PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: GREAT EXPECTATIONS²

Since the termination of the Cold War and the resulting alterations in the global and regional power balances, the world has witnessed a proliferation of low intensity conflicts. The international response, mainly via the United Nations, has been to promote preventive diplomacy and, in a number of cases, to implement peacekeeping operations. This new world order trend is obviously a most welcome and positive development. Through peacekeeping, military assets that have been originally designed and deployed to destroy human life, are now being used, albeit on a limited scale, to prevent conflict and to save lives. The peacekeeping revolution is a significant step towards increased human co-operation and the development of a functional international society. Although peacekeeping operations may require significant commitments on the part of participating states, specifically the willingness to accept financial costs and casualties, all governments should seriously consider taking part in these operations in the interest of promoting international and regional stability.

Post-Cold War conflicts may be largely divided into two categories. The first category includes civil wars caused by long standing historical differences, or new nationalism. The second category, which dominates on the African continent, are conflicts based on ethnic, national or religious divisions. Africa is additionally affected by a complex array of problems which have not been remedied over the last three decades. Many problems can be traced to colonialism, while other difficulties are part of the socio-political systems which have evolved in the post-colonial era.³ The specific nature of each dispute consequently requires appropriate responses in order to limit or to prevent conflict.

A great deal has been written on both preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, and an increasing number of conferences have been held to address these issues in recent years. This intellectual process, while in some cases far removed from the reality of international diplomacy and military operational activity, is to be welcomed as a way of further promoting the use of diplomacy and war machinery to serve peaceful and positive ends. Research in the field of peacekeeping has focused on a wide range of issues and, as is the fashion in the nineties, has attracted a large and impressive academic following. Regrettably, much of this research has concentrated on what is theoretically desirable, while the political and practically possible has been neglected. This approach has promoted enormous expectations of the UN, which clearly cannot be met.

In the African context, South Africa has been identified by many observers as the one state able to execute effective peacekeeping operations on the continent. On paper, South Africa's military capabilities appear impressive, but in reality there are many impediments to a major role for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in peacekeeping. However, these impediments are not unique to South Africa and apply to all democratic countries. There are a number of central issues which the promoters and supporters of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping have not paid sufficient attention to in their analyses.

KEYS FOR SUCCESS

The four important issues which have not received adequate attention by peace operations studies and which are of critical importance to any government contemplating involvement in preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping are:

early warning and the early response to a crisis – the key to preventive diplomacy;


adequate financial support for peacekeeping;


an accurate assessment of casualty tolerance in peacekeeping operations; and


sufficient information for successful peacekeeping.

The above issues are fundamental to any political leader's decision-making process. Without dealing adequately with these issues, no decision-maker can realistically be expected to make a major contribution to crisis diplomacy, or to undertake an even more risky peacekeeping operation.

EARLY WARNING AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

The idea of 'early warning' as "information that can provide a timely alert to potential conflicts" has been emphasised by a number of scholars as an important component in conflict resolution.⁴ In the African context, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has sought to develop an effective early warning system in an effort to deal with continental conflict. The OAU Secretary-General appears to favour a system which would provide sufficient information of an impending inter-state conflict, or internal political crisis. Once the problem has been tabled at the OAU, a high-level mediation mission can be mandated to initiate discussions with the objective of resolving the crisis.

Any successful early warning system should involve the synthesis of a range of information inputs from different sources, including governments, non-government organisations (NGOs), academic and research institutions.

By implication, any early warning system or activity may be perceived to be infringing on a state's sovereignty and could be rejected as an unwelcome form of foreign intervention. Nevertheless, crisis management and resolution have the best chance of success if action is taken early. A continental early warning system, as proposed by the OAU is extremely ambitious and is unlikely to be successful in the short term. The OAU's Conflict Management Centre (CMC) in Addis Ababa is a major step towards the prevention of conflict in Africa, but lacks the funding and resources to provide an effective continental service. Rather, individual African countries, armed with sufficient early warning information, should be able to initiate regional crisis diplomacy, while the OAU mobilises broader support. The OAU's 1993 resolution on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution serves as the foundation and guiding light for preventive diplomacy on the African continent, but the difficulties in mobilising sufficient support for speedy action necessitates a more streamlined procedure.

In the former UN Secretary-General's An Agenda for Peace, member states were asked to mobilise regional organisations and actors in co-operation with the UN to lighten the burden of peacekeeping.⁵ The OAU Early Warning Seminar, held in January 1996, acknowledged the importance of the 'sub-regional level' in early warning and preventive diplomacy processes.⁶ A multinational organisation located far from the crisis area can never compete with the speed and co-ordination of a national government. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had plans to abdicate some or all of the UN's peacekeeping functions to regional organisations. In November 1996, the UN's Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) indicated that there was a need for the UN to find partners "who would share responsibilities in collective security." In addition, the JIU study suggested that regional organisations "should be the first port of call for the prevention and pacific settlement of local disputes."⁷ There is a growing international consensus that conflicts could more easily be prevented or resolved through regional initiatives.

A recent British proposal to the UN on conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa has stressed that early warning is vital for successful preventive action.⁸ In most cases, especially conflicts in Africa over the last few years, there is no shortage of information indicating an impending crisis. However, the complex causes of conflict and the difficulty of processing and analysing different pieces of information require a co-ordinated and concentrated intelligence effort. Moreover, the sharing of processed information among all potential peace operation participants is a necessity for a timely and appropriate response. The UN, as well as its specialised agencies, should improve their information collection, analysis and distribution capabilities. Specifically, real time information should be readily available to the OAU headquarters, supplied by the UN and available to all OAU members involved in any regional peace operation.

