Operation Allied Force, the 90-day air campaign of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) against the Yugoslav military force, was terminated on 20 June 1999. This was done after the Serbs indicated their willingness to comply with the timetable of a Military Technical Agreement signed by them that covered the withdrawal of all their troops, paramilitaries, special police forces and military equipment from Kosovo. In addition, NATO signed an agreement with the leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Hashim Thaci, covering a demilitarisation plan for the KLA forces within a 90-day period, as well as a full handover of security to NATO troops. Finally, an agreement was reached between NATO and Russia regarding the integration of Russian troops into an international security presence in Kosovo, known as KFOR. This was done in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999. Thus began Operation Joint Guardian — a development that promised to be a new phase in the international community’s involvement in Kosovo.¹

The Security Council, through Resolution 1244 of 1999, furthermore authorised the Secretary-General, with the assistance of other roleplayers, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration under which the people of the province could enjoy substantial autonomy. To this end, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was formally approved on 10 June 1999.

The UN structures faced some daunting peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges in Kosovo. Although many of the northern parts of the province remained virtually untouched by the hostilities, towns such as Pec, Djakovica and Mitrovica sustained massive damage. Generally speaking, the public service structures in Kosovo were largely inoperative after the war. Municipalities were functioning inadequately or not at all.

The humanitarian consequences of the conflict for the people of Kosovo have been especially profound. In short, out of the population of more or less 1.7 million, almost half have sought refuge in Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. It was furthermore estimated that up to 500 000 persons had been internally displaced and were in a bad state of health, having spent weeks in hiding without food or shelter. Many of these refugees and internally displaced persons experienced psychological trauma, as well as physical abuse.

The security and political situation remained tense, but relatively stable. The KLA rapidly moved back into all parts of Kosovo and a large number of Kosovo Serbs had left their homes for Serbia. At the same time, criminal gangs competing for the control of scarce resources started to exploit the absence of law and order institutions and agencies. Generally speaking, the absence of a legitimate police force was deeply felt.²

Despite certain generic similarities, every peace mission is unique in character and most often bears little resemblance to earlier or other peace missions. In other words, each peace mission has its own unique challenges, circumstances, demands and dynamics. In this context, this article reflects on international involvement in Kosovo with special reference to the responsibilities and activities of UNMIK and KFOR in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. To this end, it sketches the relevant Security Council resolution with the aim of understanding the mandates and responsibilities of UNMIK and KFOR. It also outlines the structures, tasks, activities and other related dynamics surrounding the international civil and security presence in Kosovo in the period that immediately followed deployment in June 1999. In the final instance, the article reflects on the significance of the peace process in Kosovo in the context of peacekeeping requirements in Africa.

Peace missions should be regarded as political-diplomatic strategies being pursued by the international community or certain regional roleplayers.³ Peace missions must therefore be viewed as long-term endeavours that aim at political and development solutions for the achievement of lasting peace. Such initiatives normally necessitate a significant investment in peacebuilding in the aftermath of a conflict, which is mainly a diplomatic-development process. Peacebuilding includes activities such as the identification and support of measures and structures that will promote peace and build trust, and the facilitation of conflict resolution to prevent a relapse into conflict.⁴

With regard to the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo, it was decided in terms of Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo would include the following:⁵

deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary, enforcing a cease-fire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of the Yugoslav military force;



demilitarising the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian groups;



establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety and humanitarian aid can be delivered;



ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could take responsibility for this task;



supervising demining until the international civil presence could take responsibility for this task;



supporting, where appropriate, and co-ordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;



conducting border monitoring duties as required; and



ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of the force itself, the international civil presence and other international organisations.

