INTRODUCTION

Hopes were high that elections in Lesotho on 27 March 1993 would restore democratic rule and establish the political stability that eluded the country since before its independence. Independence in 1966 brought a culture of authoritarian rule, a tradition of constitutional crises, fragile civil-military relations and a deterioration of the Rule of Law. The crisis in Lesotho, which could potentially ‘spill over’, would threaten the domestic security of South Africa, its only neighbour. In the context of the Southern African region, this would have a negative impact on efforts to restructure the region’s security relations according to international criteria for democratisation, stability and co-operation.

The purpose of this article is to speculate on possible solutions for the apparently intractable political crisis in Lesotho. In so doing, it emphasises the need for solutions driven by domestic imperatives. It also focuses on the historical context in order to understand the causes of instability and the role of governing politicians in establishing authoritarian rule. Thus, the first section will provide the history of political instability in Lesotho. The second section will focus on party politics in Lesotho, parties’ views on the status of the monarch and the regulation of civil-military relations, as these factors have repeatedly formed the core of the struggle for political power and have often precipitated political instability. The third section proposes various alternatives that could be utilised to restore meaningful stability in Lesotho.

A HISTORY OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Following Independence in 1966, all major incidents of instability in Lesotho (1970, 1986 and 1994) resulted in coups, brought about by the use of the armed forces. These coups were either a form of resistance against political change, or an attempt to depose democratically elected governments. Discernible trends after each coup have included the suspension of the Constitution, attempts to redefine relations with the monarchy, restructuring of civil-military relations to suit and serve the interests of the government of the day, changes in the executive, repression of the opposition and the imposition of authoritarian rule.

Following its election victory in the first general election in 1966, the Basotholand National Party (BNP), led by Leabua Jonathan, consolidated its power by constraining the overriding powers of the monarch, successfully sending the king into exile. The new government further downgraded the role of the chiefs and increased its co-operation with South Africa. In the run-up to the 1970 elections, the ruling party therefore, had antagonised its old support base. The royalists were disgruntled, the chieftaincy was embarrassed, anti-apartheid forces were furious and the rural population lost confidence in the government after the South African Police and its counterparts in Lesotho had bungled an incidence of alleged stock theft.1 The effectiveness of the Basotholand Congress Party’s (BCP) election campaign and the neutrality of the Catholic church during the stock theft incident further reduced the chances of the Jonathan government and the BNP to retain power.

After losing the 1970 election, the BNP refused to relinquish power to the victorious BCP, causing an outbreak of political unrest. The BNP argued that it was staying in power to save the country from the communist ideology propagated by the BCP. It further alleged that the BCP had only won the election through intimidation and the manipulation of election results. Legal channels to test the validity of the allegations were closed, through the suspension of the Constitution and the use of the armed forces to prevent a change in government. As a result, the armed forces and the civil service were drawn even deeper into BNP main-stream politics. Authoritarian rule was entrenched in Lesotho, characterised by constitutional crises, economic uncertainty and repression of the opposition. Furthermore, this demonstrated the fact that "[e]ach political group could continue to advance parochial interests by arguing that its own policies and leadership were indispensable and immediately required to preserve the nation from destruction."2

As a consequence, the foundation was laid for the fragmentation of social cohesion and homogeneity in Lesotho. Despite a homogeneous culture and language and the absence of diverse tribal groupings, Jonathan’s intransigence, lack of foresight and reluctance to introduce political reform measures demonstrated authoritarian tendencies that were to become the order of the day in Lesotho. It created tension and political dissatisfaction that threatened to explode at any opportune moment.

