INTRODUCTION

This is the third article in the African Security Review which reports on the results of the collaborative survey of public opinion on security-related aspects, conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) during 1996. This survey followed on and built upon the results of a similar survey which was conducted in 1995.

The 1996 survey questions can be grouped into a number of subject areas which relate to security issues. This article presents only the results of questions regarding two issues, namely public attitudes towards the image and future of the military, and the defence industry in South Africa. Two earlier articles (Volume 6, numbers 3 and 4 of the Review), reflected the results regarding women in the security forces, language usage in the SANDF and public attitudes towards undocumented migration and crime/policing.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The HSRC Omnibus survey is done quarterly and its purpose is to give clients an opportunity to participate in a national survey at low cost. The questions relating to the security services which were included in this survey, were the result of two workshops between members of the HSRC and ISS held during August/September 1996. The core questions regarding security were originally the same as those which were used during 1995, but amended where appropriate.

Two separate questionnaires were administered during this survey to two probability samples of 2 200 respondents each. Every effort was made to ensure that the data was representative of the South African population.

The fieldwork for the Omnibus survey was conducted nationally from 7 to 28 October 1996. The data was collected by specially trained interviewers using structured questionnaires during some 2 200 personal, face-to-face interviews. Interviews were often done after hours to ensure that the respondent that had been drawn, was available. If the specific individual was not at home during the first visit, but was available during the fieldwork period, an appointment was made and the person concerned, revisited. If nobody in the household qualified, or was available during the fieldwork period, the household was substituted.¹

Interviews were furthermore conducted in the respondents' choice of language^.2

Trained co-ordinators, appointed by MarkData, were allocated to different regions in order to co-ordinate the fieldwork (data collection).³ Each co-ordinator was responsible for a group of interviewers who were recruited under close supervision and subsequently briefed according to specific instructions given by MarkData.⁴ The sample design was initiated by Prof Laurence Schlemmer, Ms Tertia van der Walt and Dr Mathilda du Toit, and formalised by Mr B Vukasovic. The capturing, processing and verification of the data was done by the Computer Centre of the HSRC.⁵

The sample allocation for the survey was done proportional to the adjusted 1991 population census figures, with a few exceptions.⁶ The visiting points were drawn by means of multiple stage cluster, probability sample design. The household and respondents were selected with a random grid from qualifying household members and interviewed at their homes.

The universe for this sample design was all South African residents of 18 years and older. All nine provinces were included in the survey, with care taken to include both rural and urban areas. The socio-economic classification of the respondents was represented as follows: tribal, traditional, rural in former self-governing areas and the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC states); squatter areas, urban (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); hostels, hotels, boarding schools etc., in urban areas (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for so-called Coloureds (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for Asians (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); former townships for Blacks (metropolitan and non-metropolitan); towns and cities (non-metropolitan); towns and cities including flats (metropolitan); and rural areas (excluding the former self-governing areas and TBVC states).

An additional sub-sample was introduced for live-in domestic and other workers, based on the incidence of households employing domestic workers, as found in previous Omnibus surveys. Domestic workers who formed part of the main sample (e.g. those living at home) were interviewed as such.

Disproportion was introduced to give a minimum number of 120 respondents per province. The minimum number of Asians in the overall sample was fixed at 120.⁷

The sample realisation for this Omnibus survey was one hundred per cent and no major obstacles were encountered during the fieldwork.

THE IMAGE AND THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY

Background

Similar to many other state institutions, the South African Department of Defence (DoD) is in a process of far-reaching change. This transformation consists of a series of interrelated issues which include:

the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa and the Defence Review process;



integration;



affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes;



the reform of budgetary planning and financial management processes;



rationalisation;



activities aimed at improving and perpetuating the effective, efficient and economic functioning of the Department; and



ensuring the institutionalisation of civil control over the military function.⁸

Initially, much of the change revolved around the integration of the so-called statutory (South African Defence Force and the armed forces of the four 'bantustans', Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda) and non-statutory forces (Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA)). Following negotiations with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), some 2 000 former members of the KwaZulu Police Force were also to be recruited into the SANDF on a preferential basis.

