INTRODUCTION

An holistic approach to the management of security underpins most South African security policy and finds expression in key Southern African Development Community and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) documents.² This approach rests on the concept of a broader definition of security which is multifaceted and multidimensional: economic, social and even environmental issues have all been put onto the security agenda.

This 'new thinking' about security is now paradigmatic (at least in this part of the world) and hardly bears repeating. Actually it is not as new as we make out. The old idea of 'Grand Strategy', after all, involved the integrated, co-ordinated marshalling of state resources on many levels – economic, psychological, technological, social, as well as military. The same was of course true of South Africa's 'Total Strategy', the central strategic concept of the Botha era.

But the 'new' security studies has a different agenda: the wider usage of the security idea is employed to explain – and sometimes to promote – the relative downgrading of the centrality of military power and military force in the security discourse.

The utility of this approach is obvious in a part of the globe where militaries are being downsized, unilateral disarmament is taking place and states are, by and large, shifting resources away from defence. No matter that in many cases these policy shifts have been brought about by external pressure, especially through Structural Adjustment Programmes or by economic realities, rather than by a change of mind-set among the ruling élite. The fact remains that a wider definition of security is of far more utility in understanding the complexity of the post-apartheid and post-Cold War security terrain in the Southern African region, than a more narrow approach centred on faith in military prowess.

This 'new thinking' about security has particular utility in the developing world because it involves not only a wider conceptualisation of security, but also a deeper one – in other words the referent level of security has moved away from the state to substate formations, such as communities or ethnic groups, and to individuals.

As most conflicts in the Third World, especially in Africa, arise from intra-state rather than inter-state causes and are usually manifested in civil wars, military coups, communal violence and other internal conflicts (even if they spill over into inter-state conflict), it is appropriate that security is conceived with reference to social and political phenomena that occur at levels other than that of the state.

But what does this mean in policy terms – and more particularly, what does it mean for the holistic approach to the management of security which we espouse on both national and regional levels?

It means in the first instance that state resources should be reallocated from military security towards policing (on the assumption that the police and not the military should be responsible for internal security), and towards social and economic development. It means also that an integrated, development-oriented approach to security management needs to be developed. And as so many of these non-military threats are transnational in nature and cannot be tackled by individual states, it also means that regional security management systems need to be established.

This line of logic underpins much of the evolution of security policy in South Africa and more widely in the SADC region since 1990. But we should also be cautious.

What does it mean to label something a security issue? If it has any meaning, it must surely imply that special measures or at least special mechanisms need to be implemented in order to manage that issue. And if there are multifaceted security threats, then surely these should be co-ordinated through a centralised structure? The danger of a return to the national security state is obvious.

Fortunately, those who have contributed to the widening of the security discourse have been acutely aware of this problem. We have protected against the danger by arguing that, although – or even because – we conceive security in broad terms, the functions of the security agencies must remain narrowly or classically defined, just as they were in the days of Cold War Euro-North American Realism.³

This nicely served the purposes of political transition, by clipping the political wings of the police, defence force and intelligence agencies, while reassuring them of their professionalism. While this is probably still the best formulation we can come up with, it is not an adequate resolution of the problem.

In the long term, the realities of the lack of institutional capacity in other government departments will pitch the security forces into wider security terrains, whether we like it or not. The reality of Third World states is that the security forces are often the only institutionally sound organs of government. In much of the developing world a 'spectrum shift' in terms of security functions appears to take place, with the police taking on essentially bureaucratic tasks, such as customs control or immigration which in more developed countries are the functions of civilian agencies, while the defence force takes on internal security and policing tasks.

While South Africa has stronger institutions of governance than many developing countries, we have not been immune to this phenomenon. Despite commitments in the White Paper on Defence to withdraw the defence force from policing, in reality, the SANDF is taking on new policing tasks, including combating crime.

Furthermore, there must surely come a time when force design for defence forces will need to be tailored to actual functions, rather than 'ideal' ones of conventional war, especially given the pressure on budgets. In other words, to train and equip the defence force for internal security, border protection and similar 'secondary' tasks.⁴

This step has been resisted, because the long term implications are frightening. There is an inevitable danger of corruption, politicisation, and decadence in relation to the primary function. One of the reasons the police in this country are so corrupt, is because they are in daily contact with criminals, many of whom have large amounts of cash for pay-offs. Why should the defence force be able to resist this pressure if they are pitched into anti-crime activities? What are the implications for military professionalism of a defence force trained and equipped for what are essentially internal security tasks?

It is true, as Williams has pointed out, that some countries have successfully involved their security forces in broader tasks without politicisation, and the nature of civil-military relations is probably a more important determinant of politicisation than actual functions.⁵ But the fact remains that internal security and anti-crime activities are essentially political, and there are many other examples in history – particularly in Latin America – where military decadence and praetorianism have resulted from such activities. We need to consider this matter with a long term (10 or even 20 years) perspective in mind: once the decision has been taken, it may prove fateful.

But even with the safeguard of a restricted, classical functional definition for the role of security forces, an holistic approach to security can have its dangers. The discourse of security has a certain logic, no matter how politically correct we might be.