Such a moment presented itself in 1986, when Major General Justin Lekhanya launched a military coup, during which Prime Minister Jonathan was arrested and a military executive, led by the Military Council, was instituted to rule Lesotho. The new military rulers claimed to have launched the coup in order to return the country to democratic rule through a process of national reconciliation. The Council rapidly granted amnesty to political prisoners and disbanded the BNP Youth League (YL). These measures were welcomed by the public, since many had suffered at the hands of these vigilantes, who had not only taken the law into their own hands, but also encouraged the proliferation of unauthorised weapons in the country. Indeed, there was applause from a society weary of conflict. Although political activity was still prohibited, early gestures helped the military to gain some degree of legitimacy for its intervention and cultivated a belief that the military was poised to institute a representative transition to democracy and national unity. It also contributed towards invalidating the widely held perception that the new rulers were puppets of South Africa. Events regarding the regulation of the status of the monarch and control of the role of the military in politics, soon shattered these perceptions, when it became clear that the new regime was not truly committed to democratisation and reconciliation.

Three issues caused the new military regime to reconsider its relations with the king. In the first place, the king was the only one who was held in esteem across the political spectrum, enabling him to arbitrate in the country’s political crisis. Secondly, the king was seen by the Basotho as the man best suited to bring about reconciliation, since he had remained neutral in the conflict between the BNP and the BCP. Thirdly, the military realised that while vying for the acceptance of society, it needed someone like the king as a credible partner. These realisations meant that the king’s co-operation had to be secured. The regime thus reaffirmed the king as head of state with complete legislative and executive authority, subject to the proviso that such authority should be exercised in accordance with the advice of the Military Council. This proviso, and the fact that Lekhanya remained Chairman of the Military Council, meant that he acted as Lesotho’s real ‘strong man’, using the king as his ‘rubber stamp’. However, the determination of the king to remove these limitations and his continued criticism of the Military Council regarding corruption, violation of human rights and undemocratic practices, soon set the king on a confrontational path with the military. The military responded by stripping him of his powers and sending him into exile. He was replaced by his son Letsie.

With regard to the military, Lekhanya lacked the enthusiasm which he had displayed in his dealings with the BNP YL. The military soon enjoyed special status that ultimately led to the entrenchment of military authoritarian rule. Furthermore, the military violated the Rule of Law, abused basic human rights and retarded the process of democratisation. The centrality of the armed forces in politics and governance increased, making the task of regulating Lesotho’s civil-military relations near impossible for any future government.

Relative stability returned in 1991 when Major General Elias Ramaema staged a coup that ousted the Lekhanya regime. Consequently, Moshoeshoe returned to the country in 1992 from exile in Britain. His return was awaited with trepidation for its possible effects on the plans of the military government. However, mindful of Moshoeshoe’s political ambitions, the new rulers warned Letsie against abdicating in favour of his father, as it would force tribal elders to elect another family to continue the royal line. The new regime reinstated political activity, multi-party democracy and made preparations for holding free and fair elections that would return the country to civilian democratic rule and end an extended period of military authoritarian rule. However, "[t]he process of achieving the actual transition was not a simple one. Elections were postponed twice - from November 1992 and January 1993 to, finally, March 27th, 1993."3 Despite logistical and organisational problems experienced during the electoral process, it was the most peaceful election ever held in Lesotho. Furthermore, it was the first election contested by more than five political parties, thus presenting the electorate with ample choice. Yet, one party (BCP) won all the seats, with Ntsu Mokhehle appointed as Prime Minister.

Although the elections were considered to have been free and fair, the BNP later refused to accept the results, alleging fraud and irregularities. It soon became clear that the main grievance of the BNP was the absence of an electoral system based on proportional representation. They argued that the Westminster ‘first past the post’ system, had deprived them of any parliamentary representation. Tension amongst political players increased. The new government not only had to contend with the dissatisfaction of its political opponents, but also had to deal with the double agenda of the royal palace intent on establishing an absolute monarchy. These issues became central to the political unrest that broke out in August 1994.

