INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, several countries in sub-Saharan Africa conducted large scale demobilisation. This is a positive sign that would create opportunities for sustainable peace and human development. However, demobilisation is a complex process. It is closely linked to security issues, and the impact of demobilisation depends largely on whether former combatants are able to reintegrate into society. Demobilised soldiers and guerrilla fighters usually have great difficulties to re-establish themselves in civilian life. Frustrated former combatants may jeopardise the peace and development process. Based on recent experiences, this article identifies some of the risks involved in demobilisation and several conditions that have to be met if demobilisation is to attain a lasting and positive impact on peace and development in Africa.

DEMOBILSATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Several demobilisation exercises — mostly after civil wars2 — have taken place since the late 1980s in Southern as well as East Africa. In Mozambique and Namibia, for example, 90 000 and 43 000 combatants3 have been demobilised, respectively. In both countries, much smaller new armies have been established: the Namibian Defence Force has about 8 000 members, while the new armed forces in Mozambique are planned to consist of 30 000 military personnel. By mid-1996, however, the latter numbered only about 12 000,4 since there is little interest in joining the forces. In Uganda, the Government demobilised 36 350 soldiers in three phases between 1992 and late 1995. In the Horn of Africa, the fall of Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime in 1991, led to the complete demobilisation of what was the largest army in Africa, of almost half a million soldiers. It also allowed the demobilisation of 48 000 former freedom fighters in newly independent Eritrea. Eritrea aims to reduce the size of its army from 95 000 at the end of the war to about 35 000. After relative stability was attained in 1992 in North-western Somalia, the self-declared Government of Somaliland made partially successful efforts to reduce the number of arms and armed personnel in the country. They were initially successful, until tensions rose between different groups and some fighting resumed. Some countries are reducing the size of their forces due to budgetary pressures and a broader peace process. Zimbabwe, for example, has recently reduced the size of its army from 55 000 to 43 000 — just 3 000 short of the 40 000 target of the Government’s economic reforms.5

Other African countries are currently conducting or preparing for demobilisation. South Africa plans to demobilise — or rationalise, as it is called — about 30 000 military personnel after the different armies have been unified into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Angola is currently in the process of demobilising about 73 000 combatants, on the basis of the peace agreement reached in Lusaka in November 1994. Of the 63 300 declared UNITA soldiers, 26 300 are to be integrated into the new national army. Since a first small group of UNITA fighters was encamped in late November 1995, the encampment process has been slow and irregular due to continued distrust, incidental fighting and slow responses from the international community to requests for financial assistance. Only after a great amount of international pressure, the number of UNITA forces registered in the fifteen encampment sites has reached 57 666 in early August 1996. However, of this number, 8 330 are currently ‘missing’ from the camps.6 Actual demobilisation started on 26 August 1996. In the Congo, the president has requested support from the European Union for a scheme that would lead to the abolition of the entire army and alternative employment for soldiers in construction and farming.7

Opportunities, problems and policy issues concerning demobilisation and reintegration are receiving increasing attention from governments, international development agencies and non-government organisations (NGOs). The United Nations (UN) also recognises the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants as critical parts of post-conflict peacebuilding, and has made demobilisation — literally — part of its agenda. The UN Agenda for Development, as presented by the Secretary-General in May 1994, states: "The reintegration of combatants is difficult, but it is critically important to stability in the post-conflict period" and "[e]ffective reintegration of combatants is also essential to the sustainability of peace."8 The Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, presented by the Secretary-General in January 1995, refers to "the all-important reintegration of former combatants into productive civilian activities."9 Most recently, the Copenhagen Declaration adopted by the World Summit for Social Development in March 1995 makes the commitment that " ... we will ... [f]oster the social protection and full integration into the economy and society of veterans ..."