In view of this, KFOR’s immediate task was concerned with the more robust peacekeeping activities in the peace process. Its task was to eradicate the violence from Kosovo which had become so much a part of Kosovar life. KFOR’s role was also to create the conditions necessary for the rebuilding of Kosovo and to assist in the establishment of a democratic and legitimate political dispensation. Its aim was to take the gun and the grenade off the streets, and to do so impartially.⁶

The Secretary-General of the UN was furthermore authorised to establish an interim international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for the province. In fact, the Security Council vested authority over the territory and the people of Kosovo in UNMIK. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed as the highest international civilian official in Kosovo and head of UNMIK in order to facilitate the political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.⁷ Against this background, it was decided that the main responsibilities of UNMIK would include:⁸

promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;



performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;



organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government, pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;



supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peacebuilding activities;



facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status;



overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;



supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;



supporting, in co-ordination with international humanitarian organisations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;



maintaining civil law and order, including the rebuilding of the local police forces, and the interim deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;



protecting and promoting human rights; and



assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

It must be clear that the restoration of order and some semblance of government must underpin the beginning of any reconstruction effort in the aftermath of a conflict situation. Such political reconstruction sets the stage for further development and recovery. In other words, the most important need immediately following war is the re-establishment of order. Once conditions of security and stability have been re-established, economic reconstruction efforts can receive attention. In this regard, the Security Council correctly affirmed the need, through Resolution 1244 of 1999, for the rapid deployment of an effective international civil and security presence to Kosovo, and demanded that the parties involved co-operate fully in such a deployment.

Before 1989, peacekeeping was a predominantly military activity. Today, most peace missions are led by a civilian representative of an international organisation — most commonly a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, supported by an experienced staff component. Therefore, at the functional level, a large number of civilians are normally engaged in a wide range of responsibilities in support of the broad political objectives of peace processes. Such responsibilities and activities include election monitoring and assistance, the promotion and monitoring of human rights, monitoring disarmament, the provision of humanitarian assistance, demining and the provision of security.⁹ The UN involvement in Kosovo is a clear case of how multifunctional peace processes are currently run and perceived.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Dr Bernard Koucher, arrived at Pristina on 13 June 1999, one day after the initial deployment of KFOR. The bulk of the UNMIK advance team was deployed in Kosovo within subsequent days. Eventually, about 880 personnel of the UN and other partner organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), were deployed.¹⁰ In terms of what was described by the UN as "a massive international effort to turn war-devastated Kosovo into a functioning, democratic society",¹¹ it was decided that the allocation of tasks would be divided into four main components:¹²

a civil administration component;

an institution-building component;

a humanitarian component; and

a reconstruction component.

The civil administration component was divided into three departments as set out below.

The public administration/civil affairs department was tasked to establish the multi-ethnic governmental structures essential for the sustainable delivery of public services where and as long as required. It was decided that UNMIK would make maximum use of skilled public employees, irrespective of ethnicity. In addition, small teams of international staff with professional experience in the various facets of public administration (ranging from the management of health services to post and telecommunications) would contribute to the provision of public services throughout Kosovo.

The police department was tasked to define UNMIK’s law and order strategy in Kosovo in accordance with two main goals: the provision of interim law enforcement services; and the rapid deployment of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service. To achieve these goals, it was decided that UNMIK would deploy international police personnel which would consist of three separate elements: civilian police (1 800 officers); special units (ten units of about 115 officers each) and border police (205 officers).

It was foreseen that the tasks to be carried out over three distinct phases. In the first phase, KFOR would be responsible for ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could take responsibility for this task. In the second phase, once UNMIK has taken over responsibility for law and order from KFOR, UNMIK would carry out police tasks and law enforcement duties. In the third phase, UNMIK would transfer responsibilities to properly trained and selected local police.

The judicial affairs department was established in the context of the urgent need to build genuine rule of law in Kosovo, including the immediate re-establishment of an independent, impartial and multiparty judiciary. This resulted from the fact that the exodus of Kosovo Serbs accelerated the collapse of the judicial system. This was a fundamental challenge for UNMIK, since only a functioning independent and multi-ethnic judicial system could address the security concerns in Kosovo and build public confidence.

The tasks of UNMIK’s second component, the institution-building component, were identified as strengthening the capacity of local and central institutions and civil society organisations, as well promoting democracy, good governance and respect for human rights. It also included the organising of elections.

