INTRODUCTION

Civil society or société civile in European references, is not a new concept in the analysis of democratic systems.¹

There is little doubt that a vibrant and robust democratic community – a state of self-defined citizens committed to the end goal of sustainable democracy on multi-varied levels and the positive impact thereof on the social interactive communication of such indigenous groups (call it civil society should you so wish) – in the (pan)-African context, will have to take a closer look at ways in which both the state and civil society can be strengthened. This should preferably take place in such a way that it would produce a strong state and a strong civil society that optimally rallies and reconstruct themselves around the redefinition and building of the inclusive 'nation' of interactive citizens and should be aimed at economic reconstruction and growth. The attempt to achieve the optimum fusion between a sound state structure, a robust civil community and a culture for the protection of the dignity of the citizen (read Ubuntu or human rights) is nothing new in the historical quest for an ideal society.²

In societies attempting to move from authoritarian rule to democracy, or from 'benevolent' military rule to a (multi-party or non-party) democracy which allows free competition, free association, and mobilisation for the securing of human rights (individual, clan, class and economic rights), the role of one of the building blocks of a democracy – the civil community or civil society – is of extreme importance.

ASSUMPTION

For the purpose of this brief article, the argument is made that civil society needs distance from the state. The South African social theorist, Doreen Atkinson identifies four different ways of defining civil society:

civil society includes economic institutions (based on definitions, such as those developed by Diamond and Camerer);



economy is part, but not all of civil society (based on definitions, such as those of Friedman and Stadler);



civil society is separate from state and economy, a voluntary non-profit sector (definitions such as those by Swilling); and



focused on the difference between civil society, economy (institutions of economy) and the state (see Shubane).

Camerer's definition (not much different and building on that of Diamond) is relevant for the purposes of this article.³ She defines it as: "An inherently pluralistic realm, distinct from, yet interacting with the state and processes of production, consisting of numerous associations and organised around specific interests with the following characteristics in common: communally organised, independent, voluntary, autonomous, able to form links with other interest groups and do not in any way seek to set themselves up as an alternative authority to the state."

One will agree with Camerer and Diamond's implicit notion of civil society as that of "law abiding" and "not seeking to put itself up as an alternative authority to the state."

A word of caution should be expressed though. It is possible in the transition to democracy and more so where a democratic tradition has not yet been deeply entrenched, civil society may find itself being absorbed by the state (public services and their bureaucratisation). Non-government organisations (NGOs) may move closer to the state as consultants assisting in neo-patrimonial networks. Civil society may become aware of economic regression or unsolved social maladies (crime, corruption, nepotism, centralist impositions of party leadership, lack of restitution as a result of little action against past perpetrators of human rights, i.e. in the areas of land reform and within processes, such as the current Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process in South Africa). When these conditions prevail, civil society may well adapt its own definitions, of what the just community and state have to achieve. It is therefore needless to qualify the definition of civil society as stated above, by adding that civil society will act forcefully, and try to establish itself as a legitimate alternative to the (new) state, if 'public space' is restricted by the new state. This would not be a new experience for a civil society that has already forcefully resisted an unjust and authoritarian ancien régime of apartheid. Such attempts by civil society or parts of it might well breed militant action (or a forceful transformational imperative perceived as a basic social need). Yet, civil society should ideally reflect social interactive praxis without overt militant tones. It implies dynamic and human-directed interaction, to the benefit of the broader inclusive democratic community, as eloquently spelled out by Gorus and Van Erp.⁴

