INTRODUCTION

The Katorus area has experienced relative peace and stability after the 1994 general elections. There have been no reports of incidences of potential violence since then. However, violent crime is increasing. There are important factors that contributed to the normalisation of the area, such as the role of the police and army in peacekeeping and crime prevention during and after periods of violence, negotiations between the various political stakeholders, the 1994 national elections, and the disbanding and integration of the self-defence units (SDUs) and the self-protection units (SPUs) into the South African Police Services (SAPS). This article will deal with policing and security, and those factors inhibiting proper policing in the East Rand. Effective policing and security are essential for development, peace and stability.

Peacekeeping and crime prevention were difficult tasks to perform during the conflict, due to the negative perceptions of the police and the defence force held by the people of Katorus. Poor relations emanated from the fact that the defence force and police were historically used to suppress legitimate protest against oppression by the nationalist government. Township residents organised street committees to protect themselves against the security forces. When violence spread to the East Rand, street committees were transformed into SDUs and SPUs to protect the community against attacks by opposing organisations and the security forces.

POLICING IN KATORUS DURING PERIODS OF VIOLENCE

The police’s capacity to maintain peace was marred by their inadequate preparation for such a situation. The traditional notion of policing black townships should be examined. Policing townships was not meant to prevent crime or for peacekeeping purposes, it was intended to eliminate opposition to the government. The inadequate training and shortage of manpower in township police stations are evidence of this fact. The shortage of resources such as telephone services or four patrol vehicles for an area comprising a quarter of a million of people, as was the case in Tokoza, indicates that policing was not meant to serve the interests of the community. However, when there were legitimate protests, large riot squads would appear from nowhere to suppress it. When crimes had to be prevented, the telephone line at the police station or patrol vehicles would be out of order. Eventually, residents took the law into their own hands and th activities of so-called ‘kangaroo courts’ were legitimised by the community. With both the police and the defence force in discredit, it was difficult to assume a peacekeeping role in a conflict that involved parties with no confidence in the security forces. When conflict escalated, they were unable to do anything, as they were seen as part of the problem by the township residents. Moreover, the security forces were expected to protect township residents from attacks by hostel dwellers, and vice versa. At the same time, the security forces were accused of escorting hostel residents when they attacked the township. In the end, the security forces were identified with the conflict to such an extent, that many local policemen abandoned their homes in fear for their lives.

When political violence escalated, the Internal Stability Unit (ISU) was called upon to contain the violence. The ISU was not new to the area, as it was involved in containing the 1984 rent boycotts, under the name Riot Squad. The Riot Squad was notorious for brutally attacking or shooting unarmed fleeing people. When the ISU came to Katorus, it was soon clear that its name change did not have any influence on its methods. The ISU led to the total deterioration of policing in the area. Allegations against the ISU range from kidnapping, murder, assault and indiscriminate shooting. They took ‘troublesome’ township youths and dumped them in the hostels. It was also alleged that the ISU would raid houses for firearms, confiscated them, from where they would be taken to the Alberton police station and circulated among hostel dwellers. ISU officers implicated in these allegations were transferred.

The ISU seriously undermined and compromised the authority of the station commanders in the area. The unit operated without briefing the local commanders. House raids were conducted and people arrested without informing the local commanders. These commanders were held responsible by the community for the complete disappearance of relatives. The community increased attacks on the police because they believed that local policemen were involved in ISU operations. Skirmishes between the ISU and the community became the norm, until the SAArmy was called in.

SANDF IN PEACEKEEPING AND CRIME PREVENTION

When the SAArmy was called in in February 1994, they were not welcomed by the community. Their image was tarnished by their role during the 1984 rent boycotts and the states of emergency. The first contingents to be deployed was vehemently opposed by hostel residents. They did not believe that the army would remain neutral in the conflict. On the other hand, township residents complained that the army damaged their property or manhandled them while conducting house searches. One battalion had to be withdrawn, after alleged cases of rape in Phola Park. When skirmishes between the ISU and the community reached unprecedented heights, the army started to devise means to win the trust and confidence of the community. Liaison forums were established that included political organisations, church groups and other stakeholders in the community.

