INTRODUCTION

During the three-year intervention in Somalia (1992-1995), more than 130 peacekeepers died. This was the highest fatality rate in the history of peacekeeping. Significantly, the death of eighteen United States Rangers during October 1993 led to the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia soon thereafter. By March 1995, the complete withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping troops had been effected, with few of the mandate objectives of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) achieved. In May 1994, President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 25 had decreed that America would not intervene in future crises, unless American national interests were clearly at stake, and the mission had clear and limited objectives, including a well-defined exit strategy2

Rwanda soon became the first victim of this cautious approach, which was shared by many other countries. Following the death of ten Belgian soldiers serving with United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in April 1994, the force was reduced to a mere 270, in the midst of the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. It has been said that "if the UN had at its disposal even a small, rapidly-deployable constabulary force of lightly-armed troops, it might have been able to prevent this new chapter in man's cruelty to man. Indeed, the speed with which such a force could be deployed may be more important than its tactical proficiency, which may need to be only marginally better than rag-tag local forces to have a profound effect."3 When the UN needed 5 500 soldiers for its operation in Rwanda in 1994, it approached the nineteen countries which at the time had pledged a total of 31 000 peacekeepers for future UN operations. All declined to participate. Former UNAMIR Force Commander, Romeo Dalaire, stated that if he "had ... 2 500 to 4 000 effective troops in the first month, hundreds of thousands of people would have survived."4

As events in Somalia and Rwanda, and the more recent crises in Burundi and eastern Zaire illustrate, there is an urgent and continuing need to develop effective methods for rapid and effective intervention in African conflicts. The UN machinery, however, has been unable to meet this challenge, perhaps because of the hardening attitudes of its more capable member states towards peace operations in Africa. At present, the UN's rapid response capacity depends on the standby forces arrangement, which has proven grossly inadequate to meet the challenges of rapid intervention in African crises. The concept of 'layered responses' to conflict in Africa may be a possible solution to this impasse, whereby local and national organisations respond initially, followed by responses at the subregional and regional (OAU) levels, and finally by those of the broader international community. However, this approach can only be viable if Africa has the necessary capability, at the appropriate levels, to resolve such conflicts.

A number of African countries are currently attempting to improve their capacity to contribute troops to alleviate crises on the continent through the presentation of dedicated training and education for peace operations. These national efforts have been assisted by a variety of external initiatives, which tend to focus on classical or 'wider' peacekeeping, rather than modalities for intervention when there is a pressing humanitarian need, but little peace to keep. However, there seems to be no shortage of peacekeepers for ongoing missions from the classical era of UN peacekeeping, such as the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The problem lies rather in fielding sufficient numbers of adequately trained troops for intervention in complex emergencies, particularly those on African soil. Despite a considerable investment in a variety of assistance programmes, Africa is no more ready to provide an effective intervention force than it has been in the past.

This article argues that scarce resources will be squandered in unco-ordinated assistance initiatives which range from the mundane to the spectacular, with little substantive progress being made beyond the realm of rhetoric, unless a more coherent approach towards assisting African countries in the development of peace operations capabilities is developed. Such an approach would require appropriate direction, integration and co-ordination of effort. Most important is the establishment of a linkage between external assistance and a commitment on behalf of the recipients of such assistance to engage in peace operations when called upon to do so. This linkage could perhaps best be established through the further development and refinement of the existing UN standby arrangements concept.

ASSISTANCE INITIATIVES

At a time when new generation peace operations are presenting a doctrinal challenge to traditional peacekeeping countries, African countries are grappling with the legacy of different approaches to peace support and humanitarian relief operations within a multinational context, in a changed environment. Among the various former British colonies, Francophone Africa, Lusophone Africa and those armed forces previously heavily dependent upon Soviet doctrine, it would not be amiss to refer to doctrinal confusion. It is not only past African dependencies which contribute to the confusion, but also ongoing attempts by external powers (in many instances former colonial powers) to 'assist' Africans with the task of preparing to keep the peace on their own continent. As one such power has observed, "... in the case of peace-keeping, many countries outside Africa, particularly European countries, provide significant military assistance training programmes to African countries. In some cases, these programmes already have an increasing peacekeeping focus. But the co-ordination between these different programmes is limited. Ways of maximising the impact of these contributors need to be considered in the UN, as well as in other fora, in particular regional ones."5

