this comes as little surprise, given the obvious advantages of incumbency and the widely held perception that President Kabbah was instrumental in returning the country to a peace long overdue.
The All People’s Congress (APC) came a poor second with about 22% of the presidential votes and 27 seats in Parliament, while Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) took less than two per cent of the presidential vote and failed to secure a single parliamentary seat. Besides Johnnie Paul Koromah’s People’s Liberation Party (PLP), which won about six per cent of the presidential votes and secured two parliamentary seats, none of the parties made much impression at all. The voting was carried out in an atmosphere of peace and calm throughout the country, with the only source of worry being the difficulty in managing the heavy turnout—estimated at about 80% of the 2.3 million registered voters.
This small West African country has been gripped by a decade-long civil war since 1991 and is now classified as the poorest country in the world in the UNDP’s latest Human Development Report. Expectations are high that the legitimation of a new government following these elections could herald the arrival of much needed international financial support that could provide over 60% of the country’s much depleted revenue for 2002 and beyond.
International concern is presently centred around the ability of the incoming government to launch the country on to a path of sustainable economic development, ushering in a period of genuine peace and growth. What steps need to be taken to forestall a return to the chaotic conditions of the recent past? What are the necessary elements to be factored into the new political calculus, to enhance its capacity to resist potential centrifugal tendencies?
Presently there is little disagreement over the underlining variables that set the stage for civil war. Most analysts hold the view that there was a mix of poor governance, social exclusion, economic mismanagement, and the denial of certain fundamental rights to a majority of the population. The new government will therefore need to keep a keen eye on issues that either directly or by implication raise fears that these problems are still immanent. Tejan Kabbah’s victory seems to augur well for the country at this time because of the international support he has been able to muster in the run-up to elections.
Kabbah was first elected to power in February 1996 after 21 years of service for the UNDP in New York, Tanzania and Lesotho. Fifteen months into his presidency he was toppled by a military junta led by Johnny Paul Koroma. Although he was returned to power nine months later with the help of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG, his leadership has been described within the country as weak and indecisive, while his ministers seem afraid of opposing his views no matter how flawed these may be. There is still concern within the country that he remains surrounded by the same individuals steeped in the corrupt practices of the past that paved the way for the RUF to launch a war on the country from neighbouring Liberia. For Kabbah to formulate and implement new policies that will steer the country on to the path of development and stability, he needs to understand and avoid the vestiges of the old dispensation that initially sparked off popular support for the RUF cause.
The RUF gained initial support from the youth and the villagers who felt marginalised by a cabal of political miscreants solely concerned with their personal aggrandisement. Many civil servants also joined the fray because of the perception that the only way to obtain a share of the wealth of the country was to soil their hands in one corrupt practice or another. Confirmation for this line of reasoning was built on the tactics that the governments of Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh used when they unleashed security forces to suppress any opposition to their power in a bid to solidify their hold on the riches of the country. In the context of massive unemployment, widespread corruption, a neglected and decaying infrastructure and outright impunity in the abuse of human rights in the country, state institutions, including the armed forces, the judiciary, the independent media, the police and even the political parties, were all used as instruments to amass personal wealth, thus undermining their legitimacy and in the process leaving very little room to redress the problems of the masses.
It can therefore be argued that the outbreak of the war in March 1991 was actually overdue, in a state beset with the perennial problems of bad governance, marginalised masses and widespread poverty. Successive governments, beginning with the military junta of Captain Valentine Strasser, justified their seizure of power on the pretext that they were returning that power to the people. However, the greed and allure of wealth and influence quickly diverted them from their initial goal of revamping the politics and the economy of the country, promoting new outbursts of political dissent and unconstitutional changes of government. However, the sheer brutality with which the RUF prosecuted the war led them to lose the initial support they had garnered following the widely held belief that their course was worthy of the struggle. More than 50,000 lives were lost, innocent civilians had their limbs amputated, what little infrastructure existed was destroyed, thousands of people fled the country to become refugees or became internally displaced and there was a total collapse of the rule of law across almost all of the national territory.
It took the intervention of ECOMOG, British forces and finally the arrival of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to separate the warring parties and initiate a return to peace. More than 47,000 soldiers have thus far been disarmed and demobilised. This number includes fighters from both the RUF and government sides, but it is widely believed that there are still secret caches of better weapons that could be resorted to in the event of the situation deteriorating.
