"From Somalia to Angola to the streets of Hillbrow, Africa is on the move creating its own models. It is this Africa that Clinton and his policy-makers should be looking at and seeking to understand, rather than condemning the continent to being a deviant example of a Western model whose only hope lies in falling victim to globalisation."¹

INTRODUCTION

During the past year or more the term 'African renaissance'' has become part of the newspeak of the 'new' South Africa. What was to be an ad hoc political innovation is slowly becoming part of the political discourse, and conceptual reconstruction of Africa. However, the South African political leadership, mostly those of the African National Congress (ANC), are not the only ones to indulge in the term. In Uganda, the leader of the non-party democracy, President Musiveni, refers frequently to the (re)awakening of Africa.

More recently, the president of the United States of America, Bill Clinton, freely used the word during his much publicised whirlwind visit to Africa - even though he added somewhat self-indulgently that the US "wishes to put a new Africa on the map." He thus reduced a conceptual innovation by Africans to a descriptive tool within the ambit of US Foreign policy in Africa, and gave a kiss of death to a home-styled invention, some critical observers might argue. American foreign policy in the developing world often resembles the inverted Midas touch: what is touched by US foreign politics becomes not gold, but straw (or even worse). In this regard, examples abound: US involvement in peacekeeping in Somalia turned first into a massacre, then a fiasco. Earlier on in Angola, American support for the UNITA rebel movement, headed by Jonas Savimbi (ironically he was initially a Maoist when the US still preferred Holden Roberto's FNLA), and attempts to turn UNITA into a western oriented surrogate force to enable a pro-western ally, enticed the South African apartheid state to intervene on behalf of UNITA in the miscalculated assumption that the US will not only support Savimbi's UNITA, but also the apartheid pariah state in its self-proclaimed alliance with the Western world. The result was a torturous Angolan civil war resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths, large scale destruction of property and the ruin of the infrastructure of a once fairly rich African country. Earlier on and lasting much longer, American support for the Zairian dictator, Mobuto Sese Seko largely contributed to instability in the Great Lakes region.

Elsewhere in the developing world, things did not look much better. US involvement in central Asia and in its foreign policy attempts to build a global bulwark against communism or 'communist imperialism' (read: containment), contributed greatly to the war in the Koreas and Vietnam at tremendous human and material costs. For a while, the American administration tentatively supported Pol Pot, only to withdraw in feigned disgust, and recently trying to get the now deceased Pol Pot tried by a world court for crimes against humanity.² Ironically, the American administration embarked on 'constructive engagement' with the apartheid regime during the same time, which was also blamed for crimes against humanity. In Central American states and elsewhere, dictators and non-democratic regimes were supported and replaced with large scale overt and covert American support. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the continuing American punishment of the Iraqi political system (fortunately with less and less European support), has left Iraq with inadequate supplies of food and medicine causing hardship for millions of the Iraqi people.³

Prior to the visit by Clinton, South African President Mandela undertook visits to Libya and officially established diplomatic relations in January 1998 with mainland China, one of the fastest growing economies in the world and an important actor in today's multipolar world.

Subsequent to the Clinton visit, the Deputy President of South Africa, Mr Thabo Mbeki, went on a much publicised visit to the Far East, that included Japan, China and other eastern countries, and resulted in the strengthening of diplomatic ties. Moreover, economic and trade agreements worth billions were signed. And while doom and gloom prophets insist that Africa is a basket case par excellence, rife with incompetence, greed and corruption and forever plagued by ethnic/tribal conflicts (somewhat like Europe immediately before and after the fall of the Roman Empire), there are those that argue "that the times they are a changing" for Africa - to take a cue from Bob Dylan. In any case, it is becoming increasingly difficult to refer to Africa in generalised terms as a basket case or political failure. Newly established states like Eritrea together with older established democracies like Botswana are proving that economic growth, political stability and peace are also part of the African reality. While a state like Uganda, as an emerging democracy, introduced a unique style of government in order to curb and overcome ethnic/tribal squabbles that once made it one of the horror stories of Africa, other states made a rather smooth and fairly successful transition to stable democracies. In Ghana, once a military dictatorship, a smooth changeover to multiparty democracy took place. In South Africa, apartheid - an authoritarian ethnic oligarchy - was replaced through protracted negotiations and multi-party elections by a more democratic constitutional regime (even though it is still plagued by corruption and with crime one of the persistent challenges to the new democratic order in the process of consolidation). On the west coast of Southern Africa, Namibia is proving to be a stable democracy. To the east, Mozambique - a former Portuguese colony plagued by civil war and apartheid destabilisation that resulted in economic stagnation and large scale destruction with horrific human consequences, has entered an era of multiparty democracy, with the restructuring of local government and the economy under way. To the north and west of Africa, stable states, if rather poor, have proven their persistence - Senegal and Tunisia being some examples. The former is also in the process of proving that vastly divergent cultural and religious communities can co-exist in an African democracy - even while poverty remains the unpleasant challenge at present. In Southern Africa, the long established democracy in Botswana - a former colonial protectorate of Britain - is excelling in economic and infrastructural growth.⁴ All these and more pose the question: is an African renaissance potentially under way? If so, is it an invented myth in search of collective dignity, a mobilising tool for economic growth and reconstruction, and/or a vital lie for élite entrenchment and enhancement in Africa? And does such a notion - whether called the awakening of Africa or African renaissance - hold any socio-political value vis-à-vis Afro-pessimism or the "pragmatism of possibilities" outlined by Sanjeev Khagram and others?⁵

