INTRODUCTION

The issue of the private possession of firearms simmers beneath the surface of the public conscience. Periodically events or developments will thrust the issue decisively to the fore of the public policy arena. Internationally, this has occurred again as a result of the killing of sixteen primary school children and their teacher in Dunblane, Scotland in March 1996, and two months later, the killing of 35 people, and the wounding of 18 in Tasmania. In South Africa, the debate on the proliferation of illegal and legal firearms has accompanied the concerns about the growth in the crime rate in the 1990s. Most recently, the issue has received renewed attention as a result of the anti-gang vigilantism in the Western Cape, in which an alleged druglord was killed by an armed crowd on 4 August. The prevalence of privately owned firearms and the charged emotional state of the crowd left the police incapable to intervene in the incident. This was followed by a shootout between ANC and IFP supporters outside a courthouse in Pietermaritzburg on 19 August, in which five people were injured. Two of those who had drawn firearms on each other in this incident were members of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature. The events in the Western Cape and Pietermaritzburg have prompted Safety and Security Minister, Sydney Mufamadi, to issue a nation-wide prohibition on the carrying of firearms at public gatherings.

The increasing use of firearms in crime in South Africa has been the focus of numerous local researchers and institutions – Anthony Minnaar and Sam Pretorius, Greg Mills and Glen Oosthuysen,2 the Firearms Unit of the South African Police Services (SAPS),3 and more recently by the 'Towards Collaborative Peace' project of the Institute for Defence Policy. Other researchers and the SAPS have addressed the issue as an aspect of their work on crime and violence – Lorraine Glanz, the Department of Criminology of UNISA, and the SAPS.4 Most of the work undertaken by these researchers and institutions is concerned with the prevalence of firearms that remain from military conflicts in the Southern African region, and are now steadily flowing into South Africa to equip criminals. That most attention should be on such firearms is correct – in the hands of criminals military firearms (mostly high capacity automatic rifles) clearly have the greatest potential to undermine the stability of South Africa's new democracy. However, some attention is also being focused on the extent that legal firearms contribute to the problem of firearm proliferation.

That legal firearm possession should draw the attention of those concerned with the growth of crime and violence in South Africa is hardly surprising, given the extent of private legal firearm ownership. Private firearm ownership is a result of this country's turbulent political and military history. Less than one hundred years ago, on the eve of the Second Boer War, it was unlawful for a man not to possess a firearm in the Transvaal Republic.5 By the late twentieth century, the spur on private firearm ownership has shifted from the prospect of war to violent crime. The most recent data from the Central Firearms Registry reveals that by mid-1996 firearms legally in private possession have numbered 3 503 573, owned by 1 933 222 citizens. This figure is constantly growing as up to 20 000 new applications for firearm licences are received by the Central Firearms Registry every month.6

The significant quantity of firearms in private possession has begun to blur the distinction between 'legal' and 'illegal' firearms, and the notion of 'proliferation' increasingly refers to all firearms in circulation regardless of their status or origin.7 The SAPS explains it: "The illegal importation and smuggling of firearms into South Africa, as well as the theft or robbery of firearms in legal possession, and legal firearms reported lost, are certainly the most important factors contributing to the apparent general availability of illegal firearms in South Africa. The availability and alarming rise in the theft of firearms and firearms reported lost exacerbate the incidence of violent crime."8 The following figures are available in this regard:

In 1994, 18 888 firearms were reported stolen or lost.9



In 1995, 16 135 firearms were reported stolen and 1 496 were reported lost .10



For the period April 1993 to June 1995, 35 098 firearms were reported stolen and 134 685 firearms were reported lost.11

The most recent figures given to the author by the SAPS Crime Information Management Centre show that, in Gauteng alone, during the period January to June 1996, 1 276 thefts of firearms were reported and 10 207 firearms were reported 'lost'. An allowance must also be made in these figures for under-reporting. The possibility of punishment for the theft or loss of a private firearm through its owner's negligence, will deter many from reporting such a loss.

Unfortunately, a significant number of firearms are also lost by the security services themselves. From April 1990 to September 1995 the SAPS lost 7 261 firearms in various circumstances, while the SANDF lost 1 324 firearms in various circumstances for the same period.12 This is exacerbated by the number of firearms that could not be accounted for in the audits that accompanied the integration of the 'homeland' security services into the SAPS and the SANDF. Inadequate recordkeeping in these services has resulted in numerous firearms being lost (38 per cent of the firearms in the armoury of the old Transkei police remain unaccounted for13).

The solution to the dilemma created by the extent of the private possession of firearms is put succinctly by Mills and Oosthuysen and by the SAPS. There is as much need to apply stricter regulations to the private possession of firearms, as there is a need to stop the flow of firearms of military origin across South Africa's borders.14 This article is concerned with the revision of the regulations that apply to the legal private possession of firearms. Because the issue of firearms of military origin is being dealt with elsewhere, as shown above, no further reference will be made here to this issue. This article hopes to contribute to the debate on the proliferation of firearms by offering some suggestions on where the provisions related to legal firearm ownership may be revised and how the administration of this legislation might be improved to assist the SAPS. Vociferous lobbies exist in South Africa, as elsewhere in world, that seek to mobilise public opinion either decisively for or decisively against the private possession of firearms. Each position has its merits and de-merits, and each has proven able to supply statistical data to substantiate its case. Invariably these positions also become ideological.15 This article, however, attempts to steer clear of this particular debate.

The objective here is twofold:

Some suggestions will be made to enhance the policeability of South Africa's firearms legislation. No suggestions will be made that imply the drafting of new legislation on firearm possession. The existing legislation, coupled with the objectives of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) as set out in Sections 4.13 and 5.7.1 of the Strategy,16 provide a suitable framework that may serve South Africa for the foreseeable future.



The suggestion will be offered that private firearm ownership should be limited as far as possible to only the most responsible owners. In this regard, it needs to be more difficult for the average citizen to obtain a firearm. This will prevent citizens from purchasing a firearm on a whim. Arguably, limiting firearm possession to the enthusiast or most responsible applicant will ensure that greater care is taken by these owners in the safekeeping of such a weapon.

Invariably many of the suggestions offered in this article will have been made before. The length and the depth of the global debate on firearm possession ensures that the issue has been examined from almost every conceivable angle, and any comparative analysis will leave the researcher with very little that he or she may call their own. On the other hand, the existence of this vast source of comparative material implies that the South African policy researcher is able to select and apply that which serves local purposes best.

