INTRODUCTION

While the illegal trade in commodities is not new, the surge in illicit arms-trafficking is a more recent phenomenon. World War II may have significantly increased the number of weapons globally, but the surplus after war ended was controlled to some degree.¹ However, the Cold War period brought about significant changes, with countries sustaining their arms production at war levels, and generating stockpiles of weapons under government control.

By the end of the Cold War, there were massive quantities of weapons available that were in excess of national needs. Countries became increasingly willing to sell weapons for profit, instead of the more political considerations that counted in the past. The number of production licences and the development of indigenous capacity for arms manufacturing grew in many developing countries as the licencing of weapons for export virtually collapsed. While few countries outside of North America and Europe were able to produce the full range of conventional land, sea and air weapons (aircraft, helicopters, tanks and ships), many more were producing smaller calibre weapons, including small arms. Today, there are an estimated 300 companies in 70 countries actively producing light weapons.² Frequently, these companies operate with less oversight than those that issue the production licences in North America and Europe.

This contribution aims to juxtapose the challenge of controlling the black market in weapons against the steps that are already being taken by governments within their own borders and through regional and international co-operation, to limit these markets and reduce the traffic in weaponry.

Identifying black and grey markets

There are three types of sales most common in the weapons trade:

government to government;



government to non-state actors (for example insurgent groups) in another country; and



commercial sales, including those not directly between seller and recipient, for example, brokered sales.

Arms transfers in the first category generally comprise the legal trade in weapons, as do the majority of commercial sales. Government transfers to non-state actors and some commercial sales are those which most often fall into categories of illegal and quasi-legal transfers, known as the black and grey markets, respectively.

Black market transfers generally refer to those which are knowingly conducted in violation of an existing arms embargo, national laws or other factors which make the sale criminal. Grey market sales, however, are more difficult to classify. As is evident in their name, these types of sales cover a broad range of semi-legal or legally questionable transfers. A suggested definition is that grey sales are those which "violate national and international norms and policies, if not laws."³ The use of front companies, third-party buyers or sellers, and suspect if not fraudulent documentation can form part of a grey market sale, complicating the picture and limiting the chances of detection.

Although attempts have been made to tackle the issue at the national and regional level, it is at the international level — with the increasing globalisation of both legal and illegal activities — where the greatest current challenge lies. As crossborder trade increases and criminal organisations begin to operate transnationally, effective international action to curb the flow of weapons becomes increasingly important.

An important step in this process has been to reach greater agreement among countries on what can be considered legal sales, making it easier, in theory, to identify what is illegal.⁴ Those sales which are clearly black market transactions, for example, the commercial supply of arms to a country under an arms embargo or to a known criminal organisation, are those where it is easier to find areas of consensus.

SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE

The illicit trade in arms is estimated to be second only to that in drugs. In 1995, drug-trafficking world-wide was estimated at US $400 billion, representing 8% of total global exports.⁵ There are no comparable figures for the illegal trade in armaments, although some estimates have been drawn, putting the illicit arms trade at between US $2 to $10 billion per year.⁶ While a substantial part of the illicit trade in weapons may individually represent small sales, larger sales do occur. The contract signed by Sandline International with the government of Papua New Guinea was for US $36 million,⁷ while it is estimated that factions in Bosnia purchased US $2 billion worth of arms and ammunition through black markets in 1993 alone.⁸

Although it seems that almost any type of weapon can be bought on the black market — from attack helicopters to missiles — the trade in light weapons represents a significant proportion of this trade. It is often conducted between individuals or small groups and buyers in other countries. The arrangement of these illegal sales takes advantage of loopholes in legislation, corrupt government officials and businesspersons, countries with less stringent monetary legislation to channel the funds through, and countries either complicit in the sale or with lax border controls that make the actual delivery of the weapons easier. Some of these are seemingly insurmountable challenges to the combat of illicit arms-trafficking. However, they also represent opportunities to interdict trafficking.

EXPLOITATION OF WEAK COUNTRIES

Globally, countries vary greatly in their willingness and ability to prevent their territories from being used for illegal purposes. Even among countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom, with largely effective law enforcement and customs practices, weapons-trafficking occurs. The situation in countries without comparable resources can be much more serious. South Africa, with its developed transport and communications infrastructure, draws criminal organisations that are able to enter the country "nearly unfettered" due to its "long porous borders and weak border controls, including unmanned ports [and] numerous secondary airports."⁹

Some countries are unable to control the weapons within their own territory. The theft of weapons from military bases in South Africa has been identified as a prime source of illegal weapons circulating within the country and being sold into neighbouring conflict areas. Likewise, in the US, a report by the General Accounting Office reported that undercover agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were able to purchase more than 7 000 pieces of military equipment from security guards and other personnel at US military installations in the state of Utah. The items purchased included weapons parts and F-16 jet engines, with a total value of $13.8 million.¹⁰

