its misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict;



the faulty premise that faction groups were criminal elements and thus could be ordered to comply with disarmament;



the misunderstandings and misconceptions of the consequences of the political and economic uses of war; and



the importance of the prize for which faction groups waged war.⁵

Politically, Liberia’s largest faction group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and its leader, Charles Taylor, manipulated and sustained different interest groups while concurrently tapping into their specific concerns and presenting the NPFL as capable of resolving their difficulties. There were multiple political, military and economic logics and advantages in using such a group. The primary reason was that, as a faction group, there were no specific international rules and regulations governing its behaviour, and to which its leader and members could be subjected. For example, French diplomatic and economic support was obtained because the NPFL presented its struggle in Liberia as partly one against suspected Nigerian hegemonic interests in the subregion. Concurrently, large business firms domiciled in the European Union and with temporary bases in Côte d’Ivoire negotiated business deals without having to satisfy export controls and other demands.

Due to the relative success and innovation with which faction groups exploited natural resources and negotiated economic deals, there was a particularly opportunistic and instrumental edge to the manner in which these wars were fought. These correlations are usually overlooked in the analysis of civil wars resulting in isolated emphasis on brutalities, and not as deliberate strategies to instil fear and control. Different approaches need to be employed to appreciate the dynamics that fuelled these civil wars. One possible method is a rational choice analysis of the cost and benefits of waging war. The second is a discursive analysis of the uses and functions of violence. Such approaches illustrate distinctive rationalities to the irrational, unattractive, strange, savage and (in)coherent actions of belligerents.⁶

When the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded south-eastern Sierra Leone in March 1991, the political economy of the war and the development of other ancillary activities resulting from war-related enterprises had expanded to such an extent that these involved several thousands of people and could not easily be stopped. The resort to violence by different factions and their unwillingness to end the civil war correspondingly mirrored a rational choice analysis of the costs and benefits of continuing the war or gaining from an uncertain peace dividend. With control over vast territories rich in natural resources, both the RUF and the NPFL commenced the efficient and calculated exploitation of these abundant natural and mineral resources. From 1992, a lucrative export business based on diamonds, timber, iron ore and gold started with French, Belgian, Turkish, Malaysian and Taiwanese contacts. To circumvent ECOWAS’s blockade of the ports of Buchanan, Harper and Greenville, products were shipped through the Ivorian port of San Pedro that was not affected by the same blockade as the Liberian ports of exit under NPFL control. Ivorian intermediaries and their French counterparts negotiated directly with the NPFL war machine and succeeded in bypassing the export controls and restrictions that any such export through the embargoed ports would have brought. To John Chipman, "Charles Taylor’s control of most of the country has been credible enough that foreign companies have dealt directly with him."⁷ It is partly within the context of the NPFL’s presumed international ‘credibility’ that the difficulties faced by ECOWAS in eliciting compliance from the NPFL and other groups should be positioned.

Appreciating Taylor and Sankoh’s negotiating and diplomatic tactics is important because they constituted part of the reasons that kept the conflict going for several years. Interrelated military, political and economic factors guided their negotiation positions. These interests were not static, but only responded to the specific stage and level of ‘success’ of their war. It was only when their positions were weakened, either politically or militarily, that both Taylor and Sankoh seemingly wished to comply. More often than not, negotiations were tactics manipulated as windows of opportunity either to re-arm or to win new political allies. In the calculations of the RUF and the NPFL, every new situation was evaluated in terms of the potential constraints and opportunities that it generated for the organisation. Strategies were subsequently either adjusted or initiated that advanced their interests and undermined those of ECOWAS. Of course, NPFL and RUF intransigence became more entrenched as the conflict began to split. This was partly due to ECOMOG and the Tejjan Kabbah government’s deliberate establishment, support and provision of arms to new groups that specifically targeted the NPFL and the RUF.⁸ However, ECOWAS’s inexperience in dealing with civil wars and faction groups also contributed to distinctive problems which reinforced the Liberian and Sierra Leonean impasse. A generally overlooked fact is that eliciting compliance from non-state actors is operationally different from state actors, since the element of sanctions is more difficult to apply. Part of ECOWAS’s difficulties also arose from the fact that this was the first time it was undertaking such an activity.

