INTRODUCTION

The international conventional arms control regime has two parts. The first comprises those formal arms control treaties or conventions that place limits on weapons. The second are the series of confidence-building measures that increase trust and may lead to the eventual conclusion of formal treaties. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1992 as part of the latter. Its function is to make information on arms imports and exports transparent. While the concept of an arms trade register had been circulating for some time, the idea gained momentum following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the reaction by the international community that the invasion could be attributed in part to an excessive and destabilising build-up of armaments.

The UN Register is a confidence-building measure that uses transparency to make information available from governments on the transfer of certain classes of weapons. From the beginning, the Register has supported the concept of the development of regional registers to complement it. This article will briefly put the UN Register into the context of arms control and confidence-building efforts, describe the Register process and then proceed to look at the development of regional registers, including the development of a conventional arms transfer register for Africa. The focus will be on the practical concerns and issues to consider in the development of such a register.

ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Arms control has developed as a formal structure to limit the number of weapons and/or to stabilise arms races. Historically, arms control initiatives have focused on weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological. The agreements on limiting these weapons, generally bilateral or global, have been negotiated from the premise that the proliferation of these weapons should not be permitted and that the existing weapons should eventually be destroyed. On the other hand, negotiating the control of conventional arms has been much more difficult due to the recognition that these weapons have a legitimate use in the self-defence of countries and that in only certain (and perhaps rare) instances can they be seen as being accumulated in excessive or destabilising quantities.

Due to these factors, arms control initiatives to limit the transfer of conventional arms have not been widely used, nor are they widely popular. Instead, confidence-building measures have been used as the basis of what could be future arms control initiatives. For example, the development of confidence and security-building measures in Europe in the 1970s through the Conference (now Organisation) on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) eventually allowed for sufficient trust and co-operation among its members to permit the negotiation and ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). This treaty establishes ceilings on military holdings in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and former Eastern Bloc countries and allows a 'cascading' process for surplus equipment to be transferred to other treaty countries which are below the recognised ceilings (e.g. the transfer of excess equipment from Germany to Turkey).

A confidence-building measure is any action that promotes or develops what Goldman calls "institutional trust."¹ Those used in the arms control field are defence or military oriented: among others, the establishment of hotlines, prior notification of exercises, and observers during manoeuvres. Confidence-building measures can be a way of building trust and co-operation among countries to a point that discussions on reducing conventional arms levels can be productive and lead to formal agreements or treaties.² Transparency is a type of confidence-building measure which attempts to build trust by making information or activities available on a bilateral, regional or global basis. It is "based on a co-operative effort; establishes a framework of dialogue in a concrete area of military potential and activity; establishes a verifiable basis for future limitations and reductions; helps to distinguish action which is permitted from action which is illegal and thus needs to be curtailed; and underlines the readiness of participants to accept a common interest in, and enhance the perception of a common responsibility for, creating security and stability."³

Existing transparency measures include the Open Skies agreement in Europe which allows for the aerial observation of the airspace among its European and Northern American signatories. At the global level, transparency exercises include the United Nations report on military expenditures and the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

The UN Register process is intended to make information available on military capabilities, thus building confidence over time so that regional military balances are not upset through the acquisition of new technologies. The Register is a first step in a long term 'building block' approach to reduce conventional arms levels which could in the medium term provide a forum for countries to discuss potentially destabilising or excessive transfers, and in the long term perhaps formalise a process of limiting arms transfers through an agreement or treaty.

THE UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

The process which created the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was a political one, and although, as noted earlier, the concept of an arms transfer register had been circulating for some time, it was only after the attack on Kuwait that there was the political motivation to address the issue of "excessive and destabilising" accumulations of conventional arms, largely to prevent the occurrence of another Iraq. This political will can be explained in part by the fact that many members of the United States-led coalition were facing the weapons they had earlier sold to Iraq.

The international pressure to prevent a recurrence of what was, with hindsight, seen as a potentially preventable situation, produced several international initiatives. The various proposals included a Middle East arms control initiative by then US President George Bush, a series of proposals on limiting arms transfers made by the US Congress, UN Security Council discussions on destabilising arms transfers, and a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on the development of a register of conventional arms. This register, developed in 1992 and made operational in 1993, is the only one of the initiatives that has become functional. This can be explained in part because it is the only one which makes no effort to limit arms transfers, but rather approaches the issue as a confidence-building measure to increase the available information on current arms transfers and uses governments to send the information to the UN each year.