Today Sierra Leone boasts the largest UN peacekeeping force currently deployed: a total of 17,455 military troops, 259 military observers and 87 civilian police personnel. Their presence constitutes an important foundation for the restoration of peace in the country, and they have succeeded in bridging the gap between the belligerent parties, creating important occasions for interaction and deliberation over matters of mutual concern. Although the war was declared officially over on 18 January 2002, the leader of the RUF, Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, has been in jail since May 2002, awaiting trial on charges of murder and robbery, together with over 70 other accused arrested for their role in the war. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, expected to open in October 2002, will probably indict him on charges of human rights abuses.
The incoming Kabbah administration has been involved in the various peace deals in Lomé and Abuja that led to the climate of stability essential to the holding of elections, so it is arguable that they possess much of the information relevant to the formulation of policies that will assuage the bitterness of the past. Moreover, the presence of a multiplicity of international organisations and foreign nationals involved with UNAMSIL has exposed the parlous state of the country to the international media, giving Kabbah enough publicity to seek international assistance of all kinds. President Kabbah will need to cash in on the high level of diplomatic prominence that the country presently enjoys, to drive through policies that will not only increase the level of donor participation but will also initiate long-term relations that will come in handy especially after the departure of UNAMSIL at the end of September 2002. Priority must be given to the most obvious indices of government performance such as human rights, the participation of the various political groupings in the running of the state, and especially by popular representation in the cabinet and respect for, and non-interference in, the spheres of the judiciary and the legislature.
In contrast to the generally calm atmosphere of the election campaign, Johnny Paul Koroma’s PLP eventually resorted to threats that should they fail to win the elections they would “make Sierra Leone ungovernable”. Given the country’s recent history it would be unwise to discount as nonsense such utterances, particularly as the political temper within the armed forces appears to favour Koroma. The incomplete rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers is also cause for concern.
Another issue of critical importance is concern regarding the youth who have become a political agent in themselves. In many cases their pre-war marginalisation has been exacerbated by years of fighting in the bush, which has in turn whittled away what few skills they had acquired in preparation for adulthood. The war has militarised their thinking and de-skilled them in the arts and customs of peace. A vast and comprehensive policy of social rehabilitation and training lies ahead, and while the present emphasis on former child soldiers is laudable, it should not be seen as an adequate response to the trauma experienced by an entire society.
The government will need to extend its presence over the entire national territory, especially in Kono district and Makeni, which have traditionally been RUF strongholds. People need to accept and respect the government, and to develop confidence that it is capable of redressing their problems in times of need. The rule of law needs to return to the country, with the police seen to be dispensing and enforcing justice. So far the Sierra Leone Police has been receiving invaluable lessons from CIVPOL, but with the envisaged departure of the British and UNAMSIL, necessary precautions need to be put into place to avoid a vacuum. The withdrawal of UNAMSIL will have to be phased so that the effects can have enough time to be digested by the society.
Most importantly the government needs to take full control of the diamond areas in order to increase its revenue base. From 1999 when that control started taking hold, the returns to the national coffers have grown from $1.2 to $26 million. Exports of legal diamonds rose to 220,000 carats, the highest volume the country had seen since 1996. Present projections are towards 300,000 carats in the near future, a level last seen in 1992 at the beginning of the war.
Efforts at professionalising the army have so far been laudable, especially with the support of British troops. The dividends of democracy that the country is presently relishing in could be reversed in the event of another coup. While efforts need to be made to capacitate the army in terms of training and equipment and keep them out of politics, care needs to be taken that they do not create another class of their own that could be more powerful than the state itself. The fact that the army and the police are still very much in support of Johnny Paul Koromah—as evidenced in the result of their vote count that was announced before that of the rest of the country—should serve as a warning sign to Kabbah. Together with the left-over support of the former RUF, there is the potential of a lethal force lurching out there, that could spell doom on the democratic gains acquired so far. That Johnny Paul Koromah is aware of this potential threat, only makes things worse.
On the international front, Kabbah will have to play a subtle game in a particularly volatile region. Foreign policy adventures should be avoided where possible.