CHANGING INTERANTIONAL RESPONSES TO CIVIL WARS

As early as 1990, there were discernible shifts in how the United Nations (UN) and its major supporters perceived their roles in civil wars. No interventions occurred if the status of civil wars in minor states and their potential threats to international security were judged inadequate to justify massive unilateral or multilateral response. Such widespread perceptions underpinned most post-Cold War approaches and responses to civil wars. This narrow and simplified cost-benefit analysis of intervention was mostly espoused by the powerful members of the UN system. Minor states like Liberia and Sierra Leone were not considered geostrategic enough to vindicate the disbursement of material, political and moral costs of intervention and counterinsurgency by the international community.

ECOWAS, however, had another perspective. It perceived the civil conflict as presenting a concrete threat to the interests of its member states and ruling regimes. These differences in perception resulted in ECOWAS’s endeavours being denied initial international support. This was because the international community did not perceive threats from Liberia and Sierra Leone to the West African subregion as threatening or undermining international security. As a response to this marginalisation, this normally fractious collection of states and regimes were virtually left alone to respond to a crisis they perceived as a threat.⁹ It was against this background that, on 24 August 1990, ECOWAS initiated its historic intervention named Operation Liberty to resolve the civil war in Liberia.

By the time ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, it was a forgotten country.¹⁰ Its conflict was seen as a poor man’s war and a forgotten war.¹¹ Simply, the Liberian civil war had become the world’s forgotten emergency.¹² This conclusion arose from the fact that the international community refrained from showing an interest in Liberia because its "disintegration only minimally imperil[led] international security."¹³

ECOWAS’s intervention, however, overcame the overriding international perception of Africa, and especially the subregion’s status as the cradle of afro-pessimism¹⁴ and new nihilism.¹⁵ It became the first subregional organisation to intervene militarily in a crisis that occurred within the ambit of its authority. As a result, these interventions contributed to the Africanisation of peacekeeping and undermined the popular impression that black African lives were of less value than white European ones.¹⁶

ECOWAS’s interventions had two explicit strategies: disarmament and demilitarisation. Disarmament components included arms embargoes and control, weapons buy-back programmes, and the disarming of combatants and irregular forces. Demilitarisation schemes entailed the reintegration of combatants into civilian life, the formation of new national security forces, and the reassertion of civilian control over security forces.¹⁷

DISARMAMENT

In both instances, disarmament was related to the search for stability and implemented under the supervision of international peacekeepers and observers. In Liberia, disarmament processes were undertaken by ECOMOG forces, while the verification and monitoring of faction compliance were supervised by the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). ECOMOG, in collaboration with the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), oversaw a similar process.

ARMS EMBARGOES

Instituting an arms embargo as a strategy to reduce weapons entering Liberia became an inherent part of ECOWAS’s peace efforts from September 1990 when the port of Buchanan was blockaded. Inevitably, the controversies surrounding the appropriateness of this policy eventually resulted in the blockade being lifted. However, continued NPFL refusal to comply with the disarmament components of agreements and peace accords and the simultaneous proliferation of factions increased the level of fighting. In June 1992, ECOWAS threatened to impose comprehensive sanctions against Charles Taylor and NPFL-controlled areas of Liberia, and any other party that failed to comply with the implementation of the programmes.¹⁸

Recognising its weakness in effectively sealing all entry points, especially the land borders, ECOWAS finally sought the support of the UN Security Council. At ECOWAS’s initiative, the Security Council convened on 19 November 1992 to consider the Liberian conflict. The deliberations resulted in Resolution 788 that imposed an arms embargo on Liberia. Despite this concerted effort, there were indications of improper enforcement. Eventually, the UN established the United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1993 to oversee warlord compliance with disarmament components of peace agreements.

