INTRODUCTION

The Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) aims to explore the predicament posed by United Nations (UN) peace operations that have recently focused on short term needs rather than long term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool to ensure stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Although one may argue that stability and deflation of conflict in any given state are more likely to be products of democracy, human rights, social and economic justice and development, than anything a peacekeeping force can do, one cannot ignore the fact that such operations are usually undertaken in situations where the crossroads to better society lie far in the past. Degeneration of the security environment in which conflicts take place are usually far advanced, and, as a direct result, the region is awash with arms. The classic chicken and egg situation arises: there is no stability without security, and no lasting security without stability. It seems inevitable that any given peace operation will have to address both issues simultaneously. This will only be possible if the interaction between military and civilian components of a mission are of such an extent that they can operate within one integrated strategy towards one common goal. It is the task of the military to ensure a secure enough environment within which the civilian component can create stability.

At the first Security Council Summit meeting in January 1992, world leaders expressed optimism about the future role of the UN in international relations. This indicated to most observers that the paralysing influence of the Cold War would no longer impair the effectiveness of the UN Security Council as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Underlying the optimism of early 1992 was the view that established principles, procedures and practices of peacekeeping would increasingly serve as an effective instrument to reduce the level of violent conflict internationally.2 By the middle of 1993 the dream had dissipated. The brutality and senseless ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia, the relapse of the civil war in Angola and the failure of the UN to achieve lasting peace in the failed state of Somalia had changed the playing field dramatically. It was time to take stock of the situation and to face the realities. The UN machinery, however, is slow in appreciating these realities and even slower in reacting to them. As the responses to the DCR Questionnaire3 on which much of the UNIDIR research on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution is based, have indicated, failure to adapt to changing circumstances, inability to find new solutions to new problems and the taking on of more complex roles with old tools are seriously hampering the effectiveness of the UN and affecting the attitudes of member states and belligerent parties towards UN peace operations. It is congenial to stick to well-known ways. It is comfortable not to accept the fact that the nature of the conflict in which the UN is involved, has changed.

Today, international violence occurs primarily at sub-state or intra-state level, with light weapons and ammunition more readily available than ever before. More effective measures should be examined that will be suitable to these kinds of conflicts.

NEW AND CHALLENGING TASKS WITH OLD RESTRAINTS

The role of the classic peace keeper, namely to monitor the implementation of an honourable agreement between two or more parties to a conflict, to do so usually unarmed, and to man a distinctly marked observation post or patrol a demilitarised cease-fire line, has become the exception rather than the rule. Since 1988 the number of UN peace operations has increased dramatically. Civil wars fuelled by deep rooted hatred and involving countless armed factions, each pursuing its own agenda, as well as the abundance of weapons and ammunition, confront peace forces with a very constrained operational environment that present new challenges to the traditional principles of peacekeeping. The impartiality of peace forces is never recognised by all parties to the conflict. The extent to which consent, as an absolute requirement, can be assumed and adhered to, becomes increasingly problematic.4 Freedom of movement, traditionally seen as a key principle for effective peacekeeping, is constantly denied to peace forces and/or military observers. Cease-fire agreements are violated as soon as they are agreed upon. No distinct front-lines exist. In the worst-case scenarios no accountable or legitimate political authority exists in operational areas. And last but not least, forces serving under the UN flag have become the target of warring factions, increasing possibilities of physical harm. Changes that occurred in the operational environment have added an array of new and challenging tasks of any current or future peace operation. These include5:

ensuring uninterrupted delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance to isolated populations;



guaranteeing the safety and security of civilian and administrative personnel, national aid workers and non-government organisations’ (NGO) personnel;



protecting the local population;



undertaking demining operations;



human rights monitoring;



disarming, cantoning and demobilising of armed factions;



executing police functions;



undertaking preventive deployment; and



elections monitoring and providing security of election points and workers.

Despite these changes, the UN has based its activities on traditional concepts of peacekeeping operations. Normally the modus operandi developed on the basis of a Security Council resolution, evolves into an operational concept that is static in nature: using a network of positions to be able to observe, report and react. Exploring the possibilities and advantages of a more mobile approach never arises. Indications from the responses to the DCR Questionnaire are that the customary principles and practices of peacekeeping are sometimes inadequate as a basis for initiating and sustaining large scale multi-component missions, undertaken in the context of the current operational environment within which the UN operates. Self-imposed operational restraints that characterise UN peacekeeping, are now seriously undermining the ability of peace forces to carry out their assigned missions. These self-imposed operational restraints include6:

unclear and/or insufficient mandates;



the absence of one integrated strategy between the different components of a mission, and the inability to work toward one common goal;



the absence of, or incomplete, planning prior to deployment;



restrictions on information gathering and intelligence operations;



restrictions on the use of coercive measures and force within the Rules of Engagement (RoE);



the absence of a universal doctrine for UN peace operations;



the absence of a universal training curriculum for UN operations;



the reluctance to subject contributed manpower to adequate screening mechanisms before acceptance;



difficult and slow logistics support systems; and



the effects of geographical spread of military contingents and administrative personnel.

