INTRODUCTION

The proposals made in this article differ radically from conventional wisdom on strengthening conflict resolution capabilities in Africa. A seemingly endless series of meetings, conferences, seminars and workshops have been convened since the Cairo Declaration of 1993, and have included a wide variety of actors, from heads of state and government, to military chiefs of staff and even non-government organisations (NGOs). While some have resulted in a few solid recommendations, others have produced platitudes, such as 'consulting on the root causes of the conflict', and 'developing mechanisms for dialogue towards building a sustainable peace'. The problem with such politically correct jargon is that there is no imperative for action, and that nothing really gets done to make a difference.

There is a real danger of 'group think', of remaining stuck in the mind set of An Agenda for Peace, while pretending to gain new insight from an array of 'lessons learned' seminars on the failures of United Nations peacekeeping and peace enforcement – in Somalia, in Rwanda and in Angola. Focusing on 'new peacekeeping partnerships' and the 'role of civilians in peacekeeping' does little to generate solutions to the problem of terminating conflicts where there is no peace to keep, and where men and boys with guns prevent the distribution of the most basic humanitarian supplies. Africa has often been described as a harsh continent, and perhaps this is true. But no one seems willing to take harsh measures to resolve its problems.

The aim of this article is to highlight the folly of attempting to deal with African crises through incremental adaptations of the principles of UN peacekeeping, and to propose a framework for more effective responses. Firstly, the argument will be made that the traditional concept of peacekeeping has become an irrelevant means of addressing African conflicts in the crisis stage, and that present conceptions of peace enforcement are doomed to failure. Secondly, a new concept of layered responses to conflicts in Africa is proposed. The third portion of the article is devoted to the articulation of the principles needed for effective conflict termination at the lower levels of the proposed response ladder. Finally, the idea of a pan-African force, which may provide the means for the advocated military intervention, is proposed.

THE FAILURE OF PEACEKEEPING AND 'PEACE ENFORCEMENT' IN AFRICA

Conflict and insecurity in Africa are primarily products of poor governance and the politics of exclusion – typically of ethnic or religious minorities. Poor governance is accompanied by poor administration, where even those of the 'politically relevant' strata are not served well by the state, and the servants of the state themselves are not trained, paid and cared for. This, of course, includes the armed forces, upon which the governors must increasingly rely to counter centrifugal forces invoked by resistance to their rule. Planners have failed to recognise the extent to which interventions in contemporary complex emergencies do not take place in the context of a system of sovereign states, controlled by internationally accepted leaders. "In many African emergencies ... beleaguered governments are likely to have lost control over substantial parts of their territories. Their monopoly of power at state level becomes eroded, proliferating downwards into the hands of warlords."² Under such circumstances, the devolution and dispersal of state power and the instruments of coercion is inevitable, and the "civil population becomes the principal target of violence, its control, division, relocation and extermination the war aims of opposing factions."³

The international community has responded to a number of such crises in the past years through stretching and mutating the concept of peacekeeping. In Rwanda, for example, a three-year UN 'peacekeeping' operation failed to halt an ethnic genocide that resulted in between 500 000 and one million deaths. During the holocaust which lasted from April to July 1994, Hutu extremists "systematically hacked down, shot and blew up tens of thousands of Tutsis and Hutu moderates."⁴ In spite of the UN's efforts to restore peace, a silent genocide reportedly continues in Rwanda. About 70 000 people have been jailed for the massacres, but there is no functioning legal system in place to deal with them.⁵ Women and children suffered most from the aftermath of the genocide, with an estimated 47 000 children orphaned, 250 000 to 500 000 women raped, and 2 000 to 5 000 children outcast because they were conceived as a result of rape.⁶

Yet even before the Rwandan holocaust, the UN had been searching for a means of enforcing the peace in situations where peacekeepers could not operate effectively, due to crumbling consent and co-operation by the conflicting parties. In 1993, Boutros-Ghali proposed the idea of peace enforcement in An Agenda for Peace, but enforcement was presented as an activity that would possibly require separate and distinct forces to that of a peacekeeping operation: "Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peacekeeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilisation of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance."⁷