CONTEXTS AND APPROACHES OF DEMOBILISATION

Each case of demobilisation involves a distinct political and socio-economic context. Decisions to demobilise have been based on specific military, political and socio-economic circumstances or events. Recent demobilisations in Africa have been the result of one or more of the following factors:10

a peace accord between fighting parties;

defeat of one of the fighting parties;

perceived improvement in the security situation;

shortage of adequate funding;

perceived economic and development impact of conversion; and

changing military technologies and/or strategies.

Although most African demobilisations in the past decade occurred after the termination of a conflict, the contexts and approaches are rather diverse. To identify the differences, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda can serve as examples. In Ethiopia, the defeat of the Dergue army in 1991 led to its total demobilisation. It was replaced by the much smaller army of the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In Mozambique, the two fighting parties — the national army and Renamo — agreed in Rome in 1992, to stop fighting, demobilise, and create a much smaller new national army, consisting of volunteers from both parties. In the case of Uganda, armed conflict had virtually disappeared several years before demobilisation was initiated, and a considerable number of soldiers of the army of the previous (Obote/Okello) regime had already been absorbed into the new National Resistance Army (NRA). The objectives of demobilisation in Uganda were threefold: budgetary, social and military.11 The budgetary aspect would lead to a ‘peace dividend’ by significantly reducing military expenditures — and the reallocation of those resources to productive and social priority sectors. The social goal was to resettle former soldiers and their families in their home district and reintegrate them peacefully, productively and sustainably into civilian life. The military objective of the operation was to retain a leaner, better-trained and motivated armed force.

Some countries, such as Uganda and South Africa, have opted to unify first and then to demobilise. Since the April 1994 general elections in South Africa, all seven armed forces are being integrated in a new national force: the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Subsequently, the SANDF will be reduced. These countries appear to consider that the financial costs of maintaining a large army for a longer period are lower than the social and political costs of an expedited demobilisation.

Post-conflict demobilisation and efforts to support reintegration are usually part of a broader process of reconciliation, nationbuilding and the strengthening of civil society. This ‘peacebuilding’ process is characterised by efforts to identify and support structures that will strengthen and solidify peace and avoid a relapse into conflict. Demobilisation and reintegration usually take place alongside efforts to reconstruct infrastructure, agriculture and industry. In some cases these efforts may reinforce each other. Former fighters in Eritrea, for example, are engaged in reforestation, soil conservation, and the rehabilitation of roads, bridges, dams, schools and clinics.

When peace returns, former combatants are usually not the only group that has to be reintegrated. Returning refugees and internally displaced people often outnumber them. In Mozambique, for example, about 90 000 combatants were demobilised. However, at the time of the ceasefire in 1992, it was estimated that about 1,5 million Mozambicans lived as refugees abroad and about 3,5 million were internally displaced.

DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATON INTO CIVILIAN LIFE

Demobilisation is usually conducted under time pressure. Once the decision is taken, practical plans have to be made, financing ensured and the demobilisation assembly areas selected. The combatants that are to be demobilised are usually brought to these assembly points, where they are disarmed. They may be assisted with reorientation and counselling. In Uganda, for example, the former soldiers and their dependants went through pre-discharge briefings, providing them with details on how to open a bank account, how to start income generating activities, environmental and legal issues, family planning, and AIDS prevention. At the time of demobilisation, a ‘package’ in cash and/or kind is usually provided to assist former combatants in the initial stages of resettlement. These may include food, civilian clothing, household utensils, building material, seeds or agricultural implements. In Uganda, the package also included the payment of school fees for veterans’ children for the period of one year. In some cases, the demobilised receive a cash payment at the time of demobilisation and then at subsequent intervals. In Mozambique, combatants received six months’ severance pay on demobilisation, as well as additional reintegration subsidies, representing a further eighteen months’ pay.12 Different packages and cash payments have led to considerable differences between countries in the direct costs of demobilisation per demobilised combatant.