As an immediate priority, it was decided that UNMIK would work in the field of democratisation and institution-building. This would entail working with other international organisations to identify the needs of local civil administrators and provide them with the required training as quickly as possible. It would also facilitate the awareness and involvement of citizens in social and political change in Kosovo by strengthening the development of ordinary citizens, women’s and youth groups, and professional, cultural and other associations.

UNMIK was also tasked to undertake programmes to facilitate conditions that would support pluralistic political party structures, political diversity and a healthy democratic political climate. Over the longer term, it would develop an integrated approach to the strengthening of governance structures through the training of government officials in procedures of democratic governance. Interestingly, UNMIK was also tasked with the responsibility to promote the emergence of independent media in Kosovo and a media culture based on democratic principles.

Concerning elections, UNMIK would organise and oversee the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement. This included the holding of elections and the creation of an environment where free, fair and multi-ethnic elections would be possible.

In the field of human rights, it was decided that UNMIK would strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo and develop mechanisms to ensure that the police, courts, administrative tribunals and other judicial structures could operate in accordance with international standards of criminal justice and human rights. For example, the treatment of detainees, the standard of prison facilities and the running of prison facilities would be monitored. Provision was made for a core of human rights monitors and advisors who would have unhindered access to all parts of Kosovo to investigate human rights abuses and to ensure that human rights protection and promotion concerns were addressed.

The third component of UNMIK, the humanitarian component, would be led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Humanitarian assistance and mine action were identified as special tasks.

The aim of humanitarian assistance was to ensure that adequate shelter, food, clean water, medical assistance and employment would be available to meet the protection needs of internally displaced persons and the growing number of people returning to Kosovo. Humanitarian programmes would also target urgent and essential infrastructure repairs and short-term rebuilding efforts.

It was decided that mine action would focus on humanitarian relief. This included the setting up of an information management system to record mine action on a database, define the scope of the mine threat, mobilise mine action resources, and conduct mine action liaison and planning with other roleplayers, including KFOR. In the longer term, the focus would be on co-ordinating mine action support for the reconstruction of Kosovo, assisting local authorities in the development of a comprehensive and integrated mine action plan, and performing quality assurance management tasks.

The fourth component of UNMIK, the reconstruction component, was tasked to promote peace and prosperity in Kosovo and to facilitate the development of an economic life that would bring better prospects for the future. It was decided that this component of the mission would be managed by the European Union. The main functions of the reconstruction component would be to plan and monitor the reconstruction of Kosovo, prepare and evaluate policies in the economic, social and financial fields, and to co-ordinate between various donors and international financial institutions in order to ensure that all financial assistance was directed towards relevant priorities.

In terms of UNMIK’s general strategy of operation, it was decided to conduct its work in five integrated phases. The first phase would focus on the establishment and consolidation of UNMIK’s authority and the creation of interim UNMIK-managed administrative structures. Once basic stability was restored, the second phase of UNMIK’s efforts would be directed towards the administration of social services and utilities, and the consolidation of the rule of law. The third phase would build upon the second and would include the finalisation of preparations for and the conduct of elections. In the fourth phase, UNMIK would oversee and assist elected Kosovo representatives in their efforts to organise and establish provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government. The fifth and last phase would depend on a final settlement and would oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established in terms of a political settlement.¹³ It is therefore clear that the peace process for Kosovo has been considered in terms of the achievement of a desirable political endstate. This coincides with the idea that peace missions are complex, multidimensional, conflict management operations with a specific political-diplomatic focus.

