The end of the Cold War, followed by the collapse of apartheid, has resulted in fundamental economic, policy and security reassessments in Southern Africa. With regard to security, aspects of doctrine, equipment and military etiquette had to be redefined, as forces were integrated, some were demobilised, and the remainder were retrained to inculcate a new orientation and ethos. Britain, through the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), has emerged as a central role-player in the process throughout the Southern African region, including the former Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique.1 This pervasive involvement raises questions about the nature of the security structures that will emerge and whether there is ultimately a hidden agenda in Britain’s attention to the military professionalism of the region. Military assistance and training are effected on the basis of theory or national doctrine, and demonstration, and are reinforced through constant peer emulation. Such external intervention has implications for local structures.

There are BMATT contingents in Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe at present, reflecting concentrated interest in Southern Africa. Elements of BMATT Zimbabwe, jointly with Zimbabwe National Army instructors, are also responsible for the training of Mozambican forces at Border Camp, Nyanga, in Eastern Zimbabwe. In the remaining states of Zambia, Botswana, Malawi and Tanzania, apathy about the colonial inheritance, as well as officers and soldiers trained in Britain or at related institutions, have perpetuated an essentially British military system.

British military assistance in its various forms on offer throughout the world, is sponsored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as a foreign policy instrument. However, it has been admitted that the core of British foreign policy is fashioned to operate in support of that of the United States (US), in order to maximise returns on national prestige, trade and influence, among others.3 The US defence and security policy for the Southern African region, as enunciated in the post-Cold War New Security Agenda, seeks to effect the following at the policy level: "To support democratisation and human rights, nurturing regional security arrangements and conflict resolution, pursuing a regional defence strategy that aims at empowering African states and organisations with a capacity to achieve the political and economic growth necessary for long-term stability."4

At the operational level, the stated US position anticipates the establishment of professional military organisations, within democratic environments and adhering to Clausewitzian tenets. Briefly stated, the military must operate under civilian control, draw its membership from all ethnic groups in its society so that it is representative of its general composition, provide security to all citizens, including the opposition, and finally, be accountable to the parliamentary process.5

Both the policy and operational imperatives flowing from US foreign policy for Southern Africa, define the place of the emerging armed forces in developing politically independent societies to a degree. The above also establishes the criteria, as well as the level of professionalism, that have to be attained, namely the capacity and efficiency to deliver on security matters expected of armed forces. As Malan points out, such organisations will also have a legitimate interest to be materially and otherwise supported by states.6

BMATT

It can be assumed that the British security initiative in Southern Africa, viewed against the above background, and represented by BMATT, has taken cognisance of the over-arching US zonal local policy. Broad British foreign policy objectives for the Southern African region have been stated as the enhancement of:

peace and stability;

democracy;

development and prosperity; and

trade.

It is also acknowledged that, " ... achievement of foreign policy objectives world-wide, is a complex process involving a range of approaches and activities from diplomatic exchanges, lobbying, to a more active ‘Hands On Approach’ in the form of aid. Slotted into the aid funding, is military aid ... to underpin our Foreign Policy in Zimbabwe and the region ... A strong, disciplined and loyal military is an essential component in the make up of a peaceful and stable country. Its mere existence is a symbol of nationhood and unity ..."7

The perceived combined interest of the industrialised world to reform Southern African security structures, also appears to fall on fertile and receptive ground among most of the regional defence forces. These seek to emulate the military professionalism of their peers, attempting to ‘catch up’. Luckham succinctly asserts of African armies: "More than any other institutions, the armed forces have continued to look toward the outside world for professional reference groups and ideologies ... which have been reinforced on a systematic and continuing basis through the external military assistance and training programs of the former colonial powers, the US ..."8

Given this broad convergence, should security analysts expect a regional deepening of ‘western’ influence and practices? If this is the case, what will the consequences of such a development be in nascent democracies from Dar es Salaam to Pretoria? It is important to pose these questions at this time while the evolution is taking place against a general background of weakening state policy control and diluted sovereignties. These previously sacrosanct turfs have been assailed from at least two directions. Firstly, the new era has ushered in the phenomenon of democratic elections. These have resulted in ‘hung parliaments’ following inconclusive election results.9 In Southern Africa, recalcitrant regimes in Zambia, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Lesotho, had the process foisted on them, essentially through withholding financial assistance. The other group of states, emerging from debilitating liberation wars, proxy conflicts and civil strife, had this process enshrined in the negotiated settlements that finally delivered independence. Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola are living examples of this experience, as perhaps Swaziland will be in the near future.