The future of Sierra Leone can best be viewed from a perspective of cautious optimism. The groundwork has been laid for a smooth transition. How well the country performs will start being determined once a new cabinet is selected and shows how it intends to relate to its former political antagonists and present supporters either in Parliament or out of government. As the rest of the world watches, the common line of thought is that “to whom much has been given, much will be expected”. – JT
LESOTHO: ELECTION 2002
The recent parliamentary elections held in Lesotho on 25 May 2002 were the third such event since democracy was restored to this mountain kingdom in 1993, following seven years of military rule. These elections, which were contested by 19 political parties, were concluded with little controversy despite the introduction of a new electoral system (the mixed member proportional system), which includes elements of the old first-past-the-post system and proportional representation.
In terms of this new arrangement 80 seats were contested using the first-past-the-post system and the remaining 40 seats were to be allocated using the proportional representative system to constitute a 120-member Parliament. The novelty and relative complexity of this system had been a cause for concern in the eyes of many observers. However, these fears surrounding the new electoral model were put to rest by a statement released by the International Election Observation Delegation that endorsed the election as “free, fair, peaceful, lawful and transparent”.
The preliminary results announced on 28 May showed that the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 76 of the 77 constituencies, mostly with large majorities. The only constituency secured by an opposition party was that of Seqonoka in the northern Berea district, which was won by the leader of the opposition Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC), Kelebone Maope. However, the 40 additional seats to be shared on a proportional basis with other parties will shrink, albeit modestly, the ruling party’s majority. Proportional representation was introduced to the electoral systems as a means to making Parliament a more inclusive political institution. Elections in two constituencies, Hlotse in the northern Leribe district and Mount Moorosi in Quthing, where postponed following the deaths of two candidates from natural causes. According to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) fresh elections will be held in these two constituencies soon.
On a less positive note, the leader of the Basotho National Congress (BNP), retired Major-General Justin Lekhanya, has challenged the free and fair endorsement given to these elections by the electoral observers. The BNP has hired independent auditors to investigate ‘distinct patterns’ in voter behaviour that suggested the results had been manipulated. Lekhanya, who came into power in 1986 after a coup and ruled until he was deposed in 1991, is not rejecting the poll but is calling for an independent audit. One of the fears that many observers of Lesotho politics had prior to the election, centred on the influence that Lekhanya once had over the security establishment in Lesotho, especially the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). Analysts feared that Lekhanya might use his extensive influence and connections to convince the military to nullify the elections in the event—now reality—of a BNP defeat. However the possibility of this occurring is very slim because, in an attempt to prevent any further disturbances by the military, the Southern African Development Community and an Indian army unit have been training soldiers from the LDF in the hope that they can turn Lesotho’s troubled military into a more professional force.
The BNP is not alone in its objection to the results of the election; other opposition political parties aggrieved over the results of the general elections have also instituted legal proceedings against that country’s IEC. One such party is the Sefate Democratic Union (SDU), which served court papers on the director of elections, Khothatso Ralitsie, as he supervised the announcing of election results at the election centre in Maseru on 28 May. According to the court papers, the chairman of the IEC Leshele Thoahlane has been called upon to undertake a recount of the ballot papers throughout the country. One only hopes that the increasingly intense objections to the results are not an indication of impending political disturbances in this country with its chequered history of post-election upheavals.
Initial fears that the introduction of the new mixed member proportional system of elections might weaken the parliamentary system by denying any single party a majority have been obviated by the size of the LCD’s victory.
Even though the process of elections has gone relatively well, the threat of future political instability in this country can only be removed if a concerted effort is made by both internal and external political actors to understand the need for a change in Lesotho’s political culture. Given the political climate over the past year or so, this task could be almost impossible to achieve in the short term, because the run-up to the election has been marked by continued feuding within, as well as between, the leading parties. Personal exchanges of a virulent and public nature have been the stock-in-trade of leading members of the Lesotho political class since the resumption of democratic competition. This trend shows no signs of abating. Until the cycle is broken, a return to the past undemocratic dispensation that prevailed in Lesotho is not impossible. Such a turn of events will reverse the progress towards good governance and democracy that have been achieved to date, and this will surely augur badly for the Basotho and future African regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. – CM
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