On 29 October 1999, UNMIK reported that a measure of success was recorded in the restoration of public services with special reference to the following:¹⁴

Regarding police functions, UNMIK has approximately 1 800 civilian police deployed in all five regions of the province and at four border crossings. They are patrolling high-risk areas on behalf of UNMIK, and jointly with KFOR. To ensure effective policing duties, the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan recommended on 26 October 1999 that the Security Council increases the strength of the UNMIK police force by more than 1 600 officers, after receiving such a recommendation from the Special Representative in Kosovo. At the time of writing, he urged the Security Council to increase the strength from 3 110 to 4 718 to ensure that UNMIK would have a police service that could enforce and maintain civil order.¹⁵

It would therefore seem that the functionaries involved in UNMIK realised the need for a significant investment in peacebuilding, particularly in building the capacity of the state and civil institutions, creating institutional order, and ensuring respect for human rights. In this regard, the staging of free and fair elections normally marks the transition of the post-conflict state, but this has little chance to succeed in the long term unless emphasis is placed on the essentials of efficient and effective governance. These include adherence to the rule of law; competent and fair judiciaries; effective policing and a criminal justice system; and a professional public service.¹⁶

The military commitment to peace missions, normally referred to as peace support operations, includes those activities where the military operate in support of the political, diplomatic and humanitarian objectives of the broader peace process. In recent times, peace processes often started with cease-fires as part of comprehensive peace agreements, and multinational military forces deployed in the affected areas with the consent of the parties to the conflict.

Most peace missions within which the military assume a prominent role tend to be primarily landward by nature. Accordingly, armies most often play prominent roles in peace missions and the bulk of operational personnel are normally infantry. Military force structures depend on the political mandate of a mission, the size of the area, the nature and expected duration of the mission, and other factors such as lines of communications, terrain, weather, threat and logistic requirements.¹⁷

Forces from the United Kingdom have been in neighbouring Macedonia since March 1999 preparing to enter Kosovo as part of a multinational ‘peace implementation’ force. On 12 June, the first wave of British airborne troops flew into Kosovo to secure the high ground above the main Skopje-Pristina road in the Kacanik defile, while another British contingent entered the province on foot.

In the meantime, French forces entered Kosovo north of Kumanovo. Elements of a German Panzer Brigade crossed over later in the day and the British troops started pushing towards the capital, Pristina. A small number of Russian troops also arrived at Pristina airfield in a somewhat unexpected development. American and Italian-led brigades entered Kosovo the next day. The Serbs were in a process of withdrawal and, by 14 June, some 14 000 foreign troops were in Kosovo. The British advanced to the north to take control of Pristina and surrounding areas. The Germans deployed in the south-west, the French in the south-east and the Italians in the western parts.

KFOR decided to divide Kosovo into five multinational brigade areas of responsibility (AORs). It was decided that the northern AOR should be French-led (including a Russian contingent), the western AOR was to be Italian-led, the eastern AOR (including the capital, Pristina) was to be British-led (including Canadian, Norwegian and Russian troops). Furthermore, the southern AOR was to be German-led (including Dutch and Russian troops) and the south-eastern AOR was to be American-led (including Greek and Russian forces). It was also decided that the whole of Kosovo would be under a single KFOR command, but the Russian forces — numbering a total of 3 500 — would remain under Russian control. By 18 June, KFOR was widely dispersed throughout Kosovo and ready to complete its full deployment under the command of General Sir Michael Jackson. On 30 June, the total number of troops in Kosovo was 23 518. It was envisaged that KFOR’s strength will be built up to some 50 000 — to include forces from other NATO and non-NATO countries which have pledged support for the peace process.

Although KFOR’s deployment helped to bring a more stable environment to Kosovo, the security and political situation remained tense. The situation was especially troubled as a result of the fact that some 5 000 Kosovar refugees in Albania and some in Macedonia made their own decision to start returning to their homes. This was done despite the danger to them from mines, booby traps and unexploded munitions. Many internally displaced persons also came down from their places of refuge in the mountains to return home. Simultaneously, despite calls upon them to stay, an estimated 13 000 Serbs living in Kosovo started to leave Kosovo and head for Serbia. In addition, by 17 June, more than 26 000 Serb security forces had left Kosovo and in the event burnt many houses as they went — together with 110 tanks, 210 armoured personnel carriers and 151 artillery pieces.¹⁸ Thus, it is clear that KFOR, since its deployment, has been burdened with the responsibility to deal with the immediate humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Kosovo and the profound effect of this on the province. Another challenge for KFOR concerned the successful demobilisation of the KLA. In this regard, a measure of success has been recorded with the signing of an agreement on the demilitarisation and transformation of the KLA on 20 September 1999. Moreover, KFOR claimed that some 10 000 weapons and seven million rounds of ammunition were handed in since the signing of the agreement.¹⁹