This argument is not new. The Dutch social theorist, Rolf Schwendter, argues for a civil society or community in contrast with élite-control/consensus.⁵ One must move beyond democracy as an impossibility. We might have to go beyond liberal (political and economic) notions of democracy.⁶ While it can be argued that certain imposed models, such as the one-party state, have failed in many instances in Africa, it is too early to argue that multi-partyism as a political mantra will serve as a panacea for all. Increasingly, there is an observable tendency among some theorists on democracy that thinking about democracy, democratisation and the consolidation of democracy (call it the process of democracy – if you like), is much more complex than previously thought. For example, Marchovic's writings on radical democracy, or Ron Perrin's on the rehabilitation of democratic theory (and hence democratic practice) in American democracy are relevant.⁷ Even the American democracy has not (yet) succeeded in including marginalised communities, i.e. the Hispanic community, and neither is it providing enough flexibility to those who are not part of the economic system to empower themselves economically and politically. In short, it remains a theory and praxis of polyarchy with inclusive tendencies towards the already empowered and exclusive ones towards the non-empowered, poor and marginalised. Democratic theory, especially within the global discussion on democracy, has to move beyond the one-sided impositions, such as those preached to Africa from economically self-interested 'cores of industrialisation' coated and covered by an argument of self-sustaining individualist impositions of power dominance. See, for example, the relentless arguments by some theorists, such as Larry Diamond, that political 'liberalism' should be accepted as an overpowering rule of thumb in the consolidation of democracy (as if 'political' and 'economic' liberalism are two distinct entities]. Hence it follows as part of this logic that civil society is best served when guided by a liberal ethos (political liberalism is presumably more important, yet linked to economic reforms). It is on this point that more critical debate becomes a necessity – even after the 'fall of socialism'. And it is on this point that the debate and critical questioning of proposed models of democracy in the African context should focus. As Jan Gorus, the Belgian theorist, argues, we are faced with the need to remodel sustainable democracy in the African context.

How do we give active recognition to civil society and its struggle for democracy in Africa?

Let us accept for argument's sake that countries can be 'differently democratic'. Italy, as a uniquely styled democracy is eloquently described by Joseph La Palombara as 'democracy Italian style'. Or closer to home, in Botswana, for example, we find a dominant party state democracy, yet with a good human rights record, little corruption and high economic growth. In Japan, traditional styles have been intermarried with democracy, and the country has a fairly good human rights record and a vibrant and growing economy – even though the problem of corruption, remains unsolved.

Mere multi-partyism, as with mere dominant-partyism, without a robust inclusive, indigenous, civil society can disempower people. "Economic disempowerment through multi-partyism", has been the persistent warning by the late Claude Ake about the fact that mere structures of democracy (such as the multi-party mantra) alone, do not ipso facto eradicate economic inequality. Neither do they necessarily guarantee free and fair competition by all citizens. But Ake and others have not only argued convincingly that mere multi-partyism can be disempowering to an already underdeveloped community (Zambia, a case in point?). In a continent like ours, we will also have to take Khagram's plea for "pragmatic possibilism" or the inclusion of the experience and views of disadvantaged seriously with regard to the process of deepening democracy.⁸ The new growth and nurturing of human rights (Ubuntu), the dignity of the citizen, the establishment of sustainable processes (structures and values) of a democracy, will have to reckon with circumstances quite different from other societies (role of traditional leaders, kinship patterns, extreme social inequality and rural/urban poverty as cases in point). The need to provide an ear and an empowering outlet to those within the citizenry (how underdeveloped or weak as a civil society, they may well be), should be taken seriously in our thinking about democratisation in Africa. In order to prevent the social "after-implementation shock" of theories imported and imposed that failed or produced negative unintended consequences because they did not 'travel well', much more collective thinking should become part of our democratisation debate in and among Africans. See, for example, the importance of what Maxwell Uwusu termed "the view from the village."