Despite the fact that reintegration efforts are usually less visible than the demobilisation itself, reintegration generally appears to be the major challenge in the overall process. All the demobilised and their families have to build up a livelihood — often after many years in the military. Former combatants with few skills face large problems in societies where it is difficult to start a small enterprise or to find employment. In addition, the combatants that are released usually have the worst prospects for reintegration, because of the lack of skills and education, or health problems. In most cases, many of them remained un(der)employed for extended periods of time. Research in Eritrea shows that the vast majority of former fighters have problems in securing a livelihood and finding housing.13 Generally, the availability and accessibility of agricultural land, housing and business space appear to be critical factors for successful reintegration.

One of the most serious constraints in the rehabilitation and resettlement of former combatants and returnees is caused by the presence of landmines in the areas where they would want to resettle. The exact location of mines is often unknown, and they continue to threaten to kill or maim indiscriminately, long after a ceasefire. They are estimated to kill more than 12 000 people in Africa each year.14 The problem is particularly bad in Angola. Estimates of the number of mines in Angola alone range between nine and twenty million. It will take decades and a massive human and financial effort to clear all these mines and allow all potential agricultural land to be used.

Psychological adjustment also appears to be hard — it is usually difficult for former combatants to adjust their attitudes and expectations. Military personnel are trained in top-down methods of management that often contradict the appropriate approaches to successful management and entrepreneurship in the civilian sector. Former combatants go through a personal process of adjustment, after losing a predictable environment with a certain social status. They are forced to rethink their ambitions and capabilities, and consider a non-violent role in society. In addition, large numbers of the demobilised suffer from psycho-social problems due to post-traumatic stress disorder. For example, a very high incidence of this disorder is believed to exist among former combatants in Angola and Mozambique, as well as the South African soldiers that fought in Angola and Namibia. Empirical data on this phenomenon is still very limited and the most effective types of counselling or other therapies remain subjects of debate.

SECURITY RISK ARMS CONTROL

Demobilisation is closely linked with issues of regional, national and human security.15 After the termination of conflict and at the time of demobilisation, there are generally two closely related weapon problems. One is that the (new) government has large stocks of so-called ‘surplus weapons’, for which it sees no further need or it has agreed to dispose of. This heritage of conflict and armament is almost always a burden for development. Something needs to be done with it and many types of military equipment cannot be used for civilian or development purposes. Massive amounts of weapons or weapon scrap remain, for example, in Eritrea and Ethiopia. A number of general methods to cope with these surplus weapons have been suggested:16

suppliers buying weapons back;

civilian usage;

scrapping weapons;

mothballing weapons;

letting weapons decay; and/or

export to other countries.

Buying the weapons back appears to be the most attractive option in African countries. The willingness on the part of the former suppliers is however limited. Using the weapons for policing purposes is also an attractive option, but not relevant to all types of weapons. Scrapping and mothballing are possible, but require the type of resources that are usually not available in post-conflict situations. It often occurs therefore that weapons unintentionally decay and rust away where they have been left, causing a waste of resources and potentially serious environmental pollution. An even larger danger is that these weapons will be stolen or exported — most likely to other African conflict areas. There are indications, for example, that weapons from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda are shipped to the SPLA in Southern Sudan. Large numbers of Ethiopian weapons have ended up in Somalia. To reduce the environmental and security costs of surplus weapons in Africa, external financing and expertise could facilitate scrapping or converting these weapons.

The second — and often more dangerous — security problem is that large numbers of weapons remain or fall in the hands of former combatants and other people. Disarming soldiers and guerrilla fighters is complicated, since many own more than one weapon. So, if they turn in one, another may be hidden elsewhere. In Mozambique, the UN was responsible for collection, storage and destruction of weapons.17 However, many arms caches were never reported to the UN. The weapons that were reclaimed by the UN were handed over to the (new) government, that appeared unable to control these weapon stocks adequately. Large numbers of weapons have ended up on the black market. In Mozambique, the price of an AK-47 automatic rifle can be as low as US $14, while the same weapon fetches between US $400 and US $500 in South Africa. It has been estimated that there are as many as six million AK-47s in Mozambique alone.18 Estimates put the number of weapons in civilian hands in Angola at one million.19

