In his address at the 1998 South African Army Conference, the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr Ronnie Kasrils stated, among others, that "... Africa has helped to free South Africa. The new SANDF, strengthened by meaningful transformation, will play its role in keeping our region and Africa stable and secure for progress, freedom, democracy and peace." The challenge that South Africa continuously faces, is how to help in keeping the subregion and Africa stable and secure for progress, freedom, democracy and peace to thrive. In other words, how does the country, in practice, ensure successful collaborative security in Southern Africa?

The notion and importance of collaborative security for Southern Africa are cogently explained in the White Paper on Defence in a Democracy:

"... a common approach to security in Southern Africa is necessary for a number of reasons. First, many of the domestic threats to individual states are shared problems and impact negatively on the stability of neighbouring states. Second, it is possible that interstate disputes could emerge in relation to refugees, trade, foreign investment, natural resources and previously suppressed territorial claims. Third, since the subcontinent is politically volatile and its national and regional institutions are relatively weak, internal conflicts could give rise to cross-border tensions and hostilities. This volatility and weakness also makes the region vulnerable to foreign interference and intervention from land, sea and air."¹

Clapham refers to "... the always hazardous and often dispiriting task of trying to promote international peace and security in Africa."² This view is reinforced by the continuation of what would seem to be intractable conflicts and problems in Southern Africa. However, the task of promoting peace and security in Africa, in particular in Southern Africa, is seen by the South African government as a compelling necessity and an overriding concern in the promotion of South Africa’s foreign policy goals and in securing the country’s own well-being.

On the other hand, there are some in this country, occupants of comfort zones, who raise their voices to demand South Africa’s disengagement from the subregion. The corollary of this demand is that South Africa must turn its back on Southern Africa and refocus solely on its major trading partners in the West that apparently have so much more to offer this country in its quest for development and prosperity. Such an approach would ignore the fact that the prosperity and development of others in the subregion are fundamentally in South Africa’s own national interest. The proponents of disengagement also argue that there is little to show for the involvement of the South African government in the search for peace, development and prosperity in the subregion.

The stark reality is that South Africa’s subregional policy is not the result of mere altruism, nor of some form of benign pragmatism. It is driven by enlightened national self-interest. In a very fundamental way, the country’s destiny as a nation is irrevocably tied with the destiny of the subregion and, indeed, of Africa at large. If ‘the continent’ wins, South Africa wins; and if ‘the continent’ fails, South Africa fails. The country has always been, is still and will always be engaged in the subregion and in Africa. What little choice there is in the matter revolves around whether the country turns such an engagement into an asset or a liability — whether the human and material resources of the subregion are collaboratively used for the good of all in the subregion, or whether destructive and fruitless ‘beggar thy neighbour’ subregional competition with a self-assured zero-zero outcome becomes the focus.

A powerful cautionary tale that emerges from a cursory glance at the effects of past apartheid policies aimed at subregional destabilisation, is that the security of South Africa’s national borders cannot be guaranteed for long in the midst of insecurity and underdevelopment in the subregion, and in Africa at large. Unlike the colonialists of the past, the country, as a constitutional democracy that is founded on respect for fundamental and universal rights and freedoms, also cannot regard Southern Africa as an exploitable hinterland. It cannot treat the subregion as an appendage whose only use is to lay prostrate as it plunders its peoples and natural resources, without any regard for the welfare and security of its inhabitants and natural habitat. National security, in the long term, will only be assured in the context of the overall collective security of the whole of Southern Africa.

The quest of the South African government for collaborative security in Southern Africa is thus a fundamental aspect of the country’s overall foreign policy outlook. Indeed, the sovereign equality of states and peace, security, and development for all in the subregion are the core objectives that underpin South Africa’s regional policy. The government will therefore continue to accord first-rate priority to the security of Southern Africa. On this there can be no equivocation.