ENHANCING POLICING

It is fundamental that any revision of the legislation pertaining to the possession of firearms in South Africa must be accompanied by initiatives that will enhance the policeability of this legislation. In other words, revisions of the legislation should be structured in such a way that they increase the ability of the authorities to enforce this legislation; and that the authorities themselves, where necessary, must be given the requisite capacities to undertake the task of enforcing this legislation.17 This implies that not only should the Central Firearms Registry and the SAPS Firearms Investigation Unit be upgraded to operate more efficiently, but that all SAPS personnel must be equipped to apply immediate control over any firearm they encounter in their daily operations. To achieve this, extensive computerisation is necessary in the Firearms Registry. Furthermore, the maintenance of statistical data by the Central Firearms Registry is inadequate. Data is difficult to retrieve and analyses of the dimensions of firearm ownership and profiles of gun owners are difficult to extract.18 It is not inconceivable that the entire process of citizen identification, and by implication firearm licensing, is going to become increasingly intertwined with technological advance. Suitable technology needs to be selected and applied as soon as possible to the firearm licensing process.

It is a reality that effective policing of private firearms only takes place 'at the source'. Any control that the SAPS exercises over legally acquired firearms is applied at the stage where the firearm is purchased by its new owner. Once the firearm has been licensed and has left the shop or previous owner, it is no longer subject to any effective policing control. Policing control will only take place again if the firearm is misused, stolen or lost (assuming that this is reported by the owner). By that stage, policing control has become reactive rather than preventive. Revisions to firearm legislation must therefore enhance the capacity of the relevant authorities to administer control over legal firearms on an ongoing basis. The application of policing control must take place at the source, as well as during the time the firearm is in the hands of its legal owner. The following are submitted as areas in which the enhancement of policeability may be achieved.

Renewable Licences

The idea of introducing a system of renewable licences into South Africa is not new. It is already advanced by the Campaign for a Gun Free South Africa19 and has found support elsewhere.20 Renewable licensing implies that the same firearm licence must be renewed periodically. Such a period might be annually, or as is the case in England, every three years.21 In South Africa, where each individual firearm is licensed separately, and where more than one license is held, renewable licensing will imply greater cost and administrative inconvenience for every other firearm purchased. This should act to deter all but the most enthusiastic owner from purchasing numerous firearms.

Special provisions will need to be made for hunters, collectors and sports people who may have to possess more than one firearm for their purposes. The regulations to the Arms and Ammunition Act No 75 of 1969 (as amended) already make special provisions for hunters, collectors and sports people,22 and such people are recorded by the Central Firearms Registry. Renewable licensing for people in these categories might thus continue to be catered for separately, for example by placing the firearms on a single licence certificate through which they can be renewed as one.

Apart from serving to deter the acquisition of firearms by private citizens, a system of renewable licensing will enhance the oversight by the police over firearms in legal private possession. The system would achieve this in numerous ways: periodic renewal will allow the SAPS or the licensing authorities to update the addresses of the owners; with every renewal the details of the firearm can be verified and updated (that is, that any modifications made to the firearm are recorded on the licence); and the loss or theft of a firearm will be difficult to conceal.

Renewable licensing has a further spin-off effect. By applying a renewal fee, most of which will be used to administer the renewal system itself, some revenue may be utilised to combat the prevalence of illegal weapons. It may be spent on campaigns to promote responsible firearm ownership, or to purchase new technology to assist the SAPS in their control over private firearms.

It has been pointed out that the introduction of a renewable firearm licensing system would place an additional administrative burden on an already overworked Central Firearms Registry and police service.23 Comparative experience suggests that the administrative burden of a renewable licensing system might be devolved to local authorities. German licence application and administration procedures are administered by the local municipal authority in which the applicant resides. Similarly, in South Africa, firearm licence renewals might be administered in much the same way that vehicle licence renewals are – through the local authority in which the owner resides. Any irregularities in the process of renewing a licence could immediately be communicated to the local SAPS who would investigate these. Admittedly, with the regularity with which firearms are sold, 'lost' or stolen, some communication will need to take place on an ongoing basis between the Central Firearms Registry and the relevant local authority.

'Fingerprinting' of Firearms

Every firearm leaves a series of very distinct 'fingerprints' on the shots it fires: on the bullet head itself it leaves the marks of the barrel rifling; while on the cartridge case, it leaves the imprint of the firing-pin. From a crime scene that yields bullet heads and/or cartridge cases, the police will be able to identify, not only the calibre of the firearm used, but also the distinct 'fingerprints' of this firearm. The recording of these prints allows the police to construct a profile of a firearm that may have been used in committing more than one crime.

The utility of developing ballistic recording capabilities is twofold. Primarily, ballistic testing needs to take place at the scene of a crime where a firearm was used. The details of the cartridge case and bullet heads (where these are available) should be recorded and stored for cross-referencing with the details of evidence gleaned from other crime scenes. In this regard, some progress towards the upgrading of the Ballistics Unit in Pretoria is currently under way.24 Equipment has been purchased from abroad that will allow the Ballistics Unit to maintain 'fingerprints' of firearms used in crimes throughout the Republic. (The equipment is capable of completing 5 000 'fingerprint' comparisons per hour.)

Secondly, ballistic recording of firearms might also be applied proactively, that is, before they are sold into public circulation. If the distinctive 'fingerprint' of a firearm were to be recorded from the outset, it would dramatically increase the capacity of the Ballistics Unit to make comparisons. Comparisons could be made, not only against firearms already used in crimes and therefore on record, but also against new firearms that are sold into public circulation. Thus, where a firearm is used in a crime, it could be traced back to its owner immediately, who would be held liable for its misuse, loss or theft.

The prospect of compiling a 'fingerprint' record of every new firearm purchased is formidable, and would present an additional burden on an already overstretched SAPS. Clearly, not every new firearm would need to be subjected to such a test. It would be sufficient to test only those 'combat' handguns that have shown themselves to be the firearms of choice of criminals. Moreover, as with the administration of firearm licence renewal, the actual recording of the 'fingerprint' of firearms might be allocated to another authority or institution. Many firearms that enter South Africa for commercial sale are already subject to an SABS approval rating. This involves, among others, firing an overcharged round through these firearms. These overcharged test rounds suffer unusual distortion during the test and would not offer clear 'fingerprint' details. However, according to the Proof Master of the firearms testing facility at the SABS, it would not be impossible to fire additional standard charge rounds through a firearm and to hand the details to the SAPS for entry into the Ballistics Unit database.25 The SABS adds that, by the end of 1996, every firearm sold in South Africa will be subject to SABS quality testing (currently only those that emanate from certain arms manufacturers are tested). This will ensure that if 'fingerprint' recording is introduced at the quality testing stage, it could eventually cover all new firearms, in the category of combat handguns, that will circulate into South Africa.