While the Secretary-General coined the phrase 'peace enforcement', he subsequently had to admit that he did not provide a universally accepted definition or concept for its implementation.⁸ In fact, 'peace enforcement' has since existed solely in the realm of theory, where peace enforcement units intervene impartially in a civil war in order to compel the warring parties to peace talks, so that a peacekeeping operation can be established. In the Congo, Chad, Somalia and Yugoslavia, multinational military forces were unable to maintain impartiality. They either took sides openly, or were perceived as favouring one side, thus becoming the allies of one faction, and the legitimate target of others. Nevertheless, a number of peacekeeping operations, which have abrogated the classical peacekeeping principle of the non-use of force have been widely considered to be 'peace enforcement' operations. According to Corum,⁹ "[p]eace enforcement operations have absorbed an enormous amount of UN troops, money, and energy, with little to show for it. Important peacekeeping operations in the Sahara, Central America and Namibia have suffered from a lack of adequate troops and support, while resources have been diverted to peace enforcement operations. Indeed, the cost, the heavy casualties, and the lack of success of peace enforcement operations have damaged the credibility and prestige of the UN, and are placing other operations at risk." Mixing the use of force with the principles of impartiality and consent has thus also largely discredited the notion of intervening in intra-state conflicts. According to Mackindlay,¹⁰ "[r]eliance on the military doctrines and humanitarian relief conventions of a previous era, as well as political short termism have disabled international interventions."

Peace enforcement has failed, not primarily because of a lack of support or finances, but rather because the concept itself is unsound. Peace enforcement bears little similarity to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, where the military's primary role is that of a support force, not an active combatant. As yet, there is no coherent body of military doctrine explaining the conduct of peace enforcement operations, and no one is even sure what is meant by 'peace enforcement'. Past UN peace enforcement operations have been combat operations in which the Rules of Engagement governing the use of force have been only slightly adapted from 'classical' peacekeeping rules. There has been little efficacy in the use of force where every bomb dropped or round fired by UN forces is carefully controlled, and becomes the subject of a long debate and decision-making process between political and military leaders. This practice has ensured that military forces react slowly, without gaining the initiative over hostile forces.¹¹ Where force has been used in defence of mandates, it has been without a clear conceptual framework and appropriately configured instruments.

Despite the failures of UN peace enforcement, there may be some utility in enforcement operations within the context of civil wars which threaten the stability of a particular region. "Regional organisations and coalitions, due to their greater familiarity with conflicts in their own area and their clear national interest in maintaining regional stability, are better motivated to employ force when necessary. The UN and United States ought to provide diplomatic support to such operations and, when necessary, aid and financial support. The UN can contribute more effectively to peace by entering conflict as an observer or peace keeper after regional intervention has compelled stability."¹²

According to Guest,¹³ "[w]e need a rationale for humanitarian intervention not dependent on TV images and the mood of the moment. It has to start with human rights, the prohibition against genocide, and the Geneva Conventions, which lay out clear guidelines for civilians caught in conflict. These universal standards were massively abused before or during every recent crisis. If governments were to enforce these laws, as they are obliged to do, there would be less unpredictability about their humanitarian response." The concept of 'layered responses' to conflict in Africa may be a possible solution. The current concept of layered responses sees local and national organisations respond initially, followed by responses at the subregional and regional (Organisation of African Unity (OAU)) levels, and finally by those of the broader international community. However, this approach can only be viable if the various responses are appropriate, i.e. if they address the most pertinent and 'curable' causes of conflict in an efficient manner, or at least in a manner which makes a real and positive difference. This means that interventions should not be discrete, but should be conceptualised within a framework of appropriate and meaningful responses to African crises.

TOWARDS A NEW RESPONSE HIERARCHY

Current thinking on responses to conflict reflects a preoccupation with establishing peace and democracy in a war-torn society in one fell swoop. States are reluctant to intervene in third party conflicts unless a cease-fire is in place, and the warring parties have agreed to a comprehensive 'peace' plan which begins with the voluntary assembly, disarmament and demobilisation of belligerents, and ends soon thereafter with the staging of free and fair elections for government. Of course, there is some recognition of the fragility of such a situation through acceptance of the concept of 'post-conflict peacebuilding', but this aspect of intervention is largely left up to international development agencies and the initiatives of a diverse group of donors.