The Register process is voluntary, requesting UN members to submit annual returns on their imports and exports of seven categories of conventional weapons. The categories are: main battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems (those with a calibre of 100 mm and above), combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships with a displacement of at least 750 metric tonnes, and missiles and missile launchers. The first five categories closely replicate those of the CFE treaty, while the last two are used for the first time in this context.⁴ The last category, missiles and missile launchers, is an aggregate category which does not include ground-to-air missiles. Countries may also submit background information on each transfer, and information on procurement through national production and military holdings. There is no provision within the Register for the submission of information on other weapons, including small arms, bombs, mortars, munitions, missiles with ranges of less than 25 km, ground-to-air missiles and support equipment (i.e. support ships and non-combat planes and helicopters).⁵

The number and type of categories have been controversial since the initial discussions on the Register, and will continue to be one of the primary issues during this year's review process. Some countries have suggested that the Register should be expanded to include weapons of mass destruction and/or light weapons, both of which are seen by some as having greater relevance in their part of the world than those weapons covered by the Register.

The first submissions were made to the UN in 1993 for transfers which took place in 1992. Overall participation in the Register process has been quite good, with the six main exporting countries reporting each year (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), and is considerably better than other UN confidence-building exercises.⁶

In four years of reporting, a total of 133 countries have made submissions at least once. The highest number of reporting countries are those from Western Europe and North America, in large part because these countries compile similar information for the OSCE,⁷ and also have the bureaucratic structure in place to compile and submit this type of information.

Graph 1: Register responses showing number and total countries in region⁸

As seen in the graph, 22 of the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, have participated at least once in the Register process. To date, nine countries in this region have reported for 1996. Of these, four countries have submitted returns in previous years (Burkina Faso, Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania), two had reported in the past, but not last year (Madagascar and Namibia), and three reported for the first time in 1996 (Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Gabon). The only country in the region which submitted a return other than a 'nil' return for 1996 was South Africa, which reported on exports and supplied additional background information.⁹

Participation in the Register has also remained steady over the years. There were 92 replies in 1993, 90 in 1994, 95 in 1995 and 93 in 1996.

The first review of the Register occurred in 1994. At that time, with two years of submissions, the panel was unable to reach consensus on either the addition of more categories or the expansion of the existing categories. Additional areas of debate included expanding the scope of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. During the course of 1997 the second review of the Register will occur, with the report due to be submitted to the General Assembly in the autumn. The same issues which have been discussed at the 1994 review session, are on the agenda for this year.¹⁰ So far, discussions have seemed to focus on expanding the categories of the Register to include weapons of mass destruction and light weapons, 'fixing' the existing categories to incorporate smaller ships and smaller calibre artillery, requiring greater specificity on types of weapons being transferred, and requiring the submission of information on procurement through national production and military holdings (both of which are currently optional).¹¹

There will be considerable debate on expanding the existing categories to include either weapons of mass destruction or light weapons. These types of weapons are seen by some countries as having greater significance or relevance in their regions than those currently covered by the Register.¹² While weapons of mass destruction are referred to in the Resolution establishing the Register, the inclusion of light weapons is a more recent demand. The Register was designed to focus on the "negative consequences of excessive arms accumulations [in contributing to the] outbreak of armed conflict across international borders."¹³ The difficulty in including light weapons in the Register is that the Register is universal in scope and "it will be difficult to make the case that light weapons, inter alia, can be destabilising."¹⁴

Thus we come to the main issue that seems to be affecting participation in the UN Register: the fact that the current seven categories do not represent weapons which are of concern to certain countries and regions. This was acknowledged in the report of the 1994 review process, which noted that "the problem of some types of conventional weapons, including small arms, not covered by the categories of the Register, is referred to by some states as one of the reasons for the lack of participation. The Group considered that such a specific problem should primarily be addressed among states in the regions or subregions concerned."¹⁵

A second reason is that while it is encouraged that countries submit 'nil' returns each year, countries find this an unnecessary bureaucratic step. Thus, countries which submitted 'nil' returns in 1992, the first year of operation of the Register, have not continued to do so each subsequent year. While this may be logical in a strictly efficient sense, it undermines the important confidence-building and transparency aspects of the Register process. An additional area that could contribute to low returns from some regions are security concerns. The 1994 Panel of Experts recognised this in its report, noting that "various regional forums could address the possible regional security concerns relating to participation in the Register."¹⁶

DEVELOPING REGIONAL REGISTERS

Discussions on the creation of regional registers have been carried out since the earliest days of the Register. The resolution which established the Register invites all UN member states to take parallel measures on a regional and global basis to promote openness and transparency in armaments.¹⁷ In 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that, "[r]egional registers of conventional arms should now be the next step. They have the advantage of allowing the categories of weapons to be registered to reflect the security concerns in the region."¹⁸ While there is a general agreement that regional registers could go a long way in addressing issues that the UN register cannot, no region has yet initiated such a process.