Even if it is partially delegated to the SABS, the introduction of 'fingerprint' recording and capturing will be time consuming. This needs to be viewed against the backdrop of the unusual extent and violence of crime in South Africa, as well as its cost in lives and money.26 The situation warrants more extensive and perhaps even more unusual policing methods. In an initiative similar to the firearms 'fingerprinting' proposed here, the Automobile Association has proposed that a 'vehicle component marking system' is introduced as a means of identifying vehicle parts and thereby also making inroads into the hijacking and vehicle theft epidemic. According to the Managing Director of the Automobile Association, Johan van Vreden, "[w]ith more than 55 000 vehicles stolen in 1995 at a cost of R4,2 billion, some drastic measures have to be taken to find solutions to this ever-increasing problem."27 Like the vehicle component marking system, the 'fingerprint' recording of all firearms promises to increase the capacity of SAPS investigators dramatically, while limiting the ability of the criminal to operate. The feasibility of a proactive firearm 'fingerprint' system therefore needs to be investigated as a matter of urgency.

No system is entirely failproof, and some foreseeable drawbacks remain in the firearm 'fingerprinting' system. The system may be overcome by the sophisticated criminal who will obtain or even manufacture 'saboting' rounds that will make bore tracings impossible, and who collects spent cartridge cases from the scene of a crime. It is also true that the distinct 'fingerprint' of a firearm may change over time, depending on how the firearm is cared for and how often it is fired. In a firearm with a barrel that becomes pitted, or that is allowed to rust, the print will be affected. Nonetheless, it is the finding of the Ballistics Unit that even in an automatic firearm that is reasonably cared for, the print will remain consistent for approximately 7 000 rounds. It is also the case that most commercial firearms in private hands are unlikely to ever fire more that 5 000 rounds and are usually better cared for than old military stock. The 'fingerprint' of a commercial firearm may be altered by deliberately changing the barrel of the firearm. (This is something that sports people might do in modifying a particular weapon for their needs.) The recording of such modifications can be accommodated with the renewable licence system.

Lastly, the introduction of mandatory 'fingerprint' recording will only effect firearms that enter circulation thereafter – the approximately three million firearms already in private hands and the countless illegal weapons of military origin will remain unrecorded. The Ballistics Unit has offered a solution that will provide for a limited form of retroactive 'fingerprint' recording. According to the Unit's director, retroactive 'fingerprinting' might be achieved by enforcing the submission of every second-hand firearm for mandatory recording during the process of the firearm's resale.28 This will still fail to record every weapon already in circulation, but does present a suitable compromise between not testing any of those firearms in circulation or attempting to recall every firearm for this purpose.

Amnesties

Whatever their relative success rate, the utility of firearm amnesties seems to be the subject of some debate throughout the world. Some British police officers have complained to the author that amnesties never yield more than the old 'clunkers' that people have no more use for anyway – the criminal will always retain his or her firearm through an amnesty.29 On the other hand, the findings of the Firearms Consultative Committee, set up under the English Firearms Amendment Act of 1988, points out that various amnesties in England since World War II have seen the handing in of more than 300 000 firearms and 11,2 million rounds of ammunition. The last amnesty in England for which figures are available, the 1988 amnesty following the 1987 Hungerford massacre, yielded 48 000 firearms and 1,5 million rounds of ammunition.30 An amnesty was also declared in June 1996, following the Dunblane massacre.

The yields of British firearm amnesties contrast markedly with the yields of amnesties in South Africa. One of the most recent, and probably also one of the most high profile initiatives to encourage the surrender of firearms, took place shortly after South Africa's first democratic election. Organised by the Campaign for a Gun Free South Africa on 16 December 1994, this campaign yielded less than 400 firearms. Numerous factors may explain this dismal public response – among others the short period in which firearms could have been surrendered, the lack of public mobilisation in support of the initiative, and the fact that it was undertaken so soon after the 1994 election, at a time during which concerns about transition may still have been high.31 In the final analysis, South Africans, whether they are legal or illegal owners, are unwilling to part with their firearms. This is probably the result of a combination of factors ranging from the extent of the crime rate, to the almost cultural attitudes to firearm possession that prevail in our society. In such a situation, firearm amnesties must be based on a foundation of steadily improved policing and increased feelings of public security, as well as a long term transformation of public attitudes towards the private possession of firearms. While periodic amnesties might remain a tool at the disposal of the SAPS to address firearms proliferation, they can never replace more proactive police efforts to seize illegal weapons, or specific decommissioning or disarmament campaigns in neighbouring states.

More recently, the idea of a firearms buy-back programme has resurfaced.32 (This was tried in the early 1990s by the SAP in which R6 000 was offered for the surrender of an AK-47.) The notion has some merit if it is viewed against the costs of crime to society (R31 billion in 1995), calculated in the 1996 Nedcor study. If the cost of crime is indeed so high, a case could be made to justify the allocation of the necessary public money to fund a firearm buy-back programme. What militates against the success of buy-back programmes is that the money on offer has to be sufficient inducement to convince those in possession of illegal firearms to part with these – the rewards offered by the buy-back must outweigh the potential rewards of retaining the firearm for criminal purposes. Invariably, where sufficient inducement is available, the buy-back programme runs the risk of stimulating a market in stolen weapons that are traded for financial return.33 Secondly, the same factors that apply to an amnesty are relevant to buy-back programmes – it will have little prospect for success until the perceived need for the security provided by a firearm is eroded by the reduction of crime rates.

LEGISLATION: FIREARM POSSESSION

Attitudes regarding the suitability of the existing Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 vary. Some of those interviewed for this article felt strongly that the Act has numerous 'loopholes' that need to be addressed and that it needed to be enforced more thoroughly than at present.34 Others were content that the Act was fairly comprehensive and suggested that all it required was more effective enforcement.35 As it stands, the Act is dated. Certain sections have already come under the spotlight for review or removal and amendments in this regard should be tabled before the National Assembly later in 1996 or early in 1997. Nonetheless, some comments about the provisions of the Act will be made here.

Revising Existing Section of the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969

Section 8

Section 8 (1) reads: "Any person not being under the age of 16 years or not being a disqualified person may, with the prior consent of the holder of a licence to possess an arm and for such a period as such holder may permit, have such arm in his possession for his lawful personal protection or benefit or for the purpose of keeping custody of the arm, without holding any licence..." Many of the interviewees have pointed out that this has been subject to tremendous abuse.36 In their experience, Section 8(1) is used by unscrupulous firearm dealers to loan firearms to people whom they often know are criminals. The section has apparently also been abused by second-hand dealers who supply firearms to buyers before their licence applications are processed. These dealers will encourage the seller to complete a 'section 8', letter leaving the details of the recipient blank. These are then filled in by the dealer once a new buyer purchases the firearm, and the new owner takes possession of the firearm before the licence application is approved by the SAPS. (These allegations will have to be investigated further, but emanating from disparate interviewees, are worth repeating.)