According to Doyle,¹⁴ "one cannot define peace as nothing short of economic justice or social harmony without losing an understanding of peace as something different from and, possibly, less demanding than those other worthwhile goals." He also sees a temporal dimension to the process of peacebuilding, recognising the fact that a temporary peace can be achieved through coercion, but that more durable peace involves aspects of legitimacy, political participation, social integration and economic development. However, "it does appear difficult, if not impossible, to secure the higher, more dynamic aspects of peace before the lower aspects of law and order are met."¹⁵

According to Mackinlay,¹⁶ "[t]he stabilisation process requires a holistic approach, one phase of activity leading to another: disarmament-demobilisation – to recovery." This is not entirely new thinking. Because situations of political breakdown can only rarely be remedied by short term intervention, a system of phased and prioritised facilitating processes is needed. An Agenda for Peace articulated a broad spectrum of responses to conflict situations; from preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment, to peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding. However, these concepts were not integrated into a coherent hierarchy of responses which would work at specific points along the 'peace' spectrum.

Preventive diplomacy has failed to defuse a number of ongoing and ruinous conflicts in Africa. There has been no political will for effective preventive deployment, before crises erupt and gain the attention of the international media. Peacekeeping has failed where there is no peace to keep. The problems of peace enforcement have been described above in some detail. And peace building cannot begin in the midst of an ongoing armed conflict. A new hierarchy of responses is therefore suggested, and discussed briefly below.

Layer 1: Instrusive Diplomacy

Intrusive diplomacy begins where preventive diplomacy has failed, when there has been early warning of an impending political crisis in an African country, but the principal actors involved have refused to respond to the customary diplomatic efforts of African leaders to resolve the dispute. It implies a recognition of the fact that such a country has diminished its right to sovereignty through ignoring or abusing the human and civil rights of the citizenry. It may involve action such as the declaration of an African state of emergency by the Central Organ of the OAU, which would specify a range of measures, short of military intervention, to persuade recalcitrant parties to negotiate a non-violent settlement. Such measures may include:

the threat or imposition of selective or comprehensive economic and cultural sanctions;



a total arms embargo and active monitoring of the effectiveness of its application;



a declaration by the Central Organ of minimum standards of human and civil rights which must be upheld;



assisting in the drafting of guidelines for a political dispensation which would defuse tensions and lead to more inclusive practices;



investigations into destabilising factors, such as unscrupulous foreign exploitation of indigenous resources and the pursuit of neo-colonial interests within the afflicted country;



investigations into state administration and the training and deployment of armed forces (both government and non-government);



offers of assistance with the transformation of such institutions, should this prove warranted through such investigations; and



a declaration of intent to deploy an intervention force should intrusive diplomacy fail.

Progress with all facets of intrusive diplomacy should be regularly and accurately reported in subregional, regional and international forums. The intervening agent would be the Central Organ of the OAU, with the assistance of the general secretariats of the OAU and the UN, subregional organisations, individual heads of state and government, and special envoys. The critical goal of intrusive diplomacy is to engineer a regional settlement to destabilising communal conflict.

If intrusive diplomacy fails, or if it has not been implemented effectively and timely, the political crisis may escalate into internal armed conflict which precipitates a humanitarian crisis marked by violence against civilians, starvation, disease, and the displacement of large numbers of people who attempt to flee the conflict. Urgent steps must now be taken to terminate the conflict in order to minimise civilian death and suffering.

Layer 2: Conflict Termination

The primary aim of conflict termination operations is to stabilise the ailing state in order to stop the killing and maiming of civilians in the shortest possible time. This involves multilateral military intervention in order to alter the internal balance of power and to assist an identified party in winning a decisive military victory which would force all parties to the negotiating table. It implies the rejection of the notions of impartiality and consent as a basis for intervention. Conflict termination operations would involve the following activities:

training and assisting the chosen force towards a decisive military victory;



international law enforcement (including coercive disarmament);



protection for emergency humanitarian aid to save lives, where this does not exacerbate the aim of speedy conflict termination (humanitarian agencies must not be allowed to derail the immediate objective of the operation); and



imposing new military standards of proficiency and cohesion on the assisted force.

Such interventions, involving a pre-ordained and calculated use of force, should contribute to political (and not parochial) outcomes. They must be aimed at changing, rather than sustaining the status quo, for it is the legitimacy of the status quo that is at issue in communal conflicts. For example, when a multinational force intervenes on the side of a legal (though corrupt) regime, such intervention must be predicated on a pre-agreed and viable programme for establishing political accountability, with milestones which can be monitored by the international community (for example, the freeing of political prisoners, unbanning of political parties, etc.).