Faction groups continued to purchase weapons in contravention of the embargo by using unconventional suppliers. It was questionable whether an effective embargo could have reduced the ability of factions to obtain weapons from their subregional allies. The vibrant war economies straddling the Liberian borders with its contiguous states created easy markets for the acquisition of cheap weapons. This not only undermined effective disarmament, but also endangered the security of especially UNOMIL officers who were unarmed.¹⁹

WEAPONS BUY-BACK PROGRAMMES

There was a close correlation between the level of insecurity and distrust among faction groups and the quantity and quality of weapons delivered to ECOWAS. There was a lack of clear confidence-building measures and an apparent lack of progress in peace negotiations. To accomplish any modicum of success, a new and more flexible strategy had to be adopted. The result was an informal and partial introduction of a weapons buy-back scheme by the interim government of national unity in September 1992, which was an economic incentive scheme to encourage faction participation in the disarmament programme. Accordingly, a cash-for-arms programme, whereby disarmed soldiers were given cash rewards, small-scale business loans and job training schemes to provide alternative possibilities for post-combative activities, was introduced.²⁰ According to Amos Sawyer, the critical factor was the reintroduction of combatants who had been living a life of violence and crime to productive ventures and alternative modes of useful contribution to social development.²¹

A study of child soldiers in Liberia showed that, during the demilitarisation and demobilisation phases, some child soldiers became stranded in the capital without family or community support.²² Despite the cash-for-arms programme, subsequent agreements did not have specific stipulations concerning child soldiers. As a result, the incentive to demobilise was minimal although child soldiers formed sizeable groups in both cases. While 25% of all Liberian combatants were children, the government estimates that 12% of the 45,000 combatants to be demobilised in Sierra Leone were children.²³ Controversy, however, continues to surround the effectiveness of weapons buy-back programmes and cash-for-arms deals. According to a World Bank study:

"Weapons-buy-back programmes have had limited medium-term impact in reducing the number of weapons circulating in countries which have: (1) porous borders with countries with active weapon markets; (2) lack of capacity to enforce regulations on the open carrying and criminal use of weapons; (3) apolitical, economic or security climate which enhances the security and economic value of owning and using a weapon."²⁴

 DISARMING OF PRIVATE AND IRREGULAR UNITS

Until the Cotonou Accord of 1993, none of the earlier agreements had made an issue of the disarming of private and irregular units characterised as ‘non-combatants’.²⁵ This term is difficult to differentiate from the non-private/non-irregular forces involved in the conflict and Cotonou did not clarify how such differentiation could be made and their disarming carried out. Furthermore, one critical peculiarity of this civil war was the disdain that all involved combatants had for codes and conventions of war.²⁶ Especially in an irregular war where guerrilla warfare and tactics had been the mainstay of military strategy, faction leaders did not know the number of combatants under their control because of the lack of permanent allegiance and alliance to the faction. Effective differentiation between supposedly private and irregular units was therefore difficult under such chaotic conditions. This was more so because of the inability of the facilitators to define the types of weapons they were looking for. ECOMOG and UNOMIL were expected to disarm all people in possession of weapons and warlike materials.²⁷

The low level of disarmament and the increasing suspicion about the status of fighters resulted from the difficulty of differentiating between combatants and non-combatants, which required further clarification under the Akosombo supplement accord. This sought to improve the ability of ECOMOG and UNOMIL to reduce the quantity of weapons in circulation drastically. Whatever outcome this clarification had on the level of disarmament is questionable as the Akosombo Accord was engulfed in controversy among the different factions and had to be clarified at Accra.²⁸ Compliance with disarmament initiatives was still not successful, partly because weapons had come to attain both a security and economic value. For most of the fighters, economic incentives such as looting had become the primary motives for fighting.²⁹

DISARMING COMBATANTS

No specific programmes were set up for the post-disarmament and demobilisation stages. The Cotonou Accord sought to rectify this oversight by linking demobilisation to the retraining, rehabilitation and reintegration of all former combatants into normal social and community life.³⁰ To improve the prospects of combatant’s being reabsorbed into community and social life, educational and community programmes were initiated.³¹ ECOWAS’s strategy was that combatants had to hand in weapons upon registration at designated assembly points before qualifying to receive their benefits. With the exception of minor cases, the disarmament of combatants was voluntary. There were, however, incidents where coercive strategy had to be used to elicit co-operation with disarmament teams.³²

Mutual suspicion among faction groups contributed to non-compliance with disarmament components amid acrimonious reciprocal accusations of violations. The outbreak of urban violence on 6 April 1996 and 9 January 1999 in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively, demonstrated that none of the warring factions were fully committed to disarmament. It also meant that the economic security and livelihood of many combatants would be undermined and in some cases totally eroded. According to a former ECOMOG commander, T M Shelpidi, "some of the warlords and their cohorts ... surrender[ed] some of their arsenals and hid[e] others for possible resumption of hostilities in case their hopes and desires [we]re flouted."³³

In both cases, several overlapping dilemmas contributed to make faction group compliance with disarmament components of agreements an agonising and arduous process:

political uncertainty;

logistic difficulties;

humanitarian crises;

security issues;

problems with child soldiers; and

economic issues.