MYTH, MOBILISING TOOL OR LIE?

There are no glib and easy answers to these challenging questions. Africa is arguably the most exploited continent on the globe. Waves of colonial domination by the British, French, German, Portuguese, Belgians and other minors (Holland 'unintentionally' colonised South Africa for a time, while Mussolini's fascist Italy took a belated and brief but destructive swipe at Abyssinia which later became Ethiopia) and the prompt withdrawal of the colonial and imperial powers during the latter half of this century, left European demarcated African states ill-prepared for independence. In an era of unbridled neo-colonialism, these European powers, often aided by US foreign policy adventures, greatly contributed to economic exploitation and factional rivalry through partisan intervention worsened by the Cold War psychosis. Such waves of exploitation, the permutations and convolutions of nationbuilding (thoroughly described by Emerson, Ronaldo Munck and others), and the indirect role and spectre of new patrimonialism, certainly contributed to a continent hovering on the verge of a chaotic implosion, and a populace bereft of dignity and haunted by perpetual poverty.⁶ And if there was talk of 'a suspended state', certainly through colonialism, neo-colonialism, indirect leadership and (neo)patrimonialism, civil society (or preferably the civil community) became disempowered and thus also suspended.⁷ No wonder then that the voices of Du Bois, Nkrumah and others were trying to give content to the invented myth of the recapturing of political space by African leaders and people. At that stage (1960s and 1970s), the recapturing of political space was seldom linked to economic power by African leadership, and where it was linked to political power, it happened to be through economic pathways that stressed equality, redistribution and socialist co-operative measures. Various models of African socialism became the trademark in Tanzania, Zambia and others, and later also in Burkina Faso, not with much registered success. Yet, the seed was sown for later endeavours. Certainly, within its collective cultural resources and intellectual traditions, Africa does have the capacity to clothe an invented myth in the powerful garb of an encompassing political framework in order to orientate Africans along new political lines so that their dignity could be restored after years of colonial and neo-colonial oppression. Political visions as far apart as pan-Africanism, African re-awakening, Rastafarianism, Black Consciousness, Ubuntu, non-party politics and Peoples Democracy testify to this.⁸

Or could it be that we are talking about a planned tool for political mobilisation to achieve targeted end goals such as economic growth, diplomatic entrenchment in a global community and the strengthening of political power? Also not unlikely, although it is argued by some that a silent revolution is occurring in Africa, a strengthening and extension of rural potentialities, local initiatives, a transition for Africans by Africans - slow, yet visible. Moreover, while Adamokeulen could speak about post-independence liberation leadership failing their followers - aptly referred to as a movement from giants to dwarfs⁹ - a new generation of leadership accepts the hardships and historical burdens brought by colonialism and neo-colonialism, yet remains aware that the continent has to look beyond its colonial past for the causes of current conflicts and economic crises in many countries. While leaders like Mbeki and Musiveni are talking about a new approach through the attempted renaissance, others like Ian Khama in Botswana are purposefully building strong economies and infrastructures.¹⁰ Yet others, like Ghadaffi, are resolutely building economies in their countries despite the targeted sanctions of the US. There is little doubt that, as a result of greater interaction between Northern, Central and Southern Africa, these ideas on political revival, but more importantly economic reconstruction (arguably by different - or even mixed - pathways) will become a more pronounced socio-political and economical imperative on the continent.¹¹