The first intake of non-statutory forces occurred during April 1994 and by 1 April 1997, 22 intakes had been completed with the assistance of the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) which served to certify, oversee and adjudicate the process. Some 24 076 members from MK and APLA were assembled from a total estimated list of 42 266 (the final figure of the Certified Personnel Register (CPR)). Following resignations, discharges, deaths, desertion, and demobilisation, some 18 190 former guerrillas had therefore been integrated into the SANDF by April 1997, the vast majority (90,5 per cent), into the SA Army.⁹

Since the turn of the decade, the SANDF has been involved in a series of demobilisation and downsizing exercises, which have managed to keep its total numbers down to some 99 400 (April 1997), from a potential figure of 140 000 which could have resulted from the integration of all forces.¹⁰

These changes occurred against the background of massive budgetary cuts which slashed defence spending from 4,3 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 1,6 per cent or R8,7 billion in 1997. By 1997 it had become clear that the defence budget allocation would not be able to sustain a full-time component of some 98 000 regular members and that the retrenchment of a further 20 per cent of personnel would be required. Following the announcement of the defence allocation for 1997/8, for example, the SA Army announced the disbandment of twelve group headquarters, the scaling down of another two group headquarters, the rationalisation of eight full-time units, the restructuring/ transformation of 21 part-time forces motorised infantry battalions, the disbandment of four part-time force support units, the amalgamation of two part-time force parachute battalions and the rationalisation of 48 commando units, affecting thousands of part-time and full-time personnel.¹¹ These changes were over and above the restructuring of the defence headquarters and command and control function which was expected to yield another R300 million in savings.

The essential and guiding process in the transformation of the DoD has been the reformulation of South African defence policy, as encapsulated in the White Paper on National Defence and the subsequent Defence Review.

In summary, South Africa has moved from an aggressive forward defence posture, based on white male conscription and self-sufficiency in the provision of defence equipment in a hostile threat environment, to a peacetime military, devoid of any significant conventional military threat, at peace with its neighbours and having adopted a defensive military posture based on an all-volunteer concept. In the absence of a clearly defined external military threat, and in accordance with many armed forces internationally, the DoD has adopted what it termed a 'threat-independent' approach, based on the retention of balanced key or core capabilities. It is from this core capability that the SANDF plans, over time, to expand its war-fighting capabilities to meet a future external military threat. Such an approach relies on an adequate early warning of an impending military threat, to allow the core capacity to be expanded to the level required.

The interim and final South African constitutions, as well as the subsequent White Paper, have also entrenched and expanded civilian oversight over the SANDF. The Constitution names the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF and makes the Minister of Defence responsible for the execution of the defence function. Under the President, the Minister exercises authority, direction and control of the defence function. The President is also responsible to appoint the Military Command of the Defence Force, while the Constitution also establishes a secretariat headed by a civilian Secretary of Defence who is the principal policy advisor and accounting officer.

The Head of Department responsibility and the Accounting Officer function have further been transferred from the Chief of the SANDF to the Secretary of Defence with effect from 1 April 1997. An integrated defence headquarters is now being established, within which the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of the SANDF would share staff for:

financial management;


joint personnel policy;


joint training;


defence liaison services;


legal services;


communication;


defence intelligence; and


inspectorate and internal audit.¹²

In summary, the transformation of the DoD is virtually unprecedented in scope and depth in South Africa, and perhaps even internationally. Thus far, the process has been remarkably successful. The DoD has made a concerted effort to involve a wide range of people and to consult broadly. The Department has been rewarded in this process by an apparent emerging national consensus on national defence priorities and a greater degree of trust between various stakeholders, such as Parliament, civil society, the academic community, and international defence analysts, as well as between the Defence Secretariat, the SANDF and the Ministry itself.