Crime prevention and peacekeeping were not easy. The Katorus area, as well as crime in the area were highly politicised, with the community protecting criminals from the security forces. Confiscating fire arms in large gatherings was problematic. The difference in the approaches of the army and the ISU led to tension between the two. The army wanted to win the trust and confidence of the community to quell violence, while the ISU fuelled the conflict by taking sides or playing an active role in the conflict. The ISU felt that the army undermined their riot control skills. However, the presence of the army enabled the functioning of churches and schools once again. Township residents started to report crimes to the army. Hostel residents remained hostile towards the army, claiming that they destroyed relief food supplied to the hostels during raids. They also accused the army of being involved in killing hostel dwellers. They preferred the ISU because they felt that it dealt thoroughly with the unruly township youth. The presence of the army provided the community with some sense of security and due to community pressure, the ISU was withdrawn from the area. The army consequently established joint operations with the local police force.

In general, joint operations between the army and the police are conducted at local and national level. At the national level the Joint Security Council comprises the Chief of the Army, the provincial commanding officer, the national police commissioner and the provincial police commander. The current system allows the army and the police to have parallel commanding structures. At a provincial level there is a security committee that comprises the Joint Operations Committee (JOC), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and Joint Operational Centres (JOC) that operate on a local level. Initially JOCs were designed to bring the leadership of various stakeholders (opposing political parties), the security forces, international observer missions and the Peace Secretariat together. The initiative was aimed to establish peace monitors from the Peace Secretariat and international peace observers within the community, in an attempt to raise the alarm if there were signs of impending trouble or danger. The system allowed the army and the police to plan operations and share intelligence, and accommodated joint exercises, while retaining parallel command structures.

PEACE, STABILITY AND ELECTIONS

The army claims that their deployment in the area was the main factor in achieving peace and stability in the Katorus area. "After one month of large scale deployments, the death toll decreased from 76 to less than 15 per month."

The army was not the sole contributor in reducing levels of violence. The establishment of joint operation centres and peace committees brought about negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). A situation of trust was created among the local leadership when leaders felt that they could control their support at ground level. The general trust created by the leadership changed hostile attitudes, although certain sectors still remained sceptical about negotiations. The trilateral agreements between the ANC, IFP and the National Party (NP) prior to the 1994 elections increased the level of trust among the local leadership. The Special Presidential Project joined opposing political parties in planning the restructuring of the area. However, hostilities among the SDUs and SPUs diminished hopes of lasting peace. They made crime prevention and peacekeeping impossible, and they were beyond the control of their own political structures and the community. They fought among themselves, attacked the police and harassed the community.

SDU AND SPU INTEGRATION INTO SAPS

It was a milestone when the commanders of the SDUs and SPUs realised that violence did not benefit them. On 5 May 1995, a draft peace agreement was signed by the commanders in Kempton Park. They realised that they can redirect their energies to crime prevention and the development of the youth. With the assistance of the Gauteng Ministry for Safety and Security the units were disbanded and their members integrated into the SAPS as police reservists. The signing of the agreement and integration into the SAPS became significant factors in improving policing and bringing violence to an end. For the first time, attacks on the police decreased significantly. The integration process assisted in augmenting the depleted police manpower. The process also established trust among those who were sceptical about negotiations.

Crime prevention and peacekeeping became easier, and because of community constables’ vast knowledge of the area and of some of the wanted criminals, crime investigation was also served.

The integration process was nevertheless fraught with difficulties. Prior to integration certain SDUs refused to disarm and become part of the peace process. Integrating the SDUs and SPUs involved the submission of name lists but unit commanders of those people who wanted to be integrated into the SAPS to police station commanders. Those selected had to pass medical and aptitude tests to qualify. Of the 2 000 that were selected, only 900 were employed. The SAPS provided four weeks of basic training, focused on arrest procedures, the use of fire-arms and opening a docket. Those that failed the training were also not integrated. The criteria used for integration has raised questions from the community. At first the community perceived integration as encompassing all SDU and SPU members. They felt that those who did not qualify were betrayed, as they did not need any tests when they were protecting the residents. Another problem arose when those who were not integrated either continued with SDU/SPU activities or turned to crime.