Some opposition exists to the elimination of Section 8 (1).37 Some interviewees argued that the section still has some utility. They suggest that it allows for the safe storage of a firearm by another person when the legitimate owner is away. Secondly, they argue that it allows an owner to leave a firearm in his or her spouse's possession while they themselves are absent. These concerns should be addressed. In the first place, it is incumbent on a firearm owner to have a secure storage facility for her or his firearm. The need to find alternative safekeeping facilities should not be necessary in the first place. (However, even in this regard alternatives to 'lending' a firearm out for safekeeping, exist – a firearm may be handed to the local police station for safekeeping or may be placed in a safety deposit box.) It was pointed out in the introduction that one of the objectives of any review of existing firearm legislation would be to eliminate the proliferation of firearms in South Africa. Arguably, the ability of a legal firearm owner to loan out a firearm contributes to this proliferation. No substantial reason exists why a responsible firearm owner should need to loan out a firearm. If someone who does not possess a firearm feels that they would like one, they should do so via the correct procedures that apply to all firearm owners and submit to the relevant licensing requirements.

The second concern put by those in support of Section 8 (1) requires more attention. A tight framework within which a legitimate owner may allow his or her firearm to be used by another person needs to be provided for. This applies in three possible scenarios:

where a spouse is left alone on a property (s)he inhabits with the legal owner of a firearm and where circumstances arise that require the use of a firearm for immediate personal defence;



where a prospective firearm owner needs to acquire a certain level of proficiency in firearm handling, and therefore require the use of a firearm, before (s)he might successfully apply to be licensed as an owner in her or his own right; and



where an employer is a legal owner of firearms that are allocated to employees for the purposes of the business of the employer – this applies mainly to security officers.

Section 8 (2) of the Act already provides for the security industry. Moreover, all security companies are compelled to register with the Security Officers Board (in terms of Section 10 of the Security Officers Act No. 92 of 1987). The Board ensures that certain conditions are adhered to by all security companies and issues such companies with 'Section 8 (2) permits' that allow them to acquire and administer an armoury. Some concern remains that the Security Officers Board does not oversee the conduct of all security companies in South Africa. Mills and Oosthuysen have found that approximately 180 000 security guards are registered in South Africa, of which some 40 000 are armed. However, they also point out that another approximately 100 000 unregistered security guards exist who are not subject to the conditions and scrutiny of the Security Officers Board.38 More research is needed to evaluate the way in which many of these unregistered security guards are armed and the controls that exist over these firearms.

It is submitted that Section 8(1) should continue to accommodate the first and second scenarios. In other words, a spouse or family member may use a firearm, with its legal owner's consent, on the property of its legal owner, in extreme circumstances. Additionally, the amendment should provide that a legal owner may allow another person, not previously qualified in handling a firearm, to practice with such a firearm under the owner's supervision. The latter provision would apply particularly to shooting clubs that engage in firearm training. In short, the proposed amendments must stipulate that, where a firearm is used by someone not licensed to possess it, it must be used either on the legal owner's property and with his or her permission, or under the direct supervision of the legal owner.

Section 39

Section 39 lays out the offences and penalties under the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969. The section provides, among others, for a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment for the illegal possession of commercial firearms and ammunition and a maximum sentence of 25 years for the possession of firearms of a military nature. The latter includes "any cannon, recoilless gun or mortar, rocket launcher, machine gun or machine rifle or any similar armament, and any ammunition or projectiles designed to be discharged from such firearms." According to an interviewee, most cases of unlawful possession of firearms appear before regional magistrates. They are, however, only empowered to impose prison sentences of up to ten years on offenders.39 It is submitted that, in the light of the extent of illegal firearm possession, particularly those of a military origin, the sentencing capacity of regional magistrates should be revised.40

Section 40

Section 40 provides for the presumption that if any article, contrary to the provisions of the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969, is or was in "any building, dwelling, flat, room, office, shop, structure, vessel, aircraft or vehicle, any person at that time on or in charge of or present at or occupying such premises, shall be presumed to have been in possession of that article at that time, until the contrary is proved." These presumptions have been struck down by the Constitutional Court in its ruling on Mbatha vs. The State, and Le Roux and 25 others vs. The State on 16 November 1995. Although the Firearms Unit feels that the removal of Section 40 has curtailed its capacity to prosecute those caught in apparent possession of an illegal firearm,41 very little needs to be said further on the section, in view of the Constitutional Court's ruling.

Sections 3 and 37

Sections 3 and 37 of the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 set out the minimum age requirement for the possession of a firearm. Section 37 reads: "No person shall permit or enable a juvenile under the age of sixteen years to be in possession of an arm or ammunition." It is submitted that, in the interests of responsible firearm ownership, the minimum age provision must be revised. Suitable age limits for legal possession that might be contemplated in this regard are eighteen (as in the German law) or preferably 21 years. Obviously, some provision must remain to allow youths under such an age limit to participate in sports Activities, or to shoot a firearm that belongs to a legal owner under that owner's supervision, for example at a private shooting club or on a hunt. This would be catered for in a revised Section 8 (1) (see above).

Justification

The introduction of a thorough justification for possessing a firearm on every licence application is possibly the most effective way to limit firearm ownership only to the most responsible and enthusiastic owner. Unfortunately, the establishment of sufficient justification in current licensing procedure remains rudimentary. (Only a few lines are devoted to 'Purpose for Which Arm is Required' on the standard licence application form, SAP271.) According to Abrie Burger, Director of the Central Firearms Registry, the justifying criterion for the possession of a firearm is simple. One of the best reasons that can be given in any application to possess a firearm, Burger asserts, is for the purposes of self-defence.42

Comparative evidence suggests that South Africa is in fact one of the few countries that will regard 'self-defence' as a suitable reason to allow almost any applicant to possess a firearm.43 Not even the Royal Ulster Constabulary will issue a firearm to a civilian on this basis except in the most extreme circumstances.44 The approaches of other countries are similar. It is illustrative to lay these out at some length. According to the guidelines of the English Home Office to licensing officers in local police stations, "[a[pplications for the grant of a firearm certificate for the applicant's protection or that of his premises should be refused on the grounds that firearms are not regarded as an acceptable means of protection in this country. This principle should be maintained even in the case of applications from representatives of banks and firms who desire to protect valuables or large quantities of money."45 The approach of the German firearm law is more lenient, but similar. Section 32 (3) of the German Firearms Law reads: "Sufficient justification exists where the applicant is able to show that considerably greater threat than is generally the case exists against their life or limb, and in which the acquisition of a firearm and ammunition is appropriate to the reduction of this threat."46

The extent of violent crime in South Africa probably implies that the English approach is inappropriate. The approach of the German licensing authorities might prove more useful in South Africa: it presents a suitable compromise between limiting the proliferation of legal firearms, particularly handguns that are the most sought after by criminals, and completely denying a member of the public the ability to acquire a firearm for self-defence purposes. It is the understanding of the German licensing authorities that all citizens are under equal threat from crime. Only those applicants who can demonstrate that they are under an unusual threat are sufficiently justified to acquire a firearm on these grounds. (Usually this will include shop owners or jewellers that need to transport valuables or money on a regular basis, or people who have received threats on their lives and have already involved the police in this regard.) This understanding, it is submitted, should also inform the South African licensing authorities. Further, where a firearm is granted on this basis, the owner should be encouraged to sell the firearm if it is found during the licence renewal process that the circumstances that prompted him or her to purchase the firearm have changed.