Civil societies usurped by the state, or by institutions of mere profit-making, weaken a democracy by disempowering the very people for which the initial changes was meant. (Jan Gorus used the example of Burundi and Rwanda to show that remnants of an already weak civil society were further disempowered by the partisan state in an attempt to establish hegemony and by NGOs that empowered segments of civil society on a partisan basis – thus exacerbating political conflict and economic discrepancies). NGOs as extensions of external interest groups versus indigenous NGOs or other organisations of civil action lacking capacity, can breed tension, rather than empower the powerless. Where those (re)defining themselves as 'civil society' feel cheated or experience neo-patrimonialism, civil action will follow. This should be seen as normal democratic developments, i.e. groups in Nigeria that rally around environmental issues ('green issues'), the establishment of political rights beyond those of benevolent military rule as example. South African examples could include groups organising and mobilising against crime, for minority rights (language and/or gay rights), better health services and groups organised around (re)claiming land.

Creeping praetorianism or praetorianism of a 'special type' (military brought to the fore by politicians and not their own doing – as experienced by South Africans during the 1970s and 1980s), remains an obvious danger in a democratising society, and more so in the South African case. The concept of reprofessionalisation of the military is important, but complex. Limiting prerogatives overnight is sometimes just not possible, as Latin American experiences made us very painfully aware. Chile, after its transition to democracy, had to deal with a still very influential military under Pinochet, and Argentina took some time to embark on the reprofessionalisation of the military in order to create a new paradigm of shared values between the military and citizenry in the emerging democracy striving to consolidate itself. However, in terms of democratic oversight, politicians as guardians over the military, and civil society as guardians over politicians, are of immanent importance in any democracy. The core assumption here is that civilian control over the military should become an inculcated value of the civil community (both in political structures, as well as in negotiated contract zones of common values shared between civilians and the military). Needless to say, on the African continent, the relentless pursuit of such shared values between political leadership and citizenry is a much needed imperative.

Do note that a potential minefield awaits here. Civilian control over the military or sound civil-military relations is not only a problem of 'newly emerging democracies'. The indirect influence gained by security agencies and techno-military industries also empowers the congruence between security-minded politicians (or 'hawks') and the professional military in established democracies, as noted by the sociologist Anthony Giddens. When the power and influence of military industrial complexes increase, less tolerance for civil society elements that are anti-militarist in nature may become observable. See, for example, oppressive state and company actions against 'whistle blowers' in 'secure democracies' such as the United States of America and Britain on issues, such as arms procurement, as one telling example.⁹

To contextualise: the idea that we can talk of the consolidation of democracy in an African context, without accommodating positive or negative aspects of the nation-building discourse or Ubuntu, is a non-starter. The nation-building debate/discourse, even if we differ from it, will be difficult to ignore. For example, the Stellenbosch philosopher, Johan Degenaar's pertinent warning about the adverse effects of it and his plea to refrain from it, stand in marked contrast to a theorist like Neville Alexander who favours planned and organic building of a working class nation, or Bishop Desmond Tutu's vision of a pluralist 'rainbow nation'.¹⁰

Some people argue that the notion of Ubuntu has no epistemiological value. Yet, by some it is creatively used as a construct to mobilise people and has recently become a term widely used within broader society and management circles. To ignore it or to pretend that it does not have value as a tool of democratisation and reconstruction in our context, would be a less useful approach. Could this have been said or done about volk or Volksgemeinschaft? Consider the mobilising force of those words in history. There might be many ubuntus (do not link Ubuntu uncritically to Ujamah – central control by nature and a political slogan for party mobilisation). But interactive communication between African people(s) and their interpretation of Ubuntu (Afrika-gerigte medemenslikheid) as (interpretative) communities, could conceivably play a role toward greater accommodation, political tolerance, and the peaceful organisation and mobilisation of civil society to the greater benefit of all.

To embark on a tentative conclusion about strengthening the civil society/community in our context, some remarks on state and civil society have to be made.

So-called developing countries can tentatively be categorised in terms of the weakness and strength of the state and the weakness and strength of civil society (a useful typology of state vis-à-vis civil society could look like Figure 1). To embark on a tentative conclusion about the role of and ways to strengthen civil society, this typology will be referred to frequently in this article.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Weak state, weak civil society

When a state and its civil society are both weak, there is little or no potential for building a working, sustainable democracy (with the possible exception of a city-state or communal village which rarely would qualify as a state in modern terms). Consolidation of a democracy within the ambit of the weak state, weak civil society will be virtually impossible.