Compliance difficulties with the disarmament components of agreements changed, however, under the Abuja Extension Agreement or Abuja II of August 1996. This marked a major departure from previous agreements on the question of disarmament and election. After seven years of non-compliance, Abuja II strategically shifted the responsibility for the success of the disarmament process entirely to the faction leaders. For the first time, faction leaders were held responsible for the non-compliance of their combatants. Abuja II also stipulated deadlines and imposed penalties for non-compliance. Introducing this proactive approach signalled to all faction leaders the prelude of a more interventionist and robust role for ECOMOG and UNOMIL in guaranteeing the disarmament component of Abuja II.

Abuja II also changed implementation delays by introducing a stringent sanctions regime. This included:

restricting travel and residence;



freezing business activities and assets of leading faction leaders in ECOWAS states;



exclusion from participation in the electoral process;



restrictions on the use of ECOWAS airspace and territorial waters;



expulsion of faction leaders and members of their families from ECOWAS states;



a request to the UN Security Council to impose visa and import restrictions; and



finally, the invoking of the OAU summit resolution, which calls for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to adjudge all human rights offences.³⁴

According to Shelpidi, this contributed in a "large extent [to] successful [disarmament] in the Liberian peace process."³⁵ Despite Shelpidi’s positive assessment, doubts persisted whether faction groups had tactically withheld troops and weapons for future use. Uncertainty also remained whether the numbers of combatants to be demobilised were fully accounted for. The impression was that a sizeable number of combatants had crossed the borders into areas where they were assured of sympathetic support. NPFL combatants were generally thought to have entered Sierra Leone where their revolutionary compatriots, the RUF, still controlled the countryside, and were simultaneously junior partners in a much maligned military regime. ULIMO-K deployed some of its best and battle-hardened combatants to Guinea, while ULIMO-J, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) sent their troops among the predominantly Yakuba ethnic group along the Liberian-Côte d’Ivoire border.³⁶

The weapons which were not collected, stored and/or destroyed during ECOMOG/UNOMIL operations did not remain in Liberia alone. Rather, they were ploughed back into the subregion, and added to the proliferation of weapons in neighbouring countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Guinea where there are ready markets and insatiable demands for small arms by diverse substate actors to fuel their conflicts with central authorities, as well as criminal activities.³⁷

The lessons learned from the Liberian experience have been applied in Sierra Leone. Firstly, the UN envoy to the country, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, in a meeting with faction leaders, has underlined the UN’s determination to apply force against groups that undermine the peace accord. In sharp contradiction to the ad hoc manner that characterised the Liberian process, Ambassador Adeniji similarly made faction leaders responsible for the non-compliance of their leaders.³⁸ Though there may be sympathy for Adeniji’s concerns, the dynamics of contemporary civil wars that were raised earlier seem not to have been taken into consideration. The extent to which the RUF, the Kamajors or the Civil Defence Force (CDF) is in control of its combatants is doubtful.

DEMILITARISATION

Liberia and Sierra Leone’s demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into integrated national armies have been particularly problematic. While estimates of combatants to be demobilised ranged between 60 000 and 45 000 combatants, respectively, for Liberia and Sierra Leone, the demobilisation phase has shown much smaller figures. This can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, all groups have either decided to retain some of their weapons and fighters and to await the outcome of the peace process and what their groups could possibly attain from a peace dividend. Secondly, since the costs related to these processes are borne by the international community, retaining the best fighters could be used as a bargaining chip to attain more resources and aid.