It has been the consistent and justifiable argument of legal firearm owners that the focus of policy makers should be on the criminal and not on the legal and law abiding firearm owner.47 In the case where the notion of 'sufficient justification' will be more rigorously applied to evaluate applications for firearms for self-defence, a counterweighing focus on the South African criminal justice system as a whole should be made. If the objective is to limit the proliferation of firearms, and more especially handguns designed for defence purposes, some undertaking must be given by policy makers that the criminal justice system will be revamped to become more effective in removing criminals from society and to eliminate some of the causes for the need to possess a firearm in the first place.48 One of the most obvious suggestions that could be made in this regard, is that tough and mandatory sentencing is applied to armed crime.49 Unfortunately, there seems little prospect that such a suggestion will receive the support of the courts (although the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 does make provision for certain mandatory sentencing for its contravention - see above.) Invariably, the suggestion of mandatory sentencing is seen as a prescription by the legislature that infringes on the discretion of the courts.50

Two state advocates of the Johannesburg Supreme Court interviewed for this paper, Henning and Chinner, suggest that the impulse to lay down mandatory sentencing should be checked by more effective policing – only effective policing and the real risk of being apprehended and punished will deter the criminal. A similar argument was made by Judge Arthur Chaskalson in his judgement on the death penalty – any debate about the deterrent value of the death penalty was academic in a situation where the criminal ran no risk of being caught anyway. It is incumbent upon the prosecution, the advocates point out, to focus the court's attention on the state of violent crime in South African society, and to ensure that the courts take this into account in applying sentence.51

That the courts are willing to apply harsher sentences for certain crimes, when these are viewed against the extent of crime in South Africa, is already being demonstrated. In the high profile case of Dr Stephen Pon, who was killed late in 1995 during a car hijacking, his very youthful murderers were recently sentenced to life imprisonment for aggravated robbery and were given additional sentences for possession of an illegal firearm and ammunition. This takes place at a time when legislation laying down tougher bail conditions is due to be tabled before the next session of Parliament, and amidst statements by the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, that all criminal legislation will be reviewed to ensure that it is adequate to combat crime.52

The submission of extensive justification to possess a firearm is not limited to firearms acquired for self-defence purposes. The notion of justification must be applied generically to all applications, and must be borne out by sufficient proof that the justification is significant. Thus, sports and recreational shotists, collectors and hunters need to submit reinforcing evidence to this effect. It was shown above that the regulations attached to the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 already made provisions for sports people, hunters and collectors (Sections 20 through 27 of the Regulations). However, the Central Firearms Registry, in June 1996, has only registered 825 bona fide hunters, 460 bona fide sports people, and 406 bona fide collectors.53 Thus, only 1 691 legal firearm owners out of 1,9 million presently qualify to be classified into these categories and will have complied with the conditions that apply to them. Given the limited justification that is currently required, and the fact that citizens may possess up to twelve firearms at any one time, it is not surprising that few will have taken the trouble to apply for registration in one or another of the special categories.

The principle of justification still allows the applicant significant latitude. Even the English guide to licensing officers points out that, "[t[he reason given for desiring a firearm must be one applicable to the particular class of firearm which the person desires to possess. It should be recognised that some classes of firearm do have more than one legitimate use."54 In other words, a sports person might be perfectly justified in acquiring a high capacity firearm if it can be shown that such a person engages in competitive shooting in which it is required to fire a certain number of shots in a short space of time. Similarly, a hunter is justified in acquiring various calibre rifles for different kinds of game and even a handgun to administer a coup de grace.

Were the German approach adopted in South African licensing procedure, the question again surfaces of how it should be administered. The approach implies not only that the licensing officer at a local police station must be qualified to exercise a considerable amount of discretion regarding the veracity of the justification to be submitted, but that the licensing officer also needs to be thoroughly cross-referenced by the Central Firearms Registry before it issues the licence. The expertise to process this exists at the Central Firearms Registry. The evaluating officers in the Registry are all of the rank of Superintendent and above,55 and are guided by a comprehensive set of regulations according to which applications are evaluated. (These regulations are confidential, for obvious reasons, and a discussion is deliberately not included here.) The German approach also implies that the purpose for which a licence is granted is reflected on the licence itself. This will allow the licence renewing authority to encourage the owners of firearms acquired for self-defence purposes to re-evaluate the necessity for their firearm on an ongoing basis. It will also make it necessary that the justification given for the possession of a firearm, other than for self-defence purposes, continues to apply. This will prevent citizens from joining a club or association for the express purpose of acquiring a firearm and then allowing this membership to lapse.

Competency Testing

In 1988, competency testing was introduced into the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 as a requirement for qualification to possess a firearm. This was never applied, and was eventually removed from the Act. Today, some support exists for the reintroduction of competency testing. Most of the interviewees for this article, and the drafters of the NCPS, which advocates the "training of gun owners" ,56 agree that it needs to be reapplied. The problem with competency testing, as with renewable licensing, has been the inability of the police services to administer its application. However, insisting that applicants achieve a specific level of competency before they qualify to possess a firearm will contribute to the objective to limit firearms to only the most responsible owners. Competency testing is a central component of the German firearms legislation. Section 31(1) of the German statute reads: "proof of competency has been achieved by the applicant who passes the test for this at the relevant licencing authority or who is able to demonstrate competency through familiarity or a relevant qualification."57 The regulations defining the competency test are laid down by the German Interior Ministry. The German approach holds some lessons for South Africa.

As with renewable licences, competency testing may be provided by institutions other than the SAPS. Shooting clubs are ideally placed for this duty. They could supply the requisite firearm training (handling, shooting, firearm law, etc.) before administering the final competency test to applicants. Once the applicant has satisfied the conditions for competency (s)he would be issued with a certificate to be attached to their licence application. Obviously, the regulations defining sufficient competency need to be laid down by the National Commissioner of the SAPS as a guide to clubs wishing to offer competency courses. It would remain incumbent on such clubs to apply to the Commissioner for accreditation, and to submit their curricula to the Commissioner for review on a regular basis. This idea is not without precedent in South Africa: the National Firearms Training Association (NAFTA) has a comprehensive training course that it offers to members of the public wishing to achieve higher levels of firearm proficiency. It also offers a detailed instructor's course and trains instructors country-wide. The South African Practical Shooting Association (SAPSA) is a similar organisation.