To be a bit more skeptical: is the much spoken about renaissance an élite plot, a vital lie to recruit the masses into neo-liberal (multiparty) politics, élite entrenchment and disempowering the poor through western mantras? Does it have only one-sided élite interests at heart while continuing the oppression of the majority of African people? This debate is frequently touched upon in African political and theoretical circles. The late Claude Ake warned continuously against disempowerment (political as well as economic) through the uncritical acceptance of the multiparty mantra. This attitude represents an implicit criticism against divorcing the political and economic by firstly introducing purely western-styled multiparty politics and electioneering as the be all and end all of democracy. It is also a valuable warning if the Zambia of Chiluba is held up as an example that election politics and neo-liberal paradigms do not always offer the magic wand of economic growth and deepening of democratic processes. This critical debate is also not new to South Africans. South African Communist Party (SACP) members inside South Africa are openly and not so openly debating the Janus-faced nature of the much spoken about renaissance. It could hold both the good and the bad, the visionary mass development or élite entrenchment, the economic launch or a planned élite cartel grabbing their part of a not too big African economic pie.¹²

Whether the renaissance or (re)awakening resembles one or more (or all) of the above seems to be more or less irrelevant. A renaissance, if described as a historical phenomenon, is most likely a planned and intended result of renaissance by stealth - even default - and of concerted planning by the élite, bureaucrats, peasants, farmers and business people. What is probably more important is that the concept has entered the African political and economic discourse and that people on various levels are taking it seriously. It is therefore critical that it should be kept in check by political actors, lobby groups and civil community interest groups so that it is not hijacked by a partisan political leadership or single élite parties. A great challenge awaits the citizenry and workers of the continent of Africa in this regard.

Yet, for the renaissance - planned or intentionally, a gradual evolution emerging from a rediscovery of self-dignity and self-empowerment on local and regional levels, an élite invention, or a combination of the above - a few issues need be addressed constantly in the discourse surrounding it and the concomitant process.

These issues are:

the unique form and content of democracy and its influence on the shape of civil society within the African context (and vice versa):



that which is referred to as 'good governance'; and



issues pertaining to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and conditionality.

Balefie Tsie, political scientist from Botswana, makes it clear that these three issues are interrelated when a broad African reconstruction agenda is at stake.¹³

Democracy and Civil Society/Civil Community in Africa

According to Tsie and others, while the neo-liberal state model is not to be dismissed outright, it is not the panacea for all. And it might well not be the endgoal for all democrats in Africa. Other socio-political (and economic) pathways may be able to achieve a good human rights record, economic growth coupled with social justice, relative/optimum stability and marked political participation in Africa. And both from their own social and historic experience, and social and intellectual traditions, Africans are potentially already empowered to construct a new agenda from lessons learned here and elsewhere. Moreover, enough might be gained from others' insights that can be adapted in a visionary, pragmatic or ad lib manner to the benefit of the continent and its people.

The implication is simply that the debate about the content and form of democracy in Africa is not to be concluded by glib mantras like multipartyism - as expounded, for example, by the Hoover Institute and Stanford scholars. It is not a debate to be foreclosed by questions molded in advance and answers self-conclusively given. Far from it. If Ron Perrin contends that America's state of democratic theory is in need of revision, and if Marchovic, a Serbian born scholar, having observed ethnic destruction in the Balkan, speaks eloquently about a new, broader notion of democracy to be radically evaluated, more so for African scholars and practitioners. For Africa this is not the end of history, nor of the debate and praxis of democratisation. In many ways, it might well be only the beginning. And as much as the notion, concept and form of democracy and hence democratic practice is as yet inconclusive, so is the form and content of civil community in the African context and its reciprocal influence on democratic theory and practice on the continent.¹⁴

Nor will Africa be the first civilisation that has to deal with the complexities of establishing democracy and with the coinciding economic challenges. The tension between rural, peri-urban and urban social dynamics that accompanies this is also not new.¹⁵ The search for economic reconstruction and sustainable development based on past pre-colonial experience and 'lessons learned' from own and others' experiences, is not as futile as some predict, nor will it be as easy and self-forthcoming as some visionaries are hoping. But, who would have predicted ten or twenty years ago that Africa would offer some remarkable success stories and that the notion of an African awakening would have sprung from a British colony ruled by a despot once sponsored by the Israeli state and mercenaries? Apart from that, the slow but not unmarked recovery of many African economies are not to be ignored.