Certain factors characterised both processes. Liberia’s negotiated settlement followed by elections occurred through an ECOWAS-brokered transition from war to peace. The process was distinguished by four mutually reinforcing factors. Firstly, by January 1997, there were four main factions involved in the conflict, none of which won a decisive victory and none was completely disarmed and demobilised. Secondly, the election, even though declared to have been free and fair, was won by a leader of only one of the warring factions. Thirdly, the elected government, claiming the prerogatives of sovereignty, defied agreements signed with ECOWAS concerning security and the reorganisation of Liberia’s security forces. There was also the fear of manipulation of former NPFL combatants into the new security forces. Sierra Leone’s example is not different in the sense that, while the national army was extremely weak, several other militias like the CDF, the popular traditional hunters guild, the Kamajors and the RUF signed the Lomé Agreement with their forces intact.

WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Weapons destruction as a component of the disarmament programmes was first introduced under the Lomé Agreement in 1991. Under the modalities for monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire agreement by ECOMOG, most of the weapons delivered for destruction were unserviceable. During the post-Lomé disarmament period, ECOMOG soldiers reported that NPFL troops delivered weapons that were inoperative. After the initial registration, most of them were destroyed.³⁹ Such instances were so frequent that prior to the completion of the process, depending on the quality of the weapon presented, they were not counted as weapons but was simply destroyed.

The rationale behind weapons collection was for their later transfer to a reconstituted Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Nevertheless, the frequency with which unserviceable weapons were delivered made the scheme not viable. During the disarmament scheme, many weapons were obviously hidden or left undeclared. Though ECOMOG and UNOMIL had suspicions about this, it was not until the 6 April 1996 crisis in Monrovia that the level of non-compliance and undeclared weapons could be detected. Still, faction leaders refrained from declaring caches in their private homes. In the aftermath of 6 April, the NPFL withdrew only to Kakata while ULIMO-J and the LPC argued that their bases in Tubmanburg, Tode, Kakata and Bong Mines were insecure. As the table below indicates, one in four of all weapons relinquished were unserviceable by the time the conflict ended. The Executive Secretariat of the National Committee, which is the official organ established to oversee the disarmament, demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) scheme in Sierra Leone stated that, by January 2000, only 3 183 of the expected 45 000 weapons had been delivered.⁴⁰

However, by mid-April 2000, an explosive increase in disarmament had taken place. According to this committee, 23 009 combatants have been disarmed, comprising:

4 373 RUF;

7 698 CDF;

5 671 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/former Sierra Leone Army;

3 804 current Sierra Leone Army troops; and

1 463 other combatants.⁴²

Several factors explained the eventual victory of the NPFL in the 1997 election. People questioned in Liberia expressed fear of the unknown, of what Taylor might instruct his combatants to do. Ignorance played its part as well, buying off local support.

According to Peter Batchelor:

"The rationale for implementing a demobilisation and reintegration program for ex-combatants during a peace support operation is that such a program can defuse tensions between parties, thereby helping to achieve the effective disarming of warring parties and reducing the possibility of parties trying to use military means for political purposes. [Such processes] provides a relatively stable environment."⁴⁴

Batchelor’s argument that demobilisation can and should be seen as a common and collective public good by all combatants and faction groups is faulty. It overlooks some of the potential problems that arise during post-conflict demobilisation phases. In both cases, several overlapping dilemmas contributed to making these processes agonising and arduous:

Suspicion and distrust among factional leaders and cross-alliances hampered efforts at demobilisation. Throughout the demobilisation phases of the diverse agreements, faction groups were reluctant to demobilise until their opponents had taken a verifiable first lead. Delays in the demobilisation and reintegration of the 45 000 and 60 000 troops resulted from distrust, lack of commitment and, in some instances, open hostility between and among various parties and other armed groups. These have been and continue to be the principal reasons for the slow pace of disarmament.



ECOMOG’s activities were hampered by poor logistics. Unfortunately, neither UNOMSIL nor UNOMIL’s arrival improved the operational situation: the poor infrastructure in Sierra Leone and Liberia; insufficient facilities; lack of communication and transport facilities to assembly points; and not least of all, logistic problems on the part of the UN, contributed to the delay in the whole process.



The sheer numbers of refugees in the contiguous states, estimated at 700 000 and about 150 000 internally displaced in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, compounded the logistic problems.