This being said, there are worrying tendencies emerging. Operational standards are under clear pressure, while a large amount of operational, managerial and technical expertise has left the National Defence Force. Morale is wavering as the Navy finds itself with insufficient and obsolete ships, the Air Force with many more aircraft than pilots, and the Army struggling with integration while trying to maintain an increasingly 'hollow' force. In fact, the DoD is showing the first clear signs of institutional overstretch.

Survey Results

Against this background, a high percentage (75 per cent) of respondents wanted South Africa to maintain a strong defence force, while almost one fifth (17 per cent) felt that there was no need for the further maintenance of a strong defence force. Only 8 per cent of respondents were undecided on this issue. This clear preference for the maintenance of a strong defence force is underscored by an analysis of the results by political affiliation, as illustrated below.

Graph 1: Compared to the past, does South Africa still need a strong defence force by political party

Clearly, those parties with a traditional white and coloured support base supported the maintenance of a strong defence force more strongly than parties such as the IFP and PAC.

Responses by province are represented below.

Graph 2: Compared to the past, does South Africa still need a strong defence force by province

The basic tendency of respondents in the provincial breakdown, namely to opt for a strong defence force or to maintain a strong defence posture/capability, is essentially similar, whether broken down by political party affiliation and/or racial categories. Gauteng, bordering on no neighbouring country and without a coastline, scored the lowest percentage with two-thirds of the respondents seeing the need to maintain current defence capability.

Respondents provided the following reasons for the need to retain a strong defence force (and hence a strong defence capability):

In response to the question as to what kind of help the SANDF should provide to neighbouring countries, the results showed that the majority of respondents supported all the types of assistance mentioned in the survey, with issues regarding border security (72 per cent) and internal stability (67 per cent) rating the highest.

Interpretation

It is clear from the survey results that a majority of South Africans are of the opinion that South Africa should maintain a strong National Defence Force. Although the question did not raise the issue of defence finances or potential trade-offs between 'guns' and 'butter', the strong support accorded to the military could be interpreted to be at odds with the Government's policy of massive reductions in the defence allocation in recent years. If the legislature is to be sensitive to public opinion, one could argue that continuous budget cuts in defence expenditure (as in arms production potential) could become controversial issues. The Government therefore may have to invest more in explaining its fiscally responsible approach to the public at large. It is also possible that the extent of crime and violence continues to raise insecurities among respondents, although only some 14 per cent of those respondents who supported the maintenance of a strong National Defence Force indicated that 'support of the police' was their most important reason for such maintenance of capabilities. Yet, this interpretation of the results is supported by the finding that border patrols and maintaining internal security in neighbouring countries were the most important types of assistance that the SANDF should render to neighbouring countries.

Respondents have a clear idea of South Africa's responsibilities to be ready to assist its neighbours if requested, although there may be an indication of a potential downward trend in this regard when compared to the results from the 1995 survey. This would, however, only become verifiable after additional surveys.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Introduction

The world has, since the turn of the decade, experienced an almost unprecedented downturn in defence expenditure, in the absence of the threat of major international armed conflict. According to the figures of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:¹³

The number of people serving in armed forces world-wide has declined from a total of 28,7 million in 1988 to 23,5 million in 1994, and figures are still falling. The largest cuts occurred in the developed world.



World arms trade fell from a high of US $83 billion in 1984 to US $22 billion in 1994 – a massive drop of 73 per cent.



World arms sales agreements (as distinct from actual deliveries) declined from US $73 billion in 1985 to US $38 billion in 1994.

In contrast with this global trend, the United States is leading a resurgence in weapon sales to regions such as the Middle East, while weapons sales from Russia and China have become, if anything, less regulated than before. Most of the recent reductions in global military spending occurred in Eastern Europe, where this was accompanied by a cumulative decline of US $9,4 trillion in aggregate GNP from 1987 to 1994. The US now accounts for more than 50 per cent of global arms sales, and 36 per cent of the global total in defence spending in 1994 (US $288 billion). The pressures on the South African defence industry are part and parcel of this global downturn.