The reciprocal influence between African conceptions of democracy and the civil community is closely intertwined. The civil community in Africa will reflect its own historic roots, evolution and content.¹⁶ And here, the debate is also far from over. The one significant danger that remains is that non-government organisations (NGOs) and multi/transnational companies could be seen as equal to the civil community. The Belgian theorist, Jan Gorus of the Free University of Brussels, has argued convincingly that partisan NGO involvement (especially as agents of other states) can destabilise regimes. Gorus' case study of Rwanda is an excellent example. Similar indications are made by Gus de Gaay-Fortman, a Dutch-based academic. The quest for a revitalised civil community - and the quest for a theory and practice of democracy - will have to go further than multipartyism, regular elections and NGOs acting as representatives of a whole citizenry.

Good Governance

If the assumption is made that the debate on what constitutes democracy, the consolidation of democracy and the civil community in Africa, and the reflection of these notions on good governance has been extensive, as has been indicated above, it is also clear that it is far from being concluded. It can be argued that with or without the classic liberal model (i.e. multiparty systems, pure capitalist economics, elections as the ultima ratio of government systems - not that it is not necessary), good governance, and the agenda for its discourse, have to entail:

good and properly functioning mechanisms for human rights protection;



viable strategies for economic growth and wealth distribution;



public participation;



relative stability (for growth and development); and



the freedom to peacefully argue and organise for a change of government (or even a political system).

The accomplishment of a good governance agenda should be measured against the access that the public or citizenry has to the levers of economic power, strategy and distribution of wealth, as well as to the design of growth (whatever the pragmatism of growth - call it empowering economics or even "enabling economics"¹⁷). The South African political theorist/sociologist Van Zyl Slabbert, refers loosely to this as the democratisation of the economy and more specifically as the democratisation of budgets (also on regional and local levels). The linkage between a revised, radically reflective approach to democratic theory, civil society and governance remains challenging here. While earlier African theoretical publications ventured into these issues, the debate is far from over.¹⁸ What is clear is that the conditionalities built into International Monetary Fund and World Bank adjustment programmes have been instrumental in some cases (e.g. Zambia) in disempowering the poor by introducing the multiparty mantra as a new political panacea, while it entrenched a new, rather exclusive élite in reality.

For African states, individually as well as collectively, directed thinking will have to go into ways and means to develop alternative empowerment strategies in order to minimise and/or neutralise the negative effects of one-sidedly imposed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). This may take the form of building 'local communities' through small business development, co-operatives, basis communities and 'third world technology', whereas 'first world technology' may prove to be too expensive or cumbersome, or may be rendered unusable as result of over-sophistication. Nationally, it may imply a focus on own needs, such as import substitution, and where further developed economies are already competitive, to niche-mark certain areas or products for export orientation. To balance this with counter-inflationary measures, the creation of jobs and infrastructural growth are tall orders, and the need for good (financial) governance remains a challenge. Democratising economies with controlled yet carefully planned strategies to democratise budgets forms an indispensable part of good governance.¹⁹

Structural Adjustment

While SAPs are closely intertwined with the issues raised above, it still begs the question whether a SAP is necessary for a country which is in the process of evolving political, economic and governance models suited to its own needs and growth, while entrenching sustainable democracy. However, more is at stake here. Certainly, the African élite has failed their communities, in many instances, through corruption, mismanagement, maladministration and greed. And many a time, failures that could be ascribed to such misconduct were blamed on neo-colonialism. There is a slowly growing realisation that looking beyond the legacy of the past in order to facilitate reconstruction is much needed.²⁰

However, the conditionalities imposed by SAPs are chequered. The further uncritical linkage to globalisation also remains problematic. Globalisation remains Janus-faced, holding good and bad, and sometimes more bad than good. The imposition of liberal economic models has proven to be problematic - if not disastrous - in some cases. Once again, the simplistic acceptance that globalisation is both inevitable and good holds potential dangers. While many see in it some good outcomes, others experience that globalisation causes disempowerment and alienation in communities that survived earlier with self-invented measures and community empowerment schemes - i.e. stokvels in Namibia and South Africa, credit unions in Namibia, and basis communities in Latin America.

The simple but hard truth may be that there is not necessarily only one path to economic growth. There may be many...