The mentioned restraints, some not new to the historical experience of peacekeeping, point to weaknesses that have been accentuated by the necessity of operating in the context of a changed operational environment. From these emerge new challenges to be met by the UN to ensure success in all spheres of a peace operation. It is no longer adequate to feed the hungry, care for the sick, or hold elections regardless of the consequences. It is time to seek lasting resolutions to conflict situations.

CHALLENGING REQUIREMENTS

The changing operational environment within which contemporary peace operations take place, demands changes in the operational concept of UN peace operations. Although much can be said about, or added to these demands, the DCR project’s research thus far merits mentioning the following aspects:

Security Council Resolutions and Mandates7

A framework for mission mandates that will address key issues to support the joint strategy in a practical manner should be developed.



Security Council mandates should include long term political and administrative objectives and not only the moral and emotional indignation of the moment.



A framework for analysis to assist Security Council decision making on UN involvement in a conflict should be developed. The UN should refrain from involvement where its presence at a given time does not reinforce the political process towards resolving a conflict.



Where interpretation of the mandate can lead to excessive or insufficient action, clear and rigid guidelines must be given.



The Security Council must develop a mechanism to adapt or adjust mandates in a pre-emptive rather than reactive manner.



A budgeting and approval procedure must be developed, within which the prerogatives of the General Assembly do not cause excessive delays in the implementation of operations.



The inclusion of an independent operational guideline for each mission and its attachment to the mandate should be considered. 

Interaction8

The interaction between the military and civilian components of a mission must be formalised to such an extent that they can operate within one integrated strategy towards one common goal.



The relationship between the military and civilian components of a mission must be developed around a formal liaison structure and integrated joint procedure for planning, information exchange and mutual support. 

Command and Control9

A joint planning mechanism and procedure should be developed.



A proper communication and reporting system between UN Headquarters and the mission headquarters in the field should be set up, and between the mission HQ and the different components deployed in their area of responsibility.



An effective joint command and control system should be created. 

Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)10

A joint UN doctrine and SOP for civil-military operations should be developed.



A UN doctrine for operations other than the traditional static concept of operations should be formulated.



A doctrine and procedure to enhance force protection in the current operational environment should be developed. 

Intelligence11

An intelligence system to provide mission headquarters with political and military intelligence should be developed and implemented. This system must provide for tactical and strategic intelligence to change the concept of the operation to a pre-emptive rather than a reactive posture on both the political and military fronts.



An early warning capability and system of analysis should be developed, to provide the necessary information to make decisions for intervention based on facts rather than emotions.

Training12

A mandatory pre-deployment training package for all military and civilian personnel contributions to UN peace operations should be developed and implemented.



The proper utilisation of the vast amount of training experience and knowledge available within the system to support missions should be structured and co-ordinated.



An accessible information system should be developed and implemented that can provide analysed and interpreted data on lessons learned, hints on training, etc. 

Support and Equipment13

Solutions for the current lack of tactical mobility should be found.



The utilisation of surveillance, reconnaissance and communication facilities available to support UN missions in the field should be planned and implemented.



An efficient logistics support system should be developed.

CONCLUSION

To curb the increasing absence of consensus among member states on how to resolve current conflicts, conflicting national interests and continuing national intervention in UN operations, the UN will have to improve its political and military objectives for future operations. The persistence of national interests, however, does not imply that nothing can or should be done to improve the effectiveness of the UN. The current realities emerging from the DCR project indicate that the nature of violence and the operational environment confronting the UN have changed. The onus is therefore on the UN and its member states to research and implement more effective measures to deal with these changes. As the results of the DCR project have demonstrated, failure to adapt to changing circumstances and reluctance to meet the new challenges that face peace missions in the field, are contesting the very concept of peacekeeping. It is up to the trainers and advisors to ensure that people being trained are ready to meet challenges when they arise.

ENDNOTES

Paper presented at a UNIDIR Workshop on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution: The Training of Peacekeepers in Disarmament Operations, Malta, 16-19 October 1995. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect that of the SA National Defence Force.



M. Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peace Keeping, Cyril Foster Lecture, University of Oxford, 4 March 1993.



UNIDIR, Practitioners’ Questionnaire on: Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilisation during Peacekeeping Operations, Geneva, January 1995.



S.J. Stedman, Consent, Neutrality and Impartiality in the Tower of Babel: UN Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s, UNIDIR policy paper, to be published.



DCR Questionnaire Analysis, UNAVEM I and II, UNOSOM, UNOMOZ, UNPROFOR, UNTAG, UNTAC, ONUSAL, and ONUCA, to be published by UNIDIR.



Ibid.



D. Cox, Peace keeping and Disarmament: Peace agreements and Security Council Mandates, in E.A. Zawels, Specificity in Peace Keeping Mandates: The Security Council Evolving Methods of Work, UNIDIR policy papers, to be published.



DCR Questionnaire Analysis, UNAVEM II, UNOSOM, UNTAC, UNPROFOR and UNTAG.



Ibid.



Ibid.



A. Raevsky, Intelligence and Information during Peacekeeping Operations, UNIDIR policy paper, to be published.



T. Ilkka, An assessment on the Training for UN Peace Operations, UNIDIR policy paper, to be published.



DCR Questionnaire Analysis, UNAVEM I and II, UNOSOM, UNOMOZ, UNPROFOR, UNTAG, UNTAC, ONUSAL, and ONUCA.