This impotence could be ascribed to diffuse and divided politics (class, race, tribal or clan divisions), patronage or neo-patrimonial systems that benefit some and neglect or discriminate against others.¹¹ Such societies are not necessarily less civilised or less developed. However, the force of too many internal and external pressures (or even the lack of such pressures) will result in an unlikely scenario for sustainable democracy, a sound human rights culture and growth through distribution (or "enabling economics" ,as the economist Langenhoven terms it) and the sound linkage between economic growth through redistribution and democratisation (according to Van der Berg's argument).¹²

Strong state, weak civil society

While strong states with weak civil societies (read: a civil society lacking in distance from the state) in many respects succeed in economic (re)structuring, growth and 'delivering the goods' (e.g. the Soviet Union, 1940-1960; South Africa, 1950-1970; and contemporary(?) Nigeria), they tend to 'freeze' growth towards a strong civil society.

The medium to long term results of an absence of human rights, democracy-building (and thus consolidation of a democratic framework), freedom of association and equal access to resources can be disastrous. In a state that lack these features, the potential for developing an inclusive democracy is subverted and/or distorted (even perverted?) by centralist impositions, élite rule after democratic elections, or imposed or enforced loyalty. Supreme examples here would be Nazi Germany (1933-1945), South Africa (1948-1994), Turkey after Mustafa Kemal and Spain (1938-1977). Obviously, much more critical analysis of Turkey under and after Kemalism as a development ideology and strategy exist and should be critically considered. Nigeria is a possible example of an African state with many elements of the 'strong state, weak civil society'. Although the Nigerian press is relatively free and academic discussion seems to occur fairly freely, its human rights record, as well as the right to collective political mobilisation leave much to be desired.

The most favourable fusion between state and civil society for sustainable development through redistribution and guaranteed democratic practices, is still a long way off in states such as South Africa, Turkey and Nigeria. The required changes will be evolutionary or revolutionary, but most probably evolutionary-revolutionary (including or excluding élite pacts, mass action, and outside pressure, or a combination of those). South Africa, in its messy, but nearly miraculous transition to an emerging democracy, is an example of a state that is changing in the evolutionary-revolutionary way. So is Namibia, another Southern African state. Nigeria could become another example. The end-products could well be 'differently democratic', but still qualify as democracies.

Weak state, strong civil society

The 'weak state, strong civil society' is a rare fusion. Society or communities are seldom vibrant, robust and economically growing without moving towards the 'strong state, strong civil society' fusion. Yet, Namibia currently reflects some elements of it. While the state and its structures seem to be relatively weak, civil society has grown strong through 'credit unions' (stokvels), stock-theft counteraction groups, vibrant local and national print media and cultural associations.

An attempt to strengthen the state versus civil society might facilitate a move towards 'strong state, weak civil society' or towards 'stronger state, strong civil society'. Should internal and external pressures arise that cannot be facilitated or managed constructively, there might be a regression to a (potential non-democratic) 'weak state, weak civil society'.

The development of dominant-party systems should not necessarily be seen as undemocratic or democratically regressive, although it could diminish the role of civil society. Civil society could be weakened by being usurped into (new) state bureaucracies after a change-over of power, as well as the manipulation (intended or unintended) of NGOs by foreign political or economic actors. So can the propagation of one-dimensional loyalties weaken civil society. Branding the media as racist when they tackle crime or nepotism, is one recent South African example. Another example is the stereotyping of people who differ from the regime as 'disloyal', 'subversive' or 'anarchist', as happened in Argentina, Greece, Chile and South Africa before transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Obviously, such stereotyping shifts the attention away from the underlying imperative to build sustainable democratic structures, a sound culture of human rights and freedom of political association, and peaceful participation.