The potential dysfunctionality of external assistance programmes has also been recognised by African leaders. For example, at the Eleventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, held on 10 January 1995, the Secretary-General observed that there was a proliferation of initiatives coming from outside Africa, all with the aim of supporting OAU efforts in the area of peacekeeping. The assistance issue was again raised during the Closed Consultative Session of the Central Organ at Ministerial Level which was held on 22 January 1995. During this session, the Secretary-General noted that the British Government had convened peacekeeping seminars in Camberly, Accra, Cairo and Harare, with the aim of examining various ways of enhancing the OAU's capabilities to prepare and deploy African peacekeepers, either under a UN or OAU umbrella.6

In parallel with the British initiative, a French proposal for an African Intervention Force had emerged from the Biarritz Summit of 1994. In essence, the French proposal aimed at the creation of a modest standing force, with possible contributions from African countries, which could be utilised during times of crisis. It was further proposed that this force would be mobilised under the auspices of the OAU and its member states. The French initiative included plans for an assessment of the capacity of member states in a particular sub-region to intervene during crisis situations, the training of contingents in peace maintenance, and the training of a high command staff.7

The main thrust of both the British and French initiatives related to the setting up of a Multi-National African Rapid Deployment Peace Force. These initiatives, which enjoyed European and American support, further envisaged the pre-positioning of equipment at logistics bases in strategic points in Africa, with Europe, the US and others providing logistics while Africa would supply the personnel.8

In addition to the above, a diverse range of less ambitious programmes, designed to assist Africans in building the capacity to manage conflict, were also pursued during this period. These have included peacekeeping training initiatives by the governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, as well as conflict resolution initiatives by organisations such as the Global Coalition, Africa Leadership Forum, Carter Centre and the UN African Regional Centre for Disarmament, to name but a few. Moreover, Africans have attended a wide variety of peacekeeping courses and seminars on offer in European and North American countries, including those presented by national armed forces and civilian organisations, such as the Lester B Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the International Peace Academy.

Although the OAU has welcomed these initiatives in principle, the Organisation has also realised its responsibility to situate them within a framework which will ensure that the final outcome will serve Africa's interests. This is because there is a danger that, if continued in an unco-ordinated fashion, such initiatives may detract from the ability of member states and, therefore, the OAU Mechanism to undertake effective action in the area of peace operations.9 The enhancement of capabilities for effective conflict prevention and management in Africa should therefore be a co-operative venture, led by the countries of Africa themselves, but including support by countries outside the continent. "To maximise the potential for effective outside assistance, the frameworks for enhancing conflict prevention, or for improving the readiness of African troop contributors to peace keeping must be clearly defined, and resources sought from outside identified with precision."10 However, this injunction became lost in a further, dramatic assistance initiative, this time by the US Government.

During the second week of October 1996, US Secretary of State, Mr Warren Christopher undertook a sudden, five-nation tour of Africa, during which he promoted a proposal to set up an all-African military force. The African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) was to deal with African crises where insurrections, civil war or genocide threatened mass civilian casualties. According to Christopher, the purpose of the proposed force would not be to intervene in hostilities, but rather to protect designated safe areas where civilians could gather to receive protection and humanitarian assistance. The intermediate objective of the ACRF would be to develop a rapid reaction capability for such contingencies. The US was offering to fund half of the cost of the force, estimated at US $25-40 million, depending on whether or not the force would be deployed in the next year.11

The idea was that the ACRF was to be led by Africans, but deployed as a UN sanctioned force, with Security Council approval and oversight. It was envisaged that the ACRF would take up to six months to build, and that it would consist of a headquarters, support elements, and up to nine African battalions. It would be able to deploy for periods of up to six months with the objective of providing a more secure environment for refugees and internally displaced persons, and of facilitating the wholesale delivery of humanitarian aid within designated zones. If time permitted, the ACRF was to be used for humanitarian intervention in Burundi.