In support of international efforts to provide information for preventive diplomacy, individual states should allocate intelligence assets for early warning. Indications and warning (I&W) or 'warning intelligence' are based on an interdisciplinary approach incorporating current, estimative intelligence with broader political, historical and geographical analyses. The warning intelligence process results in the production of an accurate warning statement for decision-makers. The peace operation warning process, however, requires some modification to the traditional approach of attempting to identify and predict possible surprise attacks by regional or ideological opponents.⁹ Traditionally, the raison d'être of an early warning system was to ensure that the nation's decision-makers were not surprised by an enemy attack. The peace operations early warning system requires a different approach with less emphasis on direct threat analysis. In order to respond adequately to a regional crisis, decision-makers require strategic warning and tactical warning. Strategic warning ensures that the decision-makers have a clear overall picture and sufficient quality time to make the necessary decision. Strategic warning should provide decision-makers with regular updates on regional developments with specific emphasis on the potential for internal or inter-state conflict, thereby ensuring an opportunity to prepare effectively for a decisive peace support intervention. Tactical warning requires more detailed and specific information for the decision-maker willing to commit a direct response. In this context, the leaders of the conflicting parties, as well as the central issues in dispute should be identified and analysed in detail. Psychological and biographical profiles of the leaders concerned should be provided along with possible diplomatic solutions. Tactical warning should also provide the decision-maker with a number of options which could be pursued if preventive diplomacy is to be initiated.

States should allocate key defence and intelligence assets to the prediction of conflict and thereby provide the means for an early settlement. The warning analyst should be trained to think in terms of probabilities, predictions and possible short term courses of action. The goal is to discern the intentions of major players in any potential regional conflict.¹⁰ Military and other reconnaissance satellites should be more directly used in providing early warning and support for diplomacy. For example, Russia's earth observation satellite, the Resurs-F3 is capable of delivering film negatives of 2,2 metre in diameter. Images, costing between $3 000 and $5 000, would be adequate to identify the movement of troops, or refugees.¹¹ The United States Air Force white paper entitled Global Presence 1995, outlined the US' ability to maintain 'virtual' presence via space-based and air-breathing reconnaissance systems along with other information gathering technologies. The use of these technologies to support preventive diplomacy, rather than simply to promote the national interests of the US, would be a major contribution to conflict resolution.¹² The mobilisation of satellite observation platforms for peace operations could be decisive in empowering early warning organisations.¹³ Last year, then US Defence Secretary William Perry undertook to provide Israel with near real time satellite early warning information from Colorado Springs via secure US military downlink stations in Europe.¹⁴ A similar service, with the emphasis on information for preventive diplomacy, would be extremely useful for the UN and OAU. Details on the positioning, or movement of military forces combined with other open sources of information may be the key in preventing the initial outbreak of conflict and accompanying loss of life. At the same time, any early warning system should respect the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all states.

The key factor in the success of any early warning system is an early response, not simply the ability to identify an impending problem: in other words, the earliest possible application of preventive diplomacy. The former UN Secretary-General defined preventive diplomacy as "the action required to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."¹⁵ The method of choice for preventive diplomacy is based on intensive 'shuttle diplomacy' to organise one-to-one meetings with all stakeholders. In addition, the involvement and support of regional leaders is clearly important for the success of such an exercise. The institution of preventive diplomacy early in 1994 in response to the growing political instability in Lesotho, serves as a useful model for this form of activity.¹⁶ The co-ordination of a regional initiative combined with a rapid response to an impending crisis were the keys to success. Moreover, the willingness of the protagonists to accept external intervention cannot be overemphasised. In the ideal case, regional crisis negotiators should be invited, rather than impose themselves, to lead negotiations for a peaceful diplomatic settlement. Events preceding the Rwandan crisis of April-June 1994 provided extensive evidence of an impending outbreak of violence. For more than a year prior to the eruption of the crisis on 6 April 1994, the increasing tension and violence in the country pointed towards a disaster. There is strong evidence to suggest that the UN was in possession of information indicating an impending outbreak of major conflict.¹⁷ The failure to respond appropriately and speedily to early warning information allowed the genocide to occur. The spark of the recent Zairian crisis occurred on 7 October 1996 when the deputy governor of Zaire's South Kivu province demanded that the 300 000 strong Banyamulenge community (ethnic Tutsis) leave Zaire within a week, or "be hunted down as rebels."¹⁸ Within fourteen days, serious conflict erupted between the Banyamulenge and Zairian troops leading to the flight of over 250 000 refugees into Zaire. It took almost one month before an emergency summit was held to discuss the crisis. By this time, the refugees were faced with severe problems and the conflict had escalated significantly. An effective early warning system should have been able to warn of the impending conflict and should have facilitated the launch of a diplomatic initiative before the crisis began on 7 October 1996, or immediately thereafter.