What are the advantages of a register of conventional arms transfers that is region-specific? Firstly, such a register would address those armaments that can be accumulated in sufficient quantities so as to be destabilising in a specific region (for example, light weapons in Africa and Latin America). Secondly, as a transparency process, the development of and participation in a regional register could reduce existing regional tensions and prevent conflicts through confidence-building. Thirdly, the process of developing regional registers would strengthen the existing UN Register.

A regional register should be developed to complement the UN Register and not seek to replace it. That is, those things which can be done better at the regional level should be done there, and those which can be addressed more effectively at the global level can be referred to the UN Register.

Additional advantages of regional registers are that they will involve "local actors who are perhaps better equipped to observe and monitor events in their own region and that they may in turn be more attuned to the means of conflict resolution most applicable under local conditions."¹⁹

How would such a register be developed? As noted below, the current proposals on developing regional registers have focused on the use of existing regional organisations to be the repositories of information which would be available for consultation and could be made public through an annual report as the UN Register does. The register could either follow the structure of the existing UN Register in terms of the submission form or could develop its own form.

A few regions have discussed the development of regional registers. The member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have, in various forums, held discussions on the issue, but the feeling in 1995 was that the time was not yet right.²⁰ In general, the consensus seemed to be that the UN Register must become universal, with more countries participating and contributing more information before a complementary process in Asia could be begun.

The Organisation of American States (OAS) has also held discussions on developing a register of conventional arms for Latin America through the workings of its Special Committee on Hemispheric Security.

The issue of a regional register for Africa has also been suggested. The means of developing such a register were discussed at a meeting of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Issues in Central Africa in 1995. The discussion focused on ways of increasing regional participation in the UN Register, and methods for developing an African version.

In any region that decides to develop a regional register there are issues which can affect the potential utility of the transparency process which must be kept in mind. These include:

Those imports and exports that are relevant to the region or sub-region must be identified and agreed upon. In Africa, these are often not transfers of major conventional weapons systems, but rather smaller transfers of training aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armoured cars, offshore patrol vessels, and light weapons.²¹



The register must address the concerns of the region and originate within the region, i.e. it cannot be imposed by a country outside the region.²²



All countries participating in the register must operate from the same definition. This will include defining the categories and classes of weapons covered, the definition of what constitutes a transfer and the reporting deadline, should one be created.



Regions that are relatively homogeneous will allow for a higher level of regional transparency. Conversely, in regions with high levels of distrust or suspicion, countries are less likely to participate in a regional register than in the UN Register.²³



Security concerns within countries will need to be addressed, and in some cases existing legislation will need to be modified to permit the submission of reports on arms transfers.

DEVELOPING A REGIONAL REGISTER FOR AFRICA

Why should Africa consider developing a regional register of arms transfers? One answer is that the development of confidence-building measures is an on-going process which must be built on for the momentum to be maintained. Africa participated in the development of the UN Register and should continue to improve that process and also development new and complementary processes. Additionally, there are common security concerns which do not reside within national borders and can perhaps be more effectively addressed by a regional approach.

The first question in discussing the development of a regional register for Africa is whether or not the entire continent should be covered by one register. This leads to the second question: which organisation will be responsible for the development and implementation of such a register?

The first question recognises that the security concerns of Africa are not the same across the entire continent. Egypt feels a greater threat from weapons of mass destruction, given its geographic location, than do other countries. Likewise, light weapons are of greater concern to South Africa and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

As for the second question, it is again an issue of the region to be covered, whether it is the African continent or specific sub-regions. The Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) conflict management division is one institution that could undertake the responsibility of a regional register. This would be similar to the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre which compiles military information submitted by OSCE members. An alternative for members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the utilisation of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security to collect and compile information.