However, the American initiative met with a cool response from many African leaders. At the time only Ethiopia, Mali and Tanzania agreed in principle to contribute troops to the ACRF.12 Shortly after Christopher's African tour, the humanitarian crisis facing Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire began to dominate the international media spotlight on Africa, and the problems of Burundi were largely forgotten, along with any enthusiasm which might have been generated for the ACRF. This is unfortunate, because the initiative has attempted to address a very important gap in the hierarchy of responses to African crises, albeit in a somewhat unilateral and hasty fashion. According to a US Embassy statement, "[t]he ACRF builds upon ongoing peacekeeping initiatives and concepts including: the UN Standby Arrangements System; the OAU's proposal that members voluntarily earmark troops for peacekeeping operations; The WEU's Joint Initiative on Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa; and the Conferences on Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping as well as numerous bilateral and sub-regional initiatives."13 Indeed, the stalled ACRF initiative highlights the pressing need for the OAU to play an assertive role in co-ordinating international initiatives. Rather than turning down much needed offers of assistance, the OAU must improve the efficacy of such aid and move towards some kind of standardisation of peace operations training on the continent. This would include setting criteria for such training efforts at the OAU level which, in turn, demands an urgent attempt to resolve the doctrinal dilemma.

DOCTRINAL CLARITY AND DIRECTION

Participation in second generation peacekeeping, in increasingly complex emergencies and humanitarian relief operations, has made it clear that military training must broaden to sensitise and develop soldiers to the expanded realities of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and associated requirements. Among the various international aid agencies, local and international NGOs, relief agencies and other organisations active in humanitarian relief work in Africa, a degree of confusion and lack of co-ordination is also evident. It is essential to establish common training and standards for military personnel, and an understanding of the contributions of non-military peacekeeping staff. This is especially true for rapid deployment, in which missions do not have the luxury of muddling through the first weeks or months of a mission until the actors adapt to each other's styles. In this environment, there is an obvious requirement for standardisation and co-ordination at the level of the OAU.

As yet, there has been no effective attempt to build on the capacity of the institutions involved in enhancing African capabilities for peace operations through co-ordination, collaboration, simplification and standardisation. Such a process may contribute to the willingness of many African countries to accept greater responsibility for providing the OAU and/or the UN with personnel who are adequately trained for future peace operations. The current, independent national training initiatives and external initiatives also carry a risk of personnel being trained according to different doctrine and methods, and/or of personnel being exposed to doctrine and training which is either irrelevant or inappropriate to the challenges of future peace operations in Africa.

However, any attempt to harmonise and standardise training initiatives in Africa must proceed from a common conceptual and doctrinal basis. By its own admission, peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the OAU would require a clearly defined doctrine, which enunciates the principles of peacekeeping and provides guidelines for OAU peacekeepers. Like any military operation, peacekeeping requires a clearly defined control and direction hierarchy. "The chain of command must equally be firmly established. The increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations, needs not only well-defined mandates, but most importantly, unified command and control, as well as firm political direction from the OAU Secretary-General. In this connection, therefore, the OAU must establish a proper machinery and unit to manage peacekeeping operations ... This may also entail establishing ... guidelines for peacekeeping operations, as well as structuring the important element of consultation and co-ordination between the Central Organ, the Secretariat and potential troop-contributing countries."14

Failing this, training initiatives in Africa will amount to nothing more than a series of ad hoc attacks on the problem of Africa's inadequacy to deal with its own problems. The OAU foresees that "training can be undertaken at national, or sub-regional level, as a normal routine before deployment. There will also be a need to work out the modalities for mobilisation in accordance with agreed procedures well in advance of deployment."15

Training should also not be conducted for the sake of training. Especially when it comes to external assistance with training for the conduct of peace operations, for which there is a proven demand and moral imperative (unlike warfighting), scarce resources need to be allocated to the areas which will produce the most effective output. In the realm of peace operations, this means that all training assistance should be contingent upon a minimal level of commitment to put such training to good use – to assist the victims of violent conflict, to keep the peace and, where necessary, to enforce the peace. While few countries have proved willing to commit elements of their armed forces to a standing multinational force for third-party intervention, there is some hope that sufficient personnel and equipment may at least be earmarked and placed on standby for such use.

STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS

The will of the UN Security Council to react to crises in Africa and elsewhere has obviously been affected by the means at its disposal. These means have always been dubious, as the military forces envisaged in Chapter VII of the UN Charter never materialised. In April 1947, in accordance with Articles 43-48, the UN's Military Staff Committee published a report on the question of contributions of armed forces to the Security Council. It reflected significant disagreements among the Permanent Five about the size and composition of national contributions, and the whole endeavour was abandoned.16 The more recent preoccupation with the establishment of rapid reaction capabilities for the conduct of peace operations is also doomed to failure, unless an effective system of standby arrangements is developed in order to provide a 'guaranteed' means of reaction.

