INTRODUCTION

Much publicity is given to the phenomenon of organised crime in South Africa. The imposition of martial law, a return to detention without trial, and draconian police search and seizure powers are just some of the demands made by those who feel that the state has failed in its duty to effectively combat organised crime. Are these demands justified? The time has come to assess the state’s response to organised crime — on a legislative and policy-making, as well as on an operational level.

Organised crime tends to grow rapidly during periods of political transition, when levels of violence are high, leading to state resources being concentrated in certain areas only and gaps emerging in which organised criminal groups may operate.¹ Inadequate border controls, a good transport infrastructure, markets for and sources of contraband such as endangered species products and cannabis (dagga), a good banking system, and a supply of trained recruits have contributed to the growth of organised crime in South Africa.²

In the first half of 1997, the South African Police Service (SAPS) identified 192 organised crime syndicates comprising 1 903 primary suspects operating in South Africa.³ The SAPS also identified some 500 target groups with a combined figure of 1 184 primary suspects.⁴ Given South Africa’s poorly resourced crime intelligence structures, and the consequent difficulty the police have in identifying organised crime groups, the real figures are likely to be higher.

South African policymakers have taken the threat posed by organised crime seriously, albeit belatedly. Over the last few years, a number of legislative initiatives have strengthened the state’s ability to combat organised crime.

STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

INTERCEPTION AND MONITORING PROHIMBIION ACT NO 127 OF 1992

The Act, which became operational in February 1993, permits a judge to direct that postal articles, communications, and conversations may be intercepted or monitored.

A judge issuing such a directive must be convinced that a serious offence has been or will probably be committed, and that it cannot be properly investigated in any other manner. The offence under investigation must also have been committed over a lengthy period of time on an organised or regular basis, or must threaten to harm the country’s economy.

A judge may only direct the interception or monitoring of an article or communication for three months at a time. Any member of the SAPS executing a direction may enter any premises in order to install a monitoring device, or to intercept a postal article or communication.

The Judicial Matters Amendment Act of 1998 amended the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act. The amendment grants the police the authority to intercept and monitor any communication, including electronic mail and facsimile communication.

A South African Law Commission discussion paper released in 1998 recommends that all telecommunication service providers must be obliged by law to acquire, at their own expense, equipment permitting the monitoring and interception of communications on their systems. Moreover, the Law Commission proposes that no South African telecommunication service providers may be permitted to provide facilities — from telephones and cellular phones, to the Internet — which cannot be monitored.⁵

NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACT NO 39 OF 1994

The Act established the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC). NICOC is responsible for the co-ordination of intelligence supplied by the intelligence divisions of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the SAPS, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the South African Secret Service (SASS).

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS ACT NO 75 OF 1996

This Act became operational in January 1998. In terms of the Act, a South African court may issue a letter of request to a court or government body in another state, requesting assistance in obtaining evidence or the testimony of a person resident there. Evidence obtained in this manner carries the same weight as if it were given under oath in a South African court of law.

If a South African court sentences a person to a fine and such a person does not have sufficient assets in the country to pay the fine, but does own property in a foreign state, the local court may seek assistance from a foreign court for the recovery of such monies.

The Act permits the President to enter into agreements with foreign states for the provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters. Provision is also made, with certain limitations, for South African courts to receive any deposition, affidavit, record of any conviction, or any document evidencing an order of a court, issued in a foreign state, as admissible evidence.

PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT NO 76 OF 1996

The Act, which came into operation in May 1997, provides for the recovery of the proceeds of crime. In terms of the Act, a court can enquire into any benefit which the accused may have derived from the offence of which she or he has been convicted. If such a benefit is found to exist, the court can make an order confiscating from the accused the proceeds of the offence. Any question of fact to be decided by the court in such an enquiry is decided on a balance of probabilities. (Normally, disputes of fact have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt — a higher burden of proof — against an accused in a criminal trial.)

The Act makes money laundering a criminal offence. Business owners and managers, who have reasons to suspect that any property which came into their possession are the proceeds of crime, are obliged to report their suspicion. Failure to comply is a criminal offence.