But the government does not stand alone. The majority of the people in the country support its policy of regional engagement. It was with great interest that the Department of Foreign Affairs took note of the article published earlier this year by Professor Philip Nel of Stellenbosch University, entitled The foreign policy beliefs of South Africans: A first cut. As suggested by the title, the article seeks to analyse a variety of surveys on South African public opinion regarding foreign policy issues. Focusing on regions of the world that South Africans would want to be associated with the most, Nel observes that "... overall, the hierarchy of regional preferences for both opinion leaders and the mass public is virtually the same: Southern Africa is the favorite region, followed by Europe or North America ..."

Nevertheless, the objective is not to project a romanticised view of the subregion that bears no resemblance to the actual realities and state of affairs on the ground in Southern Africa. As stated in the White Paper on Defence, " ... much of the sub-continent is stricken by chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. There are large numbers of refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis, widespread disease and environmental degradation." The challenges for collaborative security in Southern Africa are therefore many and complex. There are no ‘quick fixes’, no easy answers and no delusions. However, this is a challenge for all in the subregion, including South Africa, that has to be met with alacrity and a sense of historical urgency.

According to the White Paper on Defence, "... security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being." This comprehensive definition of security is applicable to the pursuit of collaborative security in Southern Africa.

The real and most profound challenge for policy-making in the realm of collaborative security in Southern Africa is well articulated in Mark Malan’s article on African peace maintenance: A hard look to the future. Two tensions around the notion of collaborative security can be recognised. In the first instance, "... mainstream thinking on responses to conflict reflects a preoccupation with establishing peace and democracy in a war-torn society in one fell swoop." On the other hand, "... one cannot define peace as nothing short of economic justice or social harmony without losing an understanding of peace as something different from and, possibly, less demanding than those other worthwhile goals ... it does appear difficult, if not impossible, to secure the higher, more dynamic aspects of peace before the lower aspects of law and order are met."³

In short, the question must be whether the quest for collaborative security in the subregion is understood as leading to the absence of conflict and the maintenance of law and order, that is, to the ‘lower aspects of peace’. Or should the quest for collaborative security also aim at creating economic justice and social harmony in the subregion, that is, the presence of ‘the higher aspects of peace’?

The subregion has sought to achieve both the absence of conflicts and the presence of economic justice and social harmony as one large, indivisible challenge. On the one hand, the pervasive prevalence of poverty, underdevelopment, ethnic strife, enforced population movements and environmental degradation will render the long-term security of national states in the subregion unattainable. On the other hand, viable, democratic, open and outward-looking national states in the subregion that are people-centred, are a fundamental sine qua non for any effort to achieve sustainable collective security in the subregion. Only such human rights-based national states are capable, individually and collectively as a subregion, to tackle the daunting challenges of pervasive poverty, underdevelopment, ethnic strife, enforced migration and environmental degradation. Indeed, the collapse of central state authority in conflict areas has significantly worsened human and environmental security conditions.

South Africa’s strategic approach to the collective security of Southern Africa is therefore based on three key pillars:

the security of national states in the subregion (national or sovereign security);



the security of the subregion’s inhabitants and peoples (human security); and



the security of the subregion’s entire environs (environmental security, or the sustainable utilisation of the subregion’s natural resources).

Any attempt at collective subregional security that seeks to ensure national security only, without paying any adequate attention to human and environmental security, will fail to address the basic causes of conflicts and instability that afflict parts of the subregion. Only an integrated and holistic treatment of these three facets of subregional collaborative security is capable of ensuring long-term sustainable development, peace and security in Southern Africa.

An approach that addresses the three key elements of subregional collaborative security in an integrated and holistic manner is also crucial in addressing not only interstate conflicts, but also intrastate conflicts in the subregion. Such an approach is also the guarantor against militaristic solutions to the subregion’s problems, as well as against alienation and marginalisation from political and economic processes by large segments of populations in national states.