Secondly, all the states in the region have been forced to link their economies to the world capitalist economy. In rapid succession, they have begun to experience great difficulty in finding resources to spend on arms and other war material. South Africa and Zimbabwe have developed adequate arms manufacturing industries, while the rest still have to import all their requirements. Luckham explains this turn of events when he states that, "[t]hese developments [of democracy and reforms] have been inseparable from the fiscal and economic crises facing African states. The discretionary funds and credits which financed large military spending and arms import increases during the first two decades of independence were largely dissipated by the 1980s ... (trend continued even after 1992 according to SIPRI). Arms purchases have suffered especially sharp reductions."10

Once the state machinery loses control of the treasury coffers, its ability to act unilaterally is severely restricted.

The combined effect of the above has culminated in the perception that states are limited in what they can or cannot do in the new era. With an increasing number of new states in Southern Africa entering into a relationship with BMATT, questions arise as to what can be expected. This article seeks to provide some pointers, by retrospectively tracing BMATT’s involvement in Zimbabwe during the last fifteen years.

BMATT’S ‘INVITATION’ TO ZIMBABWE - MARCH 1980

BMATT initially deployed for six months in Zimbabwe, pursuing their traditional policy of ‘working themselves out of a job’, but the need for their presence remained. Their tasks have evolved from amalgamating and integrating three previously contending forces, to advice on defence policy, as well as peacekeeping training at the Zimbabwe Staff College. This long term relationship provides interesting information to consider.

Although BMATT now enjoys an excellent relationship with Zimbabwe, the initial contact has been made by a beleaguered Nationalist Movement after winning at the polls and therefore being perceptively under duress. As Ginifer asserts, "[t]he lack of force integration achieved before elections can be attributed in large to the fact that the Lancaster House agreement made no provision for the unification of armies."11

Zimbabwe’s independence was partly secured through the Lancaster House Agreement, reluctantly agreed to by the British Government at the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), in August 1979.12 Lord Carrington, the chairman, secured a cease-fire on 21 December of the same year, which called for the deployment of Monitoring Forces. While the Liberation Movements of the Patriotic Front called for a UN force, the Conservative British Government and the local and regional white opinion, viewed the world body with distrust, essentially equating it with communism/atheism. As a result, a smaller, British dominated Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) was hastily despatched to Salisbury in an operation code-named ‘Agila’.13 This was facilitated by selecting a force, already on stand-by for the Namibian UN operation. A week before the 4 March election result date, the CMF personnel were withdrawn, except for 24, who were later to form the nucleus of BMATT Zimbabwe. On their arrival in the country in April, BMATT had an initial strength of 58.

The Patriotic Front element of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU(PF)), which had won the elections, took up political office while faced by two other important armed groups who owed political allegiance to opposition parties. This comprised of 20 000 Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army members (ZIPRA), 15 000 of the former Rhodesian Army, and a further 20 000 of the Muzorewa Auxiliaries. The new government’s only guarantee was its own armed group, the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), numbering some 30 000.14

The resulting impasse was the biggest hindrance to peace and stability, threatening the country with a debilitating civil war. The alternative was to reconcile the armed elements in a process that required ideological and political reorientation, amalgamating the force into a new National Defence Force of Zimbabwe. A policy to establish a 435 000 Standing Army, envisaged it to consist of eighty per cent guerrillas with the rest coming from the former Rhodesian Armed Forces. Excess numbers from the combined 65 000 armed combatants that had come forward at the close of the war, which clearly could not be sustained by the economy, had to be demobilised and reintegrated into civil society.