Reservations about the idea of competency testing remain. The South African Gun Owners Association has pointed out that the delegation of the issuing of competency certificates may create a monopoly if certain organisations alone are granted the rights to this activity.58 This is a legitimate concern that must be guarded against. The task of the SAPS would merely be to lay down the regulations defining competency and to invite clubs to design curricula that accommodate these conditions. All clubs would then be free to apply for accreditation.

Related to demonstrable competency is the issue of pre-empting negligence on the part of the firearm owner. More precisely, it refers to the ability of the legal owner, not only to handle his or her firearm with a maximum awareness of general public safety, but also to be able to store such a firearm securely when not in use. In other words, verifying an applicant's ability to safely store his or her firearm must become part of the competency evaluation. Negligence on the part of legal owners in this regard contributes to firearms proliferation. Firearms that are stolen or 'lost' invariably end up in the hands of criminals – negligent firearm owners have become the armourers of criminals. The Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 provides that a firearm owner is obliged to ensure that his or her firearm is securely stored when it is not on their person. Section 39(1)(k) declares that any person who, "while in the lawful possession of an arm, loses such an arm, or from whom it is stolen owing to that person's failure i) to lock the arm away in the prescribed safe, strong-room, device, apparatus or instrument for the safe-keeping of an arm; or ii) to take reasonable steps to prevent the loss or theft of an arm while the arm was on his person or under his direct control", is guilty of an offence. According to Section 11(1)(d) and 12(1), anyone guilty of such an offence may be declared unfit to possess another firearm. Details to guide prospective owners on what constitutes a suitably secure storage facility, are provided in sections 28, 29 and 30 of the Regulations to the Act.

Pre-empting negligence in this regard, implies that the licensing authority is able to satisfy itself that the prospective legal firearm owner does possess such a safe storage facility. This does not occur as a matter of course in South Africa. Unfortunately, there is no other way than for the licensing officer of the relevant local police to inspect the premises of the applicant. To prevent applicants' spending money on secure storage facilities before they are assured of the success of their application, licenses might be issued conditionally, but withheld until the licensing officer has inspected these facilities. In England, where similar stipulations regarding the safe storage of firearms exist, the Firearms Consultative Commission has recommended in its fifth annual report that, "the Committee considered that it was reasonable for police forces to inspect security before issuing a certificate, particularly on initial application."59 In its submission to the Cullen Public Enquiry into the Dunblane Massacre, the FCC was able to report that, "in nearly all cases the police will inspect a potential certificate holder's security before issuing a certificate."60

The system of routine inspections of the premises of first-time licence applicants by the licence officer of the relevant local police station must be introduced in South Africa. It is submitted that such an undertaking by the local police service will develop its relations with the community it serves, and will be in keeping with the sentiments that underpin the 1996-1997 Annual Plan of the Police Services. In its opening preamble on the transformation of the SAPS, the plan points out that, "[t]his transformation of the South African Police Service will, however, be in vain if it does not contribute to, and be driven by, the creation of new relationships between the police and the community. Community policing, based on the acceptance that safety and security can only be effectively pursued through partnerships and by sharing responsibility, will create the preconditions for improved public safety."61

Licensing the Owner and the Firearm

The incorporation of the notions of justification and competency testing can be consolidated with the transfer of the emphasis of the licence procedure across the firearm and the owner. The distinction is an important one and is spelled out by the Firearms Consultative Committee: "[T]he Committee agreed that the essence of any new licensing system should be that it was the individual who was being licensed rather than individual weapons. In terms of public safety the most important consideration was whether an individual was suitable to possess firearms safely; determination of the extract types and numbers to be held should be secondary considerations."62

The suggestion that a person found fit to possess a firearm of a certain category is therefore able to possess a number of firearms in this category, with due consideration to public safety, is a result of the English conditions where different categories of firearms exist from South Africa's. The English distinguish between prohibited firearms, firearms and shotguns. The South African categories draw no distinction between shotguns and other firearms, simply between prohibited firearms and others. It is also as a result of the fact that the issue of firearm proliferation does not assume the same proportions in England as it does in South Africa. The approach that might be adopted locally is a combination of the English example with our own particular needs – the applicant, as well as the firearm, must be licensed to ensure that the criteria of justification and competency are applied, and that the SAPS are able to exercise immediate control over the firearm whenever necessary.

Alternative Licence Types

It flows from the establishment of justification and the distinction between owners licensed as sports people, hunters, collectors and those who require a firearm for self-defence, that different licence types should be introduced. This applies particularly to those licences issued for self-defence purposes, and where the owner has the intention of carrying his or her firearm on a daily basis.

While owners may need to carry or transport their firearms at some time or another, the carrying of firearms as a matter of course by private citizens needs to be curtailed. Section 38(A) of the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 currently allows a firearm owner to carry his or her firearm on his or her person, subject only to the condition that it is done, "in such a way that it is completely covered, and in such a manner that he at all times has and can exercise effective control over such arm." However, reducing the prevalence of firearms in public places will greatly assist the SAPS to identify illegal firearms. In an environment where firearms are not prolific, any firearm is more likely to stand out. Such a reduction could be achieved by drawing a distinction in the licensing procedure between those applicants that are permitted to possess a firearm, and those that are permitted to carry a firearm regularly. Firearm owners that apply for a firearm for self-defence should be required to demonstrate the reasons why they would need to carry such a firearm on their person, as opposed to simply requiring it for self-defence on their own property. A firearm 'carrying' licence could then be issued to those sufficiently justified to do so. Such a system is applied successfully in Germany where two types of licences are issued: the Waffenbesitzkarte (for sports people, hunters, collectors) and the Waffenschein (for those people who demonstrate a justification to carry a firearm for their defence other than on their own property).

LEGISLATION – THE USE OF FIREARMS

Some consideration must be given to occasions when a private firearm owner may use his or her firearm. This applies particularly to those who request a firearm for the purposes of self-defence. The national media is replete with incidents of people drawing their firearms at the slightest provocation.