THIRD-PARTY COUNTRIES 

Countries often aid other countries in procuring weapons either for economic or political reasons. In West Africa, Burkina Faso has acted as a conduit to channel arms procured by Libya to fighters in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Weapons were flown from Libya to Burkina Faso, sent on to Côte d’Ivoire and transported by land to rebel forces in Liberia.¹¹

The countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe have also been implicated in the sale of arms to a wide variety of regimes and governments accused of human rights abuses and fomenting regional instability. The sale of surplus weapons in these countries’ backyards has provided much needed hard currency and has kept the arms production industries alive, sometimes to the detriment of responsible arms transfer policies.

DOCUMENTATION

In order to sell weapons, an end-use certificate, which indicates that the recipient authorises the weapons delivery, is generally required. However, there is an active black market in these certificates themselves and many countries are complicit in their abuse.¹²

Paper trails are one way in which illicit transactions can be traced and so those attempting to avoid detection therefore often create multiple (and false) trails to throw off detection. There are also very little harmonisation of documentation required by different countries for the import and export of weapons. The granting of general import permits, which specify quantities rather than specific transactions, is one loophole.¹³ Countries through which weapons may transit often request no documentation at all and can be used to conceal the origin or destination of arms shipments. Lax documentation requirements and scrutiny can also mean that suspect or illegal shipments can be made without clearly contravening national laws, for example, by using a general import certificate or avoiding countries which are more likely to scrutinise the validity of documents.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

The trend towards common trade areas and international trade agreements has had the unfortunate effect of also creating loopholes which can be exploited by commodity smugglers. The free transfer of goods through a common area can allow an illegal shipment to enter a port within a common area and then to pass through one or more additional countries undetected. For example, the existence of a common market in Europe, which allows for the free transfer of goods among members, may also facilitate the smuggling of weapons.¹⁴ While there is a European Union (EU) directive on firearms,¹⁵ which regulates the movement of civilian-owned firearms throughout the EU, most other legislation to regulate the import, export and transfer of arms is promulgated at national level. There is a growing awareness, however, of the need for standardised guidelines across the EU that provide minimum criteria for the movement of weapons.

FINANCIAL HAVENS

Offshore banks and tax havens are used to hide, move and launder the large amounts of cash used in illegal arms sales. The increasingly borderless world allows for rapid and generally anonymous money transfers to destinations not yet reached by international anti-money laundering efforts.¹⁶ The United Nations has estimated that more than US $200 billion is laundered every year,¹⁷ while the US has raised the estimate to between US $300 and $500 billion per year.¹⁸

Although efforts to change bank secrecy policies and make large transfers of money more visible to law enforcement agencies have been stepped up, common levels of transparency and information exchange do not yet exist. To avoid detection, front companies are created in countries willing to create ‘instant corporations’ including the Cayman Islands, Liberia, Panama and the British Virgin Islands.¹⁹ These companies are not required to publicise accounts or produce annual reports, allowing them to operate in virtual anonymity.

BROKERS, SELLERS AND TRANSPORTATION AGENTS

The individuals and organisations that facilitate illegal arms sales are key factors in the thriving arms-smuggling industry. Increasingly professionalised, those involved in arms-trafficking have a variety of means to hide the covert nature of their work. By using a chain of people, operating aircraft or ships registered under flags of convenience and exploiting less guarded ports and borders, these operators can circumvent the rules and regulations put up to prevent their activities.

LEGAL TRADE

As the volume of global trade continues to increase, streetwise smugglers seek to hide their covert activities within legal practice. Arms exported legally can also find their way onto the black market through illegal resale, or through regime changes resulting in weapons supplied to ‘friends’ ending up in the hands of ‘enemies’.

CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE COMBAT OF ARMS-TRAFFICKING

The threat posed by illicit arms-trafficking was first detected within the Americas in the context of drug networks. As a result, the nexus between the illegal trade in drugs and the illegal trade in arms became the focus of early efforts. It was also recognised, however, that the trade in illegal arms had elements unique from those of drug-trafficking, and the two processes, while often advancing in parallel, were kept distinct.²⁰ In other regions, countries were also realising the impact of the free circulation of arms on war and peace. Stretching from Europe to South East Asia, Africa and South America, the over-abundance of weapons appeared to be prolonging conflicts and increasing armed crime. In 1996, for example, South Africa’s new found democracy faced the second highest gun murder rate in the world, after Colombia, which posed a significant threat to its prospects for peace.²¹

Beyond simply recognising this new problem, countries began to respond. Initial efforts were largely focused on national concerns. As the regional dynamics of the illegal weapons trade were better understood, however, regional and international co-operation increased. In Europe, the Americas and parts of Africa, regional frameworks and conventions are today in place to prevent illicit arms-trafficking. At the international level, the UN has been drawn into the quest to identify ways of preventing arms-trafficking.