A most significant feature of the peace process in Kosovo is certainly the joint but, in fact, separate international civil and security presence under UN leadership in the area. For obvious reasons, co-ordination and liaison between UNMIK and KFOR are imperative for the overall success of the peace process. In this regard, UNMIK and KFOR have started to work, since their inception, towards the establishment of a close working relationship and have put a comprehensive structure of co-ordination mechanisms in place. This includes daily meetings between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the KFOR commander at the top level.

Generally, UNMIK liaises closely with KFOR to assist the latter in implementing its responsibility for ensuring public safety in Kosovo. For example, UNMIK has deployed military liaison officers to the headquarters of KFOR and to the five KFOR multinational brigades. To this end, UNMIK participates in KFOR’s Joint Implementation Commission, which liaises with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s armed forces and the KLA. In turn, KFOR representatives take part, as necessary, in the work of UNMIK.

Other examples of close co-operation include the following:

With the assistance of KFOR, UNMIK prevented some unauthorised takeovers of media facilities.



In co-operation with KFOR, UNMIK undertook various confidence-building measures aimed at restraining Kosovo Albanians and reassuring Kosovo Serbs.



Following reports of the deliberate destruction of official records, UNMIK, with the assistance of KFOR, took measures to secure official documentation stored in administrative buildings.



UNMIK and KFOR also worked closely to co-ordinate mine action efforts, especially regarding the sharing of information.

Finally, it needs to be pointed out that the principal UN humanitarian agencies and many other non-governmental organisations have committed personnel and resources to meet the relief needs of the people of Kosovo in the aftermath of the conflict. Such organisations received vital support and protection from KFOR. Specifically, human rights monitors worked closely with KFOR on actions to protect and promote human rights.²⁰

In this context, it would seem that a high premium was placed on efforts to ensure that the international civil and security components in Kosovo act in a fully integrated manner and work towards a single goal. Accordingly, the Secretary-General reported in a letter to the president of the Security Council, dated 8 July 1999, that "KFOR continues to provide a secure environment and is establishing coordination mechanisms with the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)."²¹

As already sketched above, the role of the military forces in peace missions most often include responsibilities such as:

the separation of combatants;


the disarmament of irregular forces;

the demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into unified armies;

assistance with the restructuring of societies; and

assistance with elections for new governments.

Practically speaking, the conflict context of a peace mission can be divided into two ordinal categories according to the degree of violence involved. A category of ‘less violent’ can incorporate conflicts with little or no violence, resulting in limited fatalities. A second category, ‘more violent’, can incorporate both serious clashes and war. The environment in which KFOR operates exemplifies a situation of ‘less violent’ incidents.²² Although there has been a small number of incidents in which members of the peace force have come under fire, there has been no evidence to suggest an attitude of serious aggression and hostility towards KFOR.²³

Many civil conflicts entail groups who are lacking tight discipline and frequently engaged in guerrilla warfare, paramilitary activity, transgressions of agreements and other forms of subversive activity. Such challenges may make the task of peace keepers who try to hold a cease-fire and protect themselves very difficult.²⁴ In the case of Kosovo, numerous incidents of hostilities, intimidation, looting, arson and other crimes, including murder and killings, have been reported.²⁵ There had been no substantial killings of soldiers, even though there were a number of casualties in the course of events and as a result of accidents. Despite this, KFOR managed to provide a more secure environment in Kosovo and started to lay the foundation upon which the people of Kosovo could begin to rebuild their lives and heal the wounds of conflicts. In an earlier report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK, KFOR was commended for its assistance and co-operation in the collaborative effort in the peace process.²⁶