The legislative provisions related to the use of firearms by private citizens are contained in the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. Section 42 (1) of the Act reads: "Any private person may without warrant arrest any person - a) who commits or attempts to commit in his presence or whom he reasonably suspects of having committed an offence referred to in schedule 1; b) whom he reasonably believes to have committed any offence and to be escaping from and to be freshly pursued by a person whom such private person reasonably believes to have authority to arrest that person for that offence; c) whom he is by any law authorised to arrest without warrant in respect of any offence specified in that law; d) who he sees engaged in an affray." Section 49 reads: "Use of force in effecting an arrest. – (1) If any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting another, attempts to arrest such a person and such person – (a) resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the use of force; or (b) flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, or resists such attempt and flees, the person so authorised may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or to prevent the person concerned from fleeing. (2) Where the person concerned is to be arrested for an offence referred to in Schedule 1 or is to be arrested on the ground that he is reasonably suspected of having committed such an offence, and the person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting him cannot arrest him or prevent him from fleeing by other means than by killing him, the killing shall be deemed to be justifiable homicide." (Schedule 1 offences include the most common offences: public violence, murder, culpable homicide, rape, assault, robbery, child stealing, arson, malicious damage to property, theft, receiving stolen property, etc.)

These provisions ensure that a private citizen may resort to arms to effect an arrest in a wide array of circumstances and for numerous reasons. Such latitude for private citizens who are not police officers, in the opinion of the author, is not synchronous with the sentiment expressed by the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution. Two clauses in the Bill of Rights apply particularly here. Clause 9 (1) reads: "Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law "; and Clause 11: "Everyone has the right to life." The ability of a private citizen to use his or her firearm must be brought in line with the human rights culture that South Africa is attempting to develop. According to De Caris of the SAPS Legal Services, this implies that the provisions which currently allow a private citizen to take a life for something of material value, must be revised.63

At the time of writing, a review of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 is under way by the State legal advisors, and should be tabled as the Judicial Matters Amendment Bill during the next session of Parliament in 1997. the review promises to include the introduction of a proportionality test for the use of force to effect an arrest, and will list specific crimes (those that are most prevalent in South Africa, such as car theft, stock theft, housebreaking, etc.), against which a firearm may be used. For listed crimes, the courts will probably be less inclined to apply the proportionality test.

The current levels of crime in South Africa will militate against the sentiment of the Constitution from taking hold, and the country's vision of a human rights culture remains in jeopardy. The NCPS warns of the danger: "[t]hat the crime problem – through the widespread insecurity which it gives rise to, as well as through the sheer magnitude of victimisation which it generates – may breed popular contempt for human rights, and therefore for the constitutional dispensation which enshrines these rights." 64 The sentiments of the Constitution need to be developed as the SAPS begins to bring crime under control and social stability is cemented with reconstruction and development initiatives. A culture of human rights is only nurtured in a secure environment.

CONCLUSION

The various policy areas outlined above are by no means complete or exhaustive in their detail. The policy suggestions submitted here are meant to serve only as a contribution to the unfolding debate on the dimensions and implications of firearms proliferation in South Africa. It must also be stated clearly that any reform that is undertaken of the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 in an effort to address the proliferation of firearms will be of limited impact. The South African public is already massively armed (whether legally or illegally) and is prone to spectacular violence. While increased enforcement of the Arms and Ammunition Act and tighter restrictions on firearm ownership may be applied in future, more than three million legal and countless illegal firearms will remain in circulation in South Africa.

This implies that any policy reforms that pertain to the legal ownership of firearms must simply be a small component of more comprehensive crime prevention strategies. It was shown above that the primary reason behind South Africa's urge to possess firearms is the perceived security they provide in the face of the increasing threat of crime. In its survey where respondents were asked what they did to protect themselves against crime, the Nedcor study on crime found that eighteen per cent of respondents with incomes in excess of R 2 500 per month had acquired a firearm (21 per cent of white respondents in the same income group said they had acquired a firearm for this reason). The Nedcor study also concedes that these figures may be underestimated as many people will have been reluctant to disclose that they are in possession of a firearm.65 It is quite plausible, that were tighter restrictions applied to legal firearm owners in isolation of wider anti-crime and crime prevention strategies, the continued climate of insecurity would convince many people to retain or acquire firearms outside of the provisions of the law.

It was also pointed out during the course of the interviews held for this article, that were police efforts against illegal weapons and restrictions on firearm ownership successful, not only in halting, but Actually reversing the proliferation of firearms, a certain amount of 'displacement' might occur.66 In the absence of firearms, people would resort to other tools to perpetuate their violence. On the other hand, in a recent debate on the issue of firearm control in Canada, Gabor argued that, "[t]he likelihood of weapon substitution in every potential violent incident is profoundly exaggerated by opponents of gun control."67 More research is necessary on whether significant 'displacement' would indeed occur in South Africa. There are two areas of consensus in the 'displacement' debate world-wide: that the tools at hand will determine the outcome of a violent incident, and where this is a firearm, the violent incident is much more likely to result in death or more serious injury; and that robbers armed with firearms are less likely to attack or injure their victims, since the presence of a firearm ensures greater compliance from the victim.68 The latter point of consensus in particular, seems to be contradicted by the extent of violence associated with crime in South Africa, and the NCPS states unequivocally that, "the use of firearms has significantly increased the levels of violence associated with crime in South Africa."69

Even if local research endorses the suggestion that a great deal of 'displacement' will occur as a result of a reversal in the proliferation of firearms, this would not imply that efforts to contain the proliferation of firearms are futile. It is conceivable that as the massive arming of the population continues, the number of legal firearms used in 'criminal' action will increase. South Africa is a society in transition – as the old order is broken down a vacuum of norms, values and social control results.70 This vacuum will exist until new values and norms are established in a new social equilibrium. In the interim, the potential for social conflict and crime is amplified. Recent work by Glanz, the SAPS, Nedcor and an upcoming UNISA study,71 identifies the many factors that contribute to crime in South Africa. These range from political rivalry, gender inequality, homelessness, inadequate education, unemployment, poverty, youth marginalisation, rapid urbanisation, influx of illegal immigrants, a discredited criminal justice system, amnesties for criminals, and lastly the impact of what has been described as a "global crime wave".72 All these factors destabilise society, and generate incalculable social conflict. Social conflict, in turn, is the catalyst for the misuse of legal (and illegal) firearms. "This is clearly evident in the incidence of violent robbery, rape, murder, assault, and taxi violence. It is also true in relation to domestic and family violence."73

The implication for South African policy makers is that they will need to arrive at solutions to the issue of firearm proliferation that address the country's unique circumstances. These policies will need to negotiate a path between the civil liberty of allowing law abiding citizens to pursue their recreational interest in shooting sports, and where necessary, to defend themselves against criminal violence, and the reality that firearm proliferation, from whatever source, itself feeds the instability in the country and must be contained. In all countries where private firearms are allowed, greater or lesser degrees of control are applied – the challenge to policy makers is to apply those that fit the particular circumstances of South Africa.

ENDNOTES

This paper flows from the research that is currently being undertaken by the Technical Committee on Illegal Weapons and the Licensing of Firearms, of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and Security in the Gauteng Legislature. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and the interviewees - the paper does not necessarily represent the views of the members of the Technical Committee. The research of the Technical Committee remains a work in progress.