NATIONAL EFFORTS

Without the creation and implementation of national controls, little effective action can occur to curtail arms-trafficking. The focus of national efforts to control arms varies, depending on a country’s assessment of the problems posed by these weapons and by the approaches available to combat such threats.

Contrary to many other current security threats, which tend to be confined to regions or certain situations, the trafficking of weapons seems to affect almost all countries in the world to a greater or lesser degree. A useful typology is to consider countries either as the suppliers of weapons, transit countries or demand countries.²² In many instances, a country can fit into two or even all three categories. For example, South Africa is not only a producer of arms, it is also affected by weapons passing through its poorly controlled ports of entry to other destinations and is facing a seemingly unlimited demand for new weapons. Since 1996, an annual average of 200 000 applications for new firearms are received.²³

Countries that allow the civilian possession of firearms, produce arms domestically and export arms face the greatest challenge. Each of these can feed into the illicit market in weapons and each requires its own method of control. Many countries have embarked on specific interventions to reduce arms-trafficking, including:

reviewing existing or implementing new legislation to control the ownership and use of firearms by individuals;



improving legislation on export controls;



prioritising the tracing of weapons seized from criminals;



cracking down on suspect gun dealers;



drafting legislation to control arms-brokering; and



destroying stocks of weapons in excess of national needs.

Some of the states recently taking such steps include Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Hungary, Poland, South Africa, the UK and the US.²⁴

Others, however, yet have to respond demonstrably to weapons-trafficking from and within their national jurisdiction. There are two main reasons for this lack of response: either a government is reluctant to address the issue due to ignorance or a lack of political will to take action; or the government is simply unable to respond and control the movement of goods across its borders.²⁵ The latter problem is more conducive to amendment, and regional and global initiatives to assist these countries are under way. These will be discussed in the following sections.²⁶

INCREASING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

The complex nature of illicit arms-trafficking has prompted co-ordinated regional action. This has proven to be the most successful approach to date in areas as diverse as Southern Africa, West Africa, Europe and the Americas. While almost all regional organisations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the 54-member Commonwealth have issued statements endorsing the need for attention to small arms issues, it is at the regional level that illicit trafficking has been specifically prioritised.

The Organisation of American States (OAS), the EU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), over the past five years, have all prioritised common approaches in dealing with light weapons suited to regional concerns and needs. The measures concluded have focused variously on violent crime, conflict or drug-trafficking, and have all tended to put the building of common capacity within law enforcement, customs and other government departments at the top of the list of priorities to stop arms-trafficking.

THE AMERICAS

In 1990, the illicit traffic in firearms first appeared on the radar of the OAS in the context of its relationship to drug-trafficking.²⁷ Momentum around the issue increased over the intervening years, resulting in the creation of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material. The Convention has entered into force and has been ratified by ten of the 31 signatories.²⁸ Two of the main supporters of the treaty, the US and Canada, have not yet ratified the agreement.

The convention is the first of its kind and represents a remarkable achievement, given that it was negotiated in only seven months. The purposes of the agreement are "to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and related materials" and "to promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experience." The six main provisions of the Convention are:

the development of a harmonised system of licencing for the export, import and transit of weapons;



a requirement that firearms are marked at the time of manufacture;



a requirement that states enact legislation that would make the illicit manufacture and traffic in firearms a criminal offence;



an exchange of information on legislation and national practice, known smugglers, smuggling routes and methods used for concealing and detecting firearms, ammunition and explosives;



co-operation between law enforcement agencies in the hemisphere; and



the provision of technical assistance and training for states in the region.²⁹

The most important feature of the Convention is that it is legally binding. The provisions requiring regulation and control over legal firearms and arms transfers should effectively diminish the ability of traffickers to exploit a weak rule of law in countries in the western hemisphere. In addition, the Convention is particularly strong in four areas:

It includes a broad definition of both the goods to be controlled (in this case arms) and of the concept ‘trafficking’. The most complete definition of terminology that is as widely accepted as possible is an important factor in the fight against arms-trafficking.



The Convention makes important gains in the area of documentation. By requiring standard export, import and transit licences, the Convention begins to close one loophole frequently exploited by traffickers. The Model Regulations, which complement the Convention, provide the technical information to be included in these licences and the standard format they should follow.