There is a strong criminal element among community constables, with some being feared criminals, while others are awaiting trial. The community has questioned police logic in allowing known criminal elements to conduct searches and man roadblocks. The integration of members of SDUs and SPUs was intended to reduce levels of crime and violence. Now, among community constables there are those who have dual affiliations, performing normal police duties during the day, while take orders from their old unit commanders when they are off duty. In Katlehong community constables were instructed to execute two women with their service pistols who were tried and found guilty by a kangaroo court. Community constables often do not adhere to accepted police conduct while off duty, with service pistols being used to threaten drunkards in shebeens or to harass the community for their own pleasure. It has become easy to use government arms to settle social disputes, in car hijackings or armed robberies.

Policing by community constables has further been marred by confrontations between former SDUs in Katlehong and Tokoza. During the conflict, some unit commanders in Twala section, Katlehong, committed crimes in their areas, and were declared enemies by the community. Their joining the ranks of the community constables were rejected by other former SDU members and the community. These commanders sought refuge in Tokoza and joined the community constables there. But they sneaked into Twala section to harass community constables and residents. In Mokoena section, the community wanted to execute community constables for past atrocities, a situation that was resolved by the police. In Twala, however, resolving the conflict has been thwarted by the absence of community leaders. It is still not clear how many community constables are involved in Kangaroo courts or have dual affiliations. The community has complained to station commanders about the poor quality of service rendered by community constables. Complaints range from failure to write a docket, to failure to make arrests.

Many community constables saw the integration process as the beginning of a long-term career in the SAPS. However, the contractual time frame of their services were not planned. It has been confirmed recently by senior police officers that community constables without matric would not be employed as permanent members of the SAPS. Problems with small salaries has led to ‘go slows’. Each constable works thirteen shifts or days a month, and earns R56,25 for a twelve hour shift, with pension benefits. They have complained that their salaries are inadequate to cover their living costs.

COMMUNITY POLICING FORUMS

Preceding the establishment of community policing forums (CPFs), the army started liaison forums in the Katorus community. These liaison forums were not transformed into community policing forums. CPFs were formed by station commanders in conjunction with the various stakeholders. The police at first embarked on a programme aimed at making policy acceptable. The police’s community relations units educated students, youth and businesses on policing, human rights and police procedure. The purpose of the programme was to discuss problems experienced by the community and to plan interactive security operations. Each organisation taking part in a CPF has two delegates to represent it. Delegates elect a committee responsible for the daily functioning of the forum, that consists of a chairperson, secretary and treasurer.

PFs in Katorus have experienced numerous problems, ranging from poor organisational structures to ideological ones. In Katlehong, ideological problems dealing with the ideal running of a CPF, have seen the ANC representative boycotting meetings because of the chairperson’s ideas, who belongs to the PAC. Furthermore, there has been tension between action area committees, civics and the CPF. Civics and action area committees have established security committees with similar functions to the CPF and demand similar legal recognition for these committees. The duplication of activities has created poor relations between these structures. There is also a lack of interest, with stakeholders such as businesses, youth and church groups showing little interest in the forums or being uninformed about CPFs. Meetings are generally only attended by the police, committee members and the PAC. The IFP does not attend because the township is a ‘no go area’ for them. Efforts by the police to provide them with safe passage have been unsuccessful. To resolve the problem of representation, CPFs have attempted to establish area committees. There has been communication problems between CPFs and police management, with important decisions taken by the latter not being communicated to the CPFs. It seems as if the ideological differences between organisations are reappearing in the CPF. Can the lack of participation by the IFP and other stakeholders jeopardise the legitimacy of the CPF? An interesting aspect about the CPF is that most members of the community come to the police station to lay complaints at the CPF offices, and not at the charge office, which raises the question of who attends better to community problems.