The practical implementation of the Act has not been successful. Between May 1997 and April 1998, only one confiscation order was issued in terms of the Act.⁶ Businesses such as pawnbrokers, attorneys, jewellers, second-hand car dealers, and scrap metal dealers have been accused of neglecting their duties in terms of the Act.⁷ The Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (see below).

EXTRADITION AMENDMENT ACT NO 77 OF 1996

The Act became operational in early 1997, and amended the Extradition Act of 1962. The amendment Act provides for the designation of states to which extradition may be effected in the absence of formal extradition agreements. Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign state, which is not a party to an extradition agreement, is liable to be surrendered to such a foreign state — provided the President consents. An extraditable offence is any offence which, in terms of South African law and the laws of the foreign state concerned, is punishable with a sentence of imprisonment of six months or more.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SECOND AMENDMENT ACT NO 85 OF 1996

In terms of the amendment Act, police officers and other authorised persons may use a trap, or engage in an undercover operation to detect, investigate or uncover the commission of an offence, or to prevent the commission of an offence. Evidence obtained through an undercover operation or a trap is admissible provided that such a trap or operation does not go beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence. Even under such circumstances, however, the courts have the discretion to accept the evidence. In considering whether to admit such evidence, the courts have to weigh the public interest against the personal interest of the accused, with regard to, inter alia, the seriousness of the offence, the extent of the effect of the trap or undercover operation upon the interests of the accused, and the nature and seriousness of any infringement of any fundamental constitutional right.

A police officer or other authorised person acting within the parameters of the Act cannot be held criminally liable in respect of any action which constitutes an offence and which relates to the trap or undercover operation, if it was performed in good faith.

NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY ACT NO 32 OF 1998

In terms of the Act, the President may establish three investigating directorates in respect of specific offences or specified categories of offences. Each investigating directorate consists of an investigating director assisted by one or more deputy directors of public prosecutions, prosecutors, civil servants seconded to the directorate, employees of any public or other body seconded to the directorate, or any person whose services are required by the directorate for a particular investigation.

Investigating directorates are given considerable powers for the fulfilment of their mandates. An investigating director may hold an enquiry if there is reason to suspect that a specific offence has been or is being committed, or that an attempt is being made to commit an offence. The inquiry may be extended to include any offence which might be connected with the subject of the inquiry.

An investigating director may summon any person to appear before him or her who can provide information on the subject of an inquiry, or who has any document or other object relating to the inquiry. The summoned person may be questioned under oath, and any document or object may be examined or retained by an investigating director (or a designated person). The summoned person may not refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer could expose him or her to a criminal charge.

On obtaining a court warrant, an investigating director, or his or her agents may enter and search premises if there is a suspicion that something connected to an inquiry may be found on the premises. An investigating director may examine any object found on the premises, and request information regarding the object from the owner or person in charge of the premises. It is a criminal offence to refuse to supply information when requested, or to give false or misleading information. An investigating director may also seize anything on the premises which might have a bearing on an inquiry. Under certain circumstances, premises may be entered and searched without a warrant.

WITNESS PROTECTION ACT NO 112 OF 1998

The statutory protection of witnesses is a new concept in South Africa. It was introduced in 1991 through an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act.⁸ The main shortcoming of the system is the lack of a centralised structure to co-ordinate and lay down a uniform policy on witness protection.

The Witness Protection Act — likely to become operational in 1999 — addresses this problem by establishing an Office for Witness Protection headed by a national director. The Act enlarges the existing scope of the witness protection programme beyond merely criminal trials to include the protection of witnesses of commissions of enquiry and inquest proceedings, proceedings before a Special Tribunal,⁹ as well as the Independent Complaints Directorate which investigates cases of police misconduct and complaints levelled against the police. The kind of offences for which protection may be granted, has been extended. The director also has the discretion to grant protection to a witness in respect of any offence if warranted by threats to the witness’s safety.

PREVENTION OF ORGANISED CRIME ACT NO 121 OF 1998

The Act, which became operational in early 1999, defines a number of offences related to racketeering activity. A pattern of racketeering activity is the "... planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation" in any one of 34 offence types listed in the Act. These range from murder and kidnapping, to perjury, theft and malicious injury to property. For a pattern of racketeering activity to exist, two of the offence types must be committed within a period of ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment).