Conflict termination operations are concluded when a cease-fire agreement is signed between the warring parties, and negotiations begin for a lasting settlement. However, the multinational conflict termination force remains deployed until the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement which complies with minimum standards and guidelines provided by the OAU.

Authorisation for such an operation would obviously have to be granted by the UN Security Council, on request of the OAU, and would mean invoking the full powers of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, together with Article 2 (7) which states that: "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll."

The intervening agent, in this case, is also problematic. While its legal status would depend on a Security Council mandate which allows for very robust Rules of Engagement, the suggested concept of operations has no precedent within the UN system, and it is doubtful whether there is sufficient political will to involve national troop contingents in such a multilateral force. The viability of the proposed concept for multinational conflict termination operations in Africa therefore also rests on the development of an appropriate intervening agent, which is discussed in the penultimate section of this article under the heading 'An Intervening Agent for Conflict Termination Operations in Africa'.

Layer 3: Consolidation Operations

Consolidation operations are launched for the purpose of ensuring that the provisions of a peace agreement are implemented according to the agreed upon time tables. The typical tasks during this phase of the stabilisation process would include:

continued protection for the delivery of humanitarian aid;



disarmament within a strict arms control regime (cutting off sources, no-fly zones, destruction of weapons, etc.);



demobilisation of combatants (taking into account the needs for reintegration);



repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced people;



restoration of basic infrastructure; and



training and education of civil servants and soldiers, and assistance with the restructuring of the armed forces and key state departments.

Consolidation operations differ from traditional notions of peacekeeping operations in that they do not aim at merely monitoring and reporting, but entail the active engagement of the intervening force in the process. They differ from 'new generation' peacekeeping operations in that the primary objective is not to terminate the operation through the staging of over-hasty 'free and fair' elections. The objective is rather to create the underlying conditions, or platform, from which electoral politics may ultimately be driven. In a sense, therefore, this approach is politically less prescriptive than many of the recent UN operations.

However, because of the 'hands on' role of the consolidation force in shaping key elements of the post-conflict state administration, the traditional peacekeeping principle of impartiality is extremely relevant. The standards which are set must be applied to all parties, in terms of both assistance and the prosecution of transgressors. This means that the intervening agent is a separate force than that deployed for the purposes of conflict termination. It could be structured in much the same way as contemporary UN peacekeeping forces, but should enjoy a clear mandate and very robust Rules of Engagement. Knowledge of African traditions and culture, and an understanding of local customs would be indispensable during consolidation operations. African contingents should therefore constitute a core element of the force deployed, and this is perhaps a meaningful direction in which to steer current initiatives aimed at developing an African standby capacity for peacekeeping operations.

Layer 4: Democratisation and Development

At this point of the response hierarchy, there is a shift from stability operations to peace operations. The process of promoting democratisation and development becomes feasible once a foundation of stability and law and order has been established, and there is a monopoly of violence in the hands of a responsible authority. This situation may result from the implementation of lower level responses, or it may be reached after war-weariness has resulted in a more 'normal' termination of hostilities. The process is far more consultative and far less prescriptive than lower-order responses, and includes activities such as the following:

reintegration of former soldiers, refugees and displaced people;


economic development programmes;


arrangements for politics of inclusion;


constitutional engineering; and


electoral arrangements and monitoring.

The intervening actor at this level would be largely civilian, rather than military, and would include a diverse range of international agencies, investors, NGOs, etc.

PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT TERMINATION OPERATIONS

The most controversial of the layers in the response hierarchy proposed above is the second, which involves conflict termination operations. However, this concept of operations fills a fundamental gap in the existing repertoire of international and regional responses to destructive and destabilising communal conflict. It allows for early action in response to deepening crises, a response which has thus far been sadly lacking, and without which all the ongoing efforts and debate towards establishing and enhancing early warning mechanisms becomes meaningless. Conflict termination operations involve military intervention in ongoing communal conflicts. Such radical interference in the internal affairs of a state would clearly demand international legitimisation and adherence to a clearly-articulated set of principles.