Most of these weapons are considered ‘small’ or ‘light’ weapons20 — the type of weapons used in most of the killing in conflicts in Africa. It has been estimated that more than ninety per cent of deaths and injuries in recent conflicts were the result of direct fire from small arms and light weapons.21 These are, unfortunately, also the types of weapons most difficult to control. Indeed, after conflicts large numbers of these weapons remain uncontrolled. Nobody really knows the number of weapons in circulation, and they are easy to smuggle across (often porous) national borders. Large stocks are likely to remain unreported at the time of peace agreements, since the parties might not be entirely sure that the peace will hold — or they might speculate on future income.

The availability of ‘uncontrolled’ light weapons causes dangers at different levels. The risk increases that disputes between individuals are settled with deadly violence. These weapons could also fuel banditry; and political groups could easily arm themselves and disturb non-violent and democratic political processes. It has happened that former combatants picked up these weapons when reintegration failed or when political problems flared up again, such as in Angola after the election in 1992. It is believed that some of the hijacking of trucks heading to the west of Ethiopia is perpetrated by former Dergue soldiers dressed up as government forces.22 In Mozambique, former Renamo fighters are blamed for frequent armed attacks on vehicles.

Several methods to control light weapons have been or are being tried in Africa. The police forces in Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa are currently co-operating to reduce the flow of small weapons from Mozambique to South Africa. In August 1995, South Africa launched the second phase of Operation Rachel to seek and destroy illegal weapons in Mozambique. Special South African policemen are co-operating with the Mozambican Police.23 According to the National Radio of Angola, the Angolan Police General Command has forbidden the importation and trade of arms and ammunition in March 1995.24 The question remains, however, how effective the Angolan police currently is to implement and control this measure. Another possible method to reduce the number of weapons among the civil population in post-conflict areas is to establish a ‘gun buy-back programme’. These programmes encourage citizens to turn in weapons voluntarily — with no questions asked — by providing them monetary or in-kind incentives. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia experimented very briefly with a ‘food-for-guns’ programme in January 1993. It was terminated, however, when it led to mounting tensions between UNITAF command and humanitarian relief agencies that had to provide the food.25 The actual experience with and analysis of these schemes are still too limited to prove the effectiveness of this kind of intervention. In countries where these schemes have been tried, it has been established that they can only operate for a limited period, in order not to generate a trade of arms into the country. And the price given should be higher than the black market price. It has been suggested that a more promising approach is to focus the control not on the arms themselves, but on the ammunition. This has to be replaced all the time and since very little is produced in Africa, control is likely to be easier.26

A complicating factor in disarmament and arms control is that, in several parts of Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, ownership of arms is culturally accepted. In some areas a man without a gun is not considered a ‘real man.’ Innovative ways must therefore be found to control the use of these weapons, other than taking them away completely. When disarmament is negotiated, it might be possible, for example, to specify which types of smaller weapons would still be allowed. Licensing of one small weapon per person might be an option.

Focusing on the supply of weapons, even in a relatively peaceful situation, might not be the best way. Some people argue that the weapons are not the problem, but that the people that would use these weapons are. For example, the former Minister of Defence of Uganda argued that the focus should be on these people, rather than on trying to collect all weapons — which, according to him, would not be possible anyway.27 Uganda is therefore strengthening local security arrangements and conducting political campaigns, involving community leaders and elders. Others argue, however, that the availability of weapons militarises societies and that unrestricted trade of light weapons across borders destabilises regions.28