Before 1989, peacekeeping was generally military in the nature of tasks and composition. Currently, most contemporary multinational peace processes are civilian operations with military and humanitarian components working closely together. In Kosovo, the UN — in its own assessment — has taken up an undertaking that, for any international institution, is unprecedented in complexity and scope. Moreover, no other mission has ever been designed in which other multilateral organisations are full partners under UN leadership.²⁷

What is more, the peace process in Kosovo clearly shows how far peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the UN, which was basically one of observing that the parties to a conflict abided by a negotiated truce. It also bears testimony to the growing importance of regional organisations and alliances in international peace initiatives in the post-Cold War era. In fact, it can be argued that the ability of the UN to be successful in any peace process and especially in post-conflict reconstruction depends in no small measure on the extent of support rendered to the over-burdened UN by competent regional roleplayers. The peace process in Kosovo cannot be seen in isolation from the dynamics of economic integration under the European Union and its various institutions, and the fact that mutual trust has been built historically in that part of the world. Moreover, the peace process draws on the support of a number of wealthy industrialised states that are members of NATO and the OSCE.

Although not a peace mission under a single umbrella, the activities of UNMIK and KFOR furthermore exemplify the new relationship that multinational peacekeeping has imposed on both civilian and military components in recent and current peacekeeping processes. Contrary to cases where interaction between the military and civil components of UN missions has not been on a healthy footing, it would seem that UNMIK and KFOR, by and large, have been able to direct their focus and efforts towards one identified centre. Although there are two different operations taking place in the same country with different mandates, there is clearly a synergy of efforts and activities. This is not always easy as peace processes are multifunctional efforts with a very broad spectrum of types of action to be applied. Moreover, military and civilian components normally follow different management styles and procedures.

The involvement of UNMIK and KFOR also illustrates the fact that peace processes should be seen in an holistic sense, including peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks. All functions are supposed to be streamlined in a concerted and organised approach with the view of ensuring lasting stability and a desired political endstate. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the normal military operational approach is not geared to implement development activities. The military tend not to think much about the long-term implications of their actions. Still, a most important issue is to assure security on the ground and in so doing, to promote peace at the operational level and enhance the chances of a successful peacebuilding process.

It is noteworthy that, as a result of progress in stabilising Kosovo by KFOR since June 1999, UNMIK has recorded some success in restoring public services. Furthermore, Kosovo today bears little resemblance to the territory in mid-June 1999 as most refugees are at home, the informal economy is thriving and efforts are under way to restore law and order throughout the province. Yet, the current challenge in the reconstruction of Kosovo is to re-establish some kind of inclusive and legitimate domestic civilian authority. Practically speaking, the big challenge is to work towards eventual self-government and to ensure that the people of Kosovo will be able to participate in the decision-making process. In addition, providing safety and security for all communities, especially vulnerable minorities, remains high on the priority list.

Finally, reconciliation in Kosovo will be a long and slow process. Patience and persistence will be needed to carry it through. It cannot be stated with any certainty that Kosovo’s future is secured. To this end, reconstruction has only begun in Kosovo. Much will depend on the successful demobilisation of the KLA and other elements. Yet, it should be noted that the assistance, which any third party can offer to solve problems in the province and the region, can never be durable in the long run, unless those providing it are supported by the people who live there. While the presence of KFOR troops can keep a lid on antagonisms, it can do nothing to allay the hatred which might still exist in the hearts of the (former) adversaries.

Therefore, the future of Kosovo and the Balkans will depend largely on the ability to overcome the obstacles to peace and to strive for peaceful co-existence. To be successful, conflict resolution and true reconciliation must come from the parties involved in the conflict. In view of this, the UN — which has the ultimate responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world — can only be instrumental in steering and encouraging the peace process in a responsible and constructive manner — and it would seem that UNMIK and KFOR are geared and organised to fulfil this role as far as possible.