To undertake this task, the new government was forced to seek BMATT assistance for six months, commencing in March 1980. The British government agreed. The repertoire of its assistance in this specialised area included the following:

advice on the establishment of staff systems and procedures;

administrative and technical advice;

aircraft repair and maintenance;

instruction and training assistance in support of commercial projects;

establishment and training of medical mobile groups; and

training aid to special forces.15

The Team seconded to Zimbabwe by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, headed by a Major General (now Brigadier) had, as part of its brief, both a political and military advisory function, with ready access to the Head of State. Soon after their arrival, however, before the exercise could proceed, a white haemorrhage from the former Rhodesian Army occurred, culminating in the broadening of BMATT’s responsibilities. This had to be met by increasing the team, reaching 137 by July, even as the initial termination period of the existing agreement approached. The numbers were to level off at approximately 200. As Evans was to lament, "the rapid erosion of the Rhodesian officer corps which followed General Walls’ resignation (in July 1980), allowed BMATT to assume centre stage in the creation of the National Army required by the Mugabe Government."16

Before embarking on the integration exercise, code named ‘Operation Merger’, BMATT had already formed some impressions of the calibre of groups coming forward. In their view, there were both strengths and weaknesses in the guerrilla systems, as well as in the former colonial army.

Regarding ZANLA, the first incumbent force, it was the British impression that some of their elements appeared inadequately trained, perhaps as a consequence of their larger numbers. In dealing with them, BMATT found that every decision had to be debated fully by the whole group before implementation. Once agreement was reached, however, troops at all levels demonstrated a high degree of commitment, adhering to the agreed lines. In practice, the loose and less structured manner of operation in ZANLA, devolved a large measure of initiative to the man on the ground and had the capability to absorb other dysfunctions experienced in the line of command and operations. Overall, Ginifer concludes on their level of discipline during the early stages of CMF’s involvement, that "[i]ndeed the attitude of the PF at the Assembly Points, (APs) given their insecurity, was indicative of the strong sense of political leadership and discipline that ZANU, in particular, had established over its guerrillas."17

In the case of ZIPRA, the military assistance team felt that they generally appeared better trained and therefore was more responsive to the conventional force model which was being implemented as part of the integration process. ZIPRA’s perceived acquiescence was also accelerated by the political eclipse of its mentor, ZAPU, at the polls in the 4 March 1980 elections. However, elements within ZIPRA engaged in isolated mutinies within the newly formed battalions before the end of the year, but with minimal impact on the overall integration.

Disciplinary measures meted out to truant troops by both sides, was noted for its harshness, essentially involving physical thrashings. However, BMATT was quick to acknowledge the necessity of such draconian methods in guerrilla military structures, where command was remote and operations depended very much on the hard enforcement of discipline.18 Both groups were also equipped with Eastern Bloc weapons and British instructors were expected to overcome the problems posed by technical differences.

Finally according to BMATT, the Rhodesian Army was generally in a parlous state, suffering from major morale and disciplinary problems. Large parts of this force were made up of Territorial Forces, national servicemen and mercenaries, even in specialist units of the Engineer Squadrons, Signals Corps, Special Air Service, SAS, Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Light Infantry - who were the cutting edge of the establishment. Furthermore, South African Defence Force (SADF) units and elements were also serving as part of the Rhodesian Army in local uniforms.19 It is common knowledge that, in such a motley collection, discipline is the first to disintegrate. Among the local officer corps, in-fighting, allegations of corruption, drunkenness and incidences of Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and desertions were also rampant. This weakened an otherwise effective force. The final restriction on the efficiency of the force was its ill-equipped inventory against which the strategy of mobile, flying columns was expected to be the main vehicle to prosecute the counter-insurgency campaign. Its overall posture and ethos, determined by a wish to sustain the status quo, was made irrelevant by the rapid political developments that occurred in late 1979 and early 1980.

The result was to leave the largely white-officered African troops in place and to marry them with the incoming guerrillas, a development which had occupied considerable resources and thought within the Rhodesian security circles during the war. To this end, one of the advantages to the instructors under the BMATT initiative, was the presence of similarly qualified African Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) instructors of the former Rhodesian Army. They were initially utilised as supernumeraries, and later as full-fledged instructors, after they won the confidence of the participants. The African NCOs, already proficient in the British military system, assisted with basic drills, weapons handling, range work, minor tactics, map reading, field-craft, interpretation of military law and its applications, discipline and other aspects. The existing local martial skills, for example, were instrumental in achieving a rapid transformation of 21 Infantry Battalion into a cohesive drill unit, during its hasty preparation to participate in the Independence Ceremony on 18 April 1980 that had to epitomise the spirit of reconciliation and integration.