In 1995, Canadian Foreign Minister André Ouellet presented a report entitled Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations, which detailed proposals to the UN General Assembly on ways of enhancing the organisation's rapid reaction capability in peacekeeping operations. The proposal embodied a 'vanguard concept' which would enable the UN to assemble, from member states, a force of up to 5 000 military and civilian personnel and, with Security Council authorisation, deploy it quickly under an operational headquarters. Other elements of the proposal aimed at the enhancement of training, the creation of more efficient logistics and transportation, and the strengthening of planning within the entire UN system. The operational headquarters would be responsible for advance preparations and forces would be provided under standby arrangements with UN member states.17

The events surrounding the humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire towards the end of 1996 demonstrated that the vanguard concept is still far from operational. It was only after a concerted Canadian effort that the UN Security Council eventually passed a resolution which authorised the deployment of a 15 000-strong multinational force to secure and assist in the provision of humanitarian aid for hundreds of thousands of Rwandan and Burundian refugees caught in the crossfire of conflict between Zairian troops, Interhamwe guerrillas, Banyamulenge rebels and Rwandan soldiers. Canadian, US, and British military reconnaissance teams soon arrived in the area in order to prepare for the arrival of troop contingents from these countries. Reports indicated that Spain had about 400 troops on standby to travel to Zaire, while France, Holland, and Belgium were also preparing to send troops. However, African countries, including South Africa, were extremely recalcitrant in committing troops to the Canadian-led and US-backed multinational initiative. As Canada and the US haggled over the details of the concept of operations, there was a break in the fighting and refugees began streaming back to Rwanda without the assistance of third-party military intervention. The aversion of a greater humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region, albeit by default, provided a small window of opportunity to reconsider the modalities for intervention in African crises – not least of which the future contribution of African nations to such efforts. However, to envisage some kind of rapid reaction capability, without a solid foundation of standby arrangements, is to put the cart before the horse.

According to Cane, "[t]he expansion of mandates and new tasks given to UN operations have added to the difficulties of recruiting new peacekeepers. Among the remedies currently being discussed – providing better training and equipment, encouraging the establishment of additional national (or regional) peacekeeping training centres – the most promising is national standby arrangements ... endorsed by the Secretary-General in his 1992 Agenda for Peace."18 The purpose of standby arrangements, according to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "is to have a precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities a Member State will have available at a given state of readiness should it agree to contribute to a peace-keeping operation."19

Standby arrangements assist the UN in identifying personnel and equipment for new and ongoing operations, as well as in planning and budgeting for their deployment. A well-functioning system would also enable participating nations to better plan and budget for possible contributions to peace operations, and to train and prepare dedicated personnel, rather than expend peacekeeping training efforts on amorphous groups of personnel. It is important to note that "standby arrangements apply to peacekeeping operations only; enforcement operations fall outside their scope."20 It is unclear whether the UN Secretary-General intended to exclude those peace operations with a Chapter VII mandate, or whether he was referring to coalition enforcement operations where the Security Council has clearly identified an aggressor. If the former was meant, then the utility of the whole concept of standby arrangements as expounded by the UN, for meeting contemporary security challenges in Africa, is dubious.

The present system of UN standby arrangements, which was begun in 1993, works as follows:

The UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) defines standard components for various types of peace operations, which are broken down into small basic elements (e.g. headquarters support units, infantry battalions, civilian police, communications units, air services, engineer support, health services, multi-role logistic units, food and catering services, etc.).



DPKO provides member states with organisation and equipment tables of such standard components (including guidelines on typical tasks, organisation, and equipment for these components).



Member states identify those resources which they would be willing to contribute to UN peace operations (military units, individual military and civilian personnel, specialised services, and other capabilities).



Member states provide the UN with an annual report on the availability and readiness of the standby resources, including an indication of time needed to prepare them for deployment (such details should be confirmed in writing).



Earmarked resources remain in the home country until employment (the exact timing of which is normally decided through discussions between the UN Secretariat and the contributing member state).



Member states retain full responsibility for the training of standby personnel, although the DPKO is willing to assist with training materials and the provision of UN Training Assistance Teams (UNTATs).