International Authority and Regional Supervision

In almost every historic age, the existence of revolutionary conditions and communal conflict within states has invoked intervention by strong foreign powers. In Africa, this trend culminated during the Cold War era with countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and China intervening in armed struggles for national political power. Of late, intervention in Africa has become a seemingly ad hoc affair which reflects the interests of a diverse range of actors and sponsors, including the US, former colonial powers, neighbouring countries, multinational corporations, UN agencies, and mercenary organisations.

Legitimate conflict termination operations demand an open agenda: that military intervention be authorised at the level of the international community (through the UN Security Council) and co-ordinated at the level of the appropriate regional body (the OAU) according to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The mandating resolution of the UN Security Council should clearly demand that all multinational, national and non-government involvement in the conflict be openly declared to the regional body, and that further involvement by such actors be sanctioned and co-ordinated at this level.

Partiality

An intervention force cannot maintain a posture of neutrality in the midst of ongoing violence. The history of UN 'peace enforcement' operations reveals that intervening forces have become involved in the conflicts in which they have intervened, and in the process favoured some parties more than others, regardless of their initial intentions of maintaining impartiality. The intervening force affects the balance of power between the different internal factions. By interposing itself between the combatants, or by taking control of places or resources which these have hoped to gain for themselves, it necessarily disadvantages some of them and in the process advantages others. The intervening force is not merely forced to take sides: almost inevitably, it finds itself lining up against the strongest of the domestic factions. This not only weakens the military position of the force, but protracts the conflict and impedes any attempt to negotiate a political settlement.¹⁷

On the other hand, an unambiguous intervention policy has both military and political advantages over a 'peacekeeping' operation. At the political level, taking sides from the outset enables the intervening actor to side-step the difficult task of protecting the neutral image of the intervention force, and it facilitates the co-ordination of field activity and diplomatic bargaining. Outcomes depend more on the leverage of the interventionist than on attempts to create proposals based on broad appeals intended to generate voluntary compliance by diverse conflicting groups. Direct, partial intervention also allows the military to concentrate on military and security objectives with a clarity of purpose which is absent in impartial peacekeeping.¹⁸

It is thus essential to choose sides from the outset, rather than have them chosen by default. At the political level, the decision to intervene in order to terminate an internal armed conflict, requires that a Faustian bargain be struck. It involves accepting a need for partiality, for choosing as it were the lesser of two evils, in terms of both the parties to the conflict and the amount of force which one would predict is necessary for restoring a measure of stability, while minimising the number of civilian casualties of conflict. It may mean the provision of assistance to a beleaguered government in forcing the opposition into submission, but this assistance must in turn be predicated on that government's willingness to submit to the terms and conditions set by the OAU and authorised by the UN.

At the operational level, the idea is to construct a minimum winning coalition consisting of the chosen combatant force and the multinational conflict termination force. The latter may play the role of advisors and trainers, or may also be required to provide the coalition with key combat competencies, such as leadership and aviation assets. The ultimate aim is to regain a monopoly of military force, in order to bring the instruments of mass coercion under central control.

Monopolisation of Military Force

Intervention in civil conflict in another state necessarily involves the imposition of power. According to Mackinlay,¹⁹ "[u]nless a monopoly of violence can be achieved, any attempt to disarm will expose the vulnerable, law abiding element of the community to local gangs, who are certain not to disarm. Recentralising the power within a state may require recognising and dealing with 'power brokers' or war lords. To ignore their influence invites continuing violence and the proliferation of banditry. Achieving real success may mean a tougher trade off between maintaining the moral high ground and the advantages of involving local power brokers in the stabilisation process. This does not mean allowing them to have their own way without any moral or humanitarian commitment. It does mean that the international community will have to take responsibility to put irresistible pressure on local leaders and those who influence security." Irresistible pressure involves the application and systematic monopolisation of military force. This may be accomplished in Africa by the use of fairly simple force multipliers, such as tactical aviation assets.

Rebel forces in Africa typically rely on lightly armed foot soldiers and their ability to mobilise local populations to join their cause through persuasion or coercion. They often have no access to more sophisticated weaponry than assault rifles, light machine guns and mortars. For example, it may be remembered that the destruction of the Liberian state began in 1989 when Charles Taylor invaded the country from the Ivory Coast with a lightly armed, Libyan-trained force numbering about 100 men. If even a modest intervention force with tactical aviation assets had been in place, this incursion may have been halted.