Thus, the appropriate standby arrangement for crisis management and resolution are experienced and respected 'shuttle diplomats', supported by the necessary secretariat and rapid transport. Additional requirements include satellite telephones, IT support, data communication systems, along with the necessary technical skills to manage a complex negotiation process.¹⁹ In this context, South Africa could play a leading role on the African continent. South African diplomats, complemented by President Mandela's immense prestige, along with the necessary secretarial personnel and executive aircraft could provide the means for African solutions to continental conflict without the intrusion of external powers.²⁰

THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF PEACEKEEPING

Preventive diplomacy should always be the chosen option for resolving a crisis. However, if diplomacy is insufficient, a peacekeeping operation is the next best option. Peacekeeping presents a range of different problems, the first of which is finding the necessary funds to finance the operation. As a consequence of growing scepticism with regard to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, the UN has been forced to reduce its peacekeeping budget. This marks an unfortunate reversal of an earlier trend. The UN's peacekeeping budget increased from $379 million in 1990 to a high of $3,5 billion in 1994. However, 1995 saw a decrease to $3,2 billion, while 1996 recorded the lowest expenditure in five years at $1,3 billion.²¹ In addition, the number of UN peacekeepers have also shown a marked decrease from 65 000 in 1995 to 25 600 at the end of 1996.²² The number of peacekeeping missions have decreased from 22 in 1994 to only 16. The UN's new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has suggested that "peacekeeping as a primary activity of the United Nations will not end."²³ However, the negative trend in peacekeeping missions, deployment and spending suggests that a number of critical issues need to be reviewed before a new wave of hopefully more successful peacekeeping initiatives can be undertaken.

The cash crisis for the UN, with a budget deficit of $2,3 billion in unpaid dues, undermines the ability of the organisation to continue as the world's leading peacekeeper. Moreover, the UN cannot settle the $1 billion debt owed to 81 member states which provided troops and equipment for operations during 1996.²⁴ Understandably, member states are more and more reluctant to participate in UN operations because of the high costs involved. At the end of 1996, the UN owed Pakistan $67 million and India $58 million for their contributions to peacekeeping.²⁵ Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali confirmed that some member states refused to take part in future operations until they were paid. Boutros-Ghali summarised the problem before the UN Security Council in 1996 saying, "You give me a mandate for a peacekeeping mission. But you don't give me the troops and the money I need to implement that mandate."²⁶

The UN plan to establish a standby force intended to accelerate the deployment of forces to trouble spots, has only met with five positive responses from its 185 members.²⁷ The standby agreement is designed to ensure the rapid deployment of a significant number of troops to fill the three to six-month gap between the UN authorisation of a peacekeeping mission and full deployment. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) take-over of the UN's peacekeeping operation in Bosnia suggests that peacekeeping may move increasingly towards control by regional organisations which have the ability to finance such operations.²⁸

The most costly UN peacekeeping operation was that of Somalia which totalled $1,6 billion.²⁹ The Somali experience has provided an important lesson for all potential African peacekeeping missions. Major operational challenges in Somalia were posed by problems relating to geography, transportation and the complex political system. The colonial division of Africa has ensured that peacekeepers on the continent will always face major political complexities. Africa's artificial political borders, combined with decades of colonial manipulation and economic exploitation, guarantee that the continent's political jigsaw will provide serious and expensive challenges for peacekeepers. The lack of infrastructural development and the political intractability of most African conflicts confirm that the financial cost for peacekeeping on this continent will always be high.

The British experience in Bosnia supports the contention that peacekeeping operations tend to cost more than originally planned. The cost of the British contribution to NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1996 amounted to £300 million. This was above and beyond the cost of sustaining the deployed forces in home bases. During the 1995/96 financial year the cost of involvement was carried by the Ministry of Defence. Over the period 1992-1995 of the United Nations Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) deployment, the Ministry of Defence was reimbursed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The FCO then began to lobby the UN to recover the costs of the British military participation.³⁰ The Ministry of Defence expressed a concern that IFOR expenditures should not undermine defence expenditure as a whole. Moreover, it was pointed out that it was extremely difficult to predict how much would be spent on peacekeeping. The Ministry's suggested solution to the problem was to include a "substantial contingency element" within the defence budget earmarked for peacekeeping which would be returned to the Treasury if not used.³¹ The British deployment in Bosnia also highlighted the need for a substantial logistic operation. Planning for the mission assumed that participants would provide their own "national stove-pipes" to support their forces. The British supply operation makes extensive use of the port of Split in Croatia. The Royal Logistics Corps (RLC) has been under pressure to meet approximately 1 000 daily requests for supplies. The logistics system is based on the concept of 'just in time' thus supplies have to be flown in daily. The costs of the operation are extremely high and require a complex transportation and communication system.³²

In March this year, the US Department of Defence indicated that a further $2,1 billion was required to pay for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Secretary of Defence William Cohen indicated that if the funds were not made available, the military would be forced to scale back on training and other programmes. Under rules set up by the Republican-controlled Congress, money for any emergency must be offset by cuts in existing defence programmes to avoid adding to the national debt. Funds earmarked for long term procurement and weapons purchasing programmes are likely to be used to pay for the Bosnia operation.³³ In 1992, former Secretary of Defence Les Aspin proposed the establishment of a separate fund of $300 million (Contributions for International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Activities fund) intended to assist other countries to participate in peacekeeping and to minimise budgetary problems for the US. The proposal was rejected as "yet another raid" on the Pentagon budget.³⁴

At the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Member States of the Central Organ of the OAU held in Addis Ababa during early June 1996, the issue of peacekeeping and methods to finance these operations were raised but not discussed in any detail.³⁵ A wide range of other issues were dealt with and some excellent proposals were laid on the table, but funding received only minor coverage. The official report on the meeting indicated that financing peacekeeping operations was "of a policy nature and should, therefore, be left to the policy makers." Some participants suggested that the UN should be responsible for funding. It was concluded that this issue, as well as logistic problems, would be dealt with by the proposed group of experts to be called the Budget and Logistics Committee.³⁶ At the same time, there was general acceptance that African states, individually or collectively, would have extreme difficulty in providing the necessary resources for any major peacekeeping operation.