A person who manages the operation of an enterprise and who knows or ought to have known that any person, while employed by or associated with the enterprise, participates in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, is guilty of an offence. The idea is to convict crime bosses against whom there is no direct evidence of criminal activity, but where there is evidence that they associated through an organisation with people who engage in racketeering activity.

Persons convicted of a pattern of racketeering activity face the toughest fines ever to be on South Africa’s statute books. The maximum penalty is a fine of one billion rand or life imprisonment.

The Act criminalises the actions of persons who:

engage in money laundering;

assist others to benefit from the proceeds of unlawful activities; and

acquire, possess or use the proceeds of unlawful activities.

Banks and financial institutions are obliged to report any suspicious activities or transactions regarding the proceeds of unlawful activities.

The Act focuses on a number of offences related to criminal gangs.¹⁰ Criminal gang members or participants in gang activities are guilty of an offence if they, inter alia, wilfully aid any criminal activity committed for the benefit of, or in association with a criminal gang. Moreover, any person who promotes or contributes towards a pattern of criminal gang activity, or incites, aids or encourages another person to commit or participate in a pattern of criminal gang activity, is guilty of an offence. Persons found guilty of such offences are liable to a fine and imprisonment ranging from three to eight years.

The Act makes provision for property tainted by criminal activity to be forfeited to the state by way of a civil action. On application by the National Director of Public Prosecutions, the High Court can make an order forfeiting property to the state that the court, on a balance of probabilities, finds to be "an instrumentality" of one of 34 types of offences listed in the Act, or is the "proceeds of unlawful activities." The validity of such an order is not affected by the outcome of criminal proceedings.

Money generated through the forfeiture of assets is to be deposited in a Criminal Assets Recovery Account. Such monies will be used as financial assistance to law enforcement agencies involved in combating organised crime, money laundering, criminal gang activity and crime in general, and to assist victims of crime. The Act also grants greater access to information held by other government departments, such as the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to the prosecution service.

MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL BILL

In 1996, the South African Law Commission released a draft Money-Laundering Control Bill.¹¹ The Law Commission recommended an administrative framework to facilitate the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of money laundering. Such a framework would have a wide scope of application that would go beyond the banking sector. It would include attorneys, accountants, insurers, investment intermediaries, gambling institutions and totalisator betting services.

The Law Commission recommended the creation of a statutory body, the Financial Intelligence Centre, to receive reports from financial institutions. Various bodies, including law firms, auditors, insurance brokers, banks and stokvels, would be legally obliged to report transactions above a cash threshold to the Centre that, in turn, would examine whether these transactions involved the laundering of criminal proceeds. A range of offences and administrative sanctions are envisaged for non-compliance. The Bill, driven by the Department of Finance, is still in draft form. It is uncertain whether it will pass through the parliamentary process before the end of 1999.

IMPROVING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Effective legislation is vital in creating a legal framework within which the state can operate to fight organised crime while respecting the rule of law and the Constitution. However, laws are useful only to the extent that they are properly implemented and used by law enforcement officials and the criminal justice system as a whole. In recent years, numerous actions have been taken on an operational level to improve the criminal justice system’s capacity to combat organised crime.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Throughout the world, organised crime is taking on a transnational character. The same is true of organised crime in South Africa. Of the 192 identified organised crime syndicates operating in South Africa in 1997, some 150 were operating in other sub-Saharan countries, and 32 beyond the sub-Saharan region.¹²

According to the Minister of Justice, Mr Dullah Omar, policymakers have sought "... to contribute to a common regional policy to combat organised crime."¹³ A protocol on combating illegal drug trafficking has been signed by the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The main objectives of the protocol are to:

reduce and eliminate drug trafficking, money laundering, and corruption through co-operation among enforcement agencies;



establish appropriate mechanisms for co-operation between law enforcement agencies;



promote effective enforcement;



review extradition agreements;



harmonise criminal laws and procedures; and



institutionalise mutual assistance arrangements among member states.¹⁴

The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) was established in 1995 to enhance co-operation between the policing agencies of its twelve members which includes South Africa.¹⁵ The objective of SARPCCO is to promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications.¹⁶ The agreement has led to operational successes. In 1997, the policing agencies of four Southern African countries (South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) co-operated to gather and collate intelligence on motor vehicle theft patterns in various countries in the region. As a result of this operation, some 1 590 stolen vehicles were recovered and 143 suspects arrested.¹⁷