But there is a limit to what an intervention force of fairly modest size can achieve through direct participation in combat operations. The greatest potential for maximising the impact of an intervention force lies in the co-option and reorientation of local military and police forces. The intervention force must therefore consist of a high percentage of specialist instructors, who are capable of retraining and re-educating local forces to high standards of combat proficiency and professionalism, and who are willing and able to lead them in conflict termination operations. The principle of monopolisation also requires that such forces are recognised as the only legitimate forces for the pursuit of the aim of the mission, and that all other forces be required to disband and/or assimilate into the retrained 'national' forces.

Early and Concerted Action

This principle underpins not only conflict termination operations, but is also essential to the success of the first layer in the response hierarchy, 'intrusive diplomacy'. According to Clapham,²⁰ had effective mechanisms for obliging African governments to respect the most basic rights of their own people been in operation at that time, tragedies such as those in Chad, Liberia and Somalia may have been averted. While it has become fashionable to talk of the establishment of 'early warning networks', these are meaningless unless warning of impending human tragedy is followed by early and concerted action to prevent or halt the process of escalation.

While the roots of many contemporary African conflicts may indeed be complex, complex emergencies result from fairly simple direct causes. These include, greed, corruption, ethnocentrism, and a resort to armed force to perpetuate or attempt to terminate such practices. The earlier such direct causes are addressed, the less force will ultimately have to be used to bring about stability. From this broader perspective, then, conflict termination operations do indeed adhere to the classical peacekeeping principle of 'minimum use of necessary force'.

However, early and concerted action requires a multinational rapid deployment capability for intervention in communal conflicts. The very concept of rapid deployment under such circumstances negates the use of a complex system of standby arrangements involving the mobilisation of national contingents from a variety of countries, lengthy wrangling over the nature and scope of the mission mandate, and the right of contributors to withdraw support for particular types of missions. Indeed, the existing UN standby arrangements system is based on an understanding which specifically excludes 'peace enforcement' operations. Early action requires, therefore, a unique standing force of top-calibre personnel which is free from the tug-of-war of particularistic national interests.

AN INTERVENING AGENT FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

Having outlined a concept and principles for conflict termination operations in Africa, the problem still remains as to who or what would be willing and able to operate according to such principles. The idea of a layered response to African crises has local and national organisations responding initially, followed by responses at the subregional and regional (OAU) levels, and finally by those of the broader international community. This concept is meant to overcome the well-known inertia at the level of the UN, and enable more rapid and appropriate responses at much lower levels of the international security framework. However, the concept is flawed by the fact that, where the use of military force is concerned, there is just as much inertia at these lower levels when clearly identified national interests are not directly threatened.

Moreover, no international organisation has yet assumed a supranational position of authority over the military forces of its members, despite Article 43 (1) of the UN Charter, which states that, "[a]ll Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining International peace and security."

Nation-states have thus remained the principal actors in the international arena, especially when it comes to the raising and employment of a military force. Sometimes, nations have indeed been able to act effectively in concert within the framework of regional security alliances. But in the African context, it will be many years before regional alliances of national forces are capable of the type of concerted interventions such as the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. This is because the sophistication, complementarity and interoperability of the continent's armed forces are still extremely rudimentary. Moreover, many African states are openly averse to participation in multinational operations which have any kind of 'Chapter VII' or enforcement flavour.

Where individual national armies have had the capacity and will to intervene in African crises, it has been in pursuit of the real or perceived narrow national interests of the intervening country. Sending troops to interpose themselves in a civil war in another country is a risky enterprise, in which states are unlikely to take part unless they have strong interests of their own to secure.²¹ As Mackinlay²² has observed, "[n]ational responses are developed largely with electoral survival in mind ... The likely trends of domestic pressure will take priority over realistic long term needs of the emergency." Similarly, UN operational programmes for cease-fire, disarmament, demobilisation, elections and reconstruction have been sped up to meet the institutional constraints of the UN and the domestic election time tables of troop contributing countries. "In these circumstances the peace process fails completely or becomes a cosmetic activity that is irrelevant to the stabilisation needs of the crisis."²³

Subregional responses (such as ECOMOG in Liberia) have not fared much better in Africa. They have been messy, drawn out and at least as ineffective as UN responses. Moreover, most subregional organisations in Africa were established for the co-ordination of economic development, and their political and security frameworks are very immature. While the OAU has made great progress since 1993 in establishing its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, it is a long way from fielding an all-African force for effective armed intervention. Moreover, African subregional organisations and the OAU are under-financed in the extreme. There is also a limit to what the donor community is willing to provide in terms of assistance to such organisations. Any capabilities for intervention which are envisaged at these levels will therefore have to be both effective and cost-efficient.