It has to be mentioned that the new political élite in South Africa reflected some marked intolerance towards their electorate in some cases (i.e. the 'sideways promotion' of regional leadership by national leadership after political differences, such as the case in the Free State with the former Free State Premier, Mr Patrick Lekota. Strong attempts were later made by Mr Thabo Mbeki, Deputy President of South Africa, to criticise and silence regional supporters of Mr Lekota by pointing out to ANC members in the province that they should "toe the line" or "feel free to voluntarily leave the movement" – which they helped to bring to power – in a fairly conservative and underdeveloped province amidst harsh racial oppression.)

Is there historical evidence for the 'weak state strong civil society' fusion beyond democratic elections? Sindane implicitly argues that this fusion occurred in pre-colonial Africa.¹³ Others argue that the urban democracy in ancient Athens and Greek rural democracies came close to this ideal.

In modern history, the short-lived Spanish Republic before the civil war is a notable example. In some areas, the republicans, the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists established rural and peri-urban 'liberated zones' to advance democracy despite strong counter forces. Strife among the supporters of the Res Publica, pressure and violence by Francoists and Loyalists against the democratic ideal and the structures that flowed from it, combined with military support from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, subverted this historical experiment. However, the experiment was to some extent re-employed when Spain became a multi-party democracy (with a constitutional monarchy of sorts) after transition to democracy in 1977.¹⁴

The contemporary experiment with non-party democracy in Uganda could also be a guiding light for societies riddled with class, tribal or clan rivalries that nevertheless aim for human-oriented democratic interaction.¹⁵

The debate about what constitutes a functional democracy (as well as a functional opposition) is much more complex in Africa than is made out by the 'consolidation of democracy' experts, such as Diamond. Much more research by African (South African, Southern African and Pan-African scholars) is needed on the merits and de-merits of the Ugandan approach, before the non-party democratic option for previously divided societies is ruled out. Constant academic dialogue between the North and South, East Asia and Africa, and East and West, could aid researchers in (re)defining, rehabilitating and enhancing models and structures of democracy in Africa.

Strong state, strong civil society

The 'strong state, strong civil society' fusion represents a society "beyond democracy as impossibility", as argued by Schwendter. It is characterised by varied interaction between the citizens and their leadership. Such democracies, when consolidated, will probably engage in economic democratisation (or socialisation) and take democracy in the workplace seriously.¹⁶ It may include elements of radical democracy, workers' democracy, Ubuntu, democratic nation-building, rural capacity-building, civic action and labour-oriented parties. The 'strong state, strong civil society' fusion is evident in the social democracies of Sweden and Denmark, the multi-party democracy of Poland, with its workers' focused approach, the open society of the Netherlands, with its remnants of a constitutional monarchy, and the decentralised multi-party democracy of Spain.

To achieve this fusion is not easy. A culture of human-orientation (human rights) and freedom of association will have to be combined with enabling economics and growth through redistribution. At the same time, society should actively respond to the earliest signs of regression into the 'strong state, weak civil society' (subversion of human rights and democratic imperatives), or of one-dimensional élite advancement (profit-making without caring about the broader community) and the imposition of sectional interests ('weak state, weak civil society').

Could one conceive of a democratic society with civil autonomy that transcends even this? In other words, could one conceive of a consolidated democratic community stronger than the state, but effecting growth and redistribution, sharing in accumulated assets or even wealth (beyond mere enabling economics), mobilising around human rights and protecting these rights and the discourse about them, while collectively influencing regional and world politics? I believe one could.

Will this mean a 'withering away of the state', a 'mere globalisation of the village'? As a starting point, should one first build the strong state or the strong civil society, or both simultaneously? To attain such a sustainable process of democracy against the background of what has been said above, is the challenge facing theorists and practitioners in our (Pan)-African context. Consequently, these and other related questions should occupy the minds of Africa's academics and practitioners, activists and militants, bureaucrats and benevolent rulers, at this moment in time in our movement for continental democracy – a new African renaissance if you like ...