If standby arrangements are to work properly, participating governments must, in particular, provide the UN Secretariat with detailed information on aspects such as:

the response time (from notification to deployment) of each component;



the existence of any political or material preconditions for employment;



the period of self-sufficiency of contributed components;



the level and serviceability of equipment; and



details needed to plan the transportation of personnel and equipment from the home country to a mission area.

By July 1995, only fifteen countries had supplied the Secretariat with such data. It was found that there were considerable differences in the response times for various categories of personnel, depending, for example, whether they formed part of standing armies, reservists, volunteer or conscript forces. Response times provided for confirmed standby forces have varied from seven days to over 90 days, with many contributors needing more than 60 days to prepare for deployment. In concluding his 1995 report to the Security Council on the status of standby arrangements, the Secretary-General noted that, "[w]hile there is certainly no lack of willingness to make troops and equipment available for peace-keeping operations, the United Nations is currently far from having a rapid reaction capability."21

By mid-1996, however, matters had improved somewhat. A total of 55 member states had expressed willingness to participate in the UN system of standby arrangements, but only three had formalised the commitment through the signing of memoranda of understanding: Jordan, Denmark and Ghana. Ghana, the third member state to make such a commitment, signed an agreement on 29 May 1996 in which it pledged to provide a significant number of troops, including specialised units, within a short time-frame, if called upon by the UN to help launch a new mission.22

By 4 December 1996, 62 countries had expressed a willingness to participate in standby arrangements. Of these, 41 had provided the UN with lists of capabilities, 20 had provided volumetrics, and five had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While Austria was the last country to sign an MOU, Ireland, Ukraine and Singapore were considering doing likewise in the near future. The degrees of commitment of the participating countries are outlined in the table below23 (African countries are indicated in italics):

Based on the volumetrics provided by the 20 countries listed in the second and third columns above, and estimates based on UN Tables of Organisations and Equipment for the 21 countries which have provided only lists of capabilities, it has been calculated that the following stand-by personnel resources could be made available to the UN:24

While these figures may seem impressive, there is still a lack of personnel for certain support functions which are essential to system efficiency, namely: HQ support; air services; communications; civilian police; engineers; and logistics. Moreover, only eleven of the 53 OAU member states are participating in the standby arrangements, and only four have provided lists of capabilities. One African country (Ghana) has gone so far as to sign an MOU with the UN.

Almost since independence, Ghana has committed personnel and units to UN peacekeeping and observer missions. Its contributions have involved the commitment of troops and military observers to eleven UN missions in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe. Current efforts include the deployment of military observers in support of a variety of UN missions, a battalion-strength contribution to the UNIFIL operation in Southern Lebanon (a commitment which has been upheld since March 1978), and a similar contribution to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia (upheld since August 1990). From 1992-1993, Ghana contributed battalion-strength contingents to three major ongoing peace operations simultaneously: UNIFIL, United Nations Transitional Authority in Combodia (UNTAC) and ECOMOG. Yet, Ghana has received scant recognition for this substantial commitment.

For example, Mazrui has suggested that an African security council be established for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in Africa, and that it be composed of five pivotal regional states which would presumably provide the capability for intervention.26 According to Mazrui, the five members of the suggested security council would be Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Zaire.27 While Egypt and Nigeria have indicated a willingness to participate in the UN standby arrangements, the other three countries have yet to take this step. Moreover, Ethiopia is busy with reconstruction after a protracted civil war; Nigeria is stretched with its involvement in the ECOMOG operation in Liberia as it struggles with a transition to civilian rule; South Africa is involved in a radical restructuring of its post-apartheid armed forces; and Zaire looks set to collapse as a state. The point is that, where urgent action is needed, it is of little use to focus on the potential geopolitical importance of particular African states. It may be far more fruitful to concentrate efforts to enhance African conflict resolution capacity and national peacekeeping capabilities in those countries which presently exhibit the will and ability to become involved in third-party interventions.

In June 1996, the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of member states of the Central Organ of the OAU "accepted the principle of standby arrangements and ear-marked contingents on a voluntary basis." It was envisaged that such earmarked contingents could serve either under the aegis of the UN or the OAU, or under subregional arrangements. In this regard, the meeting recognised "the need for proper preparation and the standardisation of training." The meeting also recognised "the need for further clarity with regard to the guidelines which apply to possible OAU peacekeeping operations."28 The OAU Secretariat had hoped that the Committee of Military Chiefs of Staff would also initiate action to take a census of what could be available from the military of African states, in order to determine exactly what different African countries can provide in terms of units or contingents that could be utilised during periods of crisis.29 Little progress has been made in this regard.