A Minnaar, Guns Galore! The Proliferation of Illegal and other Firearms, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1994; S Pretorius and A Minnaar, Loaded Issues! An Analysis of the Proliferation of Weapons in South Africa: 1993 - June 1995, paper read at the South African Political Studies Association Biennial Conference, Stellenbosch, September 1995; G Mills and G Oosthuysen, Weapons Control is Right out of Control, The Saturday Star, 4 November 1995; G Oosthuysen, Small Arms Proliferation in South Africa: The Role of Border Security, International Update, 1, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996b.



SAPS, Firearms in South Africa: An Escalating Problem, Firearms Investigation Unit, SAPS, Pretoria, 1995.



L Glanz, The Causes of Crime in South Africa, paper read at the CRIMSA International Conference on Crime and Justice in the Nineties, Pretoria, July 1996; C Naude, M Grobbelaar and H Snyman, The Second International Crime (Victim) Survey in Johannesburg 1996, unreleased report, Department of Criminology, University of South Africa, 1996.



T Pakenham, The Boer War, Abacus, London, 1992, p. 41.



A Burger, Director, Central Firearms Registry, Personal interview, June 1996.



See also SAPS, National Crime Prevention Strategy, Interdepartmental Strategy Team, Cape Town, May 1996, p. 22.



SAPS, op. cit., 1995, p. 1.



Oosthuysen, op. cit., 1996b, p. 1.



Glanz, op. cit., p. 10.



SAPS, op. cit., 1995, p. 3.



Ibid.



Ibid., p. 3.



Mills and Oosthuysen, op. cit.; SAPS, ibid., p. 13; SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 32; SAPS, 1996 - 1997 Annual Plan of the South African Police Services, SAPS, Pretoria, 1996b, p. 16.



Secretary of State for Scotland, Lord Cullen's Inquiry into the Circumstances Leading up to and Surrounding the Events at Dunblane Primary School on Wednesday 13 March 1996 - Evidence Submitted on behalf of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Home Secretary, 30 April 1996, p. 73.



SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, pp. 30-33.



See also ibid., p. 32.



A Kirsten, Campaign for a Gun Free South Africa, Personal interview, May 1996; A Dewey (Capt.), Firearms Investigation Unit, SAPS, Personal interview, July 1996.



Kirsten, ibid.



R de Caris, Director Legal Section, Support Services, SAPS, Personal interview, July 1996; Dewey, op. cit.



Home Office, Firearms Law: Guidance to the Police, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1989, p. 79.



See Sections 20 and 27 of the Regulations.



Burger, op. cit.



P R Gouws, Director, Ballistics Unit, Forensic Sciences Laboratory, SAPS, Telephonic interview, August 1996.



H Buys, Proof Master, Firearms Testing Facility, South African Bureau of Standards, Telephonic interview, July 1996.



Nedcor, The Nedcor Project on Crime: Violence and Investment, Nedcor, Johannesburg, June 1996, p. 73.



A Cox, New AA Marking System Will Hit Stolen Vehicle Parts Market, The Star, 12 July 1996; see also SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 71.



Gouws, op. cit.



Essex Police, Senior Staff and the Firearms Office Manager, Chelmsford England, Interviews, June 1996.



Firearms Consultative Committee, Sixth Annual Report, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1995, p. 14; Home Office Crime Prevention Centre; Firearms Security – A Beat Officer's Guide, Home Office Crime Prevention Centre, Staffordshire, 1991, p. 2.



Kirsten, op. cit.



De Caris, op. cit.; SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 32; participant, seminar on Disarmament in War Torn Societies: Responsibilities and Consequences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 19 August 1996.



V Gamba, seminar on Disarmament in War Torn Societies: Responsibilities and Consequences, ibid.



Kirsten, op. cit.; G Oosthuysen, Researcher, USIP Small Arms Project, South African Institute of International Affairs, Personal interview, May 1996a; De Caris, op. cit.; Dewey, op. cit.; A Boodhoo, National Secretary, National Firearms Training Association of SA, Personal interview, June 1996.



B Nixon, Chairperson, South African Gun Owners Association, Gauteng region, Correspondence with the author, June 1996; Burger, op. cit.



Kirsten, op. cit.; De Caris, op. cit.; Oosthuizen, op. cit., 1996a; Boodhoo, op. cit.; Dewey, op. cit.



Nixon, op. cit.; Burger, op. cit.



Mills and Oosthuysen, op. cit.; also SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 31.



De Caris, op. cit.



Some reference to this is also contained in the NCPS (SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, pp. 26 and 33).



Dewey, op. cit.



Burger, op. cit.



Kirsten, op. cit.



Usually of a calibre no larger than .38 or 9mm and invariably to former members of the security forces, public representatives, and others whose occupation puts them at risk of attack from the paramilitaries; see RUC, Control of Firearms in Northern Ireland, briefing document, Royal Ulster Constabulary, June 1996.



Home Office, op. cit., 1989, p. 70.



Waffengesetz, author's translation.



Nixon, op. cit.



Nedcor, op. cit., p. 10; G Cawthra, Policing South Africa: The SAP and the Transition from Apartheid, Zed Books, London 1993, p. 72.



C M B Naude, Department of Criminology, UNISA, Personal interview, July 1996.



J Henning (SC) and R J Chinner, State Advocates, Supreme Court, Johannesburg, Personal interview, July 1996.



Ibid.



J Malala, Crime spurs ANC to review Death Penalty, The Star, 2 September 1996.



Burger, op. cit.



Home Office, op. cit., 1989, p. 68.



Burger, op. cit.



SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 22.



Waffengesetz, author's translation.



Nixon, op. cit.



FCC, 1994, p. 24.



FCC, 1996, p. 10; a technical booklet to police officers, 'Firearms Security – A Beat Officers Guide, has been published by the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre to guide police officers in this task; see Home Office Crime Prevention Centre, op. cit., 1991.



SAPS, op. cit., 1996b, p. 1.



FCC, op. cit., 1994, p. 12.



De Caris, op. cit.



SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 8.



Nedcor, op. cit., p. 10.



Naude, op. cit.



T Gabor, The Proposed Canadian Legislation on Firearms: More Symbolism than Prevention, Canadian Journal of Criminology, 37(2), April 1995, p. 198.



Secretary of State for Scotland, op. cit., p. 75.



SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 30; the Second International Crime (Victim) Survey in Johannesburg, by the Criminology Department, UNISA, and due for release at the time of writing, promises to offer further research in this regard.



Glanz, op. cit., p. 6.



Ibid.; SAPS, op. cit., 1996a; Nedcor, op. cit.; Naude, Grobbelaar and Snyman, op. cit.



Glanz, Ibid., p. 14.



SAPS, op. cit., 1996a, p. 22.