CONCLUSION

Much has been said about the state, and of late 'civil society' has been resurrected as a concept and fervently debated. Unfortunately, the debate has been initiated by democrats from rich, powerful and industrialised countries who persist in advocating political liberal values as a solution, even a magic mantra, for poorer societies and, as such, minimise in their analysis the independence frameworks (political and economical) between richer, powerful cores of industrialisation and disempowering effects of techno-military development.

The 'strong state, strong civil society' and the 'weak state, strong civil society' are the best options for a lasting democracy. However, Africa should insist on being allowed to follow the pattern of evolutionary-revolutionary development towards democracy. After all, the imperative for democratisation is alive and uncompromised on the continent.

For example: Nigeria and South Africa are two influential actors in Africa today, the one being liberalised to some extent under (benevolent?) military dictatorship, the other a fledgling democracy (not yet a real democracy, and neither consolidated in my view). Yet, they can learn from each other for the benefit of Africa and Pan-Africa. An inclusive Indaba (a discussion in the marketplace and Kgotla by African political leadership, theorists, practitioners and segments of civil society) that presses for more democracy, more dialogue and a deepening of the democratic process is by no means out of the question.

Hence, it is imperative to move ahead with communicative interaction towards building democracies that are differently democratic. This debate among African states must go on and preferably without foreign impositions.¹⁷

ENDNOTES

Whether one sees civil society as a 'liberal' construct or a social-democratic construct, ownership of the notion and its application are heavily contested with liberal analysts lately claiming the (design and) ownership of it. See, for example, the end of history-thesis of F Fukuyama, The End of History, National Interest,16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18 points towards "... final victory for the liberal paradigm"). However, other interpretations of civil society exist, i.e. different from E Shills, The Virtue of Civil Society, paper delivered at the Athenaeum Club, New York, January 1991; and L Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy, 5(3), 1994, pp. 4-17. For such different interpretations, see J F Gorus, Grijpt Afrika Zijn Kans? De Rol van Société Civile in Transitieprocessen in Centraal Africa, Noord-Zuid Cahier, 21(1), 1996, pp. 27-38; for a very challenging definition of civil society standing in contrast to liberal and even pluralist definition of civil society, see G Esenwein AND A Schubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939, Longman, London, 1995 (chapter on anarcho- syndicalism in Spanish towns and rural areas). For a shorter critique of the Fukuyama thesis, see I Liebenberg, Final Victory for Capitalism? Some Imponderables on Fukuyama's Thesis on the 'End of History', Politeia, 13(2), 1994, pp. 73-80.



For more information on the meta-digm underpinning this article, see J Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe, Praxis International, 12, 1992, pp. 1-19. See also J Sindane, Democracy Societies and Ubuntu, Focus, 5 (1), 1994, pp. 1-16, as well as I Liebenberg and P Duvenage, Can the Deep Political Divisions of the South African Society be Healed? A Philosophical Perspective, Politeia, 15(1), 1996, pp. 48-64. For a conceptualisation with regard to pluralism, see H van Erp, Het Politieke Belang: Over de Politieke Orde in een Pluralistiche Samenleving, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, 1994.



For different definitions by D Atkinson, K Shubane, M Swilling and A Stadler, see a special edition of the Journal Theoria, 79, May 1992, pp. 1ff. For a definition by L Camerer, see Civil Society and Democracy: The South African Debate, working paper read at the South African Political Studies Association Colloquium, Broederstroom, 1992. See also L Camerer, Party Politics, Grassroots Politics and Civil Society, Orientation, December 1996. A definition by L Diamond can be found in The Democratic Revolution, Freedom House/Idasa, New York, 1994.