The numbers of weapons in private hands (irregulars and non-combatants) led to a general sense of insecurity and fear. This intensified the level of suspicion among faction groups to the extent that ordinary crimes were seen, at times, as security threats and lapses in ECOMOG, UNOMSIL and UNOMIL’s ability to create an atmosphere conducive for demobilisation. Occasionally, such actions resulted in heightened faction activity. The sense of insecurity was such that, five months after disarmament, demobilisation, elections and a new government, incidents of banditry were rife in all the big cities of Liberia. Random incidents of attacks, which seem to have a pattern of targeting a specific ethnic group, resulted in the near spontaneous mobilisation of other ethnic groups as a defensive mechanism.⁴⁵



The oversight of special and more sensitive provisions for the demobilisation of child soldiers was hardly addressed.⁴⁶



Economic problems seriously hampered the ability of facilitators to demobilise combatants effectively. Political difficulties in the demobilisation process compounded uncertainties caused by the paucity of resources and logistic problems both of which resulted in major challenges in demobilisation.⁴⁷

All these problems compounded the disarmament and demobilisation schemes. Until the Cotonou Accord of 1993, not a single Liberian combatant had been demobilised. Extensive preparations for demobilisation resulted in the deployment of UNOMIL and ECOMOG into 27 team sites and four regional headquarters around the country with three demobilisation centres for each of the warring factions. With this extensive arrangement, it was hoped that the disarmament and demobilisation of the 60 000 soldiers would be completed within two months. The optimism engendered by Cotonou was not fulfilled as the demobilisation process was suspended three months after its initiation due to the myriad problems listed above.

In spite of Abuja II’s weaknesses, it changed implementation delays by introducing a stringent sanctions regime. ECOMOG and UNOMIL felt that disarmament had been sufficiently successful for general elections to be held, although suspicions persisted that all the faction groups had withheld troops and weapons as a tactic against post-election crises. However, uncertainties remained whether the number of combatants to be demobilised were fully accounted for.

The decision by the framers of Abuja II to postpone restructuring the AFL army until the inauguration of a new government placed this complicated duty in the hands of both ECOMOG and the new administration. Because of this omission, there were disparities in information on what percentage of the new army should be formed by combatants and in what proportions. Such complex technical issues were not resolved by Abuja II. However, despite this oversight, the Cotonou agreement acquiesced to the need for programmes comprising the retraining, rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants into normal community and social life.⁴⁸

Despite these problems, Charles Taylor’s inaugural speech emphasised his concern for Liberia’s former combatants. He stated that:

"We are fully committed to the welfare of and equal opportunity for all ex-combatants — whether you are healthy, traumatised, disabled or otherwise disarmed and demobilised."⁴⁹

There were problems with Taylor’s positive inaugural statement. Firstly, no specific assistance programmes were presented. Secondly, promises were made at a time when the Liberian economy had virtually collapsed and the state was not in a position to provide the requisite facilities for reconstruction. Despite Taylor’s promises, the restructuring process was delayed until February 2000. According to the President, a Restructuring Commission of the Armed Forces of Liberia had finally been allocated US $1 million needed to redocument and adjust the size of the army in keeping with its plan.⁵⁰ The retraining of the new army was scheduled to commence in May 2000.

Studies from states that have undergone similar experiences in Nicaragua, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Mozambique reveal that the provision of severance pay and targeted programmes frequently defer having to tackle the real challenges of post-conflict reintegration dilemmas. Reintegrating combatants from different faction groups into a new and integrated AFL has been problematic. Calculations of faction interests and deeply ingrained suspicion after seven years of warfare have virtually stalled the process. Uncertain of ECOMOG’s role in the reintegration scheme and uncomfortable with the presence of ECOMOG commander, Victor Malu, now Chief of Army Staff in Nigeria, Taylor asserted his sovereign authority as president to determine the pace and selection of combatants. Under the Abuja II stipulations, ECOMOG was to remain in Liberia for a period of six months. However, Taylor undermined the AFL by splitting it into factions with some parts acting as a presidential guard.

CONCLUSION

ECOWAS’s disarmament and demilitarisation endeavours in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the subsequent crisis management were tests of regime strength, effectiveness and consolidation. However, they had no real understanding of the dynamics of both conflicts and the domestic politics of subregional countries. Compounding the difficulties of carrying out disarmament was the lack of focus among multilateral organisations concerning the specific modalities and procedures of the disarmament components of their missions.