In 1996, South Africa and the United States signed an anti-crime agreement to develop a police training programme aimed at enhancing the SAPS’s professional capabilities in fighting organised crime. This includes specialised courses offered by US law enforcement training programmes, such as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).¹⁸

At the 1997 African Regional Interpol Conference, a resolution was passed to establish an African organised crime database to which all African Interpol member states would have access. (All SARPCCO member states are members of Interpol.) The SAPS was the first policing agency to utilise the database.¹⁹ Bilateral co-operation agreements also exist between the SAPS and the policing agencies of Argentina, Brazil, France and the Russian Federation.

In late 1998, South Africa became a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The Convention provides for international co-operation in targeting drug traffickers. Signatory governments are obliged to comply with requests for the extradition of drug offenders, and to provide each other with legal assistance in criminal prosecutions.²⁰ The SAPS and the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention have signed an agreement on drug law enforcement in South Africa. As part of the agreement, international experts in drug law enforcement, including Interpol, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the US and British customs departments will train their South African counterparts.²¹

MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

Traditional investigative techniques are no match for sophisticated crime syndicates. Multidisciplinary investigation teams are vital to the successful apprehension and prosecution of crime syndicates.

Organised crime units were established as part of the South African Police (the former SAP) in 1993. In 1998, there were 24 organised crime units engaged in sixty covert projects throughout the country.²² The units are staffed by 580 investigators and intelligence operatives. Justice Department personnel and members of other police units are regularly seconded to organised crime units for specific operations.

The Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO) was established in 1992 to provide for the speedy and proper investigation of serious economic offences using a multidisciplinary approach.²³ A distinctive feature of OSEO’s approach to investigation was the use of multidisciplinary teams, combining auditing, prosecution and investigation skills. OSEO operated with insufficient staff during most of its existence and, in 1997, announced a moratorium on accepting new investigations because of a lack of experienced and well-trained staff.²⁴ This shortage was alleviated with the appointment of additional staff late in 1998.²⁵ The National Prosecuting Authority Act replaced OSEO’s enabling Act in 1998. As a result, OSEO has been renamed the Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences.

In late 1998, the Investigating Directorate: Organised Crime and Public Safety was established in terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Act. The unit’s head will lead a multidisciplinary team of senior state advocates, prosecutors, attorneys from the private sector, police investigators, chartered accountants, and members of NIA and SARS. According to the Minister of Justice,

"[t]he directorate will bring together with one line of command, all the different agencies engaged in the fight against crime. This will go a long way towards ensuring maximum co-operation, and will eliminate competition and in-fighting [among law enforcement agencies]."²⁶

The SAPS has established a border policing unit responsible for points of entry and exit into and out of South Africa. The unit works closely with SARS, the SANDF, NIA, SASS, and the Department of Foreign Affairs.²⁷ So far, a poorly resourced and organised customs and revenue service apprehends only between ten and fifteen per cent of smugglers. A transformation programme launched late in 1998 aims to increase the apprehension rate to eighty per cent by 2003.²⁸

An interdepartmental approach (primarily between the departments of Safety and Security, Justice, Defence and Home Affairs) has been adopted to implement legislation aimed at:

combating the importation and circulation of illegal firearms, and the misuse of legal firearms; and



tracking, monitoring and intercepting smuggling routes used by crime syndicates.²⁹

ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE

Organised crime groups find it both necessary and advantageous to co-opt public officials. They use bribes and corrupt state officials to protect their interests and enhance their influence. ³⁰ According to a UN report, corruption is one of the most destructive phenomena accompanying the activities of organised crime.³¹ In South Africa, a variety of initiatives have been launched to combat corruption within the state apparatus in general, and specifically within the criminal justice system.

A SAPS anti-corruption unit was formed in 1994. Initially part of the detective service, the unit was restructured in 1995 to fall under the police’s management service to avoid any conflict of interest where detectives were investigating their peers. Today, there are ten anti-corruption units operating in the SAPS, one at national and nine at provincial level. The units have a full-time staff complement of 180.³² As part of a zero tolerance approach to corruption within the SAPS, national police commissioner George Fivaz announced that officers found guilty of corruption would be dismissed or suspended without hesitation.³³ Parliament also passed the Corruption Act in 1992, making it easier for the state to prosecute corrupt public officials.