At this time, the king plunged Lesotho into crisis when he ousted the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mokhehle, in reaction to allegations that the people had ‘lost confidence’ in it. He also suspended the Constitution, dissolved government and called for the reinstatement of his father Moshoeshoe. Internal reaction against the king’s conduct and the timely diplomatic ‘intervention’ of a number of states in Southern Africa - notably Zimbabwe and South Africa - served two purposes. Firstly, it demonstrated to politicians in Lesotho that there was a firm resolve to resist political wrangling and undemocratic practices. Secondly, it sent a clear signal that the region would not tolerate the forceful removal of democratically elected governments by unconstitutional means.

Although foreign ‘intervention’, particularly by South Africa, was not well received, it contributed to the restoration of stability and demonstrated the urgency of an inclusive national forum for dialogue and consultation where mechanisms to end undemocratic rule and constitutional crises could be negotiated.

PARTY POLITICS

Prior to 1991, the struggle for political power in Lesotho was dominated by three political parties: the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) which was formed in 1952, the Basotholand National Party (BNP), established in 1959, and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). These parties were actively involved in the struggle for Lesotho’s independence from Britain. Other parties only appeared on the political scene in 1991 after the Suspension of Political Activities, Order No. 4 of 1986, was revoked. A common feature of the BCP and the BNP is the domination of their political pursuits by their leaders, respectively Dr Ntsu Mokhehle and Mr Leabua Jonathan, as well as their long involvement with these parties. The BNP ruled Lesotho between Independence in 1966 and the military coup that ousted it in 1986. The BCP became the ruling party after its landslide victory in the 1993 polls.

THE BASOTHOLAND CONGRESS PARTY

South African black politics and the nationalist tendencies in Anglophone Africa in the 1950s strongly influenced the BCP’s political orientation. Mokhehle became a fervent nationalist during his student days in South Africa, where he was active in the Youth League of the African National Congress (ANC). He later joined Robert Sobukwe when the ANC split, to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). He transposed the PAC’s Africanist ideology to the BCP, an ideology that formed the core of the BCP’s pre-independence election campaign. Its failure to attract sufficient support during the 1965 election is partly attributed to the Catholic church and British colonial administrators’ opposition to its Africanist ideology. Both were uncomfortable with Mokhehle’s ties with black South African nationalist politics, regarded by them as ‘radical’. For the same reason, the BCP was also unpopular with the South African government.

Following its defeat in Lesotho’s first national election in 1965, the BCP became the major opposition party. It criticised the BNP for its lack of transparency, the politicisation of the security forces and the civil service, and the establishment of authoritarian rule. Its main criticism of the government pointed towards the BNP’s use of unconstitutional measures to stay in power after the 1970 elections. "Although the BNP had gained a majority of seats in the National Assembly, it had only received 41,63% of the popular vote ... Chief Leabua himself failed to win his seat ... John Mothepu the BNP candidate who had been returned in the Mpharane constituency with a majority of 2 106 ... resigned his seat to make way for Chief Leabua who fought and won a by-election, but his majority in a straight fight with the BCP was reduced ... He was at the head of a minority government which had an overall majority of two."4 Given this situation, the BCP successfully contested the validity of results in two constituencies, thus equalising the number of seats between the opposition and the BNP. To prevent his constitutional downfall, Jonathan adjourned the National Assembly, thereby making it impossible to have a no-confidence motion either debated or adopted. These actions clearly drew the battle lines between the BNP and the BCP.

The BCP was now singled out for repression by the BNP government. It was constantly harassed by the police, who was later joined by members of the BNP YL.5 On two occasions, it was banned and twice its leadership was detained. Since neither the monarch nor the church could intervene against Jonathan’s extreme resolve to rule, the BCP had to change tactics. In response to repression, the BCP organised uprisings and protest marches that were in turn stopped by the security forces. What had begun as political resistance, soon developed into a military struggle after Mokhehle’s departure from Lesotho in 1974, having been released from detention. The period between 1974 and 1979 saw the founding and development of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the armed wing of the BCP, as well as the establishment of an external wing of the BCP. The LLA began its armed action in 1977, marking the combination of political means of struggle with armed action. However, this new tactical approach failed to advance the BCP’s prospects to gain political power. The mobilisation of local masses in support of LLA style guerrilla warfare was inadequate. Furthermore, the political cohesion of the BCP was fragmented in the absence of Mokhehle and the subsequent lack of coherence between the internal and external wings of the party. The image of the BCP was tarnished by allegations that the external wing was supported by the apartheid regime in South Africa. The suspension of overall party political activity in Lesotho in the period following the 1986 military coup had an equally adverse effect on the BCP.