There is little doubt that Southern Africa, as embodied in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is undertaking important measures in its search for collaborative security in the subregion. What is more, the events in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola indicate that the subregion’s collective security must increasingly encompass SADC’s immediate neighbourhood if the spillover of instability and conflict into the subregion is to be avoided. In turn, the subregion’s security can only be assured, in the long run, by continental security throughout Africa.

The leaders in Southern Africa have undertaken numerous measures to ensure the security and viability of the subregion’s national states over the last decades. These range from the formation of the Front-Line States (FLS) in July 1979, to the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 and SADC in 1992, to the July 1994 Windhoek workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security. These efforts are continuing.

With the advent of democratic South Africa, the Southern African struggle against the apartheid regime and the subregion’s quest for greater economic independence from apartheid South Africa, have been replaced by a sustained drive towards closer subregional co-operation and integration at various levels, in search of collaborative subregional security.

On the economic front, negotiations on the SADC Free Trade Treaty attest to the importance that SADC member states attach to the issues of economic viability and economic integration of the subregion. Although intra-SADC trade increasingly accounts for a growing share of the subregion’s overall economic activity, the signing into force of the SADC Free Trade Treaty early in 2000 will give a much needed boost to the regional quest for a common economic community and shared economic prosperity. Closer economic integration will ensure that the subregion is capable of integrating into the global economy, and that it derives adequate benefits from the twin processes of globalisation and liberalisation sweeping throughout the world.

The Spatial Development Corridors are also important in this regard. New and upgraded road and rail networks are beginning to link the various economic hubs of the subregion in order to maximise its economic potential and create an investor-friendly outlook. These represent a crucial element in ‘smart partnerships’ between the subregion’s national states and the private sector. It is this type of economic co-operation and development that forms the glue that will bind the economic basis and contribute to the coherence of initiatives to engender and enhance collaborative security in Southern Africa.

The adoption of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 1996 marked an important step in the subregional search for closer political integration. Key principles embodied by the Organ are:

the sovereign equality of all member states;



respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence;



peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation or arbitration; and



military intervention of whatever nature only after all possible remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the charters of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

According to the communiqué on the establishment of the Organ, the following objectives are to be pursued:

the protection of the region against instability arising from the internal breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict and external aggression;



co-operation in regional security and defence, through conflict prevention, management and resolution;



support for other organs and institutions of SADC;



mediation in interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts;



co-ordination and harmonisation, as far as possible, of policy on international issues;



promotion of the development and enhancement of democratic institutions and practices within each member state;



the encouragement of member states to observe universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the OAU and the UN; and



the promotion of peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.

The Organ also envisages "... the development of regional mechanisms for peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities and training of national forces for peacekeeping roles." This last aspect is being pursued through a number of collaborative regional training initiatives that have culminated in large peacekeeping field exercises, such as Operation Blue Crane recently held in South Africa.

In a sense, the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Security and Defence represents an ambitious effort on the part of the subregion to integrate national political institutions, and to harmonise their values and practices at political level. It is also an attempt to integrate efforts to meet the international obligations emanating from the charters of the OAU and the UN into the practice and thinking of the subregion at political level.

There are those who would argue that these efforts at subregional integration in Southern Africa are doomed to failure. They point to the subregion’s lack of financial resources, its weak economic base, and the seeming incompatibility in the values that are being espoused by the various states in the subregion. Sometimes, a case is made that the subregion does not enjoy sufficient political, social, economic and cultural links to make collaborative security and subregional integration viable. Finally, the critics of integration bemoan the fact that Southern Africa lacks what is commonly referred to as a ‘security community’, and that this makes SADC incapable of adequately mediating in conflicts caused by the vagaries of power, fear, political fragmentation, rivalry over scarce resources and ethnic strife.