From an African perspective, a key question is whether roleplayers on the African continent can improve their ability to respond appropriately to future challenges in the field of conflict resolution and peacekeeping. This will critically depend on the capacity of both national governments and the overarching regional and subregional competencies to co-ordinate and implement efforts, and to muster adequate force numbers with proper technical and logistic support. It will also depend on a greater degree of political unison between governments which would have to approach and manage conflict resolution according to the same basic principles. Against this background, it would seem that the overview of UN involvement in Kosovo and the role of UNMIK and KFOR in the province suggest some food for thought concerning peacekeeping challenges in Africa. The following points seem to be relevant from an institutional and generic perspective:

Peace and security are still matters of global concern. The UN should therefore clearly remain the pre-eminent international authority with the responsibility for dealing with international peace and security, including internal crises, which threaten regional stability in Africa.



The UN, together with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and subregional organisations, should form partnerships in framing new approaches to crisis prevention, management and resolution.



The OAU and subregional organisations, on the one hand, and the UN system, on the other, should endeavour to share the burden proportionately of maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa.



As a regional organisation, the OAU needs to be involved in and take primary responsibility for problems on the continent, especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability. To this end, the OAU’s Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict need to be vigorously supported by African leaders. The challenge is to mobilise a stronger basis for broad multilateral action in respect of conflict management.



Future relationships and successful co-operation between the UN, the OAU and subregional organisations will depend in no small measure upon the development of the latter. To this end, subregional roleplayers need to have proper structures to deal with peacekeeping requirements and conflict resolution in order to complement UN efforts in this regard. In Southern Africa, in particular, there is a pressing need to review and reform the functioning of the relevant structures and decision-making machinery.

Among other factors, subregional roleplayers should take the following into consideration concerning involvement in peace processes on the continent:

The primary aim of peace missions in Africa should be to stabilise ailing states in order to stop or prevent further killings and the maiming of civilians in the shortest possible time. Yet, there should be general acceptance of the point that long-term peace in any situation of internal conflict will depend on longer term prospects and the measure of investment in peacebuilding. These include the promotion of good governance and civil order, building state capacity, security sector reform and ensuring respect for human rights and political pluralism. Furthermore, it implies an acknowledgement of the fact that complex emergencies require multifaceted responses. It also implies acceptance of the fact that the military is but one of the participants in any particular peace process. However, in the context of current realities in Africa — where peacekeeping is often concerned with enforcing peace in impoverished, weak and collapsing or collapsed states — it could be argued that this point has more relevance for the countries of the European community than those on the African continent. In fact, it could be stated that concerns regarding post-conflict peacebuilding are largely peripheral to the debate on the future of African peacekeeping. Still, Africans must carefully take cognisance of international developments concerning ‘new peacekeeping partnerships’ that include the military, civilian police, government and non-governmental agencies, diplomats, the media and organisations sponsoring development and democratisation programmes.



In a similar vein, there should be a realisation that the command of multinational peace missions should be centralised to ensure that all roleplayers in the subregion direct their focus and efforts towards one identified centre. Rebuilding war-torn societies requires the pursuit, in an integrated and comprehensive manner, of clearly identified objectives. Thus, subregional roleplayers and relevant functionaries in Africa need to be acquainted with the holistic and unified management of peace missions. Earlier peace processes in Africa, such as those in Mozambique and Angola, suggested a need for a more integrated approach between peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding structures. On this basis, African roleplayers and functionaries need to be ad idem on the importance of sound civil-military interactions in peace missions, and need to work towards effective co-ordination of actions. At the same time, flexibility is required in the grey areas of responsibility, since the exact number and mix of civilian roleplayers will depend on the particular demand of a peace mission.