A number of factors complicate the placement of the BCP in the political spectrum. Khabela Matlosa, for example, suggests that the BCP has been Pan Africanist between the 1950s and 1970s, after which it became conservative.6 Maybe it is only possible now, with the BCP as the ruling party, to weigh mere pronouncement against actual conduct. Declining support for Pan Africanism in Southern Africa, and the reduced emphasis on ideology after the end of the Cold War also complicate identification of the BCP’s position. In its 1993 election campaign, the BCP emphasised the need for government accountability to the electorate, multi-party democracy, and the upliftment of all Lesotho’s citizens. With regard to the economy, views in favour of a mixed economy were espoused. The contents of this campaign seems to have appealed to an electorate that was exhausted by authoritarian rule. BCP promises with regard to the economy, seemed to contain the right answers to poverty, given that Lesotho is amongst the least developed countries in the world. The BCP subsequently won the 1993 election based on this campaign, although major challenges, such as defining its relations with the monarch and the regulation of civil-military relations, remain.

The first issue that had to be resolved with regard to the monarchy, was choosing between Letsie and the rightful king Moshoeshoe. When the BCP assumed power in 1993, Letsie was king of Lesotho, having been installed by the military regime in 1986 after King Moshoeshoe was exiled. King Moshoeshoe’s past relations with the BNP and the then military regime of Major General Lekhanya, had antagonised the BCP. It was alleged that he had connived with previous authoritarian regimes in suppressing BCP opposition. Letsie seemed more acceptable than his father, though his relationship with the BCP soon deteriorated when it became apparent that he had a different agenda. Letsie did not recognise the new government, as he was engrossed in establishing an absolute monarchy in Lesotho, while the BCP was stressing the need for a constitutional monarch, neither above the law, nor absolute. The BCP also suggested that the chieftaincy should be part of local government structures, in support of central government.

The regulation of Lesotho’s civil-military relations posed yet another serious problem that had to be handled with caution. The immediate challenge lie in depoliticising the army and training it along a new doctrine based on a new set of values. Following incidents of violence in January 1994 when the army demanded a hundred per cent pay rise, the new government demonstrated a spirit of ‘no compromise’ in dealing with the army when "... the soldiers were told that such a salary increase was out of question. An increase would be considered along with a review the government was doing of all civil servants. Soldiers would not be treated differently from other public servants."7 Past relations between the BCP and the LLA are yet another factor affecting the ability of the party to deal with civil-military relations. These relations have created "... army suspicions of the government’s relationship to former LLA members in Lesotho and the continued existence of a 1 000 strong LLA in South Africa."8 Following the establishment of a democratic government in South Africa, with a security policy different from that of its predecessor, it is doubtful that LLA forces are still based in South Africa. This task is further complicated by the fact that the National Security Service, representing the intelligence community, is demanding equal treatment for all members of the Lesotho Defence Forces. The creation of a non-partisan armed force, accountable to the democratically elected government, is clearly an enormous challenge for the new government.

BASOTHOLAND NATIONAL PARTY

Since its formation in 1959, the BNP has been a conservative party9, and until the mid-1970s, it has drawn its support from the chiefs, the Catholic church10, British colonial rulers and received support externally from the apartheid government in South Africa. Partly as a result of this, the BNP automatically adopted an anti-Communist stance, but changed it in 1983 following a visit of Jonathan to several communist countries, with whom diplomatic relations were forged. This severely constrained the BNP’s relations with its local conservative support base and equally tarnished its image.