The Convention promotes capacity-building and assistance. Noting that traffickers will particularly exploit countries with weak legislation and enforcement, it sets out measures to provide training, assistance and information-sharing on smuggling routes and methods, and requires the criminalisation of arms-trafficking offences — all important to limit the space within which traffickers can operate.



By requiring firearms to be marked at manufacture and by putting in place standard licencing procedures, the Convention helps to regulate the legal trade in arms. An important factor in the Model Regulations is that they suggest in-transit licences, so that any shipment crossing a third country will need authorisation from such a country. The Model Regulations also suggest that no amendments may be allowed on a licence. If a licence is changed, it is invalidated.

The Model Regulations, negotiated separately from the Convention, but also within the OAS, are an important part of the approach to firearms-trafficking in the Americas.³⁰ The Regulations are not binding on states. Rather, they give detailed information on the preparation and issue of export, import and in-transit documentation, information on the authentication of certificates, and responsibilities of members for record-keeping, information-sharing and steps to be taken if an irregularity is noted on a commercial firearms shipment. The Model Regulations simplify the process of certification and make it possible for countries to issue common certificates. This system should reduce fraudulent certification of arms shipments and make fraudulent documentation more easily identifiable.

One criticism against the Convention is its relatively narrow scope. It does not address the broader issues that arise from the proceeds of criminal activity in arms-trafficking, nor the individuals involved in the process. It also does not address the more difficult area of non-commercial arms transfers: arms exports negotiated directly by governments — often considered military assistance — do not fall under the jurisdiction of this agreement.

Perhaps the biggest challenge for the Convention lies in its implementation. Most countries in the region seem committed to the principles contained in the Convention, but their ability — financially and politically — to enact the necessary measures to comply with the agreement remains questionable.

The first hurdle is ratification by more states. Legislative processes have taken longer than anticipated in many countries, including Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, the US has publicly included the Model Regulations into its regulatory system and, as a result of the as yet unratified Convention, has stopped unlicenced firearm exports to Canada in 1999. Other states that did not already have specific legislation on arms export controls in place have had to enact legislation to criminalise offences, as required by the Convention, prior to being able to ratify it.

In March 2000, the ten states that had ratified the Convention met for the first session of the Consultative Committee, the body that will serve as the forum for information exchange and improved co-operation in tracing the illegal movement of firearms.³¹ However, without the participation of the US and Canada — the two states most able to provide direct financial and technical assistance — the level of practical assistance that will derive from the Consultative Committee process is in question. To date, while they await ratification, the US and Canadian governments are relying on direct bilateral co-operation and assistance in tracing firearms rather than utilising the mechanisms provided for in the Convention. Meanwhile, having signed the Convention, both are apparently abiding by its provisions.

Despite its limitations and lack of proven efficacy, the Convention is regarded as a success by the OAS and many countries in the region. The Mexican government stated that the number of confiscated weapons doubled in the country since the Convention was signed. The US, meanwhile, has increased its co-operation and training assistance in weapons-tracing and identification to customs and police officials in the region, most notably in Mexico and Jamaica.³²

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa is facing its own set of problems with illicit arms-trafficking. Unlike the Americas with the clear link to drug-trafficking, the impetus for regional action in Southern Africa was the effect of illegal weapons on crime, conflict and stability in the region. In co-operation with the EU, SADC adopted the Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking. It sets out a programme of action in four keys areas:

combating illicit trafficking, including strengthening laws, regulations and operational capacity, and improving information exchange and systems to trace illicit arms flows;



strengthening the regulation of and controls over the accumulation and transfer of arms, including controls over civilian possession of firearms and arms transfers, and improved capacity to monitor and trace arms possession and transfers;



promoting the removal of arms from society and the destruction of surplus arms, including voluntary weapons collection programmes and the destruction of surplus military weapons; and



enhancing transparency, information and consultation on arms in the region.³³

The Action Programme has led to increased regional co-operation within SADC and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organisation (SARPCCO). In July 1999, SARPCCO adopted a declaration which stated:

"among the issues which will be considered [by the SARPCCO Ministers] are prohibitions on civilian possession of automatic and military weapons; coordination of procedures for the import, export and transit of small arms shipments, ensuring the registration of small arms in a country, and, where appropriate, ensuring that proper controls be exercised over the manufacture of small arms to prevent their entrance into the illicit market; to promote the destruction of surplus arms."³⁴

This declaration was followed by the initiation of negotiations on a regional protocol on illicit firearms-trafficking, to complement the global protocol being negotiated in the UN. A draft of the regional agreement was circulated among SARPCCO members in February 2000, and it is expected to be completed in late 2000 or early 2001. The protocol will set out legislative requirements and common practice within the subregion to reduce trafficking.