Civil society is here understood as community-based organisations serving the populace on a local, regional and national level and not necessarily contained within the mostly artificial distinction between 'political' and community 'economic liberation' (or non-liberal at all where liberalist impositions has become exploitative, non-legitimate and/or perceived as authoritarian impositions by a local or foreign elite on the local or regional community).



R Schwendter, Modellen voor Radikale Democratisering: Strategie in Teorie en Praktijk, H Nellisen, Bloemendaal, 1974, pp. 32ff.



Civil society here seen in Schwendter's understanding as distinct from 'pluralism' which in many cases becomes a secondary conservatism to the exclusive benefit of the political and economic élite in maintaining power, status and scarce resources exclusively or predominantly for élite-use and distanced from direct benefit for the broader populace/citizenry.



See M Marchovic, Radical Democracy, in L H Legters, A Di Quattro, et. al. (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Democracy, Rowan and Littlefield, Maryland 1994, pp. 242ff; as well as R Perrin, Rehabilitating Democratic Theory: The Prospects and the Need, in ibid., pp. 1-6. For a more radical questioning of prevalent democratic structures, see S Bronner, Moments of Decision: Political History and the Crises of Democracy, Routledge, New York, 1992.



Claude Ake persistently pointed out the danger of structuralist reforms which do not impact on economic empowerment. See C Ake, Democratisation of Disempowerment in Africa, CASS Monograph, Malthouse, Port Harcourt, 1994, pp. 4ff; see also M Uwusu for the need to include the views of rural and peri-urban communities in democratisation in Democracy and Africa – A View from the Village, Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(3), 1992, pp. 369-396.



See R Griffith, H Butler and G Dehn (eds.), Blowing the Whistle on Defence Procurement, Citadel Litho Press, London, 1995.



For more detail on the nation-building debate, read contributions by N Alexander, J Degenaar and I Liebenberg in the Introduction, as well as Part 1 of N Rhoodie and I Liebenberg (eds.), Democratic Nationbuilding in South Africa, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, 1994. See also R Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Nationalism and Marxism, Zed, London, 1982. A host of literature is available on the torturous history of imposed nationbuilding , not only in Europe, but also the 'Third World' and in particular the African continent.



For the effect and prevalence in such societies, as well as in 'developing countries', see R Buijtenhuijs and C Thiriot, Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa Studies Centre, Leiden, 1995.



Enabling economics as congruence between labour productivity, export orientation, import substitution and social-democratic imperatives/welfare incentives aimed at competitive economic interaction with the global economic system. See H Langenhoven on 'enabling economics' in Rhoodie and Liebenberg, op. cit.; also S van den Berg, Economic Reconciliation as a Precondition for Sustained Democracy, ibid.



Sindane, op. cit., pp. 12-13.



For more information, see Esenwein and Shubert, op. cit., pp. 32ff, 52ff, 121ff, 189ff, 252ff. See also R Agranoff on how Spain, after its transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, succeeded in marrying regionalisation and decentralisation (even cultural autonomy) with a broader democratic entity, in Federal Evolution in Spain, International Political Science Review, 17(4), 1996, pp. 385-401.



For more details on the intricacies of the African debate on democracy, with specific reference to the issue of non-partyism in Uganda, see J Ssenkumba, The Crises of Opposition Politics in Uganda, Politeia, 15(3), 1996, pp. 51-73.



For a useful reader on radical democracy, see Legters, Di Quattro, et. a.l, op. cit.; especially relevant are the contributions by Perrin, J P Burke, and Marchovic on democracy and citizenship, rehabilitating democratic theory (and practice) and democracy in the workplace. See also Schwendter, op. cit., pp. 43ff.



The author would like to extend his thanks to Jabu Sindane, research specialist at the Centre for Socio-Constitutional Dynamics (HSRC), Lala Camerer and Hussein Solomon (ISS), and Mariaan Roos (Effectiveness and Performance Centre) for valuable comments and critical remarks. Responsibility for the final product rests with the author who is writing in his personal capacity