The unwillingness of ECOWAS and its international partners to make the re-establishment of a new politically neutral security force a prerequisite for the election in the Abuja II, Abidjan and Lomé accords, had significant consequences. This omission has given the new government the option of infiltrating any security apparatus with its own former combatants in gratitude for their contributions during the war.

The potential effects of any such action are twofold. Firstly, it can undermine the democratisation processes in both states if and when ethnic groups and faction leaders feel threatened enough to seek redress or security in new mobilisation. Secondly, the nature of support patterns extended by subregional states to diverse faction groups during the civil conflict can begin to reconfigure. Already, there are disturbing signs that such reconfigurations are beginning to form in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. Under such circumstances, the peace and reconciliation processes that were expected to be the end-result of disarmament and demobilisation components, will always be exposed to changes in fluid local allegiances.

Despite the initial weaknesses and difficulties of the co-operation between ECOMOG, UNOMSIL and UNOMIL, their institutional handicaps were overcome and almost a third of all combatants were disarmed. However, a partial conclusion is that limited and unfinished disarmament initiatives can have extremely destabilising consequences not only in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but also in the subregion.

The effectiveness of ECOWAS’s disarmament activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone was eventually undermined by peace agreements that were signed within the context of a civil war, as well as by the protracted character of both wars that created alternative war economies in both states and along their porous borders, with weapons acquiring an economic and security value for those who possessed them. Weapons had simply become a form of security and currency.

NOTES

J Rudolph, Intervention in communal conflicts, Orbis 39(2), 1995, p 259.



B Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, United Nations, New York, 1992, p 32.



C von Clausewitz, On war, (translated by M Howard & P Parets), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978; M van Creveld, The transformation of war, Free Press, New York, 1991; E Rice, Wars of the third kind: Conflict in underdeveloped countries, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988; D M Snow, Uncivil wars: International security and the new world order, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1996.



M Wesley, Casualties of the new world order: The causes and failure of UN missions to civil wars, Macmillan, London, 1997.



E K Aning, Eliciting compliance from warlords: The ECOWAS experience in Liberia, 1990-1997, Review of African Political Economy 26(81), September 1999.



D Keen, A rational kind of madness, Oxford Development Studies 25(1), 1997, pp 68-72.



J Chipman, Managing the politics of parochialism, in M Brown (ed), Ethnic conflict and international security, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1993, p 254; West Africa, 8-14 March 1993, p 369.



G Gbanabone, ECOMOG sold weapons to rebels, The Chronicle (Ghana), 1-5 October 1998, p 3. Part of the failure of the Abidjan Accord of November 1996 between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF was the government’s attempt to split the RUF under the leadership of Philip Palmer. Palmer’s leadership was contested by bush commanders who declared their allegiance and loyalty to Foday Sankoh.



Interview with James Tarpeh, Liberia’s Ambassador to Nigeria in Lagos, 18 July 1997; Interview with Abbas Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, London, 9 January 1998; West Africa, 26 November 1990.



Liberia: Forgotten country, West Africa, 4-10 February 1991.



A Adebanjo, Rich man’s war, poor man’s war, The World Today, August/September 1996.



Liberia: The world’s forgotten emergency, West Africa, 4-10 December 1995; National Concord, 4 September 1992, p 6.



M Michaels, Retreating from Africa, Foreign Policy 72(1), 1993, pp 93-108; G B Helman & S Ratner, Saving failed states, Foreign Policy 89, Winter 1992/93; African Recovery, June 1993.



S J Stedman, The new interventionists, Foreign Policy 41(3), May 1993, pp 1-16.



A Zack-Williams, Conflicts in Africa: Need for a viable African response, Africa World Review, November-March 1997/98, p 10.



G Cleaver & R May, Peacekeeping: The African dimension, Review of African Political Economy 66, 1995, p 485ff.



See, among others, Sierra Leone: Peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lomé, Togo, 7 July 1999; Sierra Leone: Peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 30 November 1996.



ECOWAS: Decision A/DEC.8/7/92 relating to sanctions against Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, especially Articles 3 and 5, and ECOWAS: Decision HSGC9-1/8/96 relating to sanctions against persons who violate the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia.



F Olonisakin, UN co-operation with regional organisations in peacekeeping: The experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia, International Peacekeeping 3(5), 1996, p 41; Fifteenth Report of the UN Secretary-General, 23 January 1996.