An additional threat to security after demobilisation is caused by former combatants trying to apply their fighting skills elsewhere. The use of former soldiers as mercenaries in official and private armies is indeed increasing. Although even the General Assembly of the UN "condemn[ed] the continued recruitment, financing, training, assembly, transit and use of mercenaries, as well as all other support to mercenaries" ,29 there are many reports of the involvement of mercenaries in conflicts in several African countries.30 Mercenaries are often implicated in the most violent activities during these conflicts and the most severe violations of human rights. Many of them originate from armies that have recently contracted. A South African firm, Executive Outcomes, is for example known to provide mercenaries to Angola and Sierra Leone. It employs about 2 500 mercenaries,31 mostly former members of the South African Defence Force (SADF). There are also allegations that a large number of soldiers demobilised from the Ugandan NRA joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and are now serving in the Rwandan army. It has been estimated that, when the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, more than half of the fighters and most of its officers were drawn from the NRA.32

CONDITIONS AND EFFORTS FOR SUCCESSFUL DEMOBILISATION33

Available research and other information on demobilisation and reintegration indicate that, in order to optimise the impact of demobilisation, at least the following conditions will have to be met.

POLITICAL WILL AND CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

Demobilisation requires cessation of hostilities, and political will displayed by all parties if it is to succeed and contribute to peace and security. It has little chance to succeed if one of the parties is not fully committed. One of the main lessons learned from the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) is that "[t]here must be clear guidelines for disarmament and demobilisation, and their activities must be carried out with the agreement of the parties."34 Disarmament and demobilisation efforts by UNOSOM in 1993 failed because of continued fighting among the warring factions. The expectation that the UN operation would not be able to see its disarmament programme through,35 and that the relative power of the militias would continue to be defined by military capability, made significant disarmament and demobilisation impossible. The 1991-92 demobilisation in Angola failed largely because both the Government and UNITA were unwilling to co-operate and were apparently maintaining secret armies in violation of the Bicesse accords.36

Demobilisation also requires a clear and credible central authority. If it is the government, it should be able to guide and secure the process, and its police force should be in position to intervene if the security of former combatants is threatened. In cases where the agreement is made between two or more parties, this role may be played by an independent outside entity. In Mozambique and Namibia, the UN was the neutral facilitator in sorting out details during the process, and it stepped in and mediated when the peace process showed delays or was at risk. In Namibia, UNTAG monitored the withdrawal of the SADF and the demobilisation of the South West African Territorial Force.

RECONCILIATION

If demobilisation is to contribute to peace and development, it needs to be embedded in a broader process of national reconciliation. Bridges need to be build between groups and individuals from formerly conflicting sides. In a safe and supportive environment these people could interact and co-operate. Various policies and programmes at different levels, including NGO activities, may contribute to such a process. In some cases, having a government of national unity would help to create such a positive environment. Ultimately, the fundamental causes of the conflict and potential future conflicts have to be dealt with.

Reconciliation efforts should aim, among others, to improve civil-military relations. First of all, the responsiveness of the military to democratic leadership needs to be ensured. Retraining and reorientation of armed forces personnel might be required. Balancing the ethnic and regional composition of the (new) armed forces might also help. The Government of Ethiopia has demobilised 20 000 soldiers in 1995, and recruited members of various Ethiopian nationalities in their place to build a national army with proportional composition.37 In addition, it would strengthen people’s confidence in the future if past human rights violations of members of the armed forces are dealt with. However, this might create a dilemma. These people should be appropriately punished, but heavy punishment might actually increase tensions between the military and the rest of society. The Ugandan Government made efforts to create a general willingness among the population to help the former soldiers reintegrate into society. Despite the different character and record of the current (NRA) army, the history of Uganda in past decades has caused a general fear and disrespect for soldiers. During the debates before demobilisation, there were even references to "unleashing the soldiers on the population."38 To help overcome these perceptions and attitudes, and to improve the environment for reintegration, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) conducted campaigns to sensitise soldiers and communities.