Within the Department of Justice, a number of control measures have been introduced to limit the incidence of corruption, the theft of dockets and the embezzlement of money.³⁴ The police and NIA are assisting the Department of Home Affairs to set up an anti-corruption unit. Measures aimed at strengthening the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) are under way. NIA is assisting the ICD in its anti-corruption tasks.³⁵

The Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act of 1996 established the framework for creating investigative units and tribunals with the mandate to investigate serious acts of corruption and maladministration in connection with the administration of state institutions, state assets and public money, and to institute civil proceedings arising from such investigations.³⁶ Political heads of government departments and senior civil servants can personally be held liable for any loss suffered as a result of a lack of administrative or financial control.³⁷

Investigating units have the power to search and seize evidence, and to recover stolen assets and funds. The Heath Special Investigating Unit, set up in terms of this legislation, is staffed by some sixty people divided into multidisciplinary teams of advocates, attorneys, accountants and other financial experts. In August 1998, the unit was investigating government corruption involving seven billion rand. Some 90 000 cases of fraud, corruption and maladministration at different levels of government have been reported to the unit.³⁸

CONCLUSION

Much has been done on both a legislative and operational level to bolster the state’s capacity to fight organised crime. It will take time, however, before the legislation begins to make an impact. Of the ten laws analysed in this article, four came into operation during 1997 and 1998, and one at the beginning of 1999. The Witness Protection Act will come into operation during the latter half of 1999, and legislation on money laundering possibly only in 2000. International experience has shown that it takes time for a criminal justice system to successfully adopt and employ new laws.³⁹ This is especially the case with organised crime where investigators work in teams, and investigations are lengthy and intricate.

Much work needs to be done to improve the operational effectiveness of the police. Out of a total of some 20 000 detectives in the SAPS, only 13 000 (65 per cent) had undergone specialist detective training by October 1997.⁴⁰ The investigation of crimes by the SAPS is inadequate. The average workload of a detective consist of the investigation of 140 separate cases simultaneously, making any proper and thorough investigation impossible.⁴¹ Of every ten crimes reported to the police, only two are sufficiently investigated on average, for the prosecution to take on the case.⁴²

A number of specialised crime units investigating serious crimes are particularly understaffed. For example, in 1998, the 933 detectives at the SAPS’s commercial branch were investigating 34 600 cases of commercial crime involving some R10.3 billion.⁴³ It is estimated that it would take each detective an average of nineteen years to complete his or her caseload, assuming that no new cases were reported during that time.⁴⁴ It is therefore not surprising that, of the 58 700 reported cases of commercial crime in South Africa in 1997, there were only 4 370 convictions.⁴⁵

These deficiencies have to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Levels of organised crime — like that of other forms of crime — tend to expand and contract in cycles. During periods of political and socio-economic instability with inadequate budgets for the criminal justice system, organised crime grows. Organised crime may expand to a point, however, where even concerted state effort is unable to counter it effectively. Colombia and parts of the Russian Federation are examples of this. It is crucial that organised crime syndicates are prevented from reaching such a critical mass in South Africa.

The legislation necessary to fight organised crime is largely in place. What is needed is a concerted effort to implement it, and to improve the operational capacities of all the main components in the criminal justice system.

ENDNOTES

M Shaw, Organised crime in post-apartheid South Africa, ISS Papers, 28, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, January 1998, p. 1.



CIMC, The incidence of serious crime between 1 January and 31 December 1997, Quarterly Report, 1/98, Crime Information Management Centre, South African Police Service, Pretoria, 27 March 1998, p. 25.



The SAPS defines a crime syndicate as "[a]n organised group of people sharing membership of a structure which, by means of unlawful activities and conspiracy, is engaged in illegally obtaining, receiving and supplying goods and services. Such a conspiracy violates the law to enrich or empower those involved and utilises a division of labour and planning to achieve its goals."