It is therefore suggested that a relatively small, but professional, standing African Legion be established as the first layer of response during the emergency (conflict termination) phase of crises on the continent. Such a Legion should be characterised by the following:

clear political direction from the OAU (Conflict Management Division);



clear command and control via the force commander and normal military command structures, including a common language;



high cohesion (well-trained, well-paid and highly motivated personnel);



strict recruitment and promotional criteria;



standardised doctrine and training for stabilisation operations;



standard equipment tables;



strategic airlift and tactical airpower on inventory;



a binding code of conduct; and



transparency through the deployment of OAU observers.

The whole concept of the Legion would be based on quality and cohesion, rather than quantity and the imperative of broad representivity. Recruiting according to a pan-African all-volunteer force recipe, should ensure a fair geographical spread, but the selection criteria should be devoid of political imperatives. The force would recruit individuals, rather than units of national armies, so that it would be unconstrained by the domestic political imperatives of the countries from which the recruits are drawn. Standards for selection and promotion must be based on the implementation of the concept of stabilisation operations discussed above. Soldiers would swear allegiance to Africa and the Legion, rather than any single nation. While there must be a single language of command and control, legionnaires should be encouraged to remain conversant in major African languages, such as Swahili. The force should include the following:

a permanent force commander and headquarters staff;


a rapid deployment operational unit;


a military advisory and training team;


a civil advisory and training team;


a recruiting and selection section;


a linguistics section;


an aviation wing;


a logistics wing;


a force training depot;


a civilian police training wing; and


an advanced training wing.

It is envisaged that the total size of the standing force should not exceed 1 000 personnel. This limit is due to the élite nature of the force, and would keep personnel costs within reasonable limits. Even so, the annual salary bill of a force of this size would amount to some $24 million (based on an average individual salary of $2 000 per month, or twice the UN scale of assessment). This amount, coincidentally, is close to the amount that the US has earmarked for a proposed African Crisis Response Force.²⁴ Weapons, equipment and maintenance could be supplied by donor countries within and outside of Africa. The latter has been proposed on numerous occasions, but has hitherto lacked an appropriate structure for implementation.

However, recruitment for the Legion would be based on a renewable contract system, allowing the force to expand and contract as the situation demands. Service in the Legion should be recognised as honourable military service in an élite unit by all African military organisations, for purposes of re-employment and seniority.

An African Legion would bridge the gap between legitimate but ineffective international responses, and the recent trend towards illegitimate but seemingly effective responses by security entrepreneurs (mercenaries). It would support the long term goal of deterring future acts of armed rebellion and genocide, of allowing people to rethink the political futures of their countries from a regional rather than a national perspective, and of helping local people to craft appropriate institutions for managing the conflicting aims of sub-national groups.²⁵

While the African Legion would be a professional standing force, it should be relatively inexpensive to maintain, compared to some of the larger operations financed by the UN in Africa during recent years. The UNAVEM III operation in Angola, for example, is often cited as the largest and most expensive ongoing UN operation. It was authorised by the UN Security Council on 7 February 1995. By 1 March 1995, there were 418 UN military and police observers deployed in Angola. By 26 April 1995, the strength of UNAVEM III had risen to 875. On 30 May it stood at 1 813, and by 4 July the total strength of deployed units was 1 970. As of March 1996, 336 military observers, 6 576 troops and support personnel and 226 civilian police officers were deployed in Angola. Direct expenditures (excluding voluntary contributions for demobilisation and humanitarian assistance) for operating UNAVEM III from inception to May 1996 were estimated at $366 523 900,26 an average cost approximating $1 000 000 per day.