For some time, however, Southern Africa has been involved in institutional and policy arrangements of which the outcome, in practice, will be precisely the emergence of a ‘security community’. It will be based on:

a determination to pursue common interests and values;

a willingness to be bound by a common set of rules applying to relations with one another;

sharing the activities of common institutions; and

the availability of instruments and means that would allow a collective response to conflicts.

Such an outcome will also lead to the predictability of the policies of SADC and its constituent member states in their interaction with one another and world at large. As in so many other matters, however, no one can expect Rome to be built in one day.

Beyond the realm of politics, defence and security, a number of SADC protocols in related areas should be noted: on illicit drug trafficking and money laundering, on wildlife conservation and law enforcement, and on shared water course systems. Other protocols are in the process of being finalised, such as the trade protocol. Recently, SADC member states held a seminar to develop modalities for accession to the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court that will form an important part of the subregion’s fight to prosecute international crimes — wherever they might happen.

A vital point to make in this regard is that these SADC protocols, in combination, represent a crucial framework within which the architecture of Southern African collaborative security, as broadly defined, is beginning to emerge. These protocols further represent a base on which to build a shared outlook, shared values and principles, and a common reference for national states and peoples in the subregion who are in search of interdependent and mutually beneficial security. The agreements are an anvil on which a truly common, collective and collaborative security can be forged in Southern Africa. They represent a clear indication that there is indeed an emergence of a ‘security community’ in Southern Africa. But it must not be simply a community of states — it must include the security interests of the peoples of the region as collectivities and as individual human beings.

Freedom from want and freedom from fear stand out as the most basic human challenges that confront Southern Africa at present. These freedoms test the subregion’s collective capacity to provide security for its people. The lack of basic human security in the subregion is epitomised by pervasive poverty, underdevelopment, the scarcity of material resources, civil strife and armed conflicts. It is exacerbated by transborder criminality, high infant mortality and short lifespans, enforced population movements and transborder communicable diseases — all of which afflict millions of people across the subregion.

The absence of human security in Southern Africa can be identified as the single biggest internal challenge confronting the stability, coherence and viability of national states in the subregion. It is also often the root cause of insecurity, and sometimes of the outright collapse of national states. It is the root cause of interstate conflicts, as well the main cause of the reckless and unsustainable utilisation of the subregion’s environmental heritage. To break the vicious circle of political conflict, underdevelopment, intrastate conflict and environmental degradation, the first and foremost task is to ensure human security in Southern Africa.

The extent to which the safety and security of individuals and peoples in Southern Africa has been attained — that is, the level of human security — is the measure of the progress that the subregion and its national states are making towards the ultimate condition of peace, prosperity, development and security. The attainment of human security will require a multiplicity of interlocking and mutually reinforcing actions at subregional and national state levels, as well as among peoples and communities. The pursuit of human security must also include an array of key non-governmental actors.

To achieve human security, national states must discharge their core functions of assuring the security of borders, of national and constitutional organs, and of maintaining internal law and order. They must also create and deepen democratic practices and respect for universal and fundamental human rights and freedoms. They must vigorously promote the welfare of all their citizens. They must create an enabling environment for the attainment of economic development, and for essential levels of trade and exchange with the outside world. They must be capable of participating constructively and successfully, for the benefit of their own peoples, in the global economy and in the processes of globalization and liberalisation.

The pursuit of human security by national states will allow individuals, peoples and communities in the subregion to unleash their creativity, and it will empower them to seek and find solutions to the type of problems that are often a sad reflection of the collapse of communal life.

South Africa is firm in its conviction that poverty alleviation and the closing of income disparities between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ lie at the very heart of sustainable human security. Therefore, a notion of human security that is devoid of an economic, democratic and development agenda — one that seeks to address only the questions of humanitarian needs, conflict and post-conflict imperatives, man-made and natural disasters and the protection of the vulnerable segments of society cannot be supported. Such a narrow and self-serving concept of human security can easily spiral into a licence for an egregious interference into the internal affairs of other states and, consequently, undermine the collective security of the subregion and global security in general. Indeed, any defining conceptualisation of human security must represent an ‘add-on’ and not a deduction from the framework provided in the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Thus, the subregion’s actions with regard to the prohibition and elimination of landmines, small arms, drug trafficking, organised crime, enforced population movements and humanitarian assistance to refugees, must be seen in the context of its overall desire for economic development and democratic governance. Human security, together with national and environmental security, must form one essential component of an indivisible concept of collaborative security for Southern Africa.