Funding for peacekeeping is a critical issue for any government. The potential costs of such operations and the massive logistic commitment for long distance operations are key factors in any decision-making process. Developing countries, South Africa included, cannot rush into any peacekeeping venture without careful consideration of the financial implications. South African involvement in a Somalia type operation could consume between one third and one half of the nation's annual defence budget. The solution for the financial crisis with Africa's peacekeeping may lie in the establishment of a peacekeeping bank, set up by donors from the developed world, who could lend or grant money to peacekeeping participants. The peacekeeping bank would be advised by military experts as to the feasibility of any operation and would require reasonable guarantees of success before making loans or donations. The successful peacekeeper would be rewarded with lower interest rate payments or the conversion of loans into grants.

CASUALTY TOLERANCE

A clear estimate of the number of casualties which would be acceptable is essential for any military operation, peacekeeping included. The Vietnam war indicated the limits of public support in the face of mounting casualties. Between 1961 and 1973, 47 244 American troops were killed and over 300 000 wounded. The unacceptable losses had a major impact on decision-makers and popular support for the war in general.³⁷ The US Government discovered that public and congressional support for any military operation was essential. Colonel Harry Summers addresses this issue in his recent book The New World Strategy, and concludes that, "[i]f the war in Vietnam proved nothing else, it proved the American people could not be excluded from the strategic equation."³⁸ In 1984, US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger outlined the Weinberger Doctrine, emphasising that "before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in the Congress."³⁹ High casualties will erode public support and are therefore important in the decision-making process. This factor, the so-called 'sixth test' of the Weinberger Doctrine is applicable to any democratic country considering the deployment of military force for peacekeeping.

The number of casualties any government can tolerate in a peacekeeping operation is a key issue that has to be decided before any deployment commences. A negative public response to high casualties in a peacekeeping operation, not considered to be of major importance, could obviously have very serious ramifications. High casualties could have long term effects on a nation's willingness to participate in future operations. The UN experience in Somalia illustrates the importance of the casualty tolerance issue. The first announcement of US casualties in Somalia led to popular calls for an immediate withdrawal from UNOSOM II. Following the death of the first four US soldiers, Senator Robert Byrd suggested that the "operation was crumbling" and that it was "not worth American lives lost and injuries sustained."⁴⁰ The US public began to apply very strict limits on the number of casualties acceptable in a far-off peacekeeping operation which had no clear place on the national interest agenda. On 5 June 1993, twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ambush set up by supporters of Mohammed Aideed. The following day the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, demanding the immediate apprehension of those responsible for the attack. Consequently, US forces were mobilised in a manhunt for Aideed. A few weeks later, a major clash occurred with Aideed's forces, leaving 18 American troops dead and 75 wounded. This event clearly surpassed the US casualty tolerance level and President Clinton immediately announced the phased withdrawal of US troops. American forces in Somalia were confined to force protection missions until the completion of the phased withdrawal. By all accounts, the US' failure to capture Aideed was caused by "inaccurate and untimely intelligence."⁴¹

With the rise in casualties sustained by UN peacekeeping forces world-wide, most countries have become increasingly reluctant to commit forces. For any democratic government it is extremely difficult to justify casualties in peacekeeping operations where clear and compelling national interests cannot be identified. Lack of public support will thus always be a limiting factor in peacekeeping operations. The Somali experience turned into the US' "peacekeeping Vietnam" – the US remains extremely reluctant to become directly involved in any African peacekeeping operation. Instead, the emphasis has shifted to efforts to sell the idea of an 'African Crisis Response Force' (ACRF – subsequently renamed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)). The ACRI has been clearly designed to promote African peacekeeping without endangering the lives of US troops. The plan contains an emphasis on humanitarian support based on the US strategic airlift, in conjunction with extensive diplomatic initiatives involving the UN, OAU and regional stakeholders.⁴²

The solution to potentially unacceptable casualties in peacekeeping could possibly be found in the provision of high quality body armour for participating forces, combined with the necessary equipment and skills to do the job. In addition, the US experience in Haiti provides some guidelines for reducing peace operation casualties. Long before the US XVIII Airborne Corps landed in Haiti, the US Army's 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Group at Ft. Bragg had analysed and divided Haiti's population into twenty different target groups to be provided with appropriate information and warning of the impending US involvement. Thousands of leaflets were distributed, supported by extensive radio broadcasts.⁴³ Prior to the US intervention, the Pentagon expected widespread conflict and unrest leading to unacceptably high casualties. However, only one US soldier was killed and the overall campaign was successful. According to the mission commander, "there (was) no question that PSYOPS helped save lives."⁴⁴

INFORMATION SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING

Adequate preparation for a peacekeeping operation should include detailed and quality intelligence. This issue was emphasised in former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace. Peacekeeping forces need what NATO calls the 'Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR)' – the minimum information required for operational success. Information systems which provide instant battlefield awareness are essential for combat supremacy in any military operation.⁴⁵ This information should be provided by the UN, or by participating states. Without CCIR, peacekeeping operations are unlikely to succeed. The UN has acknowledged this point and have debated the launching of 'spy' satellites to support peacekeeping, but high costs have led to the idea being shelved.