In the past, South Africa attempted to attain a level of self-sufficiency in the design and manufacture of complete armament systems commensurate with the high threat perception prevalent at the time. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the negotiated settlement in South Africa which followed shortly thereafter, the strategic environment within the Southern African region has undergone a dramatic change. The central strategic challenge is no longer that of deterrence, but of building common security within the region.¹⁴

Over the last twenty years, the South African defence industry gained prominence with the development of world class technologies and products, established capabilities in a number of other areas, such as weapons systems development and integration, munitions production, and the establishment of product design and development capabilities, which elevated the manufacturing sector of the economy to that of an industry with capabilities for design and development. Defence expenditure by the SANDF during the 1980s was about R15 billion per year, reaching a peak of R17 billion in 1990. Since then, it has declined rapidly to about R10,6 billion in 1995 and R8,7 billion in 1997/8 (about 1,6 per cent of GDP). As a result of the recent decline in total defence spending, spending on armaments has declined considerably, reducing SANDF purchases from the local defence industry. While this was happening, employment by the industry has also fallen dramatically from a peak of about 160 000 people to less than 50 000 today. These reductions in spending on armaments have led to a large loss of skills, manufacturing capability and capacity. The defence industry has been hard hit, with many manufacturing companies moving out of the defence market. To maintain even the most rudimentary economies of scale in order to recover investment in plant and equipment while holding down unit cost, the defence manufacturing industry will have to export vigorously.

In the Defence Review¹⁵ it was argued that, "[t]he existence of a sophisticated domestic defence industry is an important factor in enabling the SANDF to maintain the necessary state of preparedness in the most cost-effective manner. The existence of a domestic defence industry also has a number of other important economic, technological and social advantages for South Africa, including inter alia savings on foreign exchange, provision of employment, and skills training. The defence industry is a strategic and economic asset that has to be retained and developed to ensure self-sufficiency in key areas, cost-effective acquisition, the earning of foreign exchange and the development of a high technology manufacturing industry."

Against this background, a number of questions about the defence industry and arms exports were asked.

Survey Results

Responses to the question on how South Africa should obtain weapons and military equipment for its armed forces, are depicted below.

Graph 3: How South Africa should obtain weapons and military equipment by racial group

Respondents are strongly inclined to opt for self-reliance in the provision of weapons. The largest single proportion (44 per cent) of the respondents indicated that South Africa should manufacture enough weapons for its own use. Furthermore, 29 per cent of the respondents indicated that South Africa should produce enough weapons for its own use and should also compete for weapon sales overseas. Only 10 per cent of the respondents said South Africa should buy all weapons overseas and 3 per cent expressed the view that South Africa should ask for aid, including weapons, from overseas.

Chi-squared analyses of the 1996 data relating to this question indicated that black, coloured and Asian respondents, although strongly inclined to say that South Africa should make enough weapons for its own use, are not as strongly inclined to this view as white respondents.

Similarly, the proportion of respondents contending that South Africa should make enough weapons for its own use and compete with other countries for weapon sales, tended to increase as the educational level of the respondents increased (see table below).

Graph 4: How South Africa should obtain weapons and military equipment analysed by educational level

A similar response was evident regarding the question whether the country should "end, maintain or increase its weapons manufacturing capacity." A total of 28 per cent of respondents with an educational level higher than Grade 12 wanted the country to increase its weapon manufacturing capacity as opposed to 16 per cent of those respondents with an educational level of Grade 7 and lower. Only 20 per cent of respondents with no schooling were inclined to the same view.

In response to the question: "Should South Africa maintain, reduce or increase its own weapon manufacturing capacity?", altogether 21 per cent of the respondents were in favour of South Africa increasing its weapon manufacturing capacity, 68 per cent in favour of South Africa maintaining its capacity and only 12 per cent of the respondents felt that South Africa should end its weapon manufacturing capacity. In justifying the response to "increase weapon manufacturing capacity", the greatest proportion of the respondents indicated that their reasons were based on job opportunities (20 per cent) or economic reasons (20 per cent). The main reasons why respondents were of the view that South Africa's weapon manufacturing capacity should end was given by 38 per cent of the respondents, who said that their main reason in this respect was that weapons kill people or that weapons result in violence (27 per cent).