However, in January 1997, OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim stated that the OAU was seriously considering the creation, within a few months, of its own peacekeeping force which would comprise military units of all member states.30 Given the record of African countries' commitment to the UN standby arrangements (outlined above), the Secretary-General's idea seems highly ambitious. Indeed, if such a force, which would enable 'layered responses' to African conflicts, is to become a reality, information is urgently needed on African states' potential willingness to undertake peace operations and their state of preparedness to engage in such operations. This could be provided either within the framework of the UN's standby planning arrangements or within complementary OAU or subregional initiatives.

Subject to the agreement of the state concerned, information regarding African peacekeeping capabilities should be shared and compared with the UN, the OAU, and the subregional organisation (where relevant). Units could then be double (or triple) earmarked for use in UN, OAU or subregional peacekeeping operations. Assistance with training and equipping units for possible deployment should be limited to units and personnel thus identified. Scarce resources could then be dedicated to training such personnel to the same standards, using the same operating procedures and, as far as possible, equipping them with compatible communications equipment. In both preparation and training of such units, there should be a definite integration of the roles of the UN, the OAU, and the subregional organisation (where relevant).31

Further assistance with training and equipment should be contingent upon a thorough evaluation report of the performance of peacekeeping tasks by earmarked personnel and units, either in the training situation or during actual operational deployment. The creation of an integrated UN/OAU/subregional evaluation team would contribute greatly to the legitimacy of such assessments, and allay the type of suspicions and resistance to intrusiveness which normally accompany a process of external evaluation. Moreover, all forms of military assistance to African countries by external powers should be subject to the participation of the recipient country in a refined standbyarrangements system.

However, assessing the readiness of military units for deployment is a complex and somewhat speculative process. The nature of military operations, including contemporary peace operations, is such that intangible aspects, such as morale, discipline, commitment, leadership and cohesion, are crucial determinants of the operational effectiveness of military units. These qualitative factors are far more difficult to assess than quantitative measures of numbers of troops and vehicles, and scales of equipment. Even more challenging for the conduct of African peace operations is the determination of the overall operational capability resulting from the interaction of soldiers from diverse national forces organised into units; the equipment they possess; the status of training, commitment, morale and leadership; and the suitability, interoperability and maintenance of their equipment. When considerations such as response times and domestic political factors are added to the equation, it is obvious that any such assessments may be tenuous and highly judgmental.

There are two major problems with readiness reporting systems: inaccurate reporting and the omission of crucial elements. Military officers typically try to prove to superiors and a critical public that the mediocre is outstanding, and are reluctant to do anything about a problem until they learn how to measure it. The problem of determining interactive readiness is difficult enough at the national level. Within the context of a multinational African force, it would take a tremendous amount of political will to overcome such obstacles.32 Yet, inadequate assessments would mask the true state of readiness, deflect managerial and training concern from central issues to peripheral concerns, provide policy makers with inaccurate notions of the capabilities of the forces on standby, and ultimately undermine the effectiveness of attempts to maintain international peace and security through the mandating of peace operations.

If a viable African system of standby arrangements is to be created, an effective readiness reporting system would have to be devised at the level of the OAU and accepted by participating member states. Such a system should provide information on the readiness status of standby components, identify problems which degrade component readiness, and assist in the allocation of resources for improving such readiness. The basic components of such a system would logically include categories such as personnel, equipment and training. In the African context, readiness (and, implicitly, potential performance and staying power) relates to a number of aspects taken largely for granted in Western military organisations, such as:

adequate and regular pay;


the availability of basic personal and unit equipment scales;


adequate pension and life insurance provisions;


respect for civilian political authority and the human and civic rights of all civilians; and


the effects of sexually transmitted diseases on potential unit performance.

Determination of such aspects demands accurate quantitative assessments complemented by informed professional judgement. Both should be untainted by issues of national, organisational and personal interest. Obviously, this would entail sharing the reporting responsibility between unit commanders and national military chiefs, on the one hand, and a multinational assessment team on the other. Such measures may be regarded by national militaries as overly intrusive, and by national governments as an infringement upon their sovereignty. But to reject them on these grounds would be to reject the idea of African unity in circumstances which require extraordinary measures to alleviate the suffering of fellow Africans. Peace operations should, per definition, be a multinational undertaking, where transparency is the rule rather than the exception.