Irrespective of which approach, either regional or sub-regional, is selected, the following list presents issues which will need to be considered by the draftees of a regional register:

categories and classes of weapons to be included;



the inclusion of military holdings, procurement through national production and perhaps military expenditure;



defining what constitutes a transfer;



whether the register will cover only inter-region transfers or will include transfers to and from countries outside the region;



timelines for reporting (i.e. before or after the transfer occurs);



existing national legislation among members which will need to be amended or abolished to allow participation;



countries' sensitivities about making information on certain transfers public;²⁴



the development of a consultative mechanism by which countries can express concern about a transfer or perceived destabilising build-up; and



technical obstacles within the secretariat responsible for collecting and compiling the information. This could include the lack of personnel, resources and computers.

It is important to remember that the initial steps in developing a confidence-building mechanism, such as a regional register must be modest. The gains of such an exercise will only be realised over time as suspicion and distrust are reduced. Additionally, the objectives of the process must be realistic, there can be no expectation of immediately stopping all arms transfers. However, if these considerations are kept in mind, the development of a regional register could provide great rewards.

While increasing the transparency of conventional arms transfers may not seem important in itself, as part of a broader approach to developing common security its utility should not be underestimated. In the move towards a common approach to security there is a "need to put regional considerations above national interests and [a] need to relinquish some national sovereignty for the interests of the region."²⁵ The development of regional transparency requires such a commitment to elevate regional considerations. However, as the process of transparency leads to increased confidence within a region and the subsequent potential for regional arms control measures which can be complemented by outside efforts to limit conventional arms transfers either bilaterally, regionally or globally, there is also an increase in the security of the individual country.

The development of a regional register for Africa would affirm the continent's commitment to participate globally, as in the UN Register process, and to take action locally to improve and expand on what has been achieved.

ENDNOTES

R Goldman, Arms Control and Peacekeeping, Random House, New York, 1982, p. 105.



F Ruth, Transparency and Confidence-Building, in Transparency in International Arms Transfers, Disarmament Topical Papers 3, United Nations, New York, 1990, p. 64.



Ibid.



For a complete discussion of the development of the UN Register, see H Wagenmakers, The UN Register of Conventional Arms: A New Instrument for Cooperative Security, Arms Control Today, 23(3), April 1993.



E Laurance, Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint, in J Boutwell, M Klare and L Reed, (eds.), Lethal Commerce, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, 1995, p. 150.



For example, the Secretary-General's annual report on military expenditure in standardised form, which an average of 25 countries participate in each year.



Two types of information are collected within the OSCE on conventional arms. The first is for reporting obligations under the CFE treaty, the second are submissions made to the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre as part of the 1990 Vienna Document's confidence and security-building regime.



M Chalmers and O Greene, The UN Register in Its 4th Year, Bradford Arms Register Series, Working Paper 2, Bradford University Press, Bradford, November 1996, pp. 42-47.



A 'nil' return indicates that no transfers took place during the year in question in any of the seven Register categories.



For a complete discussion of issues for the 1997 review, see M Chalmers and O Greene, The UN Register in its Fourth Year, Bradford Arms Register Studies, Working Paper 2, Bradford University Press, Bradford, UK, November 1996.



N Goldring, UN Register Experts Argue Over Expansion, BASIC Reports, British American Security Information Council, 57, 1 April 1997, p. 3.



Ibid.



Laurance, op. cit., p. 152.



Ibid., p. 153.



United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the Continuing Operation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and its Further Development, United Nations General Assembly, New York, 1994 (A/49/316).



Ibid., para 39.



United Nations, Transparency in Armaments, Resolution 46/36 L, United Nations General Assembly, New York, para. 17.



Address of the Secretary-General, found in Joseph D. DiChiaro, Regionalisation of the Register, Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, New York, 17(1), 1994, p. 103.



Ibid.



R Cossa and Kwa Chong Guan, Promoting Regional Transparency, PacNet, 29, 19 July 1996, p. 3



While there is no standard definition of light weapons, a consensus has emerged that this class of weapons refers to man-portable weapons that are generally less sophisticated or expensive than major conventional weapons systems. Examples include small arms (pistols, rifles, machine guns), shoulder-fired missiles, mortars up to 80mm, landmines, ammunition and explosives.



M Moodie, Constraining Conventional Arms Transfers, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1994, p. 135.



DiChiaro, op. cit., pp. 106-107



A decision could be taken to make submitted information on sensitive transfers available only to participating governments as is done within the OSCE process. Individual countries could also forward any information that was public to the UN Register as additional background information.



J B Honwana, Military and Security Co-operation in Southern Africa, in Collaborative Security in South Africa, Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, 1996, p. 66.