There should be less normative and strategic divisions in the ranks of subregional roleplayers with regard to the resolution of conflict. Divisions within subregional groupings, where apparent, must be dealt with to ensure constructive and coherent contributions to international attempts to resolve conflicts in the subregion. By the same token, all roleplayers must realise and acknowledge the point that peace processes are supposed to be endeavours aimed at political and development solutions for the achievement of lasting peace. In other words, a militaristic ethos should not pervade the conflict resolution strategies on the continent. A common doctrinal framework could perhaps be helpful in making progress in this regard. At the same time, it should be realised that normative and strategic consistency in subregional approaches towards conflict resolution will also be dependent upon the longer term process of democratisation, state restructuring and policy reorientation of several African countries.



Since most African roleplayers lack the capacity to export significant amounts of development aid and assistance, there is an unambiguous need to engage the broader international community in support of peacebuilding efforts. African leaders and organisations must therefore be firmly committed to peacebuilding and they should systematically attempt to involve the broader international community through diplomatic means — and they should not underestimate the possibilities in this connection.



Given the lack of economic integration, and considering the fact that mutual trust has not been built historically in many parts of Africa, the subregional roleplayers in Africa need to organise themselves around the notions of common and collective security. Yet, they should not be over-ambitious in their efforts and there may be wisdom in suggestions that more focus should be directed towards confidence-building.



Considering the size and nature of the terrain in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola (against the roughly 130 by 130 kilometres of Kosovo), it is imperative for roleplayers at all levels to address the issue of adequate force numbers and financial resources in the African environment. Numbers can be a deciding factor when peace forces are deployed for operations in conflict-ridden African states in the successful implementation of a peace plan — especially when peace missions are deployed in extremely turbulent war-torn societies.

In the final instance, the following would seem to be important from a South African perspective:

The success of any peace mission in the Southern African region will depend in no small measure on the involvement of South Africa, whose commitment of material support to the peace process may be of special importance.



South Africa should face the prospect that it will have to shoulder a substantial contribution to future peace missions in the subregion.

Lastly, it must be clear that sustainable peace in conflict-ridden African states cannot simply result from short to medium term third-party intervention. Much depends on the co-operation and attitudes of the parties to the conflict. The peace processes in Kosovo and several African states — of which Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo are specific cases in point — bear testimony to the issue that assistance in the form of third-party intervention can never be successful and durable in the long run unless it is supported by the belligerents and their leadership. In other words, lasting peace cannot be imposed from outside. True reconciliation must come from the parties to the conflict. This is part of the key to lasting peace and stability in places such as Kosovo and many conflict-stricken African states.

The author wishes to thank Dr Jakkie Cilliers of the ISS for his advice on an earlier draft of this article.

E Fursdon, Kosovo — What a task, what a responsibility, Salut, August 1999, p 24.



K Annan, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 12 July 1999, <www.un.org/Docs/sc/ reports/1999/s1999779.htm>, 3 September 1999.



The term ‘peace mission’ constitutes an appropriate generic term to include all activities in respect of ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘peace enforcement’ and ‘peacebuilding’.



Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, Government Printers, Pretoria, 4 October 1999, p 10.



United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June 1999, <www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244. htm>, 13 September 1999.



Fursdon, op cit, p 24.



Annan, op cit.



Resolution 1244 (1999), op cit.



DFA, op cit, p 12.



United Nations, UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, 27 September 1999, <www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo_status.htm>, 30 September 1999.



United Nations, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Mandate & Tasks, <www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12htm>, 27 September 1999.



Annan, op cit.



Ibid.



United Nations, UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, 29 October 1999, <www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo_status.htm>, 11 November 1999.



Ibid.



DFA, op cit., p 21.



Ibid, pp 12-13.



Fursdon, op cit, pp 24-26.



United Nations, 29 October 1999, op cit.



Annan, op cit.



K Annan, Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 8 July 1999, <www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/s1999767.htm>, 3 September 1999.



D M Green, C Kahl & P F Diehl, Predicting the size of UN peacekeeping operations, Armed Forces and Society, 24(4), Summer 1998, p 493.



Annan, Letter, op cit.



Green et al, op cit, p 488.



Annan, Letter, op cit.



Annan, op cit.



United Nations, UNMIK, op cit.