Southern Africa is characterised by an over-reliance on commodity trading, a lack of adequate water resources, the vulnerability of its coastlines, and the increasing depletion of its rare wildlife. This should place the sustainable utilisation of the environment at the centre of policy-making aimed at ‘collective security’ in the subregion. Given the weak economic base of the subregion in relation to more developed countries, the sustainability and sustainable utilisation of the subregion’s natural resources, in total, have become an acute matter impacting on the economic viability and the human security of the entire subregion.

In this regard, ecotourism, driven by the subregion’s unique biodiversity, has become the single most promising source for the economic revival of the subregion, and an important plank for the subregion’s greater integration into the global economy. Indeed, the subregion is increasingly viewing and utilising its biodiversity and natural endowments as strategic resources of which the sustainable utilisation can contribute immeasurably to the security of Southern Africans. After all, disregard for and destruction of the natural environment are often functions of poverty, underdevelopment and conflicts in society. In turn, conditions of poverty, underdevelopment and conflict often make the important matter of sustainable environmental protection seem too distant, and a luxury that poor nations can ill-afford.

A number of initiatives in the field of interstate environmental collaboration have already been undertaken. For example, there has been collaboration between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique, as well as between South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe to establish common border wildlife sanctuaries. Zimbabwe and Zambia have co-operated on issues surrounding the common use of the Victoria Falls. These all point to the fact that it is recognised that the utilisation of the common subregional heritage is crucial in ensuring long-term collaborative security in Southern Africa. But there are also clear linkages between environmental security and the ‘harder’ aspects of state security, as illustrated by the issue of water scarcity.

Following a major world-wide study on water resources, the UN published a report in 1996 entitled Water and population dynamics. The report predicts that water is likely to be the source of major conflicts in a number of water-scarce regions of the world, including in Southern Africa around the Zambezi basin. The joint harnessing of scarce water resources therefore holds forth the prospect for greater subregional security and stability. This will eliminate disputes between national states, as was the case between Botswana and Namibia around the Okavango/Chobe water reserves.

There is also a lack of capacity in the subregion to police its long coastlines effectively. This has led to the plunder of the subregion’s marine resources. It also represents a sore point of vulnerability, even in military terms, with regard to the collective security of the subregion. The littoral states of Southern Africa particularly feel this insecurity, as most lack adequate resources patrol their coastal borders, let alone their littoral exclusive zones.

It is not only the utilisation of water and fish that create conflict potential and contribute to poverty. All natural resources are potential sources of conflict — especially when these include access to oil and mineral wealth. It is often stated that minerals are a root cause of conflict, and that minerals are financing and sustaining the destabilising conflicts that are raging in Central Africa and Angola. The income derived from these minerals is not used for development, but rather to extend the fighting capacity of combatants (and in some cases to enrich their sponsors), thus prolonging instability, conflict and human suffering in Africa.

The negative effects of the exploitation of mineral wealth clearly have to be placed on the environmental security agenda, and hence the collective security agenda of the subregion. Understanding the politics of mineral exploitation is essential to meaningful attempts at conflict prevention — and to those aimed at peacekeeping and peacemaking in the region.