AGREED FRAMEWORK AND EARLY PLANNING

In cases where demobilisation follows an armed conflict, it is most effective if the peace agreement explicitly provides the institutional framework for the exercise. It is important that not only the details of the ceasefire are dealt with, but also the specifics of the disarmament process, the political and social reforms and the conditions and management of demobilisation and reintegration support. The Rome Peace Accord created such a framework in Mozambique, and included an agreement on the role of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ). This made it possible to overcome sensitive disputes between the formerly warring parties.39 The attempted 1991-1992 demobilisation in Angola, on the other hand, was disrupted partly because the process was not well outlined.

The sequence of the entire process — ceasefire, assembly, disarmament, discharge, integrating forces, reintegration support, etc. — and the institutions involved, are different in each case. Clearly, there is a tension between the political uncertainty that usually exists in a country emerging from conflict and the need for advance planning. Nevertheless, important preparatory work includes the mobilisation of resources, needs assessment and sensitisation of stakeholders. No time should be wasted in linking the demobilisation with the reintegration efforts and ensuring that resources will be available. Programmes for resettlement and reintegration are most effective if they start soon after the end of the conflict, since armies might start to disintegrate before formal demobilisation, with combatants taking their weapons with them. These programmes will instill former combatants and their leaders with confidence in the peace agreement and in their future in society. In Namibia, no structured reintegration efforts were planned prior to the demobilisation. Rather, it was assumed that, with the excitement of independence, reintegration would simply happen. Subsequently, planning and programming were instituted in reaction to the destabilisation threat from some former combatants.40

DISARMAMENT

As argued above, an essential prerequisite of successful demobilisation, is careful disarmament of the combatants that will be demobilised. If they are not properly disarmed and armouries not well protected, banditry might increase or arms might end up in the wrong hands. Most former combatants have learned to use violence to solve problems. The way in which disarmament is undertaken differs from case to case. It depends particularly on the context: whether the demobilisation is after a defeat of one party, right after a peace agreement of two parties, or as a result of a decision to reduce the size of the one existing army. In Ethiopia, for example, many weapons are believed to have remained with the demobilised Dergue soldiers, because of the sheer size of the demobilisation and the lack of preparation for the process. The disarmament of the demobilised fighters in Eritrea was less of a problem, since all the weapons used by the EPLF had been registered during the war of liberation.41 In Uganda, disarmament took place in the barracks, before the soldiers were taken to the demobilisation centres.

Transparency and precision with regard to arms collection and storage are crucial. The risk exists that arms may ‘disappear’ and/or be transferred into other conflict areas. Stocks of government-controlled ‘surplus weapons’ after peace agreements require special attention and initiatives for their scrapping or conversion. To deal with ‘uncontrolled’ weapons, a broader approach than merely disarming the demobilised is required. The secretary-general of the United Nations has referred to this process as ‘micro-disarmament’.42

LOGISTICS AND PROVISION FOR BASIC NEEDS

Disarmament and demobilisation are complex and sensitive logistical exercises. They require effective management and substantial resources for accommodation, registration, transport and provision for basic needs. If the provision for the latter, such as water, sanitation, shelter and food, is insufficient at the encampment and discharge stage, frustration is likely to occur. In Angola in late 1991, for example, living conditions and the provision for basic needs in some of the camps were extremely poor.43 This contributed to widespread desertion, with soldiers often leaving with weapons. At that point, only emergency assistance by some UN agencies was able to provide some improvement.

In general, if prospects are unclear for former combatants, if the encampment takes too long and the demobilised have to do without information and opportunities to see their relatives, violent activities and rebellion could undermine the demobilisation and reintegration process, as well as the total peace process. Quick visibility of the benefits of peace is therefore required.

REINTEGRATION SUPPORT

It should first of all be noted that most of the reintegration effort rests on the shoulders of former combatants and their families. Assistance in reintegration is required from a general development perspective, with peace and security arguments adding to its importance. This support is costly, but long term costs for society could be even more if former combatants are unable to find livelihoods outside the armed forces. It could lead to increasing unemployment and social deprivation, that could again lead to increasing crime rates and political instability. Governments should therefore create an environment that facilitates reintegration, and provide specific services in a responsive and flexible way.