The UN intervention in Somalia was also extremely costly, and by all indications far more unsuccessful than the operation in Angola. UNOSOM I had a maximum strength of 54 military observers and 893 troops, and cost $42 931 700 from inception on 24 April 1992 to termination on 26 March 1993.27 The two-year UNOSOM II operation (26 March 1993-2 March 1995) had a strength, at the start of the withdrawal on 30 November 1994, of 14 968. The expenditure for this mission was $1 643 485 500,²⁸ an average cost approximating $2,3 million per day.

The envisaged Legion should not, however, be seen as a 'cure all' for communal conflicts in Africa. The concept of 'intrusive diplomacy' should be applied before the deployment of such a force. Moreover, the strength, composition and orientation of the Legion would make it a highly specialised force for the conduct of narrowly defined 'conflict termination operations'. It should therefore be supplemented and complemented by a much larger force for the conduct of 'consolidation operations'. The latter force would probably be best created through standby arrangement schemes, linked to the present initiatives to create a more 'conventional' African intervention capacity.

CONCLUSION

African crises will not be resolved through incremental adaptations of the concept and practice of UN peacekeeping. Nor have present conceptions of 'peace enforcement' yielded much success. Old remedies are bound to fail, when applied in a radically changed international and continental security environment. There is thus a clear choice between muddling through from crisis to crisis, or devising an entirely new framework for responding to conflicts in Africa. An attempt has been made in this article to present an alternative, action-oriented, response hierarchy, and to explain and justify concepts which differ radically from existing norms of intervention.

The justifications provided are probably inadequate to elicit meaningful action. The concept of conflict termination operations, for example, may not enjoy much support at the levels which count – within the UN Security Council and the Central Organ of the OAU, for it involves high levels of risk and commitment. The concept of intrusive diplomacy is also likely to invoke the wrath of those who cling to outmoded ideas of sovereignty and the sanctity of the state. However, it is hoped that the proposals made will contribute in some way to the revision of the type of stereotypical thinking which has perpetuated the impotence of the international and African communities in the face of ruinous internal conflict and humanitarian tragedy.

Similarly, the idea of an African Legion may never pass muster, but it certainly provides an alternative to the current futile attempts to create an African crisis response force based on national voluntarism and the ultimate right to non-participation in particular missions. The harsh reality is that there will always be some actors that are willing to intervene in third party conflicts, in pursuit of their own secretive agenda for war.

ENDNOTES

This article is published as part of the Training for Peace Project, a venture sponsored by the Norwegian Government and undertaken by the ISS in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).



J Mackinlay, International Responses to Complex Emergencies, International Peacekeeping News, 2(5), 1996, p. 36.



Ibid.



All Africa Press Service, 24 April 1996.



International Peacekeeping News, 2(1), March-April 1996, p. 5.



According to extracts from a report by a UN special investigator published in International Peacekeeping News, 2(1), March-April 1996, p. 7.



B Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later, Orbis, 37(3), Summer 1993, p. 329.



Ibid.



J S Corum, Operational Problems in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations, in J Cilliers and G Mills (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa, IDP and SAIIA, Halfway House, 1995, p. 132.



Mackinlay, op. cit., p. 37.



Corum, op. cit., pp. 130-131.



Corum, op. cit., p. 132.



I Guest, How and When to Intervene for Humanity, Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 1996.



M W Doyle, Peacebuilding in Cambodia, IPA Policy Briefing Series, December 1996, p. 3.



Ibid.



Mackinlay, op. cit.



Clapham, op. cit., pp. 145-146.



J Rudolph, Intervention in Communal Conflicts, Orbis, Spring 1995, p. 271.



Mackinlay, op. cit., p. 37.



Clapham, op. cit., p. 140.



Ibid., p. 141.



Mackinlay, op. cit., p. 36.



Ibid., p. 37.



During his visit to Africa in October 1996, former US Secretary of State, Mr Warren Christopher was promoting a proposal to set up an all-African military force. The African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) was to be used to deal with African crises where insurrections, civil war or genocide threaten mass civilian casualties. The US was offering to fund half of the cost of the force, estimated at $25-40 million, depending on whether or not the force would be deployed during the next year. It was hoped that the remainder of the cost would be met by European Union members and perhaps Japan.



Y Bangura, The Case for a Pan-African-Led Intervention Force in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, SAPEM, December/January 1996/97, p. 40.



United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 257-265.



Ibid., p. 721.



Ibid., p. 722.