The use of the word 'intelligence' immediately promotes a negative image. During the Cold War, opposing intelligence organisations became increasingly powerful and secretive. Intelligence became a key component in the ideological struggle between East and West.⁴⁶ The elements of Cold War intelligence included collection; analysis (forecasting); counter-intelligence (protection); and covert action. The fourth element of the Cold War intelligence menu raised the most concern and controversy. The use of covert action to eliminate opponents or overthrow foreign governments clearly brought into question the process and function of intelligence organisations.⁴⁷ At the same time, the nature of the ideological struggle between East and West enhanced the role of intelligence organisations and promoted secretive covert action activities which in turn undermined the legitimacy of the organisations themselves.

Post-Cold War intelligence activities no longer resemble the programmes of the past. Collection is based more and more on the almost overwhelming supply of open sources. Traditionally, the majority of intelligence information was obtained from open sources in any event.⁴⁸ Counter-intelligence relates increasingly to a very small area of activity. The era of obsessive information protection has been replaced by a new culture of transparency, the Internet and a world-wide flow of information which clearly benefits mankind as a whole. Covert action is irrelevant in the more open, interdependent and democratic international system.

Modern intelligence activities thus focus on analysis, or strategic forecasting. Making use of mostly open sources, supplemented by advanced processing technology, the average intelligence officer joins together the relevant pieces of the intelligence puzzle and provides the intelligence product to the decision-maker. In one sense therefore, "intelligence [remains] fundamentally a service required by those who have to make decisions."⁴⁹ The quality of the intelligence product is of vital concern to the decision-maker. The ideal intelligence officer should thus be a highly qualified and skilled individual, capable of assembling, analysing and communicating information. In the post-Cold War world, intelligence is nothing more than processed information for use by decision-makers. The trained assassin, or disguised undercover agent, are no longer part of the modern intelligence agency and no longer relevant to the modern intelligence agenda.

The new intelligence process is guided by the broad definition of security. In 1968, former US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara published a book entitled The Essence of Security in which he proposed a definition of security which included a wide range of non-military elements. McNamara stressed that "security is development and without development there can be no security."⁵⁰ Since then, other scholars have come to realise that security is a broad concept which cannot be limited only to military force and the identification of enemies, or potential enemies. In 1980, the UN's Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues concluded that military strength alone could not ensure security in an ever-changing international system. More recently, the security 'definition debate' was highlighted by Buzan and Thomas, both of whom agreed that security had been too narrowly defined in the past.⁵¹

The intensity of the Cold War and the danger of surprise nuclear attack, possibly resulting in planetary devastation, preoccupied security experts and led to a neglect of the broader and, in many ways, obvious security issues. With the end of the threat of nuclear war, or the threat of a limited regional war escalating to a nuclear exchange, broader security issues have come into focus. The new agenda contains a vast array of different elements each requiring specialist attention and analysis. Ekins, for example, suggests that there are "four highly credible, but also totally avoidable threats to our existence on earth – war, hunger, repression and eco-disaster."⁵² Mankind no longer faces the prospect of a quick and devastating nuclear exchange, but rather needs to contend with what may be called broad-based, steadily increasing, threats to human survival. In response to new threats, intelligence organisations need to master international information networks as providers of relevant security information and recruit the services of specific field specialists able to add value to the intelligence product. The modern day intelligence officer is concerned with a completely open research and analysis agenda which represents the interests of society as a whole and not the particular interests of any ruling élite, party or ideology. Thus, in the post-Cold War context, national intelligence organisations are well suited to support peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

The UN has neglected to set up a comprehensive information gathering and processing system to support peacekeeping operations.⁵³ Clearly, the implementation of an advanced information processing system by the UN would significantly benefit peacekeeping operations at both the planning and execution stages. With regard to planning, intelligence could be used to accurately calculate troop requirements, the availability and utility of facilities (especially airfields), local infrastructure (roads) and logistic requirements. Quality planning would positively influence calculations with regard to the supply of troops and support personnel for peacekeeping, thereby minimising costs and maximising chances of success. In addition, the potential for hostile action and the capabilities of potentially hostile forces need to be carefully evaluated to avoid tactical surprises, especially in the early stages of operational deployment. The use of air transport to deploy peacekeepers implies that information on possible belligerent anti-aircraft capabilities are crucial.⁵⁴ Moreover, where a peace enforcement operation is envisaged, the identification of the hostile forces' centre of gravity becomes critical.