This protocol is an important first step in operationalising the programme of action which, to date, has not yet resulted in many practical projects. In part, this inaction has been due to a preoccupation among countries in the region with other security concerns (including the penetration of organised criminal groups into the subregion and the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo), combined with a lack of clarity between recipient countries and EU donor states on fundable projects.

As with the OAS Convention, not enough time has passed to allow an assessment of the real impact of the regional programme of action and related activities. Especially in the case of Southern Africa, where the degree to which countries are affected by arms-trafficking varies greatly, it may be difficult to sustain current motivation for action. In addition to the completion of the regional protocol, another important way to sustain the focus and enthusiasm is to build on successful joint operations that have been conducted within SADC — both on illicit arms (such as the joint weapons destruction operations between Mozambique and South Africa, known as Operations Rachel) and on other types of trafficking, including commodity and vehicle-smuggling.³⁵

WEST AFRICA 

West African governments have also identified weapons flows as contributing to insecurity and armed conflict in the region. In October 1998, the 16 heads of states belonging to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed the Moratorium on the Exportation, Importation and Manufacture of Light Weapons. The entire declaration is contained in only one paragraph, with the operational part as follows:

"[The heads of state of ECOWAS] declare a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member states which shall take effect … for a renewable period of three years."³⁶

This statement is politically, although not legally, binding upon the 16 states, and it represents the first and thus far only regional initiative of this kind. The agreement is an acknowledgement of the threat to stability posed by light weapons-trafficking within West Africa, as well as an appreciation that collective action is necessary to tackle this problem.³⁷ Armed only with this vague outline, however, those tasked with its implementation were left scrambling to clarify the scope and coverage of the agreement, including which weapons were included. According to a UN disarmament expert, the Moratorium extends to all small arms and light weapons imports, exports and domestic manufacture in the region.³⁸

The elaboration in March 1999 of the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED) was an important step toward implementing the political agreement. This programme, supported financially by external donor states, is intended to operationalise and reinforce the Moratorium by building internal capacity among states. It promotes, among others, arms collection efforts and the development of legal and regulatory measures relating to weapons possession and transfer. During 1999 programme officials worked to establish an implementation office in Bamako, Mali. This office organised several conferences on various aspects of regional security sector reform, including a workshop in September 1999 on the establishment of a regional arms register.³⁹

Despite this progress, it appears that many of the functionaries within ECOWAS states responsible for implementing and monitoring the Moratorium are unaware of the mechanism and its requirements. Moreover, PCASED fails to address some of the fundamental questions of those working to support the Moratorium, both inside the region and among the donor community. Continuing uncertainty about the meaning of the Moratorium was denoted by the fact that, during 1999, the secretariat implementing the agreement received:

three requests for arms imports to be exempted from the Moratorium;



three reports by countries outside ECOWAS for clarification on acquisition attempts by signatories to the Moratorium;



four reports for deferring acquisition of arms; and



two information requests for export details.⁴⁰

The exemption requests were granted to states in the region that wanted arms for training purposes, or to replace weapons for use by national security forces.⁴¹

While limited, these queries and reports indicate that the Moratorium agreement is recognised as a control regime, although one needing more specific operational guidelines and greater technical and financial support. In December 1999, one year after it was enacted, the annual summit of ECOWAS heads of state, in response to this, adopted a code of conduct for the Moratorium that sets out objectives and priorities, including establishing national commissions, regional focal points and more support within ECOWAS to manage the Moratorium.⁴² Most significantly, perhaps, this code of conduct establishes a waiver procedure for ECOWAS states wishing to import, export or manufacture light weapons while the Moratorium is in operation. The provision requires prior authorisation from ECOWAS before importing arms for peacekeeping operations, hunting, training or sports-shooting. Such weapons must be registered when they arrive in an ECOWAS country, and their removal is required after the event for which they are intended.⁴³

In addition to political will among states in the region, the role of exporters, especially private companies, is key to the success of this initiative. In this regard, the Wassenaar Arrangement — a grouping of 33 arms-exporting states, based in Vienna — stated in December 1998 that its members would:

"undertake an appropriate collaborative role with ECOWAS member states to respect the provisions of the Moratorium and will be open to providing advisory and/or technical assistance in the implementation of the Moratorium."⁴⁴

Such assistance will be of great value to states in the region that face enormous challenges in halting arms-trafficking. Equally important, however, is the need for each member state of the Wassenaar Arrangement to implement domestic procedures to notify its arms manufacturers and brokers that arms exports to West Africa are largely off limits.

EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 

Members of the EU have prioritised issues related to illicit arms-trafficking. In addition to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, agreed upon in 1998, which requires members to take issues such as human rights and regional stability into consideration when authorising arms transfers, the EU adopted the EU Programme of Action for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms in June 1997.