A word of caution may be appropriate in analysing these results, since the extent of the downturn in South Africa's defence manufacturing capacity is probably not generally known, with the result that respondents may be under the impression that South Africa still has a significant arms industry. As a result, responses pointing to the requirement to 'maintain' present levels of arms manufacturing may indicate that respondents are under the impression that this would be from a fairly high base. Similarly, the fact that a domestic defence industry cannot survive on the small domestic demand for arms (and must therefore export to be viable) is possibly not evident to most respondents.

It is also evident that the majority of supporters of all the main political parties are in favour of South Africa's weapons manufacturing capacity either being maintained or increased. (See table below)

Graph 5: Should South Africa maintain, reduce or increase its own weapons manufacturing capacity by political party

A number of questions were asked regarding the destination of arms sales. To a question which read "Assuming South Africa does maintain its weapon building capacity, should the country sell arms to: Rwanda, Iran, Burundi, Iraq, Nigeria, Libya and Cuba?", respondents were requested to answer individually for each country. Given the fact that the majority of South Africans believe that South Africa should maintain its existing weapons manufacturing capacity and/or sell weapons overseas, the responses are interesting. Although the 'don't know/uncertain' category was consistently high (on average 17 per cent), it is apparent that almost two thirds of South Africans believe that the Government should sell arms to neither African countries with evidence of serious internal divisions and conflict (Rwanda, Burundi), nor to countries which are labelled by countries such as the US as either supporters of international terrorism (Iran, Iraq, Libya) or gross human rights abusers (Nigeria, Cuba). These findings appear to be at odds with a number of recent South African policy decisions and may even imply that the broader populace are less supportive than the South African Government may believe it to be of its decisions to befriend countries such as Libya, Cuba and Iran. Unfortunately, the survey did not measure the extent of South African public support for defence exports to other categories of countries, such as neighbours (Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe), Western countries such as the US, Britain and France, and other countries such as India and Malaysia.

Graph 6: Assuming South Africa maintains its weapon manufacturing capacity, should the country sell arms to:

CONCLUSION

The respondents in the 1996 survey support the concept of South Africa as an arms manufacturer. The support for the arms industry is to be found especially among the white respondents, but cuts across race, language and education levels. When confronted with specific countries as potential arms purchasers, responses may differ from the general trend and it is admittedly difficult to generalise too widely from the findings that indicate an opposition to arms exports to countries such as Rwanda and Libya. The countries specifically identified in the survey (with the possible exception of Cuba) have furthermore all received substantial negative media reporting in South Africa in recent months on aspects regarding human rights, democracy and internal stability. Similarly, under the National Party Government, media reporting on these countries was overwhelmingly negative – virtually without exception. The case of Cuba, a country which is very close to the present South African Government and has received substantial media coverage due to the provision of Cuban medical staff, presents an interesting anomaly. Public opposition to defence exports to Cuba is only marginally less than for a country such as Rwanda, which has received extensive recent media coverage on the carnage that occurred in that country.

However, despite the evident public support, South African defence exports will inevitably continue to be controversial given the competing demands between the commitments of the Government to a high moral code in the conduct of its foreign relations, the apparent inconsistencies in the application of South African arms export criteria, the legitimate requirements for defence and the strategic asset provided by an indigenous defence industry, as well as the pressure from the industry itself to be allowed to export vigorously within a highly competitive international market. Policy makers are left with the difficult task of balancing the availability of funding, the potential to develop future niche markets in the global arms trade and public opinion. In this process, it would appear as if media hype and 'revelations' regarding defence exports do not reflect general public opinion – provided such exports are not to countries such as Cuba!