West Africa, 6-12 July 1992, p 1143.



 Interview with Amos Sawyer, former Interim President of the interim Government of National Unity, Monrovia, Liberia, 12 December 1997.



 M Wessells, Child soldiers, Bulletin of Atomic Sciences 53(6).



Interview with Amos Sawyer, former president of the interim government, 15 December 1997; Government of Sierra Leone, Executive Secretariat of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration — Summary Programme Information, Freetown, Sierra Leone, November 1999.



World Bank, Demobilisation and reintegration of military personnel in Africa: Evidence from seven country case studies, working paper, Africa Technical Department, World Bank, Washington DC, 1993, paragraph 173; N Colletta, M Costner & I Wiederhofer, Case studies in war-to-peace transitions: Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda, working paper, Africa Technical Department, World Bank, Washington DC, 1996.



ECOWAS, Final communiqué of the Sixteenth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Cotonou, 22-24 July 1993 (ECW/HSG/XVI/7/Rev.1).



See, among others, A J Coates, The ethics of war, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997; Clausewitz, op cit; Van Creveld, op cit.



ECOWAS, Akosombo Accord, 1995, section E, article 6.



ECOWAS, Seventh meeting of the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine on Liberia, Accra, 7 May 1996 (ECW/MINFA/CTTE9/VII/2/Rev.1).



A Sawyer, The dynamics of conflict management in Liberia, Occassional Paper 12, Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra, Ghana, March 1997, p 12; A de Waal, Contemporary warfare in Africa: Changing context, changing strategy, IDS Bulletin 17(3), 1996.



ECOWAS, Cotonou Accord, 1993, section H, article 9 (2)



Ibid, section H, Article 9(3).



Interview with General Ike Iwachukwu, former foreign minister of Nigeria, 21 June 1997; Daily Champion, Nigeria, 21 May 1992, p 19.



T M Shelpidi, Transition from war to peace: Consolidation of achievement, paper read at an ECOWAS Forum on Conflict Management and Resolution, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 7-11 July 1998, p 8.



ECOWAS, Final Report of the 39th meeting of the Council of Ministers, Abuja, Nigeria, 22-25 July 1996 (ECW/CM/XXXIX/18/Rev.1), p 26; New Nigerian, 19 August, 1997, p 12.



Shelpedi, op cit, p 9.



Interview with General Ike Iwachukwu, former foreign minister of Nigeria, 17 July 1997.



Interview with General Ike Iwachukwu, former foreign minister of Nigeria, 18 July 1997.



Transcript from Star Radio News, Liberia, 16 February 2000.



Interview with General Ike Iwachukwu, former foreign minister of Nigeria, 15 August 1997.



Government of Sierra Leone, op cit, p. 9



According to final figures presented by UN-HACO and UNOMIL, ECOMOG collected a total of 9 579 weapons. Of these, 7 797 (81.4%) were serviceable, and 1 782 (18.6%) were unserviceable. The NPFL accounted for 58% of the demobilised combatants and 68% all delivered weapons. ULIMO-K accounted for 6% of the combatants and 17% of the delivered weapons.



Figures from the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration as at 20 April 2000.



New African, September 1993, p 6; Tanner, op cit, p 137.



P Batchelor et al, Small arms management and peacekeeping in Southern Africa, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1996, pp 78-79.



During a field trip to Monrovia in December 1997, a robbery involving the death of a Mandingo moneychanger was not interpreted as a common criminal act, but as the targeting of a specific ethnic/religious group. Within minutes of the attack, the story had spread in central Monrovia that Mandingoes were being attacked. It took the diplomacy of Sheikh Kafumbah and other personalities to calm the situation. The author was at a meeting with Amos Sawyer and Sheikh Kafumbah Konneh when this incident occurred and had the chance of witnessing the diplomatic skill of these men in dffusing a sensitive and potentially explosive incident.



Wessells, op cit, p 37.



United Nations, Third Progress Report on UNOMIL, 18 April 1994.



ECOWAS, Cotonou Accord, 1993, section H, article 9(2).



Inaugural address of President Charles Taylor, 2 August 1997.



Transcript of Star Radio Broadcast, 12 February 2000.