This programme commits EU members to the strengthening of national efforts to prevent and combat arms-trafficking, the provision of assistance to other countries affected by arms-trafficking, and co-operation among national authorities.⁴⁵ The EU programme is a political declaration and places no legal obligation on EU members to implement any of the suggested approaches. However, the EU programme is significant as it addresses the problem of illicit arms-trafficking within a broader context. It incorporates the need for capacity-building and long-term development, and recognises the need for disarmament measures in regions where weapons are abundant and for greater education within affected regions.⁴⁶

In December 1998, the EU adopted the Joint Action on Small Arms which commits EU members to the provision of resources, including financial and technical assistance, to countries in their efforts to combat illicit arms-trafficking. The strength of the Joint Action is that it recognises that, without assistance, efforts to combat trafficking will not succeed. It also prioritises the provision of this assistance. Through the joint action, the EU has to date been working with countries in Southern Africa, and has identified West Africa as another region for assistance.

In 1995, the Group of Eight⁴⁷ added firearms-trafficking to the list of issues on transnational crime which they identified for greater attention. A subgroup on arms-trafficking was formed (the Lyon Group) and law enforcement officials from the G8 countries have been looking at ways in which the issue of arms-trafficking can be addressed at intergovernmental level. At the G8 summit in Denver, Colorado in 1997, a set of priorities on arms-trafficking were adopted, which included:

an international instrument to combat arms-trafficking;

stronger import/export regimes for weapons transfers; and

the development of a standardised system for firearms identification.

In large part through the political support of the G8 members, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) process to draft a protocol on illicit firearms was started (see below). G8 countries have continued to support these global efforts, most recently in the Cologne communiqué issued in 1999, while maintaining the Lyon Group. The political endorsement of the UN process by the richest countries in the world and those which represent some of the largest arms exporters has been significant in the negotiations on the UN firearms protocol.

PROGRESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 

Several regions — such as South-East Asia, North-East Asia and the Middle East — have not yet undertaken specific initiatives to combat arms trafficking. At the beginning of 1998, the momentum shifted to the global arena. Approaches within the UN system have focused on the need to identify the magnitude of the problem and on finding means of reducing the availability of weapons. Efforts have largely centred on two aspects of the problem: the availability and misuse of military-style weapons, and the criminal use of firearms. There is a great deal of similarity between the two foci, especially where the illicit traffic in arms is concerned. The latter approach is leading to the creation of a legal instrument to prevent arms-trafficking in the form of negotiations on the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Material.⁴⁸

The Protocol represents the first global regime for all commercial transfers of firearms and ammunition, devised to prevent the illegal diversion of these weapons. Negotiations began in early 1999, within broader UN negotiations on a convention on transnational organised crime by the ECOSOC’s Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The goal for completion of both the umbrella treaty and the firearms protocol is October 2000, although the target date may possibly not be met.

Many of the Protocol’s main provisions mirror those found in the OAS Convention, including its strict focus on commercial transfers of arms and its exclusion of state-to-state transfers. Many provisions have been modified in order to gain global consensus.⁴⁹ While it is still a work in progress, the Protocol is expected to:

establish an international, legally binding definition of ‘illicit arms-trafficking’;⁵⁰



create common international standards for the export, import and in-transit movement of firearms, ammunition and their parts and components, including licencing and end-use certification;



improve international co-operation on commercial transfers of firearms;



regulate the activities of those engaged in commercial arms-brokering;



require record-keeping of arms transfers, potentially for a minimum of ten years;



establish a comprehensive system for marking firearms at manufacture and possibly at each subsequent point of entry into a new state; and



encourage widespread and systematic international information-sharing and co-operation to improve the identification and tracing of firearms.

In adopting this approach, those negotiating the Protocol have been willing, in some cases, to include issues that were omitted from the OAS Convention. Most importantly, provisions to register and license arms brokers are included in the current draft. In addition, as a supplement to the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, the Protocol will also benefit from provisions within the draft convention on combating money-laundering and corruption.⁵¹ These elements will make the Protocol the most far-reaching instrument available to combat illicit arms trafficking at the international level.

However, even this agreement does not cover the full spectrum of illicit arms-trafficking occurring around the world, and the Protocol has been criticised for not using its potential for a wider scope and broader objectives. Specifically, it has been suggested that the scope should encompass government-to-government transfers of firearms (including those for national security) in addition to commercial transactions. The rationale for the inclusion of these state-controlled weapons is that such arms are often diverted from state control into illicit markets through either criminal motivation or negligence.