In Tokoza, the CPF seems to have experienced less problems compared to Katlehong. However, the struggle between the station commander (a black major) and his deputy (a white captain) has on many occasions lead to conflicting decisions. They have organised cliques around them and have created confusion about who is in charge of the station. The resulting problems have led the community to demand their withdrawal, a fact that has left the CPF directionless. A serious problem facing the CPF, is the recent demand from students that community constable units should be disbanded, as they are open to bribery and are poorly trained.

The normal functioning of CPFs has been affected by the lack of institutional resources. Each CPF has been allocated a budget of R5 000 to cover its annual activities. As examples of police transformation, CPFs have so far remain powerless. Their relationship with station commanders is based on a partnership. If they disagree with the station commander they can only appeal to the highest level. No relationship has been established with local government structures. How do CPFs hope to effect change and security, if security and development issues are not jointly pursued by the various local government role-players?

PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION

Despite the Government of National Unity and the ongoing negotiations between the IFP and ANC, relations have remained silently hostile. Although negotiations have led to the opening of inaccessible routes, ‘no go areas’ remain a serious problem affecting development and security in the area. In Katlehong, hostel residents are scared to go to the township, as they feel they are not accepted by township residents. There is still uncertainty concerning the ability of township leadership to control their members, something which has affected participation in the CPF. They want the houses surrounding hostels to be occupied by IFP members or sympathisers. In Tokoza houses surrounding hostels are already mostly occupied by IFP supporters (Phenduka section and part of the Basothong section). ‘No go areas’ have also influenced normal family relationships. Prior to the violence erupting, hostel dwellers and township residents mixed on all levels. The situation changed during the conflict, with people with relatives occupying hostels forced to flee their homes, as they were suspected to be collaborating with hostel residents. They often had to flee and seek refuge in hostels, leaving their families behind. It is difficult at present to walk from the township to the hostels to visit relatives and vice versa. People with relatives in the hostels have to commute by taxi to Germiston and from there to the hostels, an expensive and time consuming exercise. In Alberton separate taxi ranks operate for hostel and township residents. Few people have returned to their homes in the buffer zones, some of those illegally occupying houses have refused to leave them, a fact which has raised tensions between residents (lately in Phenduka). A different situation exist in Cross Roads which has a strong IFP support base and where people are in a position to commute freely to and from the township. The question remains, however, whether it Is safe to reconnect the rail lines from the hostel through the township, and whether township residents and hostel dwellers can safely board the same means of transport.

There are other areas of concern that might affect the present security situation. The continuous presence of ‘kangaroo courts’ clearly indicates the lack of effective policing in the area and the community’s lack of confidence in the law. ‘Kangaroo courts’ were originally used for political trials against opponents and police informers, with community constables lately becoming involved in executions. This indicates that SDUs are still functional in the townships, despite their official disbandment. It is possible to conclude that the community is still harassed and intimidated by SDUs.

The politicisation of areas has also affected policing by community constables. Politically hostile communities have threatened constables, because they have been identified as belonging to a certain political grouping. Former SDUs and SPUs still patrol and protect their areas against possible attacks. The issue of ‘no go areas’ also needs to be resolved urgently, as it is associated with recent killings in Zama Zama and Zonkezizwe.

The present infrastructure in the Katorus area is below acceptable standards. A poor infrastructure automatically inhibits effective policing. Crime prevention is difficult when roads are inaccessible, houses are not numbered and streets do not have names or lights. The dense population within the area should be addressed in order to facilitate effective policing in squatter settlements. Policing in neighbouring Alberton is far easier because of a proper infrastructure, streets having names and lights, houses being numbered and roads tarred. It is easy for flying squad vehicles to respond to crime situations. Although the Presidential Project is aimed at developing the area, issues such as ‘no go areas’ and buffer zones can lead to the politicisation of the project and can render it useless.

PRESENT POLICY

Present policing in the Katorus area can be viewed against the general transformation of the SAPS. However, the unique dynamics of the Katorus area has to be taken into account. To effect policing in the area, foot patrols have been organised for flash points (areas bordering the hostels, Mngadi, Khumalo and Ramponupi in Katlehong and Phenduka and Basotho in Tokoza). Eleven satellite police stations have been allocated to Katlehong and six to Tokoza and Phola Park. Recently, seventeen vehicles were allocated to the three police stations. Each action area will have a satellite station with a vehicle and a permanent group of police to patrol the area on a 24-hour basis. This exercise will help the police and the community to get to know each other better, and is another way of improving police visibility.