The early and non-negotiable withdrawal of the CMF20 between 3-5 March, had also indirectly facilitated the above development through the early meeting of African combatants. The success of the CMF exercise translated into a nightmare, when they were suddenly expected to take care of 23 500 combatants.21 On the rapid departure of the CMF, the former Rhodesian Army had been forced to move in to maintain the logistic and administrative chain, including daily basic medical assistance. This fortuitous interaction positively assisted the thawing period and succeeded in removing some of the sharper and more negative views about each force, commonly bandied about during the war.

BMATT proceeded to fashion what has turned out to be a model army in the region. The first BMATT task was to proceed with the amalgamation of the 65 000 troops available, "as a political imperative rather than a process for enhancing military efficiency..."22 Integration, which had tentatively commenced on 19 February as an experiment, was now formally required to be accelerated, under the direction of the Joint High Command (JHC). The JHC included generals from ZANLA, ZIPRA and the former Rhodesian Army, (who also supplied the Chairman) and the Commanded BMATT Zimbabwe. As the former Rhodesian white forces resigned, sometimes en masse as units,23 the vacuum was filled by members of BMATT.

The integration exercise was expected to produce a 35 000 strong standing army by the end of 1980. In practice, BMATT established forty battalions of some 23 000 men by October 1981, representing over 14 000 potential leaders. The exercise had taken over all existing training facilities in the country. The method of setting up a battalion involved each Liberation Movement selecting 150 potential leaders from the APs and dispatching these to the Zimbabwe Military Academy in Gweru. They would constitute the unit hierarchy, ranging from the Commanding Officer to Lance Corporal, clerk or driver. Before the new unit finally passed out, BMATT would submit the recommended structure to the JHC for ratification. Simultaneously, 400 men from each Movement would be sent either to Balla Balla or Llewellin Barracks, for basic soldier training. Both groups, numbering a total of about 1 100, would undergo four weeks training before being combined. They would then be allocated a more permanent site. On occupying the Administrative Base area, continuous training for the entire unit would continue for a further four months, before the unit would be regarded as fit for operation.

For the specialised units or sections, such as the Parachute Training School, Maintenance Units, Field Artillery, Armoured Car Regiment, Careers, Manning and Records and Logistics, BMATT sent out special teams to advise and train members of the ZNA. To cater for the Command grouping, BMATT ran a six week Senior Officers Orientation course for 27 officers, who were later commissioned as Colonels and Brigadiers, from March 1981.24

Following the initial success of whittling down the force to manageable levels and inculcating common basic military skills, this early success had a positive effect on the foreign policy goals of the British Government. This is evident in retrospect, considering the continued generous funding of BMATT Zimbabwe amidst major cuts elsewhere, in a bid to make an example of its involvement there. From 1982, a process of developing the skills of the ZNA further, in what has been described as vertical and lateral continuum training, culminated in the improvement of its efficiency.

Junior NCO training was assigned to the Infantry Training Depot at Balla Balla, with Senior NCO courses undertaken at the expanded School of Infantry at the Military Academy in Gweru. The same venue also catered for cadet officer training, as well as offering Young Officers Weapons Systems courses. Unit training facilities were established at the Battalion Battle Training School (BBS) in Nyanga. Full brigades could be catered for at this venue later on. Expansion of training facilities in Zimbabwe meant that, within a short time, the four brigade army was operating as a cohesive unit.

MOZAMBIQUE, 1982 - 1992: BMATT AND ZIMBABWE'S EXTERNAL OPERATION

During late 1982 and early 1983, with training proceeding apace, and the integration exercise weathering mutinies, Zimbabwe took the decision to respond militarily to South African destabilisation efforts through the proxy forces of the National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (RENAMO). Serious and economically dislocating sabotage attempts on the road, rail and oil pipe-line to Beira were perpetrated in conjunction with sudden constraints on the movement of Zimbabwean imports in the South African ports and rail network. Zimbabwe’s military deployment and involvement was meant to assist a beleaguered FRELIMO, a ZANU comrade-in-arms.25 In response to this decision by the Zimbabwe Government, BMATT followed by establishing an operational training component at BBS, Nyanga. It catered for pre- and post-deployment training for ZNA troops, based on the nature of the war they were engaged in. BMATT did not stand in the way of an independent decision to use force, but merely re-configured itself, and produced the necessary syllabi to offer realistic operational effectiveness.