A second area that should — and might be — included in the Protocol is a commitment by signatories to destroy illicit weapons that have been seized by security forces. South Africa has been a vocal proponent of the inclusion of such a destruction clause in the Protocol,⁵² but other countries have suggested more temperate language calling only on states to take adequate steps to prevent seized weapons from falling into private hands.⁵³

A third area of contention centres on provisions related to the marking of weapons. There is general agreement that firearms being sold commercially should be given a unique and indelible mark at the time of manufacture (although some governments resist even this fairly common practice). There is no consensus, however, that weapons should be marked at each place of import, or that weapons produced for military purposes should be marked at the time of manufacture. Retroactively marking unmarked firearms already stockpiled or in circulation would pose an even greater challenge.

Objections to this comprehensive approach to marking are technical, financial and political. On the former, the question is asked, logistically, how states would mark weapons at import and under whose authority (police, military, foreign ministry). Financially, the most onerous costs would be associated with marking already manufactured weapons and with marking arms at the point of import. Most challenging, however, are the political objections. Some national governments are either not convinced that marking will have a significant impact on reducing illicit arms-trafficking, or do not want routes and destinations of their arms exports to become known.⁵⁴

Clearly, significant challenges remain before the Protocol is completed and before enough states ratify it to ensure its implementation. However good the Protocol looks on paper would be a moot point without its implementation by as many states as possible. As already pointed out, arms traffickers are masterful at exploiting weak links, and without high common levels of detection and enforcement capability, arms-trafficking will continue to flourish.

A second relevant international effort is the forthcoming UN conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The first preparatory meeting for this event was held in February 2000, and the UN conference is scheduled to take place in mid-2001. Expectations have been high among those within and outside governments for the achievements of this conference. However, following the first preparatory meeting, during which Russian and Chinese officials, among others, voiced strong objection to the discussion of limits on state-authorised transfers, these expectations have been diminished. Reservations by a few governments — even ones that are major sources of small arms supply, like China and Russia — should not prevent states that are committed to prevent illicit arms-trafficking from finding a way to move the international momentum from beyond the rhetorical realm and into the practical.

PROGRESS AGAINST PROSPECTS  

In a few short years, governments around the world have begun to take concrete steps to limit the threats to security and stability posed by the unchecked proliferation of small arms. While the illegal arms trade represents only one element of the larger problem of reducing the supply of and demand for weapons, the billions spent on illegal weapons acquisitions that are used to prolong wars and destabilise societies must be effectively addressed. The progress that has been made within several regions thus far is significant, and with the conclusion of the UN Protocol, the legal and political framework to address the criminal aspects of the problem will be in place. The challenge will then be for countries to prioritise the implementation of these mechanisms and to assist one another in narrowing the space available wherein arms traffickers can operate.

NOTES 

This is a version of a chapter in L Lumpe (ed), Running guns: The global black market in small arms, Zed Books, London, forthcoming 2000.

For example, the US encouraged a retired military member, Sam Cummings, to purchase tons of surplus weapons and equipment, which he resold only with the approval of the US government. See chapter by T Naylor, The rise of the modern black market and the fall of supply-side control, in V Gamba (ed), Society under siege: Crime, violence and illegal weapons, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1997.



G O’Callaghan & K Joseph, The international response to the light weapons crisis: Lessons for the Commonwealth, in A F Musah & N Thompson, Over a barrel: Light weapons and human rights in the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, London/New Delhi, 1999, p. 304.



M Klare, The subterranean arms trade: Black-market sales, covert operations and ethnic warfare, in A Pierre (ed), Cascade of arms: Managing conventional weapons proliferation, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1997, p 47.



Thus efforts within the EU and the UN to shed more light on arms transfers have had the benefit of making legal sales more transparent and accountable and making it more evident which arms transfers fall outside these legal sales.



Illegal drug trafficking represents 8% of world trade, says UN report, Newsbriefs, August 1997,<www.ndsn.org>.



M Renner, Arms control orphans, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, January/February 1999, p 24.



The contract for the US $36 million worth of weapons included the supply of eight helicopters and helicopter gunships. See B Wood & J Peleman, The arms fixers: Controlling the brokers and shipping agents, PRIO/ BASIC/NISAT, Oslo, 1999, p 86.



Klare, op cit, p 51.



S Barber, SA a mecca for international criminals, says US report, Business Day, 2 March 1999.



Klare, op cit, p 51.



A F Musah, Small arms and conflict transformation in West Africa, in Musah & Thompson, op cit, p 121.



For more detail, see Naylor, op cit.



Ibid, p 237.



J McShane, Light weapons and international law enforcement, in J Boutwell & M Klare (eds), Light weapons and civil conflict, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 1999, p 180.



EU directive on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, 91/477/EEC.



For a recent study on this issue, see Financial havens, banking secrecy and money-laundering, United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter 34/35, United Nations, New York, 1998.