Take the example of illegal migration to South Africa. There appears to be a consensus that this is a security issue. There is an assumption – unproved so far – that illegal immigrants are involved in crime to a great extent. There is also an assumption – and here there is considerably more evidence – that they are involved in the smuggling of weapons. There is also an argument that, because illegal immigrants are 'taking away jobs' from South Africans, communal tensions will arise (again there is little evidence).

All this – combined with the lack of capacity in civil institutions – has resulted in illegal immigrants becoming fair game, not merely for the South African police, but also for the defence force. Troops patrol the borders to arrest illegal immigrants. On combined police-military crime sweeps, a large percentage of the 'criminals' arrested have done nothing more than be here without the necessary permits. Of course, this contributes little to the resolution of the problem, because the vast majority of those deported come back again a few days or a few weeks later.

The logic of the security discourse can be seen also in the way we increasingly conceive of a 'war' against crime. Even in terms of the old narrow definitions, crime becomes a matter for national security when it reaches the corrosive proportions that it has in South Africa today. Yet, the talk of 'war', the campaigns to reinstate the death penalty, the evident enthusiasm in sections of the media for a new State of Emergency, sound increasingly like the discourse around the political conflicts of the 1980s.

The holistic approach to security, while it remains the most appropriate one in our circumstances, needs to be carefully thought through in policy terms.

Surely, we should be aiming at a situation where crime is not a national security issue, but can be dealt with through the normal process of policing? Surely, we should try by whatever means to deal with illegal immigration as a political or socio-economic issue and not a security issue? In short, the aim of an holistic approach to security management should, whenever possible, be to remove items from the security agenda, and not to put them on it.

It is necessary to try and restrict the security shopping-list, with the aim of dealing with matters as far as possible as part of the 'normal' processes of politics and society. Issues should only be labelled security threats when there is no other way of dealing with them. In other words, we should revert to the classical definition of a threat as something which poses a high possibility of severe disruption to the normal processes of government and society within a relatively short timeframe.

On a regional level this would mean, in institutional and policy terms, that as many issues as possible should be dealt with through political and not security structures, and that the process should be led by departments of foreign affairs, social affairs and economic affairs and not by the military and police. In other words, in the Southern African context, we need to put the 'politics' back into the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. While the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) functions very well on a technical level, it primarily involves defence institutions and thus cannot address major policy issues.

We should seek to restrict, not to enhance, the roles of the security forces and agencies. At the same time, it is clear that, in the context of holistic security, we need to reorient and retrain them. We need, in particular, to pay attention to civil-military relations. Demilitarisation and defence downsizing are potentially destabilising. The security forces need to be on-side in this process and they need to understand their new roles and their limitations.

Within the new approach to security, there remain important tasks for the police and the military. The necessity of dealing with security issues on a regional level will entail joint operations, peacekeeping and rapid reaction. Defence forces do remain the final guarantors of sovereignty and – something that is often overlooked – one of the few reservoirs of surplus organisational capacity available to weak states. In times of natural or other emergencies, for example, the defence forces need to be available to deal with crises, not only on a national, but on a regional basis. The short term involvement of defence forces in such social or environmental disaster situations is entirely appropriate.

Above all, an holistic approach to security must entail a re-examination of the role and functions of the state as a whole. If we look at the roles that the state can play in co-ordinating state-business-civil society initiatives, in providing a nurturing environment for civil society and in leveraging resources, we have the outlines of a new paradigm for governance in the developing world. And this transformation of the state must be done a regional basis – the development challenges are simply too big to be dealt with by individual states.

At the same time, especially on a regional level, we must beware of statism. Many regional organisations, especially those involved in security, have contributed more to regime security than to the security of the people of the region.⁶ The multiplier effect that one is looking for in regional integration, can serve to entrench unpopular and undemocratic regimes who can rely on each other, and each others' militaries, for support.

Political processes are important in the holistic management of security on a regional level, but even more vital are structures and processes which will facilitate the participation of civil society and deal with democracy and human rights issues. If the new paradigm of governance is to work, then it will require a strong civil society.

Regional security integration should rest on concepts of good governance, sound civil-military relations and commitments to democracy and human rights. As far as possible, potential security issues should be dealt with through political and social processes and institutions: they should be elevated to the security agenda only when real threats become visible and special measures are required. At this point the possible role of defence institutions in dealing with such threats should be considered, but the implications of such employment need to be cautiously examined.

ENDNOTES

Edited version of a paper presented at the First International Conference on Comparative Regional Security, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1-3 July 1997.



See for example, White Paper on Defence, Republic of South Africa 1997; National Crime Prevention Strategy, Republic of South Africa, 1997; OAU, Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, Kampala, 23 May 1991; SADC, Heads of State or Governments of SADC Communiqué, Gaberone, 28 June 1996.



For a critique of this and a discussion of the actual roles of defence forces, see D Chuter, What are Armies For?, Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1997, Brassey's, London, 1997.



Cilliers is one of the few analysts who has tackled this issue; see for example, his comments on the First Report of the Defence Review, Defence Review: First Report, unpublished paper circulated at the Defence Review Conference, Cape Town, 16 May 1997.



R Williams, The Effects of Threat Perceptions, Security Concepts and Operational Doctrines on Force Planning, unpublished monograph prepared for the SIPRI International Arms Procurement Study, Johannesburg, 1997.



M Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, Colorado, 1996, pp. 61-65.