CONSOLIDATION OF INTEGRATION 1983-4

The embedding of conventional and staff system training occurred when BMATT commenced with limited Intermediate Staff Courses (ISC) at the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC), between 1983 and 1984. In 1985, plans were also made for the introduction of the first Command and Staff Course (CSC), a process "representing a quantum lead" according to the then Commander of BMATT. The latter also became Head or Commandant of the ZSC, to guide it through its initial phase. The first intake of seventy students was accepted in September 1986, to begin specialised military training, making the force equal to the major armies of the world. The syllabus included aspects of limited wars, defence policy and geo-political developments. A ‘Tactical Trainer’, described as unique on the continent, was later established at the college to facilitate war-games. At present, the ZSC also offers UN accredited peacekeeping courses and its catchment area for students has broadened beyond SADC states.

MAZAMBIQUE TRAINING TEAM

In view of the present Commander of BMATT Zimbabwe, "the principal direct regional impact (of his team) has been on Mozambique."26 In the mid-1980s, President Samora Machel requested military training assistance from Britain, that was finally granted in February 1986. BBS Border Camp received 180 Mozambican officers, where training was conducted by BMATT, jointly with ZNA instructors. After the death of Machel, Joaquim Chissano continued to make periodic requests for aid, and after the elections of 1994, both RENAMO and the government retained foreign military assistance. Mozambican Armed Forces training, initially lasting fourteen weeks, involved basic officers’ training or instructors courses to platoon level. This was later increased to Company level and by 1995, to as near to Battalion level as possible. The joint ZNA teams working with BMATT have also been instrumental in carrying out "re-training for retaining quality control" inside Mozambique.

BMATT ZIMBABWE AND CHINESE(CMATT),KOREAN (KMATT), PAKISTAN(PMATT) AND TANZANIAN(TMATT) MILITARY TRAINING TEAMS

BMATT’s entry into Zimbabwe occurred at a time of global political division as a result of the Cold War, coinciding with regional destabilisation attempts. While London successfully stayed the hand of Pretoria to undertake more drastic military escapades against Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Government’s broader perception, however, was to strengthen itself. Internal political disagreements further heightened concerns over the security of government incumbents. Against this background, North Korea offered military equipment, which was accepted with 106 instructors, to constitute the Fifth Brigade. However, once its training was completed and elements deployed to hunt down dissidents in the south-west of the country, adverse reports on its discipline and general conduct forced the Government to withdraw the units. These were eventually placed under BMATT for re-training.

In continuing the trend to complete training previously undertook by other foreign military missions, BMATT put together various specialised teams in 1985, who came to Zimbabwe for fifteen months or more, to attend to field-artillery, armoured car regiment, vehicle repair and maintenance workshops, and logistics training needs formerly catered for by other foreign military missions. At present, BMATT are also involved in the Logistics training of the Air Force, a process which has started with a formal invitation in the early 1990s to continue the training started by Pakistan. BMATT also envisages bringing out another Wing Commander from the Royal Air Force to assist with curricula for a joint air and army Staff College.

TRADE

It is BMATT’s stated policy to recommend a suitable inventory to armies they are assisting, without taking into account the promotion of British equipment, even to the extent of advising on its rejection. They contend that, although it is part of their terms of reference, when engaged to assist with the training of an army, their first allegiance is to that particular force, leaving the sales pitch to the British Defence Attaché. In Zimbabwe, the British defence industry has won some contracts and lost others, resulting in a variety of equipment.27 One important example is the type of aircraft the country has acquired since 1980. British Hawk Jet Trainers, Chinese MIG 21s and Spanish Transport/Para-trooping Cassas have been purchased. However, BMATT still provide advice both on the operational use and the maintenance of all systems, irrespective of their country of origin.