CONCLUSION

In this contribution, it was argued that the terms African 'renaissance' or 'awakening' have become part of the African (and others') socio-political discourse. It was pointed out that it could have sprung from one or more sources - all of them having value, yet also holding some dangers - at least, some tendencies not to be uncritically accepted.

It was also argued that the inconclusive debate on democracy, civil society and transparency is far from over and indeed necessary. Closely linked to this is the uncritical and unexamined acceptance of the conditionality that pertains to structural adjustment programmes, liberal democratic economic models and globalisation that does not recognise the Janus-faced nature of these notions. Implied in this is the need for an encompassing debate on the future of an Africa aiming at reconstruction and democratic models suitable to its people in their quest for dignity.

While limits on the democratic debate and the theory of democracy probably exists everywhere, let it not be limited in advance - nor in theory, practice, discourse or vision. If all roads led to ancient civilisation in Rome, many pathways are likely to lead to a new African community.

ENDNOTES

Weekly Mail & Guardian, 14(2) 22 March - 2 April 1998, p. 22.



The Chronicle, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 17 April 1998; The Herald, Zimbabwe, 17 April 1998.



The Herald, ibid., p. 10.



See Du Toit for the definitional parameters of the "strong state, strong civil society" which, apart from favourable historical conditions, shaped the Botswana democracy. P du Toit, State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, p. 5. Borrowing freely from Migdal, Shils and Horowitz, as well as more conservative theorists like Huntington and Dahl, Du Toit in a restricted liberal analysis found Botswana to be one of the African success stories. See pp. 5, 30ff, 35ff, 39, and 72ff. Du Toit, however, fails to recognise normative democratic approaches and existing examples of state and democracy building outside the (neo)liberal paradigm.



For more detail, consult I Liebenberg, Consolidation of Democracy in Africa: Inhibitors on Civil-Society, African Security Review, 6(4), 1997, pp. 36ff. Different approaches to the 'African condition', especially where democratisation in Africa is concerned, is outlined in R Buijtenhuijs & C Thiriot, Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Afrika Studiecentrum, Leiden (Holland).



See R Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Nationalism and Marxism, Zed, London, 1981; see also R Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-assertion of Asian and African Peoples, Beacon Press, Boston, 1960.



Seemingly, the existence of a civil community in pre-colonial Africa is undisputed according to Mamood Mamdami, Sindane and others. See Paul Maylam quoted in Liebenberg, op. cit., as well as J Sindane, Democracy in African Societies and Ubuntu, In Focus, 13(3), Nov/Dec 1995, pp. 1-16.



On the earliest roots of pan-Africanism, read I Geiss, The Pan African Movement, Methuen, London, 1968. For application (theory and practice) in South Africa of pan-Africanist philosophy, see M Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid: A Socio-ethical Analysis, Skotaville, Johannesburg, 1985. For more references, consult I Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, Taurus, Emmerentia, 1990, pp. 89ff. For attempts to make 'first' and 'second' world models of statebuilding and paths of economic development fit, a host of sources are available. Even socio-ethical reflections on peace, violence and the struggle for liberation abound. See for example K Kaunda, Kaunda over Geweld, Sphere/Verhaak, Grave (Nederland), 1982; R Mugabe, Zimbabwe: Our War of Liberation, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1983, and others. For applications to South Africa in theory and practice, literature abound. Consult Liebenberg, op. cit., pp. 80ff; G M Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1978. For a historical background on Ubuntu and democracy in African societies, see Sindane, op. cit., p. 16.



See A Adamokeulen, in P Anjang Nyongo, Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa, Africa Development, 13(1), 1988, pp. 72-74, 76.



Taking over the reigns of power after a populist struggle for liberation while confronted by vast development challenges hampered by ill preparations for independence, general lack of education and experience and poverty contributed greatly to leadership failure in Africa. For a particular case study on transitional difficulties and complexities, see B Klandermans, M Roefs & J Olivier, A Movement Takes Office, in D S Meyer & S Tarrow (eds.), The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, Rowman and Littlefield, London. The case of the ANC taking power in South Africa as a social movement, is described and quantified in this article.



A recent report by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, a sixty-year old Ghanaian national, to the UN Security Council, summarises this spirit of Africa looking beyond its (leadership?) failures in solving its problems and reconstruction of the continent. See the leading article in The Chronicle, op. cit. and The Herald, op. cit., p. 3.



See Liebenberg, op. cit.