The SAPS defines a target group as "[a]n organised criminal group which has come to the attention of either the SAPS or the intelligence agencies, but of which, due to numerous factors, the whole structure or extent of criminal activities is not yet known. It is a potential syndicate, to be classified either as a gang or a syndicate once investigation is completed and its structures and involvement in crime more completely identified."



SALC, Review of security legislation: The Interception and Monitoring Act, Discussion Paper, 78, project 105, South African Law Commission, Pretoria, November 1998.



Hansard (Q:NA), 7, 22 April 1998, columns 942-943.



Fraud: McNally warns banks, Sunday Tribune Sunday Finance, 5 July 1998.



Criminal Procedure Act no 51 of 1977, as amended by Act no 135 of 1991, Section 185A.



Those established under the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act no 74 of 1996.



The Act defines a criminal gang as any formal or informal ongoing organisation or group of more than two persons, "... which has as one of its activities the commission of one or more criminal offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity."



SALC, Report on Money Laundering and Related Matters, project 104, South African Law Commission, Pretoria, August 1996.



CIMC, The incidence of serious crime between 1 January and 31 March 1997, Quarterly Report, 2/97, Crime Information Management Centre, South African Police Service, Pretoria, p. 28.



D Omar, unpublished speech, world conference on Modern Investigation, Organised Crime and Human Rights, Sun City, 24 September 1998.



Ibid.



SARPCCO member states are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.



D J M Bruce, The role and achievements of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), ISSUP Bulletin, 4/98, 1998, p. 3.



Ibid., pp. 8-9.



South Africa signs anti-crime agreement, <www.usia.gov/ regional/bnc/usafrica/sfmtcrim.htm>, 4 January 1999.



Hansard (Q:NA), 15, 22 July 1998, columns 2237-2238.



J Soal, SA signs UN treaty on drugs trade, Cape Times, 14 December 1998.



B Stuart, UN and Interpol to help SA fight drugs, The Citizen, 15 December 1998.



J de Beer, Assistant Commissioner and Head: Specialised Investigations, submission to the Portfolio Committee on Justice, 29 September 1998.



The Office for Serious Economic Offences was created in terms of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act no 177 of 1991.



Hansard (Q:NA), 13, 8 October 1997, columns 2897-2898.



R Morris, Boost for Cape Town OSEO, Cape Times Business Report, 14 October 1998.



D Omar, Press statement on the establishment of an Investigating Directorate on Organised Crime and Public Safety, 17 September 1998.



Hansard (Q:NA), 13, 7 October 1997, column 2842.



R Cokayne, Customs sharpens its legal teeth, Cape Times, 14 September 1998.



Hansard (Q:NA), 13, 7 October 1997, column 2841.



Report by the Secretary-General to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, on the implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime, E/CN.15/1996/2, 4 April 1996, paragraphs 17-20. See also, J Walsh, A world war on bribery, Time, 22 June 1998, pp. 19-25.



Report by the Secretary-General to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, on the impact of organized criminal activities upon society at large, E/CN.15/1993/3, 11 January 1993, paragraph 36.



E Randall, Wrath of Kahn hits corrupt cops, Saturday Argus, 25 April 1998.



L Ensor, Police anti-corruption drive has ‘some success’, Business Day, 10 September 1998.



Hansard (Q:NA), 19, 19 August 1998, columns 2730-2732.



Hansard (Q:NA), 5, 18 March 1998, column 416.



Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act no 74 of 1996.



Ibid., Section 2(2).



Heath probing government corruption cases involving R7bn, Business Day, 28 August 1998.



In a written submission to the Portfolio Committee on Justice on the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill, national police Commissioner George Fivaz argued that while RICO legislation (Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act) was enacted in the US in 1970, it was understood and fully utilised by law enforcement agencies only since about 1982.



Hansard (Q:NA), 19, 25 November 1997, columns 3978-3979.



T van Vuuren, Private and public cooperation in the restoration of order in South Africa, Police Science Association of Southern Africa Bulletin, 2, Pretoria, 1997, p. 5.



Executive summary, Nedcor project on crime, violence and investment, Johannesburg, June 1996, p. 2.



J W Meiring, Facsimile message, head of the SAPS Commercial Branch, 12 October 1998.



Spotting the office fraud, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 27 March 1998.



CIMC, 1/98, op.cit., pp. 28-31.