CONCLUSION

Several important points and lessons emerge when considering BMATT’s relationship with Zimbabwe over the last fifteen years. Firstly, the experiment had no precedent. British military aid and assistance world-wide had been offered before, but not with such concentration and the same amount of spin-offs. At the time of BMATT’s entry into Southern Africa, the zone was a contested area, with regard to both Cold War and apartheid South Africa’s policies. The Zimbabwean experiment provided Britain with an opportunity to demonstrate the revival of its interests and influence in the region. A chance to carve out an important niche in the post-Cold War era was beckoning through the successful implementation and sustaining of the Zimbabwean military integration and professionalisation process. Britain quickly moved to seize the initiative. The result is that the relationship has been mutually beneficial and continues to be so for both Zimbabwe and Britain.

If the exercise is deemed successful, what measure could be used to test whether such a statement is true? The ‘hands on’ approach showed people with a keen sense of absorption and a marked ability to learn and to adapt, which has culminated in the professional participation of the ZNA in multinational force operations with some members assuming the command of contingents. Former guerrillas from ZANLA and ZIPRA and former commandants of the Zimbabwe Staff College have successfully led UN troops on peacekeeping operations.28 In measuring competency and effectiveness of training, no higher measure exists than the appointment to command a UN force. With two incumbents having both performed well, it may be argued that this is no flash in the pan, but a result of thorough and sustained training.

Given the present direction of policy, linked to the gradual implementation of joint staffs, combined services are likely to continue, partly through the efforts of BMATT.

Zimbabwe is already offering assistance to Lesotho and South Africa as well as receiving students at its Staff College from Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and Swaziland. This trend reflects that the Mozambican joint training scenario has evolved onto a higher plane - further embedding the British military culture, tradition and practices in the region.

Apart from the formal Mozambique Training Team element attached to BMATT Zimbabwe, Britain has recently been involved in setting up communications for the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Angola, UNAVEM III, at the invitation of both sides in the conflict.



Concise Dictionary of Quotations, Harper Collins, New York, 1992, p. 1.



According to senior officials and academics in the British government in private discussions with the author.



Quoted in J Nye, US Defence Interests in sub-Saharan Africa, African Security Review, 4(6), 1995, p. 17.



Defence Parliamentary Committees in both Zimbabwe and South Africa have recently begun to play an important role in this respect. In Zimbabwe, for example, the retired Lt Gen S Mujuru, now MP for Chikomba District, has been appointed Chairman to this important committee and it is anticipated that it will enlighten and strengthen the overall effectiveness of the committee.



M Malan, Democratic Transformation In Civil Society: Implications, lecture.



Presentation to the Zimbabwe Staff College by BMATT Zimbabwe Commander, 9 February 1995, Harare.



R Luckham, The Military, Militarisation and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues, African Studies Review, 37(2), September 1994, p. 35.



First democratic elections in the region between 1988 - 1994 failed to give decisive victories to incumbents. In Namibia, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), took the reigns in a power-sharing arrangement, with only 57% of the vote; in Malawi, the United Democratic Front (UDF) assumed office, in a coalition government with a wafer thin 48,8%; in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), mustered 62,6%, 15 seats short of the required two-thirds majority in the 400 member parliament; in Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola secured 53,7% of the poll, but the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA’s) 34,1% was deceptive, as it effectively controlled over 70% of the rural provinces. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), wriggled into power with 49,7% and with its support concentrated in the Southern and Central regions. The overall effect of the democratisation process was to engender moderation, accommodation and having to share important government posts, often including the creation of a Second Vice-Presidency.



Luckham, op. cit., p. 59.



J Ginifer, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project - Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, UNIDIR/95/41, United Nations, Geneva, 1995, p. 49.



See S Chan, The Commonwealth Observer Group in Zimbabwe A Personal Memoir, Socio-Economic Series, 18, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1985, pp. 10 - 11, for a fuller discourse on the setting up of the Lancaster House Conference.



Ginifer, op. cit., pp. 5, 13-15, & 25 cites the CMF consisting of 1 319 personnel, of whom 309 had been drawn from five other Commonwealth countries.



M Rupiah, Demobilisation and Integration: ‘Operation Merger’ and The Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980 - 1987, in J Cilliers (ed.), Dismissed: Demobilisation And Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa, IDP, Halfway House, 1995, p. 53.



Interview, BMATT Zimbabwe Headquarters, Harare, December 1995; S Baynham & G Mills, British Military Training Assistance in Southern Africa: Lessons for South Africa?, Africa Insight, 22(3), 1992, p. 218.