P Arlacchi, Attacking the profits of crime: Drugs, money and laundering, United Nations, New York, <www.odccp. org/speech_1998-06-10_1.html>.



International crime control strategy, US government, June 1998, chapter 2, p 3.



Financial Havens, op cit, p 9.



McShane, op cit, p 174.



S Meek, New democracies under the gun: Small arms in Southern Africa, in Musah & Thompson, op cit, p 166.



Concept developed by the Arms Management Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.



K McKenzie, Domestic gun control policy in 10 SADC countries, Gun Free South Africa, Johannesburg, September 1999, p 22.



Various UN General Assembly documents provide updates on states’ actions in this regard. See, in particular, Report of the group of governmental experts on small arms, UN Doc. A/54/258, 19 August 1999. This and other relevant UN documents are available on the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs’ website at <www.un.org/Depts/dda/ CAB/>.



L Nathan, draft paper presented to the BICC Expert Seminar on Smart Sanctions, Bonn, Germany, 21-23 November 1999.



In addition to more formal regional and international programmes, there are also extensive bilateral assistance programmes, especially on implementing export controls for countries of the former Soviet Union and East Europe. For detailed information on legislation being put in place, see the website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at <projects.sipri.se/expcon/expcon.htm>.



McShane, op cit, p 173.



Ratifications as of February 2000: Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru.



See also, O’Callaghan & Joseph, op cit, pp 307-309; S Meek, The Organisation of American States, in V Gamba (ed), Society under siege: Licit responses to illicit arms, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1998, pp 49-54; McShane, op cit, pp 176-177.



Available at <www.cicad.oas.org/en/legal_ development/legal-regulations-arms.htm>.



Organisation of American States, Consultative committee meets on hemispheric firearms convention, press release, 9 March 2000, <www.oas.org>.



O’Callaghan & Joseph, op cit, p 309.



A McLean & E Clegg (eds), Towards implementation of the Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Trafficking, Institute for Security Studies and Saferworld: Pretoria/London, 1999, pp 71-85.



Ibid, p. 114.



For more information on these initiatives, see V Gamba, Small arms in Southern Africa: Reflections on the extent of the problem and its potential management, ISS Monograph 42, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, November 1999; M Chachiua, Arms management programme: Operations Rachel 1996-1999, ISS Monograph 38, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, June 1999.



The text of the Moratorium, a related chronology, news and analysis are available on the NISAT website at <www.nisat.org/west%20africa/ african.htm>.



For an analysis of the evolution of the ECOWAS Moratorium, see J Smaldone, Mali and the West African light weapons moratorium, in Boutwell & Klare, op cit, pp 129-145.



Conversation between the author and Dr Ivor Richard Fung, director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Security in Africa in Lomé, Togo, August 1999.



UN News Centre, Workshop on arms register in Africa opens in Accra, press release AFR/175 DC/2661, 23 September 1999.



Information based on a presentation made by the director of PCASED, Ivor Richard Fung, to the seminar on Small Arms and the European Union, Helsinki, Finland, 8-10 October 1999.



UN News Centre, West African states adopt code of conduct on light weapons, launch regional arms register and database, press release AFR/199-DC/2675, 27 December 1999.



For the text of the ECOWAS Code of Conduct, see J Seck, West Africa Small Arms Moratorium: High-level consultations on the modalities for the implementation of PCASED, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Geneva and Lomé, 2000.



UN News Centre, 27 December 1999, op cit.



Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology, Public statement, Vienna, 3 December 1998, <www.wassenaar.org/docs/ press_4.html>.



S Meek, International initiatives on the control of weapons in Gamba, 1998, op cit, p 10.



O’Callaghan & Joseph, op cit, p 316.



The US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Japan and Russia.



The phrasing was originally ‘other related material’ as in the OAS Convention. However, during negotiations in October 1999, it was recommended that the phrasing change to mirror that of the relevant ECOSOC resolution, which reads ‘parts and components.’



Notably, the Protocol is unlikely to include explosives within its mandate, unlike the OAS Convention.



The precise wording of the definition is unlikely to be resolved until the Protocol is close to completion. Currently, the definition of illicit trafficking reads: "the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, ammunition and parts and components from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorise it." UN Doc. A/C.25/4/ Add.2/Rev.2, p 8.



See UN, Revised draft United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, UN Doc. A/AC.254/4/Rev.4.



UN, Contribution from the delegation of South Africa, UN Doc. A/AC.254/CRP.6, January 1999.



British American Security Information Council, Strengthening the UN Firearms Protocol: Recommendations BASIC, London, February 2000.



Ibid and International Alert, Developing the firearms protocol, paper circulated at the meeting of the ad hoc Committee of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials, Vienna, October 1999, <www. international-alert.org>.