The BNP’s relations with the monarch were not uncomplicated, as King Moshoeshoe was "... opposed [to] the granting of independence without major constitutional revisions that would restore to him substantial executive powers, he .... was reluctant to be relegated to a ceremonial role."11 However, the view exists to the contrary that the king did not want extraordinary executive powers.12 Relations between the king and the BNP took a decisive turn for the worst 1970 when the BNP, despite having lost the general election, stayed in power by executing a coup, assisted by the military and supported by the South African government. Following this event, the monarch was sent into temporary exile in the Netherlands, based on allegations of partisan involvement in politics. This measure was however, an inadequate deterrent, because "[f]rom the time of his return from exile - during which the 1966 constitution, written for a multi-party democracy, had been suspended and the then government had instituted various repressive and oppressive measures - the king ... worked to persuade the government to return the country to democracy and to restore to the people their basic rights and political freedoms."13 Other issues that constrained relations, were the lack of enthusiasm shown by the BNP to adopt development strategies that would enhance social development and its lack of support for the national liberation struggle in the region, particularly in South Africa.14 The monarch was eventually allowed to return in 1970, on condition that he would not interfere in party politics and that he would accept his role as being that of a constitutional monarch. The BNP clearly sought to reduce and control him. This approach persisted in defining relations, until the military take-over in 1986.

The Jonathan regime misused and politicised the armed forces, ultimately transforming them into a de facto armed wing of the BNP. As an additional check on the military, the BNP YL was transformed into an alternative source of power, after being trained as a para-military formation to serve as party vigilantes. This became a serious cause of concern to the military, effectively using it at a later stage as a pretext to precipitate the downfall of the Jonathan regime. The BNP had thus further undermined civil-military relations, already suffering from an absence of civilian control15 and culminating in the lack of accountability and transparency within these forces. They were ultimately left to their own devices. These factors characterised Lesotho’s civil-military relations throughout the period of BNP rule. Thereafter, the successful regulation of the country’s civil-military relations became a major preoccupation in an attempt to enhance stability and development in Lesotho.

Changes in the security environment in Southern Africa and mounting pressure against totalitarian rule within Lesotho, created an environment conducive for democratisation. This was to be initiated by the general elections on 27 March 1993. These changes reduced the chances of totalitarian rule, characterised by politicisation and harassment of the civil service16, repression, co-option of political opponents, corruption and fragile civil-military relations, to resurface. The same applied to military authoritarian rule. A clear consensus, however, still had to be reached on the future role of the military, that had become a considerable force in Lesotho’s politics, even under civilian rule.

The manifesto of the BNP for the 1993 election represented a remarkable departure from its previous political outlook. In tandem with the changed political situation, the BNP now propagated political tolerance, accountability and respect for human rights, and avoided mentioning the status of the monarch and the chieftaincy. Its lack of a position on this thorny aspect, its past record of totalitarian rule, the effectiveness of the BCP election campaign and the strong public ground-swell for democracy, accounted for the massive defeat of the BNP in favour of the BCP.

MAREMATLOU FREEDOM PARTY

The position of the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) which was formed in 1961 "... could be described as middle-of-the-road and non dogmatic, if only because this stance approximated the centre of the wide political spectrum contained in the party. The lone unifying principle of the Freedom Party was the belief that the Basotho national interests could be most effectively represented by the living symbol of national identity, the king. Definition of national purpose was thought to be a royal prerogative best exercised directly by the monarch in consultation with the nation."17 This political stance has since prevailed in the MFP, which draws its traditional support from royalists and the chieftaincy. Continued reliance on this traditional support base has recently been affected by a number of factors that has partly accounted for its failure in the general election of 1993. There are strong suggestions within Lesotho that the chieftaincy must be abolished or, alternatively, cease to be hereditary. These suggestions are resisted by the chiefs, who consider the chieftaincy as the epitome of Basotho culture and tradition. Liberals and democrats oppose this institution on the basis that the right of the chiefs to rule is not derived from a democratic mandate. Another argument advanced against the continued existence of the chieftaincy is that its sentiments are often manipulated by politicians for their own interests. These factors influenced the MFP to change its attitude towards the chieftaincy, calling on it to adapt to the requirements and administrative demands of a developing society.

