Shaun P McCarthy, The Function of Intelligence in Crisis Management: Towards an understanding of the Intelligence Producer-Consumer Dichotomy, Aldershot, Suffolk, 1997, 328 pp.

The study of secret intelligence is no longer in its infancy, having matured fast over the last twenty years. This has been due, in part, to the study of intelligence in England which has revolved around historical research, especially the Second World War. Such historical perspectives have been important in reassessing established views of significant events. Across the Atlantic, the study of intelligence has mostly generated theoretical approaches to United States intelligence and policy-making. Shaun McCarthy’s book is a hybrid of these two dominant approaches. In this regard, he has made an important and interesting contribution to the growing corpus of intelligence literature.

As a former National Intelligence Service (NIS) official, McCarthy has chosen to centre his study around the problems that confront the serving intelligence officer and his superior, the policy-maker. It goes without saying that such a relationship is often fraught with difficulties. The intelligence official is concerned with the production of an objective and balanced assessment (or as close as possible). The policy-maker often has his own agenda and intelligence may be perceived as a hindrance to such an end.

McCarthy’s book explores this fascinating relationship within the context of crisis management. His case study revolves around the Reagan years, and he examines the relationship between intelligence professionals and policy-makers with particular reference to America’s traumatic involvement in the Middle East. He focuses on key events — the terrorist attacks against the US Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut by Hizbullah in 1983, and the kidnapping of the Central Intelligence Agency’s station chief, William Buckley.

In essence, this is a book about intelligence failure. The Reagan years were replete with them. McCarthy tries to identify some of the reasons why the Reagan administration was unsuccessful in foreseeing and preventing such failures within an integrated theory of intelligence and crisis management model. The most interesting feature that he identifies, is that, contrary to the usual perception that intelligence failure occurs at the policy-making level, failure occurred at the intelligence level itself. The operational capabilities of the US intelligence community are questioned.
There is no doubt that key policy-makers such as George Schultz, then Secretary of State, Robert McFarlane, the National Security Advisor, and William Casey, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, were unduly fooled by their own sense of US military and political prowess. Such a distorted view created what McCarthy calls "a cognitive barrier" in their threat perception and their understanding of the changing nature of Middle East terrorism.

Intelligence failures were primarily one of low quality intelligence collection. However, the US intelligence community was not entirely to blame. One of the most frustrating issues for the US intelligence community was that they were unable to do a timely and relevant intelligence estimate of Lebanon before and during their involvement there. The policy-makers may rightly complain that time is precisely something which they do not have — a weakness that any intelligence organisation has to deal with — but even then, Reagan’s inner circle could still be faulted for not listening to their intelligence community when it did matter. Instead, when they did take the time to listen, it was often focused on the question: What is the bottom line?

McCarthy convincingly shows that the interaction between intelligence and crisis management broke down as a result of the lack of communication between the National Security Council (NSC) staff and the State Department, and between the White House and the intelligence community. This bureaucratic disarray undermined effective crisis response. Disastrously for US policy in the Middle East, this state of affairs not only continued, but deteriorated further with the kidnapping of Buckley.

Theoretically, McCarthy’s lucid insights lead him to question the traditional Kent-Kendall debate (first formulated in 1949) which has been at the centre of the producer-consumer dichotomy. McCarthy challenges the assumption that analysts (producers) cannot question policy-makers (consumers), and hence policy. The nature of modern crisis management would seem to strongly support his point. During the Reagan years, the NSC became the embodiment of producer and consumer, thereby complicating the traditional producer-consumer dichotomy.

All this goes to show the importance of the clear communication of policy. In the absence of such policy direction from the very top, somebody else will pick up the loose ball and run with it. Seizing the initiative was exactly what the NSC did during the many crises that the Reagan policy-makers had to face. Perhaps the most damaging, and one outside the purview of this book, was the Iran-Contra debacle.

McCarthy is not presumptuous in concluding that the study of one administration and its failings is satisfactory to resolve the producer-consumer dichotomy. I would go further and say that the use of intelligence in a crisis management model that takes terrorism as a case study can also be limiting. Different crises inevitably throw up different ways to manage them, which in turn shapes how intelligence responds.

In this regard, more research should be done of other foreign models. Recently the Brown-Aspin Committee in the US looked into the future of the US Intelligence community in the 21st century and noted some of the positive features of the Joint intelligence Committee (JIC) that has served Britain for intelligence assessment. Recent historical research on competing models of intelligence assessment machinery will add to the growing debate around the role of intelligence, not only in crisis management, but also in policy-making itself. In this respect, McCarthy’s book is a timely and relevant addition, especially in the light of recent South African intelligence failures in Lesotho.

Shahzad Ahmed
South African Institute of International Affairs

Greg Mills. South Africa and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Rim, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1998, 87 pp.

In an era where regional integration is gaining momentum, Greg Mills provides a valuable account of the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) process. Mills argues that the rudimentary IOR is faced with several problems. The first is the question of membership, on which an approach cannot be agreed upon. On the one hand, South African and Australian governments are committed to an inclusive policy of membership. On the other hand, India rejects the idea in order to isolate Pakistan, which is on the fringe of membership.

For Mills, another problem of the IOR relates to the ambivalence of certain members. South Africa, for instance, fears that the IOR might detract from its policy to cultivate strong ties with the states of the Southern African region. This fear is premised on the fact that South Africa attaches a significant importance to the economic development of Southern Africa. Not surprisingly, the South African fear is magnified by the weaknesses of the IOR concept which attempts to bring together states with different geographical, religious, economic, cultural, and political backgrounds.

Mills postulates that a notable problem confronting the IOR is the issue of security. The IOR states face common traditional and non-traditional security challenges, but there is no consensus on the means to deal with their impact. Some states insist that security issues must be left to UN structures and that the IOR should focus on matters falling in the economic sphere. Others suggest that the IOR can duplicate the mechanisms adopted by the Asian Regional Forum so that it can come to grips with security challenges.

Mills maintains that the IOR, however tenuous it may be, possesses a great potential for co-operation. On the economic front, the region holds 66 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, sixty per cent of uranium, forty per cent of gold, 98 per cent of the diamond supply, fifty per cent of rubber, and 31 per cent of the world’s population. There has been a growing trade between Australia, India and South Africa, which make up the core members of the IOR process. Furthermore, there has been a sharp increase in intraregional investments in the past few years.

Mills goes on to suggest that, despite the threats posed by the Indo-Pakistan rivalry, there is room for security co-operation. The IOR states can engage in maritime co-operation to ensure regional stability, to remove suspicions, and to provide an environment that creates a sense of responsibility. In advancing this strategy, the IOR can draw useful lessons from the Bi-Annual Western Pacific Symposium, a forum in which naval officers discuss a number of maritime issues that affect their respective states.

Mills sums up his study by stating that the IOR does not need to confine itself to economic issues, but must also deal with security threats. Clearly, economic development cannot be attained without improving the security environment. However, Mills warns that the entire IOR process might have little substance if it is used as a tool to advance improved relations with India, or a means to isolate political adversaries.

The study successfully examines different dimensions of IOR issues, including regional initiatives. It is well-researched, concise, and contributes to the debate in this realm. It would be an essential reference not only for policy-makers, but also for those who have an interest in the study of regional interdependence.

Abdul Omar
Institute for Security Studies