Dr Balefi Tsie at a session on African Renaissance at the Partnership Real Africa: Swedish Donor Assistance, Democratization and Economic Growth in Africa, workshop arranged by the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), 25 March 1998. See also C Landsberg & C Kabemba, Partnership Real Africa: Swedish Donor Assistance, Democratization and Economic Growth in Africa (Research Report and Executive summary), Research Report No 57, CPS, Johannesburg, September 1997. For further exploratory points and tentative directives toward such reconstruction and (sub)continental empowerment, see F A Kornegay & C Landsberg, A Nordic/SADC Partnership? Options for Future Bi-regional Co-operation, CPS Policy: Issues and Actors, 11(3), April 1998, pp. 5 - 14. For the complexities, pros and cons, as well as an attempt at scenario sketching on the potential role of South Africa in such a process, see C Landsberg & F A Kornegay, Mayivuke iAfrika! Can South Africa lead an African Renaissance?, CPS Policy: Issues and Actors, 11(1), January 1998. For some insight into the extent and radical re-evaluation of the debate in theoretical world, see the debate between M O West & W G Martin, as well as the more conventional views of C C Lowe, Resurrection How? A Response to Michael O West and William G Martins article, "A Future with a Past: Resurrecting the Study of Africa in a Post-Africanist Era", Africa Today, 44(4), 1997, pp. 385-422. The parameters and radicalism of this discourse is also implied in earlier debates on democratisation between Chege, Ake, Wamba-dia-Wamba and Ramosi Mokgobi, a South African social philosopher, in Africa Today.



For a breakdown of sources consulted as background to this statement see I Liebenberg, Consolidating Democracy in Africa: Inhibitors to Civil Society, paper read at the Seventh All Russia Conference of Africanists, Moscow, 3-5 October 1997. The paper is due to be published as part of a reader on democracy (forthcoming 1999) compiled by Solomon and Liebenberg. Copies can be requested from the HSRC's Democracy and Governance Group by sending a stamped, self-addressed envelope to Martie Boesenberg or Pip Rothero, HSRC (D & G), Private Bag X 41, Pretoria, 0001, Gauteng Province, South Africa (Telephone +27-12-3022414 or +27-12-3022219 or fax +27-12-3022284.



Europe, in its slow movement towards democracy, experienced real and potential violence and social upheaval between the demands of peasants/agrarianists/countryside and urban/industrialisationist imperatives not to mention between élite rule/oligarchy/ monargism/authoritarian rule (in the latter case as late as the 1930s and 1940s in Germany and Italy) and putting democratic idealism in practice. Some historic examples being the French Revolution in the late 1700s, the British Revolution (1688) and more recently, social transformation towards social democracy in Eastern Europe. Much earlier civilisations, such as the Greeks, went through the same experience in their so-called Golden Age. Even for them, the issues of oligarchy, monarchy and rural urban differences were part of a heated social discourse and even upheaval. See V Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization during the 6th and 5th Centuries BC, Methuen, London, 1968; especially pp. 11, 13-15, 122ff, 384ff, and the conclusion.



The existence of a civil community in Africa is not new. While liberal theorists are currently (and belatedly) claiming ownership of it, it is much older. See Sindane, op. cit., pp. 6-7. Despite shortcomings, people were involved in decision-making in earlier African societies. See again Sindane, pp. 7. The debate 'in the marketplace', as known by the Greeks, was reflected by the 'Kgotla' or meeting of the village in African experience.



A term coined by a South African economist at SAFSEC, Henk Langenhoven. See the chapter Enabling Economics in N Rhoodie & I Liebenberg, Democratic Nationbuilding in South Africa, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, 1994.



W O Oyugi & A Gitonga (eds.), Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, Nairobi Press, Nairobi.



The directed research undertaken by institutes like the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and the HSRC's Group for Democracy and Governance, as well as Nedlac thinktanks, is of importance here.



The Chronicle, op. cit. and The Herald, op. cit. on Kofi Annan's report to the UN Security Council regarding Africa. In the same Chronicle, the Kabila regime is criticised for its human rights record and a further erosion of legislative, judicial and executive distinction. For interest sake, the dismissal of twenty Tsholotsho counselors of a Rural District Council in Zimbabwe for alleged corruption and mismanagement of funds is also reported. This seems to point towards a Zimbabwean drive at rooting out corruption. Self-help schemes also seem to have sprung up in Zimbabwe, such as those aimed at assisting taxi-drivers in buying taxis, driving training, building of irrigation schemes (sometimes with minimal state assistance). The Chronicle, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 16 and 17 April 1998.