The UN process of ad hoc ground reconnaissance has resulted on a number of occasions in serious time delays in the deployment of troops, as well as the insufficient provision of supplies. The use of both aerial and ground-based surveillance, using sensors and imaging technology, would significantly improve any peacekeeping force's ability to monitor the theatre of operations.⁵⁵ Lockheed Martin Corporation is presently developing a reconnaissance vehicle, known as 'DarkStar', which will provide near real time, continuous, all-weather, wide area surveillance to tactical commanders. Moreover, it is specifically designed and constructed to operate in high threat environments. Technology of this kind would be ideal to provide intelligence support to peacekeeping operations.⁵⁶ Intelligence specialists have identified unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as potentially one of the greatest force multipliers. The Pioneer UAV was used extensively during the Gulf War (483 missions, totalling 1 559 hours) with good results.⁵⁷ The Predator UAV's multiple sensors provide an effective close-up picture of ground operations capable of revealing objects as small as 20 centimetres in diameter from an altitude of 4 000 metres. The development of an aerial border patrol system similar to the US counter-narcotics Command and Management System (CMS) to monitor cease-fire agreements in support of peacekeeping operations would also be useful.⁵⁸ Other options for the provision of quality intelligence includes the Hughes synthetic aperture radar system capable of providing 1,8 metre resolution images from an orbital distance of 110 kilometres.⁵⁹

The Sinai Support Mission, established by the US in 1974 at the request of both Israel and Egypt, used sensor technologies to successfully monitor military activity in the Sinai.⁶⁰ In April 1982, the Multinational Force and Observers began to make effective use of ground sensors, aerial photography and on-site verification to ensure the implementation of the Camp David Agreement. Advances in the field of satellite imagery have provided tactical information support for peacekeeping forces. During Operation Restore Hope, the US' operation in Somalia, the US Army Space and Strategic Defence Command provided the 10th Mountain Division with a multi-spectral satellite imagery terminal capable of accessing civilian LANDSAT satellites. This ensured a quick response mapping capability for tactical use by unit commanders. The US operation in Somalia confirmed Sun Tzu's two thousand five hundred year old thesis – good intelligence is vital for any military operation.⁶¹ In his book entitled Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Kenneth Allard points out that "while 'information' is the term of choice, operations in Somalia proved that, whatever it is called, intelligence has a crucial role to play at the lower end of the conflict spectrum."⁶² US forces in Somalia made use of a wide range of information gathering equipment, including night-vision devices, ground-surveillance radars, tactical air reconnaissance and unmanned aerial vehicles. An important source of intelligence proved to be soldiers in the field using eyes and ears to provide commanders with quality "situation awareness."⁶³

The UN operation in Somalia suggests that peacekeeping operations have created a new form of 'information warfare' within which the peacekeepers compete with those who oppose the peace process. Success in this new information environment however, requires a mindshift away from the traditional intelligence approach of identifying and assessing the 'enemy'. In peacekeeping operations there are no enemies, but there may be factions or groups which use force to undermine the peace process. Nevertheless, the approach towards peacekeeping, as with any form of military deployment or conflict, should be based on the logic and science of war.⁶⁴ In the case of Somalia, the forces of Mohammed Aideed became the central opponents of peace and were therefore identified as hostile. At the same time, it is clear that in every peacekeeping operation there is a possibility that the peacekeepers themselves will become the target of hostility. Good intelligence will be able to predict and prepare for this eventuality. In Somalia, despite the technological aids outlined above, the US did not have sufficient quality intelligence and thus paid the price. The issue of intelligence is therefore one of approach, more than technological barriers.

CONCLUSION

Preventive diplomacy is the best response to growing regional low intensity conflict, especially in Africa where the political, social and geographical complexities make peacekeeping unattractive. At the same time, preventive diplomacy requires adequate early warning and the speedy response to a crisis. Early warning should be provided by national governments and international information networks, supported by the developed countries until such time as the capacity of the UN and the OAU are further enhanced. Moreover, individual states should be encouraged to initiate preventive diplomacy, in consultation with regional neighbours and organisations, as well as the UN, in order to begin peace negotiations before conflicts escalate. When preventive diplomacy fails, peacekeeping may be the next best option. However, decision-makers require sufficient funding for successful peacekeeping. The funding problem will have to be solved before peacekeeping becomes a respected and successful element in global conflict resolution. Moreover, an accurate calculation of casualty tolerance and public support for a peacekeeping operation is critical, especially if a long term involvement is envisaged. High casualties will erode popular support for peacekeeping and make this activity more difficult to implement. Recent peacekeeping operations have confirmed that quality intelligence is essential for success. Without adequate UN or regional intelligence networks in place, states should allocate intelligence assets to assist peacekeeping operations in the interest of international peace and regional stability.

ENDNOTES

When the article was written, the author was Director for Intelligence Policy of the Defence Secretariat in the Department of Defence (1996-97). The views expressed are solely those of the writer and do not reflect the opinions of the University of the Witwatersrand of the Department of Defence.



Peace operations are defined as including preventive diplomacy/crisis management; peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Preventive diplomacy is action required to prevent the escalation of conflict. Peacekeeping is defined as an operation designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an agreed political settlement. Peace enforcement involves the threat or use of force to restore or maintain peace.



According to Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), "border differences, refugees, economic stagnation, abuse of human rights, lack of political accountability and democracy, environmental degradation and a host of other problems have combined to undermine the confidence and security of the continent." Quoted in Sapem, April 1996, p. 10. See also G Mills, Inter- and Intra-State Conflict in Africa in the 1990s: Democracy as a Cure-All?, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 18(1), 1966, pp. 19-35.



See for example K Rupesinghe and M Kuroda (eds.), Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992; J Cilliers, Some Practical Proposals on Early Warning of Intra-State Conflict in Africa: The Political-Military Dimensions, ISSUP Bulletin, 2, 1996; W G Nhara, Early Warning and Conflict in Africa, IDP Papers, 1, February 1996.



In January 1993, the UN Security Council invited regional organisations to become more involved in peace operations in co-operation with the UN. Some suggested the complete handing over of peace operations to regional actors. The problems relating to this suggestion are a lack of funds and capacity in most regional organisations outside of Europe.