M E Gukurahundi, The Development of The Zimbabwe Defence Forces 1980-1987, manuscript, p. 16.



Ginifer, op. cit., p. 52.



The question of harsh or firmer enforcement of discipline to suit a specific situation in the context of the Zimbabwe’s integration with BMATT is in fact a two-way process. Deployed BMATT personnel are themselves subject to the most stringent measures and any misdemeanour essentially means taking the next plane back to the UK. A few officers and men have been subjected to this treatment. Some of them were found to be exhibiting pronounced amorous intentions and were summarily withdrawn. This in a way has been a feather in the cap of BMATT Zimbabwe, as other foreign military missions suffering the same fate have simply posted the affected members around the country with disastrous diplomatic implications.



H Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War Counter - Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 1962 - 1980, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1993, pp. 110 - 123, deals at length with the South African connection with the Rhodesian forces.



Ginifer, op. cit., p. 50, footnote 136, cites H Wiseman & A M Taylor, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition, Pergamon Press for the International Peace Academy, New York, 1981, p. 65, asserting that "[b]oth Mugabe and Nkomo asked for the CMF to carry on in the post-election period".



Ginifer, op. cit., p. 35.



Gukurahundi, op. cit., p. 17.



Rupiah, op. cit., p. 32.



Ibid., p. 38; Gukurahundi, op. cit., p. 17.



See J H Beggar, Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power In Southern Africa, James Currey, London, 1987, pp. 3, 174-5, & 191-2; P Johnson & D Martin, Destructive Engagement, Apartheid Terrorism, The Destabilisation Report: A Report on the Devastation of the Front-line States prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, James Currey, London, 1989, pp. 1, 7, 27 & 3304, for an assessment of the destabilisation policy; S Chan, Exporting Apartheid - Foreign Policies In Southern Africa 1978 - 1988, Macmillan, London, 1990, pp. 21, 28, 48-53, & 83-4, sufficiently deals with the evolution of Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy, citing Mugabe’s sense of debt to Machel and the ZNA deploying between 5 000 to 10 000 men in Mozambique at this time.



The success at being invited by the former Portuguese territory to train the military included its desire to join the Commonwealth, granted in 1995.



British firms won the supply of Land-Rover 110 series and lost supply of armoured cars to Brazil, for example.



Both Maj Gen M Nyambuya (Deputy Commander UNAVEM II in Angola and UNOSOM II in Somalia), and P V Sibanda (present Commander of UNAVEM III in Angola) are examples of this. During a peacekeeping study tour to Luanda, co-ordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) during November 1995, the author learned of the immense respect Sibanda generated from government officials, UNITA generals and politicians, members of the diplomatic corps, as well as other contingent commanders serving under him. This, it was admitted, was as a result of his hard work especially in the field, enabling him to be aware of the exact situation on the ground most of the time. There was therefore little room for the contending parties to misinform the UN.



Over and above commanding the work of the team, liaises closely with the British High Commission (HC), in Harare and Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Maputo. Acts as advisor to the Commander Defence Forces, Commanders of the Army and Air Force and their Senior Officers. Provides specific situation reports for the two Services Commanders on aspects noted by the team in discussions or during visits focusing on both good and bad points, some of which require urgent action. Also liaises with the Minister of Defence and his Permanent Secretary.



Principal BMATT Staff Officer, assists with the preparation of papers and is available for advice and assistance on any matter. Presently engaged in advising on Career Structures.



Theoretically not part of BMATT, but taken care of by them.



One Wing Commander in Air Force Headquarters advising mainly on logistics, although reportedly finds himself ‘inevitably’ advising on all manner of things. Commander BMATT seeking to have another Wing Commander sent out to the Staff College to help with the integration of Army and Air Staff training from 1996.



Is fully integrated and works full-time with the Director of Army Training and his Staff, offering advice on almost all areas.



Director of Studies and works very closely with the Command. Responsible for quality control and effective teaching, research of new tactical and logistical concepts. Lt Col, Directing Staff, (DS) serving in an advisory capacity.



Establishing Logistical Branch and (Maj) assigned to The Army Data Processing Unit to introduce Logistic Systems into the ZNA Mainframe Computer.



Source Document BMATT Zimbabwe, Staff College Presentation, Harare, 9 February 1995.