If one compares the image and future of the SANDF (the previous section) with data representing the arms industry and its perceived future, it is evident that national status and the strength of the nation (or national democracy) are still seen as very important and as key priorities. The popular feeling among South Africans in this survey seems to be that strong democracies need strong armies. South African public opinion appears to be generally conservative in its views on these issues.

ENDNOTES

Substitution of the visiting point was only allowed for the following reasons:

* refusal by the selected respondent;

* empty premises, e.g. no building or occupied structure;

* nobody on the stand qualified for the survey;

* after three visits made at different dates and times, the respondent could still not be found at home;

* respondent could not communicate with the interviewer because of the use of a foreign language; or

* respondent was not physically/mentally able to be interviewed.



The questionnaire was printed in English and Afrikaans and translated during training into other languages used in the local area.



The co-ordinators were trained between 3 and 4 October 1996 by MarkData in the Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Province, Gauteng and North West. Clients were invited to attend the training session and to give additional information pertaining to their questions.



Interviewers were recruited to conduct interviews as close as possible to their own residential area. Preference was given to interviewers with prior interviewing experience. Co-ordinators were responsible for the recruitment of the interviewers.

All interviewers had to comply with the following minimum requirements: a matric educational qualification or equivalent; and fully bilingual or multilingual in order to speak the relevant language in a particular fieldwork area.



The co-ordinator's responsibility was to ensure that all the questionnaires sent to MarkData had already been checked for correct completion, and that 20 per cent field control was done. From the office, a 20 per cent fieldwork control (back check) was done once again on each interviewer's questionnaires. The co-ordinators also supervised the fieldwork process to ensure that the correct procedure was maintained. Details of the fieldwork progress were communicated to MarkData on a regular basis.



Census enumerator areas and similar areas were used as the clusters. The number of respondents drawn per enumerator area was either 4 or 8. All clusters were drawn with probability (a serial sampling procedure was applied).



The factor weights to be applied to the captured data set were derived at the sampling stage. The aim of the factor weights was to correct the disproportions which were incorporated in the sample design. The only weighting targets were the stratification variables: 'province' and 'socio-economic' category. RIM weighting is generally used in two cases: when the purpose is to weight data according to various characteristics, but the relationship of the intersection of those characteristics is unknown; or when there are not enough respondents to fill all the possible cells (e.g. males who had passed Grade 10, 35-44 years old, employed part-time). As the RIM weighting runs, it attempts to distort each variable as little as possible, while still trying to attain all the desired proportions among the characteristics. The 'Root Mean Square' figure was used to determine how much distortion had been introduced.

The following variables were submitted to the RIM weighting procedure at various stages: age; gender; education; employment status; occupation; marital status; language; and population group.

Close examination of outputs suggested that a satisfactory solution cannot be obtained despite the increased number of iterations (too high between the weights ratio) and only 'age', 'gender', 'education' and 'population group' variables were retained. RIM weighting targets for the former TBVC states were estimated according to population characteristics drawn from the available Census data. Weighted and unweighted frequencies on all biographical variables are available.



CSANDF, CSANDF Internal Communication Bulletin, 7/97, 5 February 1997, p. 1



From a briefing by Maj Gen D Mortimer, Integration, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 16 April 1997.



Note that about 23 per cent of the DoD personnel are civilians. CSANDF, Defence Review: Human Resources, CSANDF Internal Communication Bulletin, 25/97, 24 March 1997, p. 1.



CSANDF, The Redesign of the SA Army, CSANDF Internal Communications Bulletin, 8/97, 7 February 1997, pp. 1-2.



CSANDF, The Minister of Defence on Transformation in the DoD, CSANDF Internal Communication Bulletin, 9/97, 11 February 1997, pp. 1-2.



US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995, Washington, DC, April 1996, pp. 1-10.



See DoD, Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, pp. 22-24; and Department of Foreign Affairs, South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, [n.d.], released during July 1996.



Defence Review Drafting Team, Defence Review Second Report, Structure of the Department, Human Resources, Part-Time Forces, Defence Industry, Defence Legal Environment, 21 February 1997, p. 115.