Police visibility remains problematic in certain areas which recently experienced violence or shooting incidences (Sunrise, Zama Zama and the Vereeniging road which is used by both township and hostel residents). The absence of a security force presence in Zama Zama led to three political murders and one politically unrelated death on the route to Pam Ridge. A recent investigation after an unidentified man was shot behind the Sun City hostel, proved that police are not alert as both the Katlehong and Tokoza police station commanders were still unaware of the incidence six hours later. It also once more raised the question about the effect of non-participation by the IFP in the CPF on policing the hostels.

Problems that affected policing in the past have not yet been resolved. The police inherited different policing agencies, namely the railway police, municipal police, kitskonstabels and recently community constables were added. These different agencies received different training which exacerbated problems in the area. Moreover, various policing standards are applied within one police agency, a fact which has affected the quality of policing adversely.

Racial tension is still rife within the SAPS. One can hardly find a white junior officer in Tokoza or Katlehong police stations. On the other side, there are few or no high ranked black police officers in urban areas. A recent temporary appointment of a white colonel was vehemently rejected by black police in Katlehong on the grounds that he was a racist. The police unions are divided on the issue of appointments, Popcru want all white senior officers to be replaced by black affirmative action appointees, while Sapu will not oppose any appointments as long as officers are not racist. The recent power struggle between a black major and a white captain in Tokoza are further proof of racial tensions.

The police are still starved of resources, although the problem is receiving attention through the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Despite the additional vehicles allocated recently, more are needed for effective patrols and to enhance visibility. Police stations are overcrowded and cells are too small to cope with the prison population. The Tokoza police station is not accessible to the community, as the township development has taken part away from the police station. The police station is situated on the border of the Tokoza and Katlehong, complicating crime reporting and policing, with residents having to walk great distances to reach the police station.

In Katlehong the army and police are jointly patrolling the area on a daily basis. Unlike in Tokoza, there is no army base in Katlehong. Community constables patrol buffer zone areas on foot. Managing personnel remains problematic. Patrol vehicles are misused for personal gains, cars are sometimes parked for long hours outside shebeens while there are no other vehicles available to respond to emergencies. In Tokoza policing is also done jointly with an army base inside the township. There the army assist the police in inaccessible areas like Phola Park. Certain community constables, however, cannot patrol some areas as they have been adversely associated with political organisations. The slow delivery of essential services, the silent hostilities between the ANC and the IFP and poor policing have the potential of reneging the Katorus area to violence.

FUTURE POLICING PLANS

In order to achieve stability in, and reconstruction and development of the Katorus area, it is important to improve the security situation in the area. The Katorus Special Presidential Project addresses the restructuring of policing on a broader level, the objective being to provide safety and security to enable development of the area.

According to future policing plans, there are three phases in the restructuring:

the development of stability and the rehabilitation of the area, as well as the establishment of JOCs and communication centres to ensure effective communication and security for role players;



the consolidation and maintenance of stability in order to establish effective community policing and crime prevention; and



the facilitation of ongoing safety and security measures in the area, that includes improving community policing relations.

The first phase involves:

the establishment of community policing forums;

retaining former municipal police and kitskonstabels;

installing satellite police stations;

establish SOS communication lines;

placing trained members in charge offices;

introducing special crime units; and

augmenting the number of police officers.

The second phase involves:

updating and improving services through retaining all members of the security forces;

restricting the occurrence of serious crimes; and

redeploying the SAPS in peacekeeping and crime prevention.

The third phase involves:

developing additional police stations with the consent of the community;

ensuring a sufficient infrastructure in respect of logistics and personnel; and

withdrawing the SANDF.

To effect the restructuring of the police, the East Rand has been divided into North East Rand (Midrand, Benoni and Kempton Park) and East Rand (Brakpan, Boksburg, Alberton, Germiston and Springs). The district commissioner’s offices will be closed and will be replaced by two area commissioners. Resources from the district commissioner (personnel and furniture) will be redistributed to local police stations. Personnel will function as station commissioners.

