This year the United Nations celebrates fifty years of peacekeeping. Since 1948, more than 750 000 people from 111 countries have served in the 48 mandated UN peacekeeping missions. Evolving from a concept developed as a response to the truce in Palestine, and not even mentioned in the UN Charter, peacekeeping has become an important instrument in the conflict resolution tool box. Rather than resting on its laurels, however, the UN would do well to use the opportunity of fifty years of experience to conceptualise a model of intervention that can respond to conflicts in the coming fifty years.

The nature of conflict has changed since 1948 and so has the way in which the Security Council, as the mandator of all peacekeeping operations, operates. Caught in the ideological battle of the Cold War, the Security Council mandated eleven peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1987. The rules behind them were simple (at least compared to the rules of engagement in subsequent operations): consent of warring parties; impartiality; and the non-use of force, except in self-defence. Some of these earliest missions are still in place: UNFICYP in Cyprus (1964); UNIFIL in Lebanon (1978); UNMOGIP in Jammu/Kashmir (1949); UNTSO in Palestine (1948); and UNDOF in Syria (1974). The change in global politics in the late 1980s signalled a wave of new conflicts no longer solely interstate: many were now intrastate and required new rules, bigger missions and more tasks.

Between 1988 and 1998, the Security Council mandated an astounding 35 missions, deployed in Central America, South East Asia, Africa and Europe. Working in uncharted territory, the UN became confounded by the need for immediate responses to a proliferation of burgeoning crises precipitated by intrastate armed conflicts. In the glory of the cause, the organisation sometimes forgot that the peacekeepers were often not in truce zones, but in the middle of active combat. Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina remain solemn reminders. However, the UN also had successes during these frenetic years: Central America, especially Guatemala and El Salvador; Cambodia; Haiti; Namibia; and Mozambique. These missions, and the elements that made them function — from the highest political negotiations to technical details — must not be forgotten. The lessons of past missions, both successes and perceived failures, must be assessed and noted for future operations. For there is no doubt that the UN must continue to deploy peacekeeping operations.

The recently established mission to the Central African Republic (MINURCA) shows that the UN has not forgotten its responsibility towards Africa. The UN Secretariat has been on a steep learning curve, and is preparing itself for the challenges that lie ahead. This is evident in an emerging willingness to consider abridging the bedrock principle of political sovereignty when populations are at risk. The Secretary-General has also mooted the notion of inducing consent where conflicting parties remain recalcitrant in the face of legitimate international mandates. This would obviously involve the use of both carrots and sticks which, at the political level, may vary from recognition and support to sanctions and isolation. At the operational and tactical levels, it could involve the use of force.

Building consensus behind a new peacekeeping paradigm remains, however, a daunting challenge. The international community is divided, rather than united on the core issues. Many would prefer a return to the simpler era of Cold War peacekeeping — an option that would undoubtedly leave Africa out in the cold in the new millennium.