Given its traditionalist ideological background, the MFP has always had good relations with the monarchy. In the formation of the first post-independence constitutional dispensation for Lesotho, the MFP proposed that the monarch, as head of state, should automatically be the head of the armed forces, as he would act as a safeguard against the misuse of security forces by politicians.18 The proposal was rejected, and at present, the party has not clearly defined either its position with regard to the status of the monarch, or the nature of Lesotho’s civil-military relations. Its ambiguity on these issues and the intolerance and lack of interest in traditional sources of power in contemporary political systems, are some factors that will affect the political standing and credibility of similar institutes, even beyond Lesotho.

NEW PARTIES FORMED IN 1991

Several new parties were formed in 1991, showing social democratic inclinations in the 1993 elections. These were the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), that entered into a pact with the Kopanang Basotho Party (KBP) for the elections, the Lesotho Labour Party (LLP), the Liberal Party of Lesotho (LPL), the Hareeng Basotho Party (HBP, a splinter group of the BCP), the United Party (UP) and the Lesotho Education Party (LEP).19 Time and their development towards the 1998 general elections will test these parties’ commitment to the principles of social democracy.

In general, and judging from election manifestos for the 1993 general elections, the common interest of all political parties in Lesotho seems to be the creation of accountability in governance, a multi-party democracy and the socio-economic upliftment of the nation. Divergent views occur with regard to the economy. The BCP and PFD favour a mixed economy, whereas the BNP and the MFP are for a free market economy. In education, the BCP is for equal opportunities for all and the revision of the curriculum to make it relevant to Lesotho’s level of economic development. The MFP propagates comprehensive primary education and more emphasis on vocational training than on academic education. The BNP places more emphasis on vocational and technical education. It also advocates the introduction of national service for the youth, explicit religious training for teachers and state aid for needy students based on good performance. The PFD, amongst others, advocates free and compulsory education that will emphasise vocational and technical education.

The commonly shared aspiration of accountable governance is a galvanising factor that could be used to initiate a debate that would consider other problem areas impeding stability in Lesotho. The starting point for this debate would be the identification of the causes of instability that have plagued Lesotho until now.

ALTERNATIVES

Lesotho’s first Constitution became a reality in 1961 when King Moshoeshoe appointed a commission to draft a post-independence constitution. This new Constitution, approved by Britain in 1964, provided for a Westminster-style bicameral parliamentary system. It envisaged the establishment of a National Assembly, with members elected from constituencies, as the legislature. The principle of universal adult suffrage would apply in the electoral process. The second chamber, the senate, consisted of principal chiefs and members appointed by the monarch. The original Constitution, however, was suspended by the Jonathan regime in the run-up to the 1970 elections.

In preparation for the 1993 elections a new draft constitution was prepared and later adopted. The first constitutional dispensation (1964) contained flaws and appeared to be incompatible with the national interests of civil society. Its shortcomings resulted in an appalling disrespect for the Rule of Law that, in turn, rendered constitutional control measures ineffective and encouraged authoritarian rule. Yet, a common feature of the 1964 and 1993 constitutions is their endorsement of a hereditary constitutional monarchy without constraint on its desire to seek more executive powers. In the past, this factor precipitated instability and was at the core of conflict between the BNP and the royal palace.20 Secondly, both dispensations allow the king to appoint representatives to the senate, despite the fact that the monarch is not supposed to interfere in politics. The secondment to Senate of principal chiefs who were not elected, was a further cause of concern as it could continue to undermine the democratic foundations of Lesotho’s political system. Retaining these principles in constitutional dispensations might contaminate rules of fair play in the contest for political power and might have an adverse effect on governance. Although the 1993 Constitution is modelled on the first one, it represents "[a] significant deviation from Westminster principles (and perhaps more appropriate under African conditions) [in] the provision made for a Council of State - in addition to the National Assembly and the Senate - to advise the king on matters of national importance such as the declaration of emergencies. The fact that the Prime Minister will henceforth have to be authorized by the King and the Council of State before a national emergency can be declared should go a long way in assuaging the fears of ex-King Moshoeshoe and all democratic-minded Basotho in this respect."21