OAU, Summary of Record of The Seminar for the Establishment, Within the OAU, of an Early Warning System on Conflict Situations in Africa, Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa, 15-18 January 1996, p. 8.



Defence 96: The World in Conflict, Jane's Magazines, 6, 1996, p. 21.



UK Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Proposals to the United Nations: Conflict Prevention and Peace-Keeping in Africa, report based on discussions between African and non-African countries in New York, and at seminars in Accra, Cairo and Harare, UK Ministry of Defence, London, 1995.



Former Deputy Director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby R Inman, stressed the importance of early warning in the Cold War context. He stated, "There are few jobs more important to our country than to recognize the earliest indications of future international problems and to alert our national leaders quickly." B R Inman, Forward, Signal, October 1981, p. 9.



For a more detailed analysis of early warning intelligence, see for example R K Betts, Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1980-81, pp. 559-571; see also T G Belden, Indications, Warning and Crisis Operations, International Studies Quarterly, March 1977, pp. 181-197.



Resurs-F World Map consortium was created in 1993 by Priroda, Russia's primary non-military remote sensing acquisition and processing organisation and JEBCO Information Services of London to market digital data from original negatives.



A survey by the US magazine Via Satellite recently pointed out that more satellites have been launched during the 1990s than in the previous three decades combined. Quoted in Jane's Defence Weekly, 26(13), 1996, p. 52.



The paper also suggested that 'virtual' presence could prove effective in influencing the behaviour of an adversary. Information technology could thus protect US interests without the physical presence of armed forces. See G W Goodman, The Power of Information, Armed Forces Journal, July 1995, p. 24.



Defence News, 21-27 October 1996, p. 24.



Quoted by R Evans, Preventive Diplomacy in Lesotho and Mozambique, in J Cilliers and G Mills (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa, 2, IDP and SAIIA, Halfway House, 1995, p. 187.



In this case, the Foreign ministers of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana played important roles in resolving the crisis. Wide discussions with all stakeholders in Lesotho over a period of several days led to the formulation of a draft proposal, which served as the basis for a resolution of the crisis. A determined diplomatic effort combined with the willingness of stakeholders to make compromises produced a positive outcome.



UN was Warned of Rwanda Genocide, Reuters, 11 January 1994, Usenet Newsgroup: clari.world.africa.



Quoted in Focus on Africa, January - March 1997, p. 15.



An ideal tool for preventive diplomacy communication is the planned 66-satellite digital network, known as Iridium, which is presently being developed. The Iridium system is expected to be unmatched in its ability to relay information instantly anywhere in the world. In comparison to geostationary communications satellites 40 000 km above the earth, the low orbit of the Iridium system will allow communications to low-power hand units on the ground with insignificant time delays. See National Defence, March 1995, p. 26.



The South African Department of Foreign Affairs' foreign policy discussion document describes preventive diplomacy as "a crucial element of South Africa's foreign policy." Unpublished document, based on a Heads of Mission Conference, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, September 1995, p. 25.



Briefing: Debts Undermine UN Peacekeeping, Jane's Defence Weekly, 27(1), 1997, p. 17.



The largest contributions are presently being made by Pakistan (1 704); Russia (1 215); India (1 208); Bangladesh (1 178) and Jordan (1 127). In total, 81 countries provided troops for the UN in 1996.



Quoted in Jane's Defence Weekly, 1997, op. cit., p. 17.



Ibid., p. 19; see also National Defence, November 1995, p. 9.



According to Indian Ambassador Prakash Shah, the UN still owes India money from the 1960 Congo operation.



Quoted in Jane's Defence Weekly, 27(2), 8 January 1997, p. 21.



Over 60 countries have shown an interest in the plan, but only five have formally signed an agreement. They include Jordan, Denmark, Ghana, Malaysia and Austria.



Both Malaysia and the Pacific Rim countries have spoken out against an increasing role for regional organisations in peacekeeping, especially if the UN is ignored.



UN Report, quoted in Jane's Defence Weekly, 24(5), 1995, p.16.



House of Commons, Defence Committee, Fifth Report, British Forces in Bosnia, HMSO, London, 1996, p. 23.



Ibid. The Ministry's recommendations was that "the additional cost to the defence budget of UK participation in IFOR should not be borne by the defence budget."



British soldiers deployed in Bosnia are paid the same amount as others who serve in the UK, Northern Ireland or Germany. During the intervention in Somalia, the US Army even had to fly in water supplies.



Defence News, 10-16 March 1997, p. 50. The House Budget Committee Chairman, Representative John Kasich threatened to use the request for funding to end the peacekeeping mission.



Armed Forces Journal, October 1994, p. 12



Discussions at the Addis Ababa meeting.



OAU, Report of the First Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Member States of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa, 3-5 June 1996, p. 21.



Approximately 56 per cent of US troops witnessed comrades being killed or wounded in military operations. See P Marshal and P Chinnery, Getting the Wounded Out, in Nam: The Vietnam Experience 1965-75, 3, Orbis, London, 1987, p. 77.



Col H G Summers, Jr (ret), The New World Strategy, Touchstone Books, New York, 1995, p. 21. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara suggested that "the greatest contribution Vietnam is making – right or wrong is besides the point – is that it is developing an ability in the United States to fight a limited war, to go to war without arousing the public ire" (quoted in Summers). The Vietnam war proved McNamara wrong and suggested that any democratic government contemplating a military operation, peacekeeping included, should take public opinion seriously.



Quoted in Summers, ibid. Critics complained that Weinberger was suggesting that the US Government should take a poll before becoming involved in any dispute.



Quoted in M Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Papers, 281, October 1993, p. 65.



Armed Forces Journal, December 1993, p. 34.



US Government Document, The African Crisis Response Force: A Partnership for the 21st Century, United States Embassy, Pretoria, 16 October 1996. The ACRF was originally designed to conduct humanitarian operations in Burundi.



Care was taken in the presentation of information – leaflets were printed in red and blue – the colours of Haiti's flag. Messages were intended to reassure the population and to avoid any violent response to the arrival of US forces.



Quoted in Armed Forces Journal, June 1995, p. 32. Many pamphlets were distributed by aircraft and thousands of transistor radios were dropped by parachute. Haitian soldiers were told to remain in their barracks and not to resist the invaders.



In order to stay ahead in the information warfare race, the US plans to spend increasing amounts on information technologies. The Pentagon's 1995 request for new investment in information technology totalled almost $10 billion. See National Defence, March 1995, p. 24.



During the Cold War, intelligence was viewed as the "continuation of war by the clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another power." See J Der Derian, Antidiplomacy, Blackwell, London, 1992, p. 21. Some observers suggested that the use of intelligence during the Cold War was "to wage war without war – which, in the superpower stasis of nuclear peace, has made it for a very long time, the only real game in town." See P Virilio, Pure War, Semiotext, New York, 1983, p. 27.



See for example E Ray, W Scharp, K van Meter and L Wolf, Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, Lyle Stuart, New Jersey, 1979.



Grant points out that information provided by 'secret agents' formed only a very small proportion of 'total intelligence'. See N Grant, Spies and Spying, Kestrel, London, 1975, p. 17. Some specialists, including former intelligence officers, have suggested that spies are "more trouble than they are worth."



J Haswell, Spies and Spy Masters, Thames and Hudson, London, 1977, p. 10.



R McNamara, The Essence of Security, Hodder and Stoughton, New York, 1968, p. 12.



See B Buzan, People, States and Fear, Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 1991; C Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations, Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 1987.



P Ekins, A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 52.



Mats Berdal suggested that this issue should be examined by a high-level panel of experts which could advise the United Nations. See Berdal, op. cit, p.65.



The use of air power for troop deployment has become a central feature of modern military operations. The movement of forces by land or sea may be too slow to ensure a favourable result. Military units can only realise their full potential if they are rapidly deployed where they are needed. The availability of enough airlift to deploy an adequate military force speedily to the area of operation is vital for successful peacekeeping. See K Chapman, Military Air Transport Operations, Brassey's, UK, 1989, pp. 1-14. The presence of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles held by potentially hostile forces in the area of operations could have a major impact on troop deployment via aircraft. High-risk missile systems include Stinger (XFIM-92A), Blowpipe, Grail (SA-7), RB83 and Redeye (FIM-43A).



In recent years, there have been significant technological advances in the development of UAVs.



National Defence, September 1995, p. 8. An enormous increase in spending on unmanned aerial vehicles is predicted in the short term. The use of airborne robotic sensors, combined with improved observation platforms, is expected to have a major impact on the collection of area of operations (AO) information.



See Armed Forces Journal, July 1995, pp. 34-39. The US armed forces have identified four 'must have' UAV systems for the next century. These include the Tactical UAV, Tier II Predator, Tier II Plus and Tier III Minus DarkStar. See Defence 96: The World in Conflict, op. cit., p. 26.



The CMS is a dedicated US Department of Defence surveillance system supporting counterdrug operations of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The system provides information for the various drug enforcement agencies along the US-Mexican border. See Jane's International Defence Review, Jane's Magazines, 6, 1996, pp. 49-54.



The high resolution radar imagery does not vary in relation to the weather or time of day.



See J Wallen, The Application of Technology to Peacekeeping, in H Hanning (ed.), Peacekeeping and Technology: Concepts for the Future, International Peace Academy Report, New York, 1983, pp. 51-53.



Sun Tzu stressed, "The reason the enlightened sovereign and the wise general often win the battle when they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men, is foreknowledge." Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Wadsworth, Hertfordshire, 1993, p. 67.



K Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, National Defence University Press, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 74. Good intelligence, including up-to-date maps, as well as an understanding of local politics, conditions and languages, were identified as important for peacekeeping in Africa by the South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa Conference held at Jan Smuts House, 13-14 July 1995. See Jan Smuts House News, 3(2), November 1995, p. 6. See also Cilliers and Mills, op. cit.



Problems encountered by US forces included how to provide intelligence to unit commanders in the absence of suitable local facilities. Consequently, the US established an Intelligence Support Element (ISE) which became the main source of information for UNOSOM. However, US law prevents the distribution of intelligence via any channel over which the US does not have exclusive control. Consequently, a system of guidelines were implemented to prevent the compromising of US intelligence sources and methods while providing information to coalition forces. US officers serving in the UNOSOM Force Command Staff usually acted as the conduit for ISE intelligence.



This relates to the debate on how armed forces should respond to the complexities of the post-Cold War system. Some argue for a concentration only on war fighting, while others call for doctrinal changes to give armed forces greater flexibility, specifically the ability to carry out operations other than war. See Armed Forces Journal, January 1995, p. 35.