The Katorus area has been targeted for upgrading of the positions of station commissioners, with twelve posts targeted in the area. Katlehong will have a brigadier and Tokoza will have a Colonel in charge. The upgrading of station commissioners’ positions is aimed at empowering them to make decisions independently for their stations. Both commissioners will have the same authority. They will be in charge of their own budget, and will be able to authorise the acquisition of certain equipment and to transfer personnel. All police stations will prioritise their own needs and be responsible for their own administration. They will also be responsible for their own financial control and logistics.

To supplement and redistribute resources, 68 vehicles and seventeen satellite police stations have been purchased for Katlehong, Zonkezizwe and Vosloorus. A communications system to encourage crime reporting and identify problems with essential services will be developed. Fifty six SOS telephones will be installed, which will be linked to communication centres in Vosloorus and Tokoza. These centres will be manned by members of SAPS, the SANDF, town council and the traffic department personnel. Two officers will educate people on how to use the system and monitor peak periods. All processed information will be communicated to various stakeholders and organisations.

To effect the restructuring the retaining of all security force members should be prioritised. Programmes of deracialising the SAPSshould be established. Politicising the police services should be avoided at all costs. A uniform policing standard should apply to all existing police agencies. Police with low educational levels should be encouraged to study further and matriculate.

The process of redeploying the SAPS in peacekeeping and crime prevention is going to be lengthy. Redeployment goes hand in hand with restructuring. The role and presence of the army in the townships will facilitate immediate restructuring and redeployment of the SAPS. However, the continuous deployment of the army should be viewed against the negative and positive background. The changing role of the army from defence to policing will have a negative impact on its morale. It might also have a negative impact on the community. With the area having being transformed from violence to relative peace and stability, the possibility of ‘adrenaline junkies’ looking for action might change the peaceful environment. Local police have established methods to involve the community in policing and the continuous presence of the army might have a negative impact on relations between the community and the police. The army uses different methods when involved in crime prevention. Sustained peace will in the long run depend more on co-operation than on the use of force. The police acknowledges that policing will be difficult without the army, but senior police officers are nevertheless eager for the army to withdraw.

There is an increase in crime in the Katorus area, with the main incidents being car hijackings, armed robberies and housebreakings. Attacks on police are no longer political and are rare, mainly involving criminals who want firearms. There are little problems with gangsters, with crimes committed by individuals or syndicates. Drug trafficking and illegal guns present major problems to law enforcement, with the amnesty period to hand in illegal guns seeing only 200 guns being handed in.

Policing local government elections would require joint efforts by the army and the police. The present situation needs to be analysed carefully. It is not clear how the hostilities between the IFP and the ANC will affect existing local relationships. There are indications that the local leadership trust each other and are working hard to resolve conflict peacefully. The recent violence in Zama Zama and Zonkezizwe, however, indicates an intolerance between the parties. It is not clear what impact these small insulated violent incidences will have on the greater Katorus area. There are, however, issues that need to get serious attention, such as the relocating of displaced persons and the depoliticising of certain areas. The possibility of violence resurging on a large scale will be minimal, if people on the ground are tolerant and trusting.

The police need to retrain the entire force. Policing attitudes have not changed adequately. Although there are changes evident, issues such as the politicisation of the police will continue to affect peace and stability in the area. Communication facilities need to be upgraded and police visibility should be improved especially in sensitive areas. Peaceful local government elections will depend on improved policing and the capacity of parties to resolve disputes speedily and peacefully.

This article is published as part of the Crime and Policing Policy Project, a venture jointly sponsored by the British High Commission, the Hanns Seidel Foundation of Germany, the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, Q Data Consulting, the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the United Nations Development Programme.

REFERENCE

Col. C.P. du Toit, Peacekeeping In The Townships: The East Rand (SANDF GROUP 41), 1995.

Capt. B.F. Kruger, Katorus Special Presidential Project: Stability, Reconstruction and Development Programme. Overall Business Plan, 1994.