The prevalence of de facto one party rule leads to the politicisation of and nepotism and corruption in the civil service. Furthermore, civil-military relations lack cohesion as a result of the absence of civilian control. The absence of such control over the security forces makes it impossible to have multi-party involvement at parliamentary committee level that could, in turn, remove the security forces from party politics. The particular lack of parliamentary control poses the perpetual danger of exposing Lesotho’s security forces to abuse by politicians.

It can be discerned from the above that the most tenable solution to Lesotho’s political instability would be to embark on a process of constitutional reform. This should focus on such fundamental issues as creating a constitutional dispensation built on respect for the Rule of Law. Constitutional reform deliberations have to focus, amongst others, on the viability of a proportional representation electoral system in order to enhance democracy, entrenchment of multi-party democracy and power sharing mechanisms at all levels of state power, the enforcement of human rights, enhancement of reconciliation, reconciling present laws, including customary and common law, with the Constitution, the status of women, future role of the military, the future of the LLA, etc.

Lesotho is one of only two sovereign countries in the world, completely encircled by a single neighbour on whom it must depend exclusively for its access to the outside world. In addition, Lesotho’s poor economy and lack of resources compel it to rely heavily on its powerful neighbour, South Africa. In fact, Lesotho is a vulnerable ‘hostage’ partner in relation to South Africa and, as a result, its sovereignty has been undermined by the apartheid regime in the past. Although there have been dramatic changes in the security environment in Southern Africa, with the new South African government no longer poised on a bellicose policy towards Lesotho, developments have not completely removed threats to its security. On the contrary, the world has become increasingly unpredictable.

There is thus a need for the Basotho people to review their collective identity and their dependence on South Africa. Such a review could look into the Luxembourg and Filipino models, amongst others, and seek to identify a concrete role for Lesotho in SADC, enabling it to make a contribution towards a more integrated regional economy with a common security apparatus. Secondly, certain questions will have to be addressed. Does reality propose that Lesotho remains independent at present, but that the possibility of closer political integration with the region in the future should be left open? Should Lesotho focus on regaining its territories that now form part of South Africa, after having been conquered in the late 1800s and at the beginning of this century, or should it join hands with South Africa?

Because of the role played by politicians in fomenting political instability in the past, civil society doubts their credibility and commitment to embark on a meaningful path towards democratisation in Lesotho. On the other hand, the palace coup of 17 August 1994 proved that the monarchy could not be trusted with the delicate task of arbitrating for democracy and stability. These were clear indicators of the urgent need to convene an inclusive national forum for dialogue and consultation that would extricate Lesotho from perpetual constitutional crises, deterioration of the Rule of Law and suspicion. A national forum for dialogue and consultation has been created and is spearheaded by the Lesotho Council of Non-Government Organisations. According to the forum, there is a need for "... a national dialogue which will lead to national reconciliation and broad consensus."22 Its agenda focuses on issues that undermine stability, identification of measures that would bring about sustainable economic growth, looking at the role of the military and the need to develop professional security forces that would be accountable to the electorate and the executive, constitutional reform, reconciling the monarchy with democracy, etc.23 The sectoral commissions of the forum look at specific detail and propose actual legislation to Parliament. The advantage is that it is an inclusive forum that involves representatives from civil society, as well as from government. Its inclusiveness will help to consolidate a common view and create the necessary guarantees for adherence, since negotiated solutions tend to be more popular as they are not perceived to be imposed from above. It is hoped that this approach will earn the popular support of the Basotho and will not be bogged down by mechanisms of decision making, as was the case in South Africa during constitutional negotiations.