The framework and parameters for South Africa’s involvement in subregional peacemaking and peacekeeping are clearly spelled out in the White Paper on Defence, as well as in the White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions. Indeed, the latter policy document states that:

"... regions, governments, and communities have begun to challenge traditional concepts of security, and to re-configure the strategies required to deal with previously ignored sources of insecurity and instability. This process has typically involved the broadening of traditional concepts of security — hitherto limited largely to the military dimensions — to include political, economic, social, cultural and personal security. It has also led to the widespread acknowledgement of the fact that appropriate responses to ongoing political, economic and social instability must include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies, and ongoing economic and social development."

Clearly, this broad understanding of security informs South Africa’s encompassing approach to peacekeeping and peacemaking in the subregion. Emphasising only the military dimensions of conflicts may result in an imperative to rush armies into every subregional conflict. The political, social, cultural and environmental considerations of peacekeeping and peacemaking should also be emphasised. South Africa seeks to achieve all aspects of peace and security. The country supports comprehensive subregional collaborative security, paying equal attention to both the causes and effects of insecurity and instability in Southern Africa.

This has been the basis for South Africa’s approach to the crisis in Lesotho in 1998. It has also been its approach to conflicts in Angola, the DRC and the Great Lakes region, in general. It is the failure to appreciate the holistic context of South Africa’s approach to subregional security that underlies the often virulent criticism of its regional involvement. For example, Dr Francis Makoa of the University of Lesotho, summarily condemns and dismisses South Africa’s peace enforcement mission in Lesotho. Among other assertions, Makoa writes that, "... like its apartheid predecessor, the ANC regime wants a compliant and pliant Lesotho." He also makes the startling assertion that "... South Africa’s African policy, in general, is not surprising given that country’s historically insignificant economic and political interaction with the African continent — a phenomenon that has been barely tempered by the demise of apartheid. What would be termed post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy objectives are dominated by concern with strengthening its erstwhile economic ties with Western Europe and North America."⁴

These observations are clearly not informed by an accurate analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy framework and objectives — as outlined above in the regional context. They are also in stark contrast to the conclusion reached by three prominent local scholars in 1995, long before South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho during September 1998. Commenting on a seminar addressing the future of peacekeeping in Southern Africa, Cilliers, Shaw and Mills observed that, "... whereas the initial approach of the South African Government of National Unity to the region was extremely cautious, the seminar appeared to reaffirm an increased South African confidence in engaging the region — a confidence that appeared to see South Africa’s leadership role as making an important contribution to peace in Southern Africa."⁵

In conclusion, it is not surprising that a degree of frustration exists among those who advocate a prominent role for South Africa in forging collaborative security and participating in peacekeeping ventures in the subregion. Conflict prevention and peacemaking in the subregion are arduous and long processes with out the offer of a ‘quick fix’. And even when significant diplomatic contributions are made to this process, few will know of these gains. For example, in August 1998, South Africa put forward proposals for ending the conflict in the DRC. About a year later, the essential ingredients of these proposals formed the basis for the Lusaka agreement on the conflict in the DRC.

South Africa will thus continue to work — behind the scenes and in international and regional forums — for the promotion of state, human and environmental security for all, but especially through its engagement in collaborative efforts to enhance security in Southern Africa.

This is an edited version of a paper with the same title presented at a conference on The Southern Africa challenge for the SA Army, hosted by the Institute for Security Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Pretoria, 29 July 1999. The article is published under the auspices of Training for Peace in Southern Africa, a project funded by the Royal Norwegian government and executed by the ISS in partnership with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI).

 

Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence in a Democracy, Pretoria, 1995.



C Clapham, The United Nations and peacekeeping in Africa, in M Malan (ed.), Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?, ISS Monograph Series, 36, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, April 1999, p. 42.



M W Doyle, quoted in M Malan, A hard look to the future, in Malan, ibid., p. 93.



F Makoa, Foreign military intervention in Lesotho’s elections dispute: Whose project?, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 21(1), June 1999.



J Cilliers, M Shaw & G Mills, Towards a South African policy on preventive diplomacy and peace support operations, in M Shaw & J Cilliers, South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, volume 1, Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, 1995, p. 14.