CONCLUSION

While all investments in the enhancement of African capabilities for keeping the peace should be welcomed, there is a pressing need for the co-ordination and rationalisation of such initiatives. Failing to meet this need can only add to the confusion and lack of enthusiasm of Africans to play a more assertive role in addressing crises caused by conflict on the continent. However, such co-ordination is impossible without clear direction and guidelines as to the nature and scope of interventions for which African personnel and assets will most likely be required. It is only when a much greater degree of doctrinal clarity has been achieved that a meaningful attempt can be made at such rationalisation.

Moreover, rational investors may be expected to demand a reasonable return on their investments. A 'reasonable return' is perhaps currently defined by a number of donors as the enhancement of their prestige, the gratitude of recipient states, or the expansion of spheres of influence. It may be easy to deliver such returns, but to do so is an affront to African pride and morality. More tangible returns, in the form of real commitments on the part of recipients to provide an agreed upon contribution to the resolution of conflict and the alleviation of suffering in Africa, are required. A refined system of standby arrangements, which includes an effective readiness reporting system, may be the solution. Of course, this may subjugate narrower personal and national interests to the good of the continent, but this is precisely what African unity is all about.

It is also important that clear linkages are established and maintained between the emergent peace support capabilities at the subregional, regional and international levels. This would prevent the over-commitment of national contingents (for example to Southern African Development Community (SADC), OAU and UN peace operations) and avoid confusion in planning for peace operations based on standby arrangements at the various levels. It would also mitigate against the UN washing its hands of peace operations in Africa, something which the OAU has been very keen to avoid, and a situation which would remove a very essential layer from the idea of 'layered responses' to African crises.

ENDNOTES

This article is published as part of the Training for Peace Project, a venture undertaken by the ISS in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and which is sponsored by the Norwegian Government.



T Woodhouse, Negotiating the Millennium: Prospects for African Conflict Resolution, International Peacekeeping News, 2(4), September-October 1996, p. 42.



Peacekeeping: Perils and Prospects. 'The Big Ten' Lessons Learned From Recent Operations In Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia. Observations from two BENS-sponsored symposia on peacekeeping, January 1996.



Quoted in International Peacekeeping News, 1(12), September-October 1995.



United Kingdom, Proposal to the United Nations: Conflict Prevention and Peace-Keeping in Africa, in response to the Security Council's Presidential Statement of 22 February 1995 (S/PRST/1995/9), encouraging the Secretary-General and member states to continue to consider ways and means of improving practical co-operation and co-ordination between the United Nations and regional organisations and arrangements, drawing particular attention to Africa's needs in this regard.



OAU Secretariat, Report on the OAU's Position Towards the Various Initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing OAU's Capacity in preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Central Organ/MEC/MIN/3 (IV), Addis Ababa, July 1995.



Ibid.



Ibid.



Ibid.



United Kingdom, op. cit.



R Wright, Christopher Urges Africa to Create Crisis Force, Los Angeles Times, 11 October 1996.



Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 42.



US Embassy Political, 631, 16 October 1996.



OAU Secretariat, op. cit.



Ibid.



A Roberts, From San Francisco to Sarejevo: The UN and the Use of Force, Survival, 37(4), Winter 1995-96, p. 9.



International Peacekeeping News, op. cit.



A Cane, Other New and Emerging Peacekeepers, in T Findlay (ed.), Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, SIPRI Research Report, 12, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 120.



UN Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peace-Keeping, S/1995/943, 10 November 1995.



Ibid.



Ibid.



UN Secretariat, 29 May 1996.



UN Secretariat, United Nations Standby Arrangements: Status Report as of 4 December 1996. Report provided by Colonel Ola Petter Løvlien, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations.



Ibid.



This category consists of personnel who are deployed as individuals, and not as part of an organisational unit or sub-unit, and includes military observers, civilian police, staff officers, etc.



International Peacekeeping News, op. cit., p.2.



Ibid.



Summary of major recommendations of the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Member States of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 - 5 June 1996.



OAU Secretariat, op. cit.



Panafrican News Agency, 6 January 1997.



United Kingdom, op. cit.



For a dated but detailed account of the inadequacies of unit readiness reporting systems, within the context of the US Army, see L Sorely, Prevaling Criteria: A Critique, in S C Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Volunteer Military, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1980.