CONCLUSION

Changes in the security environment in Southern Africa, and the Basotho people’s quest for democracy, should be exploited in order to restore stability in Lesotho. The Basotho people should consider constitutional reforms that will enhance democracy and the Rule of Law. A major challenge would be to reconsider the viability of traditional institutes of power in enhancing democratisation in a modern world, where political constellations are hostile to hereditary and non-elected leadership. The attitude of the monarch and politicians with regard to the Rule of Law require urgent attention, as failure to solve them will leave Lesotho with an unpredictable Pandora’s box. The regulation of civil-military relations is of equal importance. The absence of immediate threats to Lesotho’s security, presents an excellent opportunity to rationalise and retrain the security forces, based on a new doctrine that would uphold the values articulated in the new Constitution. In itself, the constitutional process should be carefully planned and executed by an elected body to provide it with the necessary legitimacy. The mistake of allowing a non-elected Constituent Assembly to fulfil this task, as with the draft Constitution in 1992, should be avoided at all cost.

Presuming that there is a role envisaged for external players in the process of solving Lesotho’s instability, these roles should be clearly defined, in order to ensure that the process is driven by domestic imperatives and that Lesotho’s sovereignty is not violated. Their expertise should be located properly within this process. The commendable strides and initiatives taken so far by Lesotho’s non-government organisations in restoring democracy, are inspiring and it is hoped that, as neutral and supportive role players, they will continue to make their contributions.

J. Herskovits, Lesotho and the Return of Democracy: What Future for the Military?, unpublished paper, no date, p. 8.



R.F. Weisfelder, Defining National Purpose in Lesotho, Papers in International Studies: Africa Series 3, Athens, Ohio, 1969, p. 3.



Herskovits, op. cit., p. 34.



B.M. Khaketla, Lesotho 1970: An African Coup under the Microscope, London, 1971, p. 12.



For more information on the involvement of the BNP YL in political violence see, Khaketla, op. cit., p. 262.



K. Matlosa, The 1993 Elections in Lesotho and the Challenges of the New Government, Southern African Perspectives, 27 October 1993, p. 2.



Anon, Lesotho Army Tensions Run Deep, Mayibuye Journal of the African National Congress, March 1994.



Anon, South Africa Joins Neighbours to Mediate in Lesotho, Africa Report, March/April 1994.



Matlosa, op. cit., p. 2.



For more details on Leabua Jonathan’s influence by the Roman Catholic Church, see Khaketla, op. cit., pp. 18-23.



Weisfelder, op. cit., p. 4.



Khaketla, op. cit., p. 3.



Anon, King Moshoeshoe II, Crisis in Lesotho, Southern African Political and Economic Monitor, April, 1991.



Ibid.



Civil control of security forces can be exercised by the state through legislation by parliament and its committees; by the executive through the head of state, cabinet ministers, etc.; by the judiciary through constitutional and normal law of the land. Entrenched civilian control refers to control that is contained in the constitution.



Khaketla, op. cit., p. 263.



Weisfelder, op. cit., p. 26.



Khaketla, op. cit., pp. 11 and 65.



Matlosa, op. cit., p. 2.



Khaketla, op. cit., pp. 63-4 argues that family quarrels contributed in straining Jonathan’s relations with King Moshoeshoe.



P. Esterhuysen, Lesotho’s Elections: Making haste slowly, Africa Institute Bulletin 33(3), 1993, p. 2.



S. Santho, Basotho Must Find A Way Forward Together, Work for Justice 42, October 1994.



Ibid.