Governments and NGOs are using various instruments to facilitate reintegration, such as counselling, technical and managerial training and advice, provision of tools, credit facilities, construction of houses, improvement of social infrastructure and the creation of employment. Temporary employment, for example, has been provided in the rehabilitation of infrastructure, demining or in emergency operations. Reintegration programmes generally do not specifically consider female former combatants, their children and the wives of former combatants. Women have usually acquired new roles during wars, and men often expect them to return to their traditional roles. Thus, reintegration creates tensions. A growing divorce rate has been noted between former fighters in Eritrea, which has 13 000 female former fighters.44 Special support is also needed for former child soldiers. Many of them have become adults in the meantime, but they still require extra care and assistance. Health care and special assistance to the disabled are also important components of effective reintegration programmes. In order to be responsive to the real needs, assistance programmes could best be designed and amended in a continuing dialogue with former combatants, their families and communities.

In most efforts to support reintegration, policy makers face a dilemma on whether or not to treat the former soldiers as a special target group. Support programmes have to strike a balance between dealing with the specific needs of these people and not creating discontent among the rest of their often poor communities, which would actually jeopardise true reintegration. Support for the reintegration of returnees and displaced people faces similar dilemmas. From a short term, conflict resolution point of view, the inclination may be to please former combatants to forestall a return to arms. However, special treatment of this group may also affect the morale of soldiers remaining in the army — protests and even mutinies in the new Mozambican army (FADM) were partially caused by high payments to the demobilised.45 From a long term perspective, a consensus appears to be developing that special efforts for former combatants are necessary during demobilisation and resettlement, but that support in the reintegration phase should be increasingly community-based and part of general post-conflict rehabilitation efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

Termination of several armed conflicts in Africa in recent years, has created opportunities to redirect resources from the military to development programmes. One of these resources is the people that served in national armies and/or opposition forces. The diversity of demobilisation experiences among countries — even within Africa — is so great that generalisation is hazardous. Analysing some of the general issues that have come up in recent demobilisation efforts, however, may help to prepare for future demobilisations.

This article concludes that demobilisation does not automatically contribute to sustained peace and human development. On the other hand, however, if demobilisation is managed well, it could have a positive impact. Demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants are thus critical steps in post-conflict peace processes — during peacekeeping, as well as in peacebuilding. They should be undertaken as integral components of a broad conflict resolution and development strategy. Even then, the benefits do not come easy. Demobilisation and efforts to support reintegration are costly and there are several risks that could derail the whole process. For sustainable impact, the efforts should be well-planned and prepared. Linkages between all the phases in the process and early planning for the actual reintegration in civilian life are crucial. If the issues of disarmament and security are adequately addressed, demobilisation is likely to make an important contribution to peace and human development.

ENDNOTES

This article is partially based on research conducted for the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Conversion Survey 1996: Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. Data are based on the survey, if not stated otherwise. An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Methodology Workshop for the project Disarming ethnic guerrillas, power sharing and transition to sustainable peace and democracy in Africa, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway, 17-18 February 1996.



Although referred to as civil wars, they often included outside involvement and/or were linked to the east-west conflict.



The term ‘combatants’ is used to reflect that the demobilised could be former government soldiers, as well as former members of armed opposition groups.



FBIS-AFR-96-123.



PANA, 19 July 1996.



There are also allegations that many of the encamped have not been UNITA guerrilla fighters; PANA, 3 August 1996.



Africa Confidential, 26 May 1995; New African, September 1995.



B Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General, A/48/935. United Nations, New York, 1994, p. 7.



B Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60, United Nations, New York, 1995, para. 50.



BICC, op. cit.



E Mondo, Demobilization and Reintegration Experiences in Uganda: December 1992 - December 1994, paper read at the IRG Workshop on Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa, December 1994.



United Nations (UN), The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, Blue Books Series, 5, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 1995.



S Klingebiel, I Gärke, C Kreidler, S Lobner & H Schütte, Promoting the Reintegration of Former Female and Male Combatants in Eritrea, German Development Institute, Berlin, 1995.



US Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, Report to the US Congress on the Problem with Uncleared Landmines and the United States Strategy for Demining and Landmine Control, Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations, Washington DC, 1994.



For a discussion on relevant security concepts and the security aspects of conversion, see M Brzoska, K Kingma & H Wulf, Military Conversion for Social Development: Report on BICC Panel Discussion at the World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 8 March 1995, Report 5, BICC, Bonn, 1995.



E Laurance & H Wulf (eds.), Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion Research and Policy, Brief 3, BICC, Bonn, 1995; K Kingma & V Sayers, Demobilization in the Horn of Africa: Proceedings of the IRG workshop, Addis Ababa, December 1994, Brief 4, BICC, Bonn, 1995.



UN, op. cit.



C Smith, The International Trade in Small Arms, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 7(9), 1995, pp. 427-430.



Angola Peace Monitor, 2(11).



Various definitions exist for the terms ‘small arms’ and ‘light weapons’; see for example A Karp, Small Arms — The New Major Weapons, in J Boutwell, M Klare & L Reed (eds.), Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge (Mass.), 1995, pp. 23-24; also S Rana, Small Arms and Intra-State Conflict, UNIDIR Research Paper 34, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), New York & Geneva, 1995, p. 2. In the context of the risk of proliferation of weapons after demobilisations in Africa it appears to be useful "to define small arms and light weapons as those which can be carried by a normal infantry soldier." Karp, ibid., p.23. This definition would include pistols, grenades, medium-sized machine guns, grenade launchers, light mortars and hand-held rocket launchers.



Rana, ibid.



Africa Confidential, 5 January 1996, p. 4.



Media statement, South African Police Services, 24 August 1995.



BBC Monitoring Service, 22 March 1995.



C Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Geneva, 1995.



C Smith in the Seminar on Donor Response to Demobilization and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa, IRG and BICC, Copenhagen, 11 September 1995.



Maj-Gen E Tumwine, former Minister of Defence and chairman of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB), GCA/OAU workshop on Post-conflict Demobilisation in Africa, November 1994, Kampala, Uganda.



V Gamba, Project Introduction, in Adibe, op. cit., pp. xi-xvii.



UN Resolution A/RES/48/92.



E Bernales Ballesteros, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People’s to Self-determination, Submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Document A/49/362, United Nations, New York, 1994.



A Rake, Dangerous Dogs of War, New African, November 1995, pp. 10-12.



S Goose & F Smyth, Arming Genocide in Rwanda, Foreign Affairs, 73(5), 1994, pp. 86-96.



This section draws on K Kingma, Demobilisierung und Wiedereingliederung von Soldaten: Wichtige Schritte im Friedensprozeß, in H Birckenbach, U Jäger & C Wellmann, (eds.), Jahrbüch Frieden 1996, Verlag C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1995, pp. 177-188; also Kingma & Sayers, op. cit.



Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Life and Peace Institute and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, in cooperation with the Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations, Comprehensive Report on Lessons-learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992 - March 1995, FEB, 1995, p. 38.



Adibe, op. cit.



Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections, Human Rights Watch Arms project and the Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York, 1994.



The Horn of Africa Bulletin, 6, 1995, p. 16.



Tumwine, op. cit.



UN, op. cit.



R Preston, Demobilizing and Reintegrating Fighters after War: The Namibian Experience, International Center for Education in Development, University of Warwick, Warwick, 1994.



Klingebiel et. al., op. cit.



Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., 1995.



World Bank, Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies, Africa Regional Series Discussion Paper IDP-130, Washington, DC, October 1993, p. 24.



Klingebiel et. al., op